:oIo: Pure nonsense fr the focking moron writer who doesn't noe the meaning of fair justice, and who obviously is blindly pro-Israel, pro-US, and anti-Iran for no obvious fair reason.
The double std of the US and IAEA favoring rouge nations like Israel is why the NPT continues 2b an object of mockery fer fledging nuclear countries like Iran. And even dat is simplifying the politics behind the US targeting of Iran and the condoning of the vicious atrocities against humans committed by Israel.
I can't believe tis trash article's even deemed fit fer publication. Focking Satanic Verses !!
ST Nov 15, 2010
commentary
Case for Israel to keep mum about N-bombs
It has shown restraint, while openness could trigger arms race
By William Choong, Senior Writer
IT IS the world's worst-kept secret. It is widely acknowledged that Israel, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), crossed the nuclear threshold sometime in the late 1960s as it faced a slew of Arab enemies across its borders.
There is growing pressure for Israel to abandon its stance of deliberate confusion over its nuclear status to join the ranks of recognised nuclear states. While the arguments sound convincing, in fact there is little real benefit in doing so.
Animut or the policy of nuclear opacity in Hebrew, took root around the 1960s. The United States had then badgered Israel about going public with its nuclear capabilities and joining the NPT.
In a secret meeting between then US President Richard Nixon and then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in 1969, however, a tacit agreement was reached: The US would tolerate Israel's nuclear capabilities and not ask it to join the NPT, as long as Israel did not reveal its capabilities.
So far, all American presidents, including Mr Barack Obama, have kept these implicit understandings. Animut has served Israel well - it has enjoyed the advantages of deterring potential enemies and suffered none of the costs attached to nuclear weapon possession, in particular, intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Recently, however, there has been a growing chorus for Israel to come clean. In September, Arab countries tabled a resolution at an IAEA meeting, expressing concern about Israel's nuclear assets, and called on Tel Aviv to join the NPT.
Last month, Dr Avner Cohen, the author of The Worst Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain With The Bomb, wrote in Foreign Affairs journal that Israel's nuclear opacity went against emerging nuclear norms and prevented Israel from becoming a 'responsible nuclear power'.
A loosening of opacity, he argued, would allow Israel to be a 'fuller partner' in the global non-proliferation regime, improve its image as a nuclear power and enhance Israel's 'democratic transparency at home by informing the Israeli public about the fateful decisions that are being made on its behalf regarding the bomb'.
Dr Cohen's argument is simple but powerful: Israel's nuclear arsenal is already a non-secret secret. Moreover, abandoning opacity could net gains for Tel Aviv by bolstering its deterrent against Iran. As Mr Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, put it, taking the bomb out of the basement would simply be a long overdue acknowledgement of reality.
That said, however, the loss of nuclear opacity is not without some costs. It might sound fashionable, but it is not feasible - for now.
For one thing, it is doubtful how such an abandonment would enhance Israel's nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis Iran. Thanks to websites such as the Federation of American Scientists and Wikipedia, anyone with some interest in Israel's nuclear weapons would have a pretty good sense of what its arsenal contains: between 75 and 400 nuclear warheads, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed submarines.
In 1986, Israel nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu gave the world the first glimpse into Israel's nuclear weapons programme, after he told London's Sunday Times about Tel Aviv's highly secretive nuclear reactor in Dimona. Twenty years later, then Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert piqued the interest of many when he ranked Israel among the world's nuclear powers.
Arguably, nuclear opacity has reduced pressure on other Middle East countries to go nuclear. Conversely, abandoning it could trigger a nuclear arms race.
Arguments that Israel would burnish its non-proliferation credentials by abandoning its nuclear opacity are spurious. Despite its opacity, Israel is already a responsible nuclear power. Dr Cohen himself notes Israel's participation in non-proliferation regimes such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Dr Cohen argues that global criticism of Israel might spill over to the nuclear domain, making Tel Aviv a 'nuclear-armed pariah state' in the same company as 'today's rogue Iranian regime and the old apartheid government of South Africa'.
This is unlikely. Unlike Iran, which has threatened Israel many times, Israel, due to its nuclear opacity policy, has never brandished its nuclear arsenal openly.
In fact, Dr George Perkovich, an analyst at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers the somewhat heretical suggestion that Israel's restrained management of its bombs could point a way forward towards abating nuclear dangers.
Recognised nuclear powers could show the world they are serious about disarmament by following Israel's example: putting nuclear bombs at the bottom of their arsenals, refraining from referring to them during crises and declining to pull rank because of them.
Most importantly, opacity about nuclear weapons creates what Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling calls the 'threat that leaves something to chance'.
Maintaining that one might retaliate, and possibly with nuclear weapons, rather than will retaliate, sows uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors. This puts any confrontation in the realm of 'chance', making them think twice before engaging in ploys that intensify the risks of a conflict.
In short, the argument for abandoning Israel's nuclear opacity might sound compelling, but the net benefits of doing so are probably negligible.
A better way, in the end, is for Israel to gradually chip away at the foundations of nuclear opacity, and accelerate its abandonment once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. In other words, when Iran finally takes its bomb out of the basement, Israel should do likewise.
[email protected]
The double std of the US and IAEA favoring rouge nations like Israel is why the NPT continues 2b an object of mockery fer fledging nuclear countries like Iran. And even dat is simplifying the politics behind the US targeting of Iran and the condoning of the vicious atrocities against humans committed by Israel.
I can't believe tis trash article's even deemed fit fer publication. Focking Satanic Verses !!
ST Nov 15, 2010
commentary
Case for Israel to keep mum about N-bombs
It has shown restraint, while openness could trigger arms race
By William Choong, Senior Writer
IT IS the world's worst-kept secret. It is widely acknowledged that Israel, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), crossed the nuclear threshold sometime in the late 1960s as it faced a slew of Arab enemies across its borders.
There is growing pressure for Israel to abandon its stance of deliberate confusion over its nuclear status to join the ranks of recognised nuclear states. While the arguments sound convincing, in fact there is little real benefit in doing so.
Animut or the policy of nuclear opacity in Hebrew, took root around the 1960s. The United States had then badgered Israel about going public with its nuclear capabilities and joining the NPT.
In a secret meeting between then US President Richard Nixon and then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in 1969, however, a tacit agreement was reached: The US would tolerate Israel's nuclear capabilities and not ask it to join the NPT, as long as Israel did not reveal its capabilities.
So far, all American presidents, including Mr Barack Obama, have kept these implicit understandings. Animut has served Israel well - it has enjoyed the advantages of deterring potential enemies and suffered none of the costs attached to nuclear weapon possession, in particular, intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Recently, however, there has been a growing chorus for Israel to come clean. In September, Arab countries tabled a resolution at an IAEA meeting, expressing concern about Israel's nuclear assets, and called on Tel Aviv to join the NPT.
Last month, Dr Avner Cohen, the author of The Worst Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain With The Bomb, wrote in Foreign Affairs journal that Israel's nuclear opacity went against emerging nuclear norms and prevented Israel from becoming a 'responsible nuclear power'.
A loosening of opacity, he argued, would allow Israel to be a 'fuller partner' in the global non-proliferation regime, improve its image as a nuclear power and enhance Israel's 'democratic transparency at home by informing the Israeli public about the fateful decisions that are being made on its behalf regarding the bomb'.
Dr Cohen's argument is simple but powerful: Israel's nuclear arsenal is already a non-secret secret. Moreover, abandoning opacity could net gains for Tel Aviv by bolstering its deterrent against Iran. As Mr Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, put it, taking the bomb out of the basement would simply be a long overdue acknowledgement of reality.
That said, however, the loss of nuclear opacity is not without some costs. It might sound fashionable, but it is not feasible - for now.
For one thing, it is doubtful how such an abandonment would enhance Israel's nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis Iran. Thanks to websites such as the Federation of American Scientists and Wikipedia, anyone with some interest in Israel's nuclear weapons would have a pretty good sense of what its arsenal contains: between 75 and 400 nuclear warheads, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed submarines.
In 1986, Israel nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu gave the world the first glimpse into Israel's nuclear weapons programme, after he told London's Sunday Times about Tel Aviv's highly secretive nuclear reactor in Dimona. Twenty years later, then Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert piqued the interest of many when he ranked Israel among the world's nuclear powers.
Arguably, nuclear opacity has reduced pressure on other Middle East countries to go nuclear. Conversely, abandoning it could trigger a nuclear arms race.
Arguments that Israel would burnish its non-proliferation credentials by abandoning its nuclear opacity are spurious. Despite its opacity, Israel is already a responsible nuclear power. Dr Cohen himself notes Israel's participation in non-proliferation regimes such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Dr Cohen argues that global criticism of Israel might spill over to the nuclear domain, making Tel Aviv a 'nuclear-armed pariah state' in the same company as 'today's rogue Iranian regime and the old apartheid government of South Africa'.
This is unlikely. Unlike Iran, which has threatened Israel many times, Israel, due to its nuclear opacity policy, has never brandished its nuclear arsenal openly.
In fact, Dr George Perkovich, an analyst at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers the somewhat heretical suggestion that Israel's restrained management of its bombs could point a way forward towards abating nuclear dangers.
Recognised nuclear powers could show the world they are serious about disarmament by following Israel's example: putting nuclear bombs at the bottom of their arsenals, refraining from referring to them during crises and declining to pull rank because of them.
Most importantly, opacity about nuclear weapons creates what Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling calls the 'threat that leaves something to chance'.
Maintaining that one might retaliate, and possibly with nuclear weapons, rather than will retaliate, sows uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors. This puts any confrontation in the realm of 'chance', making them think twice before engaging in ploys that intensify the risks of a conflict.
In short, the argument for abandoning Israel's nuclear opacity might sound compelling, but the net benefits of doing so are probably negligible.
A better way, in the end, is for Israel to gradually chip away at the foundations of nuclear opacity, and accelerate its abandonment once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. In other words, when Iran finally takes its bomb out of the basement, Israel should do likewise.
[email protected]
