Jamus discusses HDB housing.
2 h ·
Earlier this month, Parliament debated a motion on whether HDB housing was affordable and accessible. The
#workersparty ended up voting against affirming that this was the case, proposing instead that the government intensify its efforts to meet these goals. This isn’t to say that we don’t recognize the remarkable public housing success that HDB has accomplished since independence, nor that four-fifths of the population continue to choose to reside in HDB. But it’s misleading to say that just because we keep buying HDB flats, it implies that it must be affordable. After all, what other options are there? If we price water at $10 a bottle, thirsty concertgoers will still buy, but it doesn’t mean that they’re happy.
The issue of expensive flats—besides affecting our wallets—is that it also messes with our retirement. This stems from the fact that most Singaporeans use their CPF to pay for their HDB mortgages. In principle, this isn’t a bad thing; it allows us to deploy some of our forced saving into another asset, which could offer higher returns. It also allows us to keep more of our take-home pay, cos living in Singapore ain’t cheap. The problem is that it now conflates two differing objectives: high prices mean higher returns for retirement (good), but it also means that it’s harder for couples starting out to get a roof over their heads without breaking the bank (bad).
In theory, this shouldn’t be happening. Assets that expire worthless after 99 years must gradually decrease in value, year after year (it doesn’t follow a straight line, due to the mathematics of interest rates). This relationship known colloquially as “Bala’s Curve.” So why do HDB prices even go up? One reason is simply that they are underpriced relative to the market (due to taxpayer-funded grants). Another is that they will rise if we allow for inflation in rents over time. And what have inflation and rental rates have been recently? No prizes for guessing what increases of more than 20 percent last year—and an anticipated 10-15 percent this year—might do to resale prices (and, by extension, BTO valuations, which take reference from resale) (As an aside, notice that this very simple tweak in our assumptions also generates the sharp drop in valuations from around year 60 or so of the lease, something that real estate agents will also confirm).
The way the government has tried to square this circle is to offer more grants for first- and second-time buyers, to help them get on the housing ladder (once you’re on, even if prices are high, you can sell high and buy high, so it’s more palatable). So we have a game of musical chairs. If you can see your flat before the inevitable collapse in house prices, good for you, you’ll retire comfortably. But the one carrying the bag could be family that just needed the extra space and so they upgraded.
Incidentally, the current approach also does a number of government finances. Over time, inflated house prices mean higher grants to make up the difference. Where does this money come from? In part, from interest from our reserves. So on one hand, we’re propping up high land valuations—arguing that any other approach amounts to a raid in the reserves—but on the other, we’re tapping more on revenues, to fund the larger grants. It’s robbing Ah Seng to pay Ah Huat.
There is another way. The
#workersparty believes that housing should be a rational multiple of the annual income of new homeowners, closer to 3 times (it’s currently more like 4 for BTOs, and 5 for resale). More than that, things get quickly unaffordable. So what to do? Well, the key component driving escalating HDB prices is land. This has value, and should be valued. But when we allow markets to fully determine what land is worth, it omits intangibles, like the value of making sure every Singaporean has a roof over the head. It also omits the value of leisure time we get to spend with our kids, because we’re all pulling OT in order to afford our downpayments. And of course, asset markets are prone to bubbles, which more than a few believe is the case for real estate here.
If the government sets the parameters for the Chief Valuer to price public housing as a fair multiple of incomes, we can then net out construction costs, builder profit, etc to derive a lower land valuation. Less will go into reserves, but we’ll also need to take less out.
What about what this means for those who bought HDB under the current terms? Well, asset prices go up and down. Some folks may go underwater—their stake in the place ends up being worth less than what they owe—but as long as they stay put, this is inconsequential. For others, who wish to sell for various reasons, they’ll have to stomach a loss. But recall, they’ll also be in a cheaper market when they buy their next place. And the government can step in buy out leases, so long as most of the loan has been repaid.
That’s the essence of our universal lease buyback scheme, which will guarantee those who need to cash out at least a reasonable price. Sure, they’ll give up a windfall, but at least they’ll not be completely left out to dry. To avoid overbuilding in the short run while we’re waiting for more supply to enter the market via lease buybacks, we can operate an expanded public rental scheme, with larger format apartments that can be rented for a maximum of 10 years.
These transition measures will help reset house prices, to make their levels more sustainable. This is much better than waiting for the market to self-correct, which may happen via a financial crisis (think Japan in 1992, or the U.S. in 2007). In the longer run, so long as incomes keep rising, the correction will eventually get washed out. Just as important, the alternative will also avoid a new bubble, that will eventually need to be corrected down the road.
#makingyourvotecount