SG in ménage à trois with US and China for next 30 years

[LITTLEREDDOT]

How will Singapore cope as the vice of US-China rivalry tightens?​

Beyond repeating the point that we don’t want to be forced to choose, there are steps – external and internal – that Singapore can take to ease the pressure from the two superpowers.​

Joseph Chinyong Liow

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as they are by anything else. PHOTO: REUTERS

OCT 13, 2023

The bilateral relationship between the two largest economies in the world is not in a good place, and has not been so for many years now.
If anything, the situation remains brittle, and further deterioration can be easily triggered by another “balloon incident”, another round of tariffs and sanctions, an incident at sea, or a visit involving Taiwan. For us in South-east Asia, the proverbial question of “choice” hangs like the Sword of Damocles over our region.
We have come a long way from Jan 13, 2009, when the former national security adviser in the Carter administration, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed that the United States and China should work together to tackle a laundry list of problems afflicting the world. His proposal quickly morphed into the idea of a G-2.
Fast-forward to the present. We know that the G-2 failed to materialise in any substantive way. What set off this tailspin?

Power transition​

The Power Transition Theory is probably the most popular in terms of efforts to explain what is going on in US-China relations today.
Basically, this theory proposes that when an ascendant state rises to the point of equivalence of power to the dominant state in the international system, and is dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of war is very high because the rising power will want to challenge and displace the incumbent, and the incumbent will not want to cede dominance.
It is clear in today’s context who is the ascendant power, and who is the incumbent power.

Tensions are further heightened by what is called the Security Dilemma. Measures taken by a state to increase its own security tend to heighten the sense of insecurity of other states, leading them to take their own measures to feel more secure, which in turn heightens the insecurities of the first state.
Needless to say, the dynamic also plays out in the Asia-Pacific, where China’s assertiveness has made smaller regional states less secure, resulting in their efforts to strengthen ties with the US. This has in turn made China feel less secure as Beijing accuses the US of trying to contain it. We also see something of this dynamic in the Taiwan Strait.
And today, interactions between the two great powers have also taken on a decidedly ideological flavour, with President Joe Biden casting US-China rivalry as democracy versus autocracy.

Domestic politics​

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as it is by anything else. That American society is deeply polarised along political lines today is obvious to all. There is, however, one exception – China policy, where both parties are in lockstep on the need to take a hard line. Yet, at the same time, both are also tripping over each other to demonstrate how hawkish they can be while criticising the other party for being weak on China. We can expect this to ramp up as elections loom.
As for China, the fact that America persistently calls it out over Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and, most provocative of all in Beijing’s view, Taiwan, projects US-China rivalry onto Chinese domestic politics. The downturn in US-China relations feeds into a very nationalistic narrative that casts the United States as being dead-set on preventing the Chinese Dream from becoming reality.

Something also needs to be said about the role of leaders. We have to ask how much of a role did Donald Trump, the iconoclastic former president of the US, or Mr Xi Jinping, the most titled leader in the history of modern China, play in escalating strategic competition?
As a princeling, Mr Xi considers himself the legitimate heir of the Communist Party of China’s “mandate of heaven” established by Mao Zedong. As an ideologue, he seems very convinced that he knows what is best for his party and his country. Therein lies the foundation of that singular focus that has driven him to reshape China today as a strong and decisive leader leading in challenging times.

Options for Singapore​

So, where does all this leave Singapore, as a small country caught up in the waves of great power rivalry?
While Singapore would much prefer not to be placed in a position where it has to choose sides, and it would indeed be wise to avoid being entangled in the US-China rivalry, the harsh reality is that, unless the geopolitical climate changes, we will increasingly find ourselves squeezed.
So, how do we prepare for this growing pressure?
First, both the US and China are important to Singapore, so we have to maintain good relations with both, and avoid casting US-China competition in binary terms. In fact, we should turn the issue on its head: Perhaps what we should also be asking is how do we make them choose us?
The answer to that question lies in our value proposition to them. As a small country whose relevance to the international community is not at all self-evident, and that is heavily dependent on economic linkages with the rest of the world, not least the major economies of the US and China, it behoves us to make ourselves relevant to their strategic, economic and commercial interests, so that neither would want to make us choose.
How do we do that? This leads to my second point. In order to figure out our value proposition for them, we need to understand them better, to understand what makes them tick.
American and Chinese society, politics and decision-making have undergone profound changes in recent years. Once an ardent advocate of economic liberalism and free markets, the US has now embarked on industrial policy. China, too, today looks very different compared with the one that so captivated the world when it hosted the Olympics in 2008.
Better understanding them means more than just understanding how policies are made in Washington DC or Beijing. It is in the nature of being a big power that they don’t put in too much effort and attention learning about small countries, but as a small country, we cannot afford that luxury. We have no choice but to invest time, effort and resources to better understand the big powers around us.
We also need to understand that even if great powers might genuinely not want to foist a choice on small states, make no mistake, they pay close attention to the choices made, and right or wrong, they will draw conclusions from them.
In recent years, American friends (as well as friends from countries from the region that are allies of the US) would frequently ask why Singapore was gravitating towards China. At the same time, Chinese friends would ask why Singapore is so emphatic in our support for a US presence in the region. It is precisely because Singapore has developed a strong international reputation for punching above our weight that how we manage our relations with the US and China in this present climate of growing geopolitical rivalry is of great interest to the rest of the world, not least, to the US and China themselves.

Singapore can of course boldly proclaim that what we will choose is not sides but what’s in our national interest, but the situation has become very complex.
Take Singapore’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example. The Singapore Government has made its position very clear, and has gone to great lengths to explain it. Yet there are still a considerable number of Singaporeans who persist in – in fact, insist on – viewing Singapore’s position on the Ukraine war through US-China lenses, even though our opposition to the invasion has nothing to do with our relationship with Washington or Beijing.
Another example is how some citizens understand and process narratives emanating from some external powers that are designed to appeal to diasporic communities. Herein lies a curious but disconcerting twist that is manifested in two ways. First, it speaks to the sophisticated ways in which some external powers may foist choice without obviously saying or doing so, through the narratives they propagate. And second, it poses the disturbing question of whether it is external powers that are forcing us to “choose sides” as it were, or our own population.
This means that our leaders and policymakers will need to explain, educate, explain, educate, and then explain some more, why our foreign policy imperatives and priorities are what they are.
Finally, rather than obsess reactively over choice, we should be forward leaning and proactive to stay ahead of the geopolitical curve.
A forward-leaning diplomatic posture must also involve reinforcing old partnerships and seeking out new ones with other regional powers and with neighbours in Asean, who themselves are trying to avoid becoming entangled in the US-China rivalry. This creates maximum room for autonomy and manoeuvre, which is vital for small states. Indeed, as powerful as the US and China are, they are not the only two countries that count.
There should be no question that the US and China are locked in intense strategic competition that grows sharper by the day.
At the risk of simplifying very complex dynamics, perhaps the definitive questions for the great powers themselves, at the end of the day, are really these. For the US, is it prepared to accept that China is a global power, and to accommodate it? And for China, is it prepared to acknowledge the US is and will remain a major player with deep and legitimate interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and to accept it? In that respect, both are likely prepared to coexist, but at this point, the problem seems to be that both want to do it on terms that are advantageous to them.
All this is to say that while bilateral relations between the two great powers are not in a good place at present, further deterioration can be tempered, and competition managed, if both parties are prepared to turn away from zero-sum calculations.
And by way of a final observation, let me say this. It is not easy to find many countries that have the scope and depth of relations with both the US and China that Singapore has. So, in that sense, we are in a somewhat unique position. And because of this, while we must certainly be realistic about what we think we can do vis-a-vis the two great powers, I also believe that we can do more than we think.

• Joseph Chinyong Liow is Tan Kah Kee chair in comparative and international politics and dean of the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University. These are edited excerpts from the first IPS-Nathan Lecture he delivered on Tuesday.

 

[k1976]

S'pore should prepare for up to 30 years of US-China rivalry: George Yeo​

Former foreign minister George Yeo suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity. ST PHOTO: FELINE LIM

Justin Ong
Political Correspondent
JAN 11, 2022


SINGAPORE - Singapore should prepare for "easily" up to 30 years of competition between the United States and China, which could take the form of skirmishes off the sea or proxy wars, said former foreign minister George Yeo on Tuesday (Jan 11).
To avoid being caught in between and to maintain sovereignty, he suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity - one where being Singaporean means being "bigger" than just a nationality.
Mr Yeo, who is currently a visiting scholar at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, was speaking as a panellist at a curtain-raiser for the annual Singapore Perspectives conference organised by the Institute of Policy Studies think-tank.
This year's event, with the theme "City", comprises seven virtual forums on Jan 13 and 17, and a physical conference on Jan 24.
Asked by moderator and ambassador-at-large Chan Heng Chee if he saw Singapore being among the great cities in the region and the world in the next two decades or so, Mr Yeo said that if the Republic can position itself well in a flourishing Asia, its prospects would be bright.
"There's no guarantee because we're in competition with others. There's always the possibility that we may make bad mistakes," he added.
"For example, the current tension between the US and China will mark this period of history and it will go on for years to come… sometimes high tension, sometimes low tension."

Mr Yeo said that if Singapore remains just a city-state, it would find itself frequently between a rock and a hard place.
Singapore thus needs to organically "reroot" itself in the region and become a capital city of Asean, he added, noting Singapore's links to other members of the 10-nation bloc through their sizeable communities here.
Working through Asean, Singapore can better navigate the big powers - not by taking sides, but by leaning "a little to the other side" in the event anyone pushes Singapore too hard.


Mr Yeo said Singapore's leaders must have the foresight to steer the nation away from potential conflict and danger.
"We are part of many networks - the American network, the Chinese network, the Indian network. And every network has to capture us, naturally, so we have to be careful," he cautioned. "We are friendly to everybody, but we are autonomous."
Also taking part in the in-person panel discussion was former chief city planner Liu Thai Ker, though their audience was an online one. Viewers could submit questions - one of which was how Singapore could thrive amid conflicting spheres of influence between China and the US.


Mr Yeo said the challenge for the country - where about three-quarters of the population identify as ethnically Chinese - was not outside but "inside".
"Who are we as Singaporeans?" he asked. "Is Singapore just a facility, a convention centre, a good hotel, a restaurant - or is it something more? Does it stand for values which others are happy to associate with?"
Mr Yeo added: "Singapore is special because our different communities retain their ancestral cultures… and we encourage them to be proud of their ancestral cultures. Our diversity is not based upon everybody curbing themselves to become Singaporean, but everybody being bigger in accepting others who are not like themselves.
"If we can make this happen - that to be Singaporean is to be bigger than what you were when you were in China or India or Indonesia or Thailand… then to be a Singaporean is to become bigger."
Mr Yeo said this, and questions around how Singaporeans relate to one another, was something to think deeply about.
"The more comfortable we are with our own identity, the more open we'll be," he said. "If I know who I am, I can accept you for who you are… So identity is important, and Singapore's identity is complicated because it is made up of constituent identities."

No worries, we are 万福金安with good hands around, he will fix all problems de

 

[k1976]

How will Singapore cope as the vice of US-China rivalry tightens?​

Beyond repeating the point that we don’t want to be forced to choose, there are steps – external and internal – that Singapore can take to ease the pressure from the two superpowers.​

Joseph Chinyong Liow

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as they are by anything else. PHOTO: REUTERS

OCT 13, 2023

The bilateral relationship between the two largest economies in the world is not in a good place, and has not been so for many years now.
If anything, the situation remains brittle, and further deterioration can be easily triggered by another “balloon incident”, another round of tariffs and sanctions, an incident at sea, or a visit involving Taiwan. For us in South-east Asia, the proverbial question of “choice” hangs like the Sword of Damocles over our region.
We have come a long way from Jan 13, 2009, when the former national security adviser in the Carter administration, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed that the United States and China should work together to tackle a laundry list of problems afflicting the world. His proposal quickly morphed into the idea of a G-2.
Fast-forward to the present. We know that the G-2 failed to materialise in any substantive way. What set off this tailspin?

Power transition​

The Power Transition Theory is probably the most popular in terms of efforts to explain what is going on in US-China relations today.
Basically, this theory proposes that when an ascendant state rises to the point of equivalence of power to the dominant state in the international system, and is dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of war is very high because the rising power will want to challenge and displace the incumbent, and the incumbent will not want to cede dominance.
It is clear in today’s context who is the ascendant power, and who is the incumbent power.

Tensions are further heightened by what is called the Security Dilemma. Measures taken by a state to increase its own security tend to heighten the sense of insecurity of other states, leading them to take their own measures to feel more secure, which in turn heightens the insecurities of the first state.
Needless to say, the dynamic also plays out in the Asia-Pacific, where China’s assertiveness has made smaller regional states less secure, resulting in their efforts to strengthen ties with the US. This has in turn made China feel less secure as Beijing accuses the US of trying to contain it. We also see something of this dynamic in the Taiwan Strait.
And today, interactions between the two great powers have also taken on a decidedly ideological flavour, with President Joe Biden casting US-China rivalry as democracy versus autocracy.

Domestic politics​

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as it is by anything else. That American society is deeply polarised along political lines today is obvious to all. There is, however, one exception – China policy, where both parties are in lockstep on the need to take a hard line. Yet, at the same time, both are also tripping over each other to demonstrate how hawkish they can be while criticising the other party for being weak on China. We can expect this to ramp up as elections loom.
As for China, the fact that America persistently calls it out over Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and, most provocative of all in Beijing’s view, Taiwan, projects US-China rivalry onto Chinese domestic politics. The downturn in US-China relations feeds into a very nationalistic narrative that casts the United States as being dead-set on preventing the Chinese Dream from becoming reality.

Something also needs to be said about the role of leaders. We have to ask how much of a role did Donald Trump, the iconoclastic former president of the US, or Mr Xi Jinping, the most titled leader in the history of modern China, play in escalating strategic competition?
As a princeling, Mr Xi considers himself the legitimate heir of the Communist Party of China’s “mandate of heaven” established by Mao Zedong. As an ideologue, he seems very convinced that he knows what is best for his party and his country. Therein lies the foundation of that singular focus that has driven him to reshape China today as a strong and decisive leader leading in challenging times.

Options for Singapore​

So, where does all this leave Singapore, as a small country caught up in the waves of great power rivalry?
While Singapore would much prefer not to be placed in a position where it has to choose sides, and it would indeed be wise to avoid being entangled in the US-China rivalry, the harsh reality is that, unless the geopolitical climate changes, we will increasingly find ourselves squeezed.
So, how do we prepare for this growing pressure?
First, both the US and China are important to Singapore, so we have to maintain good relations with both, and avoid casting US-China competition in binary terms. In fact, we should turn the issue on its head: Perhaps what we should also be asking is how do we make them choose us?
The answer to that question lies in our value proposition to them. As a small country whose relevance to the international community is not at all self-evident, and that is heavily dependent on economic linkages with the rest of the world, not least the major economies of the US and China, it behoves us to make ourselves relevant to their strategic, economic and commercial interests, so that neither would want to make us choose.
How do we do that? This leads to my second point. In order to figure out our value proposition for them, we need to understand them better, to understand what makes them tick.
American and Chinese society, politics and decision-making have undergone profound changes in recent years. Once an ardent advocate of economic liberalism and free markets, the US has now embarked on industrial policy. China, too, today looks very different compared with the one that so captivated the world when it hosted the Olympics in 2008.
Better understanding them means more than just understanding how policies are made in Washington DC or Beijing. It is in the nature of being a big power that they don’t put in too much effort and attention learning about small countries, but as a small country, we cannot afford that luxury. We have no choice but to invest time, effort and resources to better understand the big powers around us.
We also need to understand that even if great powers might genuinely not want to foist a choice on small states, make no mistake, they pay close attention to the choices made, and right or wrong, they will draw conclusions from them.
In recent years, American friends (as well as friends from countries from the region that are allies of the US) would frequently ask why Singapore was gravitating towards China. At the same time, Chinese friends would ask why Singapore is so emphatic in our support for a US presence in the region. It is precisely because Singapore has developed a strong international reputation for punching above our weight that how we manage our relations with the US and China in this present climate of growing geopolitical rivalry is of great interest to the rest of the world, not least, to the US and China themselves.

Singapore can of course boldly proclaim that what we will choose is not sides but what’s in our national interest, but the situation has become very complex.
Take Singapore’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example. The Singapore Government has made its position very clear, and has gone to great lengths to explain it. Yet there are still a considerable number of Singaporeans who persist in – in fact, insist on – viewing Singapore’s position on the Ukraine war through US-China lenses, even though our opposition to the invasion has nothing to do with our relationship with Washington or Beijing.
Another example is how some citizens understand and process narratives emanating from some external powers that are designed to appeal to diasporic communities. Herein lies a curious but disconcerting twist that is manifested in two ways. First, it speaks to the sophisticated ways in which some external powers may foist choice without obviously saying or doing so, through the narratives they propagate. And second, it poses the disturbing question of whether it is external powers that are forcing us to “choose sides” as it were, or our own population.
This means that our leaders and policymakers will need to explain, educate, explain, educate, and then explain some more, why our foreign policy imperatives and priorities are what they are.
Finally, rather than obsess reactively over choice, we should be forward leaning and proactive to stay ahead of the geopolitical curve.
A forward-leaning diplomatic posture must also involve reinforcing old partnerships and seeking out new ones with other regional powers and with neighbours in Asean, who themselves are trying to avoid becoming entangled in the US-China rivalry. This creates maximum room for autonomy and manoeuvre, which is vital for small states. Indeed, as powerful as the US and China are, they are not the only two countries that count.
There should be no question that the US and China are locked in intense strategic competition that grows sharper by the day.
At the risk of simplifying very complex dynamics, perhaps the definitive questions for the great powers themselves, at the end of the day, are really these. For the US, is it prepared to accept that China is a global power, and to accommodate it? And for China, is it prepared to acknowledge the US is and will remain a major player with deep and legitimate interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and to accept it? In that respect, both are likely prepared to coexist, but at this point, the problem seems to be that both want to do it on terms that are advantageous to them.
All this is to say that while bilateral relations between the two great powers are not in a good place at present, further deterioration can be tempered, and competition managed, if both parties are prepared to turn away from zero-sum calculations.
And by way of a final observation, let me say this. It is not easy to find many countries that have the scope and depth of relations with both the US and China that Singapore has. So, in that sense, we are in a somewhat unique position. And because of this, while we must certainly be realistic about what we think we can do vis-a-vis the two great powers, I also believe that we can do more than we think.

• Joseph Chinyong Liow is Tan Kah Kee chair in comparative and international politics and dean of the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University. These are edited excerpts from the first IPS-Nathan Lecture he delivered on Tuesday.

Really way to cope...is to diam diam...we are always a Price taker mah, leemember?

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

US and China must remain in close touch, PM Lee says, especially in view of hot-spot events in 2024​

US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the Apec forum on Nov 15, seeking to reverse their deteriorating ties in their first in-person meeting in over a year. PHOTO: REUTERS

Bhagyashree Garekar

NOV 19, 2023

SAN FRANCISCO – Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong says the Biden-Xi meeting this week was an important step in keeping ties between the world’s two major powers more stable, but cautions that close contact at all levels including the highest must continue, especially in view of hot-spot events in 2024.
These include elections in the United States and Asia. Taiwan – a tinderbox in the relationship between China and the US – is two months away from holding its presidential polls, on Jan 13.
“There will be issues which will arise... various hot spots (from) which there can be developments. If they are in contact, I think you have a better chance of keeping things on an even keel,” he said.
In this unpredictable world, Singapore must continue to count on its wits to make a living for itself, he added.
US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping huddled for four hours on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum on Nov 15, seeking to reverse their deteriorating ties in their first in-person meeting in a year.
But while it was an important step, “I do not think China-US relations are amenable to quick fixes”, said PM Lee, sharing his assessment of the meeting during a wrap-up interview with the Singapore media on Nov 17, at the end of his six-day working visit to the US.
A key outcome of the Biden-Xi meeting was their decision to restore military lines of communication, disrupted by then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022.

Mr Biden and Mr Xi also agreed to address the flow of fentanyl precursors from China, which are fuelling the US opioid crisis, and they also discussed new commitments on climate change. Their mutual distrust lingers, however.
“These are deep differences in perspectives, in views and interests, in philosophies. It is also a contest for influence for a spot in the sun in the world,” said PM Lee.
The imperative for their meeting was clear, but it did not necessarily herald a return to the good old days, PM Lee added.


“They do need to work together because there are many problems which cannot be solved without both America and China participating together. And so, the two sides need to talk, in order to manage the differences, to be able to cooperate where they need to cooperate.
“The meeting was an important step in this direction,” he said.
But he cautioned: “It does not mean that things will now get better and better.”
PM Lee said: “I hope things can now begin to stabilise, and the two countries can continue to remain in close touch and at many levels.”
He noted that this would create stability, even if some tumult were to follow.
“Not everything which happens is anticipated, predictable,” he said, pointing out the probability of new situations looming.
“They have to stay in close touch with one another. There will be issues which will arise,” he said.


Besides the Taiwan election, Americans will also be heading to the polls. Mr Biden is seeking a second term and relations can quickly turn testy in view of harsh anti-China rhetoric that is frequently a part of American presidential campaigns.
China has carried out military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait, and many analysts in Washington claim there could be a potential invasion in the coming years of the self-governed island that Beijing seeks to unify with the mainland.
Mr Biden has signalled strong support for Taiwan, and on a few occasions said the US would defend it militarily if it were attacked, although his aides insisted there has been no change to the strategic ambiguity the US government maintains over its ties with Taipei.
Against this backdrop, the first in-person meeting in a year between Mr Biden and Mr Xi was a chance to offer assurances and prevent a dangerous escalation.
For Singapore, better vibes between its two most important partners hold promise, but the situation also means contending with uncertainties that have not ended.
“In this... open, less predictable, less multilateral environment, we have no choice but to say we continue to depend on free trade, depend on multilateralism, to work with other countries whom we can cooperate with, in order that we can make a living for ourselves,” PM Lee said.
In other words, it will be business as usual for the Republic, which must protect itself against shocks beyond its borders by doing business with multiple trading partners that may not be friendly with one another.
“That means you have got to export to America, you have got to attract investments from the US.
“You have got to do the same with China, with Asean, with India, and be partners with all of them, even though they may not all be partners with one another,” PM Lee said.
“And that is what we have been doing and that is one of the things which I have been doing on this trip here in San Francisco.”

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

When push comes to shove, China edges out US as S-E Asia’s preferred superpower: ISEAS survey​

Among the 1,994 respondents polled across the 10 Asean nations, 50.5 per cent indicated China as their preferred choice. PHOTO ILLUSTRATION: PIXABAY

Michelle Ng
Correspondent

APR 02, 2024

SINGAPORE China edges out the United States as South-east Asia’s preferred superpower by a narrow margin, if countries in the region were forced to choose between the two major powers, a survey has found.
The findings, published in the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State Of South-east Asia 2024 report on April 2, indicated a notable shift in sentiments among respondents from the region, who had leaned towards the US in the last four surveys.
Among the 1,994 respondents polled across the 10 Asean nations, 50.5 per cent indicated China as their preferred choice, while 49.5 per cent selected the US, when asked a hypothetical question on which country the region should choose if it was forced to align itself with either.
In the 2023 survey, only 38.9 per cent of respondents picked China, with 61.1 per cent opting for the US.
The 2024 survey was conducted online from Jan 3 to Feb 23, and polled respondents from academia, think-tanks, research groups, businesses, civil society, the media and regional or international organisations, as well as governments. Eligibility criteria were tightened in this edition and respondents were screened on various criteria such as nationality, age, affiliation, education, general knowledge of Asean and level of interest in current affairs.
Respondents could take the survey in one of six language options: English, Bahasa Indonesia, Burmese, Khmer, Thai and Vietnamese.
First conducted in 2019, the annual survey aims to present a snapshot of the prevailing attitudes among people in a position to inform or influence policy on regional issues.


In the 2024 survey, China continues to be seen as the most influential economic power in South-east Asia, followed by Asean and the US. China was perceived as the most influential political and strategic power in the region, followed by the US.
The Asean nations’ perception of the bloc’s political and strategic influence is also on the rise, according to the survey.


Despite the positive perceptions about China, concerns about its growing regional political and strategic influence persist, with 73.5 per cent of respondents expressing unease, up from 68.5 per cent in 2023.


Confidence in the US has also waned, with nearly 60 per cent of respondents concerned about its growing strategic and political influence in the region, up from over 40 per cent in 2023.
The waning confidence in the US could be attributed partly to the escalating rivalry between China and the US, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute said in the report.
Although most respondents were worried about the US’ growing influence, there were exceptions, including those in the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, who perceived US influence more positively.
In a webinar on April 2 organised by the institute to discuss the findings, Ms Bonnie Glaser, managing director of US think-tank German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific programme, noted that the results, which are sometimes contradictory, show the complexity of issues Asean faces.
Ms Glaser said that the slight shift towards China by Asean nations if they had to choose between China and the US could be due to the make-up of the respondents. She noted that unlike the 2023 poll, the 2024 survey had a higher proportion of private-sector or business-affiliated respondents, who might place more emphasis on China’s growing power.
In the 2024 survey, respondents affiliated with the private sector comprised 33.7 per cent of the total, increasing from 24.7 per cent in the 2023 poll. Conversely, respondents from academia, think-tanks or research institutions dropped to 23.6 per cent in the 2024 survey, down from 34.8 per cent in 2023.
Professor Danny Quah, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, cautioned that there is no need to “read too much” into China’s 1 percentage point lead over the US as the results are more indicative than prescriptive.
He said the underlying data shows more of a seesaw pattern rather than a direct trend leaning towards China. “By focusing on who crosses the 50 per cent mark, we lose sight of that,” he noted.
Since the hypothetical question of which country the region would choose if it was forced to align itself with either was added to the 2020 edition of the survey, the proportion of respondents picking either China or the US has fluctuated over the years.
For instance, 46.4 per cent of respondents picked China in 2020, and the proportion dropped to 38.5 per cent in 2021. It rose to 43 per cent in 2022, and dropped to 38.9 per cent in 2023, before rising to 50.5 per cent in this year’s survey.
Prof Quah said: “We need to distinguish statements about China and the concerns about the degree of influence, which are extremely high.
“The fact that China is acknowledged as most influential does not mean acceptance of that (influence). Similarly for the US.”


On the issue of trust in the major powers, the level of distrust in China crept up in the 2024 survey.
Slightly over half the respondents indicated either “little confidence” or “no confidence” that Beijing would do the right thing when it comes to contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. This was a slight increase from the 49.8 per cent in 2023.
Around a quarter were either “confident” or “very confident” that China would contribute positively, while the remaining quarter had “no comment”.


Among those who distrust China, 45.5 per cent think its economic and military power can be used to threaten their countries’ interests and sovereignty. More than a third of Singapore respondents had the same sentiment.
Levels of distrust towards China were higher than levels of trust in all Asean countries, except Laos. In particular, respondents from the Philippines, which has had a series of run-ins with China in the South China Sea, recorded the highest level of distrust.
Japan continues to be the region’s most trusted power, with 58.9 per cent of respondents expressing confidence in the country. The US was second at 42.4 per cent, followed by the European Union at 41.5 per cent, China at 24.8 per cent and India at 24.2 per cent.
While more respondents indicated trust towards the US than distrust, the findings show a significant drop in trust from more than half of the respondents in 2023, a sign that South-east Asia could be treading cautiously ahead of the US presidential election in November.
Negative sentiment towards the Joe Biden administration by way of US engagement with the region has also risen, as more than one-third of respondents felt that US engagement has decreased or decreased significantly in 2024.
On assessing the future of China’s relations with the Asean bloc, more than half of the respondents anticipated an improvement in the next three years.
Those from Singapore and Myanmar held the most neutral stance on their countries’ relations with China, expecting the status quo to be maintained.


Among those who anticipate an improvement in future relations with Beijing, the region’s top concern was China’s growing economic dominance and political influence in their countries – a telling sign that China’s willingness to use coercion to achieve its aims does not sit well with most South-east Asians.
The top concerns among Singapore respondents were China’s use of economic tools and tourism to punish the Republic’s foreign policy choices, as well as China’s interference in Singapore’s domestic affairs, including through social media and influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens in the country.
Bolstering Asean’s resilience and unity continues to be the most popular option among respondents to counter pressure from both the US and China amid escalating tensions.
The second-most popular option is adhering to Asean’s traditional stance of not siding with either China or the US, though support has slid marginally. Among Singapore respondents, this view rose to 35.9 per cent from 33.7 per cent in 2023.
On the findings, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute director and chief executive Choi Shing Kwok said: “The results reflect heightened regional concerns over economic issues and the risk that unrestrained geopolitical rivalry can adversely affect the region’s interests in the short to medium term.”
On the other hand, the region remains hopeful that major powers can cooperate on issues of mutual benefit and welcomes other major powers in the region to engage more closely with Asean, said Mr Choi.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

South-east Asia’s turn towards China may not last, say US analysts​

China Coast Guard vessels firing water cannon at a Philippine vessel on a resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal on May 4. PHOTO: REUTERS

Bhagyashree Garekar
US Bureau Chief

APR 07, 2024

WASHINGTON – China’s status as South-east Asia’s preferred superpower in a new ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute survey is likely to be short-lived, say analysts.
The annual survey of 1,994 policymakers, journalists, businessmen and analysts in Asean nations showed that they would prefer China over the US – if forced to align with either strategic rival – by a narrow margin of 50.5 per cent to 49.5 per cent.
The findings, published in the institute’s The State Of South-east Asia 2024 report on April 2, point to a reversal of trends seen in the last four surveys. In 2023, 61.1 per cent chose the US, while 38.9 per cent went with China.
Analysts told The Straits Times that the findings are not too surprising and do not necessarily mean the region is uncritically closer to China.
The survey is consistent with trends seen in data from other sources over recent years, said Mr Gregory Poling, who directs the South-east Asia Programme and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
“That said, I’m not prepared to say those trends are towards a long-term preference for China,” he said, noting that the Gaza war – identified as the region’s top geopolitical concern – had impacted responses captured in the survey.
The downward trend in trust for the US appears concentrated among the three Muslim-majority countries of the region, which suggests it is tied to the war in Gaza, he said.

Since Malaysian and Bruneian elites were already more pro-China, the real shift here is the big swing in Indonesia, he pointed out.
“It’s too soon to say whether the shift in Indonesian opinion is long-term, like we saw under the Bush administration, or a short-term signal of frustration,” he added.
During the George W. Bush years, Indonesia had opposed the US invasion of Iraq after the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It was also concerned that the war on terror fed Islamic xenophobia.


Mr Poling noted that other questions in the survey, like those related to the South China Sea, reveal greater distrust of China among Indonesian elites – as do other recent surveys, such as from the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia.
“So there is reason to think these numbers could revert to a modestly pro-US tilt,” he said.
The survey’s methodology is also worth poring over, analysts said.
It is a survey of elites, and a tiny fraction of elites, in the cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar, Mr Poling said.
“It still has value as a data point, but should not be treated as a definitive reflection of elite opinion in the larger countries of the region,” he said.

In addition, he pointed out that ISEAS had designed the survey as a proxy for Asean as an institution, not South-east Asia as a region.
To do this, the survey weighed each country’s responses equally – each country’s responses were averaged and then counted as 10 per cent of the total. That skewed the overall averages in favour of the smallest countries, which lean more towards China.
“So by all means, we should note that the opinions of those elites who respond to ISEAS’ survey have shifted, but we can’t infer from that about where public or overall elite opinion in most of the region stands,” he said.
Likewise, Mr Blake Berger, associate director at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, said he would not read too much into the close 50-50 split in preference.
“It shouldn’t exactly be a surprise that the US took a hit in terms of confidence, especially as respondents relayed that the Israel-Gaza conflict topped South-east Asia’s list of geopolitical concerns,” he said.
The swing in opinion in Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, where more than 70 per cent of respondents said they would align with China, might appear concerning from a US foreign policy perspective, he said.
But this finding needs to be juxtaposed against answers to the question about whom the region trusted, he said.
Pointedly, China was seen as the fourth-most trusted partner, garnering 24.8 per cent support, while the US received 42.4 per cent of the vote, coming behind Japan, the country named as the region’s most trusted partner.
Mr Berger ascribed the shift away from the US to its failure to capture the public imagination in the trade-driven region.
“The US’ lack of a comprehensive strategy to economically engage South-east Asia has provided China avenues to make significant inroads in terms of regional influence,” he said.

Over the past decade, Asean’s trade in goods with China more than doubled, reaching US$722 billion (S$974 billion) in 2022 and accounting for nearly one-fifth of the grouping’s global trade.
Since 2020, Asean and China have been each other’s largest trading partners, amid the signing of notable agreements like the Asean-China Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
In comparison, the US was Asean’s second-largest trading partner, with goods and services trade with it amounting to an estimated US$520 billion in 2022 after almost doubling over a decade.
But despite having a smaller trading volume with the region, the US is still a vital export market for Asean goods. In 2021, Asean’s goods trade surplus with the US was US$145.9 billion, compared with its goods trade deficit with China of US$107.7 billion that same year.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the Biden administration’s main vehicle for engaging the region, has failed to shore up regional confidence in the US’ economic engagement strategy, Mr Berger said.
The region remains sceptical that the two-year-old framework, which does not provide access to US markets, will deliver meaningful returns. Instead, the region fears that the IPEF will also raise compliance and adjustment costs of trading with the US.
Even as it considers options to diversify away from greater dependence on China, the region’s expectations of a more robust economic engagement with the US are unlikely to be met. Free trade is an unpopular topic with both Republicans and Democrats, especially in an election year.
Where the US could score higher was on the strategic side, said Mr Berger.
The survey surfaces increasing turbulence and “aggressive behaviour” in the South China Sea as the region’s second top geopolitical concern, he noted.
“This poll number, taken alongside the lack of trust in China, underscores that there’s far more nuance in the region’s outlook on both the US and China than the response to the ‘who would you align with’ question would have readers believe,” he said.

Thus, an interpretation of the 2024 poll as an indication that the region is turning to China or that this is part of a larger trend line in the region cannot be sustained, he said.
“The see-saw nature of the region’s stance on China only underscores this point,” he added.
The survey has also raised a question about Asean’s efficacy.
One implication of a more dominant China is the further diminishment of Asean as an organisation protecting and enhancing the sovereignty of regional states, Mr Berger said.
“Should China’s growing influence in South-east Asia coincide with an even more aggressive approach to the South China Sea and the further sidelining of Asean, that’s a situation that doesn’t bode well for any regional actor,” he said.
The ripples from the survey have also reached the Biden administration.
A State Department spokesman, while acknowledging the survey, reiterated that the United States was committed to delivering for the Indo-Pacific, with its vision for an open, connected, prosperous and secure region.
“In collaborating with our allies and partners in the region, we are not imposing a solution, but listening intently to their priorities and addressing their concerns,” the spokesman said.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

Both the US and China have fallen short in their quest to win over SE Asia​

The 2024 ISEAS survey on regional sentiments reveals a mixed picture in the contest for influence.​

Tommy Koh

For both superpowers, there is a broader overarching message: walk the talk, words are not enough. PHOTO: PEXELS

MAY 08, 2024, 06:19 AM

Which country has greater influence in South-east Asia – China or the US?
The answer to the question is not as straightforward as the question suggests. If we are to rely on surveys, the answer can hinge on the choice of participants and also the nature of influence we are talking about. Influence is also dynamic in nature; annual temperature-taking exercises of regional sentiments are at best a snapshot in time.
Take, for instance, the recent results from ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s annual survey in the 10 Asean countries. Those taking part in the survey are from sectors such as academia, think-tanks, civil society and media as well as government and regional or international organisations. The results are an elite opinion of the region, not the public opinion.
The difference between public and elite opinion can be quite dramatic. According to the ISEAS survey, elite opinion in Singapore is pro-US but, according to a 2021 Pew survey, the public opinion in Singapore is pro-China.
Here’s my assessment of the state of play of the superpower contest for influence in this region as gleaned from the ISEAS survey.

Most influential but not most trusted​

Going by its findings, China is the clear winner in the influence contest, with the United States a distant second.
In terms of economic influence, China received a score of 59.5 per cent and the US only 14.3 per cent. The economic influence of Japan, the European Union, India, South Korea, Australia and the United Kingdom are negligible.

China is also No. 1 in political influence, with a score of 43.9 per cent. The US is in second place with just 25.8 per cent. The other countries, including Japan, have barely any influence.
But influence is not the sum total of how a country is perceived by other countries. Trust also matters.
Which is the country most trusted by the region? The answer is Japan. Japan enjoys a score of 58.9 per cent. The US is in second place at 42.4 per cent, followed by the EU at 41.5 per cent. China is in fourth place with just 24.8 per cent. It topped the rankings for distrust, with a score of 50.1 per cent.


What do the trust scores tell us? In South-east Asia, unlike China and South Korea, the people have forgiven Japan for the painful experiences of World War II. They have forged a very good relationship with Japan. The Chinese and South Koreans will be surprised to learn that Singaporeans love Japan.
A key reason for the positive state of Japan-South-east Asian ties is the groundbreaking move in 1977 by then Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda to pursue a “heart-to-heart” relationship with the members of Asean, one that is built on trust and goodwill. To be sure, aid has helped, but the equality in Japan’s relationship with Asean member countries plays an important role too.

ST ILLUSTRATION: MIEL

China’s trust problem​

China is in the paradoxical situation of being the most influential country and the least trusted country. Why the distrust of China? There are three reasons.
The first is China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. In 2009, China submitted a map with nine dashed lines to the United Nations. China has made extensive claims to the South China Sea, based on that map. Asean claimant countries reject the map and the claims based on that map.
In 2013, the Philippines referred its disputes with China to arbitration, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). China, a signatory to Unclos, refused to participate in the arbitration, claiming that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the case. This question is for the tribunal and not for China to decide.
The tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction and proceeded to consider the case in China’s absence. In 2016, the tribunal delivered its unanimous award. It ruled that there is no legal basis for China’s claims based on the map with nine dashed lines. In other words, China’s claims are illegal. The award is binding on China even though it chose not to participate in the tribunal.
China has refused to abide by the tribunal’s award. Instead, it has used its superior military power to enforce its illegal claims, against the Philippines and Vietnam.

The second reason for the lack of trust in China is its conduct on the Mekong River. The Mekong is an international river. In an international river, unlike a national river, a riparian state has qualified sovereignty and not absolute sovereignty. Before building a dam on the river, China is obliged to inform the other riparian states and to take their interests into account.
China has not done so. It has built 11 dams and is currently building its 12th dam. The dams have caused harm to the farmers and fishermen who live downstream in Cambodia and Vietnam. I urge China to accede to the 1995 Mekong Agreement and join the Mekong River Commission.
The third reason is that China has weaponised trade and tourism. They have been used to punish countries which have defied China’s wishes, such as the Philippines and South Korea.

Decline In American popularity​

One of the compulsory questions in the survey is to choose between China and the US, in a crisis. In the 2023 survey, 61.1 per cent chose to align with the US and 38.9 per cent chose China.
In the 2024 survey, 50.5 per cent chose to align with China compared to 49.5 per cent for the US. What happened? Why has the popularity of the US plunged so steeply in the course of a year. The reason is Gaza.
The people in the region, especially in the three Muslim-majority countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – are shocked and horrified by what Israel has done in its war against Hamas.
Israel has the right to defend itself against Hamas. However, Israel’s right of self-defence must conform to the principle of proportionality, international law and international humanitarian law. Israel has violated all three. Israel has killed more than 34,000 Palestinians in Gaza, most of them women and children. Israel has reduced much of Gaza to rubble. Israel has weaponised food, starving the people in Gaza.
All these actions have damaged the US’ standing in the region. It is seen as an accomplice of Israel for providing the Israelis with funds, aircraft, missiles and bombs, the instruments of death. The US has used its veto power in the UN Security Council to protect Israel from being held accountable for its actions in Gaza. It is therefore not surprising that the popularity of the US has plummeted, dropping for the first time behind China in the ISEAS survey, now in its sixth year.

Message from the region​

The US and China are competing for influence everywhere in the world. The competition is most intense in South-east Asia. Using the latest ISEAS survey findings as a yardstick, it would appear that neither can conclusively claim to have come up tops.
The message to Washington is that you are losing the competition for influence to Beijing. Your unconditional support for Israel has lost you much goodwill.
The message to Beijing is that while you are winning the competition for influence, both political and economic, you are not trusted by the region.
For both superpowers, there is a broader overarching message: walk the talk, words are not enough.
It is not enough to talk about helping South-east Asian countries to maintain the rules-based order in places like the South China sea when international law is being trampled in the Middle East. It is also not enough to talk about having a win-win relationship with other countries when the territorial interests of smaller countries are ignored or, worse, met with shows of force.

• Tommy Koh is the chairman of the International Advisory Panel of the Centre For International Law at the National University of Singapore.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

We are pro-Singapore: DPM Lawrence Wong on standing between the US and China​

DPM Lawrence Wong said the Republic is neither pro-China nor pro-America, but “pro-Singapore”. ST PHOTO: ONG WEE JIN

Lim Yan Liang
Deputy News Editor

May 09, 2024

SINGAPORE - As the United States and China seek out a new equilibrium in their relationship, Singapore must brace itself for possibly a decade or more of unpredictability, and hopefully help steer global events towards peace rather than war, said Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong.
In an interview with The Economist magazine on May 6, he said the Republic is neither pro-China nor pro-America, but “pro-Singapore”.
DPM Wong said the global order is shifting, and the transition will be messy because while America’s unipolar moment has ended, it remains a pre-eminent power in a world that will have more than one major power.
“China certainly looks at the US as trying to contain, encircle and suppress them, and trying to deny them their rightful place in the world,” he said in a transcript released by the Ministry of Communications and Information on May 8.
It is not just the leadership that thinks like that, but a lot of Chinese officials, noted DPM Wong, who will take over as Singapore’s fourth prime minister on May 15.
“They feel that there is this containment to put China down; there is that sense, and for every action, there will be an opposite reaction,” he added.
Asked how Singapore will deal with the scenario where American tech sanctions and controls lead to a complete split into two technology systems, DPM Wong noted that a lot of these sensitive technologies lie in the hands of American firms operating out of the Republic.

Singapore would expect these firms to comply fully with export restrictions, but it hopes that such restrictions will be carefully calibrated. A technological bifurcation would be detrimental not just for Singapore, but also for the US and the whole world, he stressed.
He said that while militaries are very mindful about collateral damage, retaliation and escalation in conventional warfare, it is less straightforward to assess the fallout from using economic and financial tools for geopolitical purposes.
“We do not have so much experience with it; if we are not careful, it will have profound implications for the global economy but worse still, for global stability,” he said.
Asked about the US’ decision to seek a change in identity and ownership of TikTok, which is headquartered in Singapore, DPM Wong said it was America’s prerogative to decide how to deal with the social media platform.
“But from our point of view, when it comes to social media, that does not count as national security,” he said, noting that there are social media companies from all countries here in Singapore, and the Republic does not see this as a national security risk.
DPM Wong said China now sees itself as a strong country, whose time on the world stage has come. This means the Chinese want to be more assertive about their national interests, and this includes overseas.
As with all big countries, China will have to learn that if it pushes its way around other countries and overdoes it, it will engender a backlash, including in this region.
“That is why they cannot go too far, and they will have to learn that lesson,” DPM Wong said. “It is a lesson that all big countries go through. America goes through that lesson too.”

DPM Wong was asked how trying to maintain its position of standing between the superpowers might put Singapore under pressure. For instance, it had put in place sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine – would it do likewise against China, should there be a conflict over Taiwan?
He responded that Taiwan is fundamentally quite different from Ukraine, even though people have tried to draw parallels between the two. Ukraine is a sovereign country, and the Russian invasion was an egregious breach of the United Nations Charter and a breach of territorial sovereignty and integrity, he said.
Meanwhile, the vast majority of countries around the world have a “one China” policy. Singapore has long upheld its “one China” policy and opposed Taiwanese independence, even before it established diplomatic ties with Beijing, DPM Wong noted.
“We are very careful when we conduct relations with both China and Taiwan that is consistent with our ‘one China’ policy,” he said. “And we do not allow ourselves to be made use of for any causes supporting Taiwanese independence.”
If all parties understand the red lines and the risks of exceeding them – something the Biden administration certainly does – then there is a good chance of upholding the status quo, said DPM Wong.
He reiterated that Singapore is not a US ally, but its only Major Security Cooperation Partner.
Why then should Singapore receive American weapons, advanced security equipment, and all the benefits of that, and yet be unable to call itself an ally, asked The Economist.
Because this is a security and defence relationship, spanning many decades, that has proven mutually beneficial for both sides, DPM Wong replied.
He noted how Singapore not only buys technology and military equipment from the US, but also leans forward to work very closely with Washington, such as by providing access to its air and naval bases and logistical support, and exchanging intelligence.

Asked whether he thinks international law still works, and if it should remain the basis of Singapore’s foreign policy, DPM Wong said the rules-based multilateral order is under tremendous pressure, but that there is no alternative.
The Republic will continue to plug away at strengthening the system by working with like-minded countries, he added.
For instance, it is very hard to get everyone on board at the World Trade Organisation, but by working with other countries, Singapore is now part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of the largest free trade agreements in the world by gross domestic product.
Being constructive, providing value and finding partners to sign on to such agreements – “that is how we can play a part in strengthening multilateralism in the world”, said DPM Wong.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

All eyes on whether new Singapore PM will have a baptism of fire with China​

Mr Lawrence Wong will be steering the Republic through an increasingly complicated world. The Straits Times examines what lies ahead for Singapore’s ties with China.​

How DPM Lawrence Wong navigates the rivalry between China and the US will be one of his biggest foreign policy challenges. PHOTO: ST FILE

Tan Dawn Wei
China Bureau Chief

May 13, 2024

BEIJING/SINGAPORE - When then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made an unofficial visit to Taiwan a month before taking up the top job in Singapore in 2004, he unwittingly incurred the wrath of Beijing.
It abruptly called off a trip by then central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan to Singapore, delayed an invitation to a trade delegation to Chengdu led by then National Development Minister Mah Bow Tan, and scrapped a Singapore fair in Shanghai two weeks before it was due to open.
A group of more than 120 Chinese mayors and officials also cancelled a routine training programme in the island-state, while foreign ministry spokespeople railed against Singapore for “hurting China’s core interest, the political base between the two countries and the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese people”.
That diplomatic incident was widely seen as China seizing the opportunity to test the incoming prime minister, who was taking over after 14 years of the Goh Chok Tong administration.
When Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong takes the reins from PM Lee on May 15, political pundits will be watching to see if he might have his own baptism-of-fire moment with the Chinese leadership.
Ties between the two countries are at their best since another diplomatic row in 2016 over the South China Sea and Singapore’s military training in Taiwan.
Nine army vehicles en route home from Taiwan were impounded in Hong Kong in November that year and held for two months.

Relations eventually thawed and strengthened, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, when Singapore was quick to send medical supplies to China, which later also donated masks to the Republic.
Singapore also remains China’s biggest foreign investor, a record held since 2013, while China is Singapore’s biggest trading partner.
In March 2023, as China reopened its borders following the pandemic, PM Lee seized the opportunity for a visit, meeting President Xi Jinping and letting the Chinese leadership know that DPM Wong would be his successor. The two leaders also upgraded bilateral ties to a partnership that has been described as “all round”, “high quality” and “future-oriented”.

PM Lee was followed two months later by DPM Wong, who met China’s newly elected premier Li Qiang and executive vice-premier Ding Xuexiang.
While Singapore’s relations with China are comfortable now, DPM Wong is taking over as Singapore’s leader at a turbulent time, when different countries are jostling to shape the world order, wars are raging in Ukraine and Gaza, and the United States-China rivalry has never been more acute.

DPM Lawrence Wong (left) with Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Dec 6, 2023. PHOTO: ST FILE
How he navigates this intensifying clash of the two major powers, keeping Singapore from being squeezed by one or both giants while ensuring its economic survival, will be one of the new PM’s biggest foreign policy challenges.
Increasingly tough conundrums will arise, as Singapore juggles its different national interests.
For instance, much of Singapore’s growth has been through serving as a conduit between different economies, but with China and the US pivoting to new trade policies such as Beijing’s “internal circulation” and Washington’s “friend-shoring”, there may be less demand for economic exchange among Singapore’s traditional economic partners, said political scientist Chong Ja Ian at the National University of Singapore.

“To sustain growth in such an environment, Singapore may have to rethink its business model. Wong has not yet spelt out how he intends to navigate such circumstances, but has instead emphasised continuity.”
A continuum in Singapore’s China policy is the approach Beijing expects when the Singapore leadership changes hands, especially with PM Lee providing guidance in the background as senior minister.
Chinese political observers have taken note of DPM Wong’s rapid rise and his previous service as PM Lee’s principal private secretary, which in Chinese officialdom is a highly important position with strong prospects of career advancement.
President Xi, for instance, was once a personal aide, or mishu, to the defence minister.
That political continuity is also evident in how the Singapore Government has for years been preparing its fourth-generation leadership to engage China, appointing young ministers to helm provincial business councils that spearhead collaborative projects. DPM Wong was a previous co-chair of the Shanghai and Tianjin councils.
DPM Wong has similarly good ties with the Chinese leaders as PM Lee does, said the current ambassador to China, Mr Peter Tan, adding that DPM Wong has met Premier Li on a few occasions, and worked with Executive Vice-Premier Ding as co-chairs of the Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation, the highest platform for inter-governmental collaboration.
“I believe DPM Wong will build upon the work done by his predecessors to further strengthen Singapore-China relations,” he said.

DPM Wong (fourth from left) and China’s executive vice-premier Ding Xuexiang (sixth from right) are co-chairs of the Joint Council on Bilateral Cooperation, the highest platform for inter-governmental collaboration. PHOTO: ST FILE
But closer to home, DPM Wong may face a different kind of pressure: Dealing with continued efforts by the Communist Party of China to pull ethnic Chinese Singaporeans into its orbit through influence operations.
The Singapore Government in February designated Singaporean businessman Philip Chan as a “politically significant person” under an anti-foreign interference law, requiring him to disclose political donations of more than $10,000 and foreign affiliations. Mr Chan had publicly advocated for China’s interests, even urging the Chinese diaspora to help spread Chinese propaganda.
“It seems that the goal was to register the point that the relevant Singapore authorities were keeping a close watch over the activities of such individuals without the need to publicly identify the country concerned. This implicit way, in my view, has served its intended purpose,” said ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute senior fellow Lye Liang Fook, adding that Singapore was still able to maintain substantive ties with China while keeping the foreign influence in check.
Singapore’s unique composition as the only country in the world, apart from China, with an ethnic Chinese majority has resulted in a complex bilateral relationship.
Politicians and diplomats have spoken about the consistent pushing-back they have had to do to assert Singapore’s sovereign status, instead of being viewed as a Chinese vassal state.
“Over time, China has come to realise that although we have a sizeable ethnic Chinese population, it does not follow that we always see things their way. We are very much a multiracial society. Even our ethnic Chinese are different from China Chinese. The Singapore identity is real,” said retired diplomat Chin Siat Yoon, who was Singapore’s longest-serving ambassador to China from 1998 to 2012.
“We are good friends with China and we wish them well, but as different countries, our interests are quite naturally not always identical.”

The 2004 Taiwan episode also took several rounds of “tough negotiations” before Beijing understood that Mr Lee was not out to undermine it with his visit, recalled Mr Chin, who was summoned to the Chinese foreign ministry for an explanation.
“The timing was unfortunate. It took place soon after the surprise re-election of Chen Shui-bian, who was from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. The mood in Beijing was decidedly sour. It certainly did not help that the new administration in Taiwan chose to publicise and generally play up what was a private and unofficial visit,” said Mr Chin.
But with the US-China rivalry – and with it the Taiwan issue – becoming a preoccupation at global fora in recent years, PM Lee’s remarks on such occasions have gained him many Chinese fans.
At the Asia Future Summit 2023 held in Singapore, he cautioned against likening Taiwan to Ukraine, and framing the Taiwan issue as a tussle between democracy and autocracy. Countries should make clear the international understanding that there is just one China, he said.
“This has won him goodwill in China,” said Beijing-based analyst Chen Nahui, who researches Singapore-China relations, adding that it also demonstrated Singapore’s ability to promote a deeper understanding between China and the West.
Singapore should take more initiative in the future to facilitate dialogue, said Assistant Professor Chen, who acknowledged that mediating between China and the US will require a higher degree of skill and knowledge than before.
“Singapore’s elite politics have provided good conditions for this,” she said.

 

[k1976]

S'pore should prepare for up to 30 years of US-China rivalry: George Yeo​

Former foreign minister George Yeo suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity. ST PHOTO: FELINE LIM

Justin Ong
Political Correspondent
JAN 11, 2022


SINGAPORE - Singapore should prepare for "easily" up to 30 years of competition between the United States and China, which could take the form of skirmishes off the sea or proxy wars, said former foreign minister George Yeo on Tuesday (Jan 11).
To avoid being caught in between and to maintain sovereignty, he suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity - one where being Singaporean means being "bigger" than just a nationality.
Mr Yeo, who is currently a visiting scholar at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, was speaking as a panellist at a curtain-raiser for the annual Singapore Perspectives conference organised by the Institute of Policy Studies think-tank.
This year's event, with the theme "City", comprises seven virtual forums on Jan 13 and 17, and a physical conference on Jan 24.
Asked by moderator and ambassador-at-large Chan Heng Chee if he saw Singapore being among the great cities in the region and the world in the next two decades or so, Mr Yeo said that if the Republic can position itself well in a flourishing Asia, its prospects would be bright.
"There's no guarantee because we're in competition with others. There's always the possibility that we may make bad mistakes," he added.
"For example, the current tension between the US and China will mark this period of history and it will go on for years to come… sometimes high tension, sometimes low tension."

Mr Yeo said that if Singapore remains just a city-state, it would find itself frequently between a rock and a hard place.
Singapore thus needs to organically "reroot" itself in the region and become a capital city of Asean, he added, noting Singapore's links to other members of the 10-nation bloc through their sizeable communities here.
Working through Asean, Singapore can better navigate the big powers - not by taking sides, but by leaning "a little to the other side" in the event anyone pushes Singapore too hard.


Mr Yeo said Singapore's leaders must have the foresight to steer the nation away from potential conflict and danger.
"We are part of many networks - the American network, the Chinese network, the Indian network. And every network has to capture us, naturally, so we have to be careful," he cautioned. "We are friendly to everybody, but we are autonomous."
Also taking part in the in-person panel discussion was former chief city planner Liu Thai Ker, though their audience was an online one. Viewers could submit questions - one of which was how Singapore could thrive amid conflicting spheres of influence between China and the US.


Mr Yeo said the challenge for the country - where about three-quarters of the population identify as ethnically Chinese - was not outside but "inside".
"Who are we as Singaporeans?" he asked. "Is Singapore just a facility, a convention centre, a good hotel, a restaurant - or is it something more? Does it stand for values which others are happy to associate with?"
Mr Yeo added: "Singapore is special because our different communities retain their ancestral cultures… and we encourage them to be proud of their ancestral cultures. Our diversity is not based upon everybody curbing themselves to become Singaporean, but everybody being bigger in accepting others who are not like themselves.
"If we can make this happen - that to be Singaporean is to be bigger than what you were when you were in China or India or Indonesia or Thailand… then to be a Singaporean is to become bigger."
Mr Yeo said this, and questions around how Singaporeans relate to one another, was something to think deeply about.
"The more comfortable we are with our own identity, the more open we'll be," he said. "If I know who I am, I can accept you for who you are… So identity is important, and Singapore's identity is complicated because it is made up of constituent identities."

No clear winner until 2050 earliest?

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

In highly politicised America, pressure will grow on Singapore to pick a side in US-China conflict​

Mr Lawrence Wong will be steering the Republic through an increasingly complicated world. The Straits Times examines what lies ahead for Singapore’s ties with the US.​

DPM Lawrence Wong's strength in finance and trade will be seen as important assets. PHOTO: COURTESY OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Bhagyashree Garekar
US Bureau Chief

May 13, 2024

WASHINGTON – Singapore’s incoming prime minister Lawrence Wong will need to walk a tightrope through the buffeting winds of great power strategic rivalry at precisely the moment that a particularly contentious election campaign in the United States moves into high gear.
Mr Wong will have to contend with a more challenging world, said nearly all diplomats and experts The Straits Times spoke to.
“I think Lawrence Wong will face a difficult world, squared, from day one,” said Ambassador-at-Large Chan Heng Chee, who was Singapore’s longest-serving diplomat in Washington from 1996 to 2012.
Competition between the US and China will not subside, Professor Chan said, although the two sides are trying to find a new equilibrium after the first in-person meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2023.
“There’s a slight stabilisation because it suits both sides to make sure that the relationship doesn’t go over the cliff,” she said.
But there are complications. One set arises from the US presidential election on Nov 5. With both Mr Biden’s and his Republican rival Donald Trump’s campaigns gaining steam, China could become the target of hostile rhetoric from both sides, one trying to outdo the other.
In China, Mr Xi has his own dragons to tame, the chief among them the worsening economy. The high youth unemployment and social disaffection over millions lost in the property bust can put his China Dream on pause and tarnish his legacy.

On the US election outcome, Prof Chan said: “If it is President Trump, we do not know what his policies will be.” This translates into a more difficult world for Mr Wong and greater pressure on Singapore. “While we say we do not want to choose sides, the pressures will increase,” she said.
Mr Daniel Russel, vice-president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, agreed.
“Quite apart from the uncertainty over the election outcome, Wong takes the reins at a time when issues ranging from trade to defence are highly politicised in Washington,” said Mr Russel, who served as assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration.

While demands on Singapore from both the US and China are increasing, he observed, their tolerance for partners accommodating their rival is shrinking. “This generates unwelcome pressure on Singapore to make the kind of ‘either-or’ policy choices that it has long and skilfully resisted,” he said.
In a Taiwan Strait crisis, for example, Singapore may wish to remain neutral but the US may want it to provide port access to US warships heading towards Taiwan.
“Reconciling Singapore’s respective strategic partnerships with the US and China while maintaining its freedom of action and safeguarding its interests constitutes a formidable challenge for Lawrence Wong,” said Mr Russel.
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Professor Graham Allison, Professor of Government at Harvard University, noted that Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had been very clear in explaining to both American and Chinese leaders that they should not attempt to force Singapore to choose between its economic relationship with China and its military relationship with the US.
“This has required many difficult, candid conversations with leaders of both great powers, as well as artful adaptation. But under his leadership, Singapore has managed to have trade arrangements with both countries and military agreements with both countries,” he said.
“Finding ways to sustain this straddle will be a big part of the challenge for the new prime minister, Lawrence Wong.”
Asked if Mr Wong was going to have it worse, Prof Allison replied with a reference to his 2017 book, Destined For War: Can America And China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?.
The trap, he says in the book, refers to a build-up of stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling one.
“In relations between the US and China, expect things to get worse before they get worse,” said Prof Allison.
“The relationship between China and the US is a classic Thucydidean rivalry – indeed destined to be the fiercest Thucydidean rivalry of all times. So geopolitical tensions will continue rising – making ever more challenging the role of straddlers,” he added.
While the dynamic is widely recognised in Washington, there is a measure of appreciation in the Biden administration for the role PM Lee played in deepening the strategically key US-Singapore relationship.

PM Lee Hsien Loong (left) meets US President Joe Biden in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington DC, on March 29, 2022. PHOTO: ST FILE
“Under his leadership, ties between the United States and Singapore have deepened into the expansive and enduring strategic partnership that our two nations enjoy today,” a senior official of Mr Biden’s National Security Council told The Straits Times.
“President Biden has always appreciated his close relationship with PM Lee, grounded in their shared commitment to the rules-based economic and security order in the Indo-Pacific and around the world.
“The President is especially grateful for PM Lee’s powerful affirmation of the positive and enduring US role in the Indo-Pacific and his wise counsel on how to best advance our shared interests,” the official said.
Months ahead of his impending takeover, Mr Wong visited Arizona, New York and Washington in the course of an 11-day working trip in October 2023, his first to the US since he became deputy prime minister.

In 2024, the two nations are marking the 20th anniversary of the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), which tripled bilateral trade from US$40 billion in 2003 to US$120 billion (S$162.5 billion) in 2022.
Almost 6,000 American companies operate in Singapore, which is the top recipient of US investment in the Indo-Pacific at over US$300 billion – larger than China, Japan and South Korea combined.
Although Singapore is much smaller than the US, it is the third-largest Asia investor in the US, behind only Japan and South Korea. More than 200 Singapore companies operate in around 40 of the 50 American states.
Bilateral trade and investment supports nearly 250,000 jobs in the US.
The two nations have launched new platforms, like the Partnership for Growth and Innovation in 2021, to secure inclusive growth in areas like the digital economy, smart cities, advanced manufacturing and healthcare.
The Critical and Emerging Technology Dialogue launched in 2023 is intended to allow the tapping of game-changing technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and biotechnology.
And in less than a month, Singapore will host a ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, a US initiative launched in 2022.
The fact that there is a large diplomatic net already in place will help Mr Wong ease into steering US-Singapore ties.
“Lawrence Wong is not particularly well known in Washington and certainly has big shoes to fill,” said Mr Russel.
“But the bilateral relationship is very strong and Singapore is held in high esteem as a security and economic partner by US policymakers. So he can expect a warm reception,” he said, adding that Mr Wong’s “strength in finance and trade” will be seen as important assets.
Singapore’s Ambassador to the US, Mr Lui Tuck Yew, who was the Republic’s envoy to China for nearly 3½ years before he arrived in Washington in June 2023, said PM Lee had been at the “forefront of shaping Singapore’s relations with both the US and China”.
PM Lee was there during key defence milestones, he noted, citing the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and the renewal of a 1990 memorandum of understanding that allows US armed forces access to Singapore’s air and naval bases.

At the same time, under his watch, the Singapore-China bilateral relationship saw a “double upgrade”, first to an “All-Round Cooperative Partnership Progressing with the Times” in 2015, and then to an “All-Round High-Quality Future-Oriented Partnership” in 2023.
“With his depth of knowledge, technical acuity, and ability to build rapport with world leaders, PM has helped Singapore to adroitly navigate an increasingly contentious geopolitical and economic landscape. And PM’s wisdom and clear directions have provided steady guidance to the foreign service as we advance Singapore’s interests on the global stage,” Mr Lui said.
As much as his strategic vision, PM Lee’s humour and down-to-earth manner were also his secret weapons.
Prof Chan remembers the time PM Lee gave a speech on Singapore’s strategic vision before a business community in Washington in 2005, just before the decision on the casinos.
“A question came from the audience: Why is Singapore introducing casinos? Don’t you feel introducing casinos is introducing sin to Singapore?”
The audience was a bit startled, she recalled. “But without missing a beat, the PM said, ‘No, rather we see we are helping to cultivate the Protestant ethic, because of all the jobs we are creating.’ And the ballroom broke out in laughter.
“I think it went down very well with the Americans because he was giving an intellectually substantial speech, but he could take questions and answer with great wit.”
“That created the link between Prime Minister Lee and the American business and policy elite in Washington.”
The other quality that stood him in good stead was his humility.
“The Prime Minister is a very unassuming person. That’s what I discovered working alongside him when he visited Washington for President Barack Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit in 2009,” Prof Chan said.
“Presidents and prime ministers were flying in their own aeroplanes, the equivalent of Air Force One. Prime Minister Lee and Madam Ho Ching flew Singapore Airlines to John F. Kennedy Airport and then took the shuttle to Washington.
“I went to the airport with two State Department officials to meet him,” she said.

As they waited at Washington’s Ronald Reagan Airport for the plane to land, one of the officials told her: “Of all the countries in the region, Singapore can most afford to have a private plane, but your prime minister chooses to fly shuttle. That is most impressive.”
Another time, before the decision was made on the tenders for the casinos, PM Lee wanted to visit Las Vegas, the land of big-ticket casinos.
“We flew there after his visit to DC on the red-eye direct shuttle to Las Vegas. The flight lasted more than four hours. We sat three in a row. PM, Foreign Minister George Yeo and I, as Ambassador. The PM got into his seat and dozed off.”
Prof Chan also noted the considerable contrast in attitudes about ageing in Singapore and the US. She credited PM Lee’s policies for “ageing” not being a bad word in Singapore. “Prime Minister Lee comes across as someone who’s compassionate, a decent man.”
Mr Ashok Mirpuri, Singapore’s US ambassador from 2012 to 2023, cited PM Lee’s disarming praise of the US role at a time of widespread disenchantment over the hurried withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan.
At a press conference in Singapore when Vice-President Kamala Harris made her first trip to Singapore in August 2021, the media was peppering Ms Harris with tough questions on the withdrawal.
PM Lee adroitly stepped in.
“The PM spoke quite sincerely about how important the US rules were in dealing with terrorism. Everyone looked at the Afghanistan withdrawal as a crisis but the PM reflected on the 20 years that the US had committed itself to keeping the world safe from terrorism. And expressed his thanks during that press conference, which the Americans deeply appreciated,” Mr Mirpuri said.
While incoming Mr Wong will put his own stamp on policies, Prof Chan noted he has spent years in the Cabinet. “He’s well aware of policy considerations,” she said, adding: “You will see continuity.”

 

[cow138]

To be frank.. Singapore is starting to get irrelevant in the modern world. What do we have to offer to the Big boys?

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

In China’s backyard, America has become a humbler superpower​

The United States is adapting to a more multi-polar world. PHOTO: AFP

Jun 19, 2024

Far from Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, as the Group of Seven wealthy democracies gathered in Italy to discuss a range of old, entrenched challenges, the nature of American power is being transformed across the region that Washington sees as crucial for the century to come: the Asia-Pacific.
Here, the US no longer presents itself as the confident guarantor of security, a trust-us-we’ve-got-this superpower.
The terrain is too vast, China’s rise too great a threat. So the US has been offering to be something else – an eager teammate for military modernisation and tech development.
“In the past, our experts would talk about a hub-and-spokes model for Indo-Pacific security,” Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said in June at a global defence conference in Singapore. “Today, we’re seeing something quite different.”
In this new era, many countries are doing more, on their own and with US help.
For the first time, the US is building nuclear-propelled submarines with Australia; involving South Korea in nuclear weapons planning; producing fighter jet engines with India; sharing maritime surveillance duties with small Pacific islands; and working with Japan on adding an offensive strike capability.
Behind the scenes, US officials are also testing new secure communications systems with their partners. They are signing deals to co-produce artillery with allies and to secure blood supplies from hospitals around the region in case of a conflict. They are also training with many more nations in more expansive ways.

These collaborations highlight how the region sees China.
Many countries fear Beijing’s growing military strength and belligerence – its threats against the democratic island of Taiwan, its claim to most of the South China Sea and its land grab at the border with India. They are also less sure about China as an economic partner, with the slowing pace of its post-Covid-19 economy and tilt away from pro-growth, pro-entrepreneur policies under President Xi Jinping.
But are the countries linking arms with the US making a long-term bet on America over China? Or are they recognising their own rising strength and behaving like pragmatists, getting what they can from a fitful superpower where an increasing number of voters want the country to stay out of world affairs?

In interviews with more than 100 current and former officials from the US and countries across the Indo-Pacific over the past year, many said that the next century was likely to be less dominated by America than the last.
No matter who wins the next election or the one after that, they said, the nation responsible for today’s world order has been weakened by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the destabilising effects of China’s rise on domestic manufacturing and its own internal divisions.
The world is changing, too, with more countries strong enough to shape events. And as the US shares sensitive technology and prioritises teamwork, many believe they are witnessing both a global reshuffling and an evolution in American power.
For now, they argue, the US is adapting to a more multi-polar world. It is learning to cooperate in ways that many Washington politicians, fixated on US supremacy, do not discuss – with an admission of greater need and more humility.

America diminished​

The US does not tower over the world like it used to.
Since World War II, the US share of the global economy has been cut in half.
That is mostly because of Asia’s steady economic rise. China alone produces around 35 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods, three times the share of the US. Japan, India and South Korea have also joined the top seven in terms of output, giving Asia more industrial heft than any other part of the world.
US military superiority has been better maintained, but China, with a smaller budget and sharper focus on the Indo-Pacific, now has a larger navy by number of ships, a likely lead in hypersonic weapons and many more factories to expand military production if needed.
American democracy is also not what it once was, as measured merely by the declining number of Bills that presidents have signed into law.
The Republican Party has repeatedly held up budgets, drawing the President back from trips overseas, in addition to delaying aid for partners including Ukraine and Taiwan. Recent polls show that most Republicans want the US to take a less active role in solving the world’s problems.
Yet, both parties have struggled with how to tackle and talk about Asia’s shifting power dynamics and America’s limits.
“It goes back several administrations,” said retired Marine Corps general James L. Jones, who served as national security adviser under former president Barack Obama. “We’ve had a fairly long period of time where the United States has sent conflicting messages.”
The Obama administration promised a “pivot to Asia” that seemed to never come.
The Trump administration’s foreign policy – with its mix of anti-China diatribes and abandonment of a major trans-Pacific free-trade deal – was seen by some countries as a sign of US insecurity about the challenge from Beijing.
China had already become an economic colossus, the most important trade partner for most nations in the Indo-Pacific, and a major investor.
Countries across the region have also spent the past few decades producing millions of new middle-class consumers and expanding sophisticated industrial production, fuelling a surge of regional trade that made the US market less important while allowing more Asian nations to build tighter bonds.

Both confidence and anxiety have emerged from these broader trends.
Military budgets across Asia have soared in recent years, and the demand for American defence technology has never been higher.
Yet many countries in the region now see themselves as players in an emerging multi-polar order.
“We are the main characters in our collective story,” President Ferdinand Marcos Jr of the Philippines said during a keynote speech at the conference in Singapore.
And as a result, they have turned to the US less as a protector than a provider of goods (weapons), services (training) and investment (in new technology and equipment maintenance).
Japan has made the sharpest turn. From easing tensions with South Korea to pulling back from decades of pacifism with plans to sharply increase its military budget, to signing troop movement agreements with Australia and other countries, Tokyo has made clear that it now seeks a leading role in protecting regional stability. But even as Washington welcomes the move, Tokyo’s actions grow in part from a critical assessment of the US.
During a joint exercise with the US Air Force in Guam in 2023, Japanese commanders said they were expecting to become more active because Japan’s neighbours wanted Japan to do more, implying broad recognition that America’s future role was uncertain.
“The United States is no more what it used to be 20 years ago, 30 years ago,” said a senior Japanese intelligence official, who spoke on a condition of anonymity to avoid offending his American counterparts. “That’s the fact of the matter.”
“No matter who the next president is,” he added, “the role of the United States will be relatively diminished.”

America adjusting​

US officials are aware of the world’s doubts. When told that some counterparts in Asia saw humility in the American response, a handful of Washington officials winced, as if lemon juice had been squeezed into their eyes. It sounded too much like weakness.
But some Pentagon leaders have been open about seeking what analysts describe as “co-everything” with partners – co-development, co-production, co-sustainment. And, while US officials have talked for decades about alliances in Asia, their tone and actions over the past few years point to a subtle shift, towards a more decentralised approach to security and greater candour about their concerns.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech in September 2023 that called for greater humility in foreign policy to face “challenges that no one country can address alone”.
General David H. Berger, the Marine Corps’ top general until he retired in 2023, launched a sweeping plan in 2019 to counter China’s strengths by redistributing US forces in Asia, shifting to smaller units that are now more mobile, with access to bases in many countries.
In Singapore, a senior defence official said the formula involves more capable nations, investing in themselves, in partnerships across the region, and in working with the US, which now accepts that it need not be at the centre of every relationship.
Hints of that humbler America can be seen in large, multinational military exercises, where other countries are playing bigger roles, and in smaller projects, such as a Pacific Fusion Centre that opened in 2023 in the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu. A data hub for maritime analysis of threats ranging from illegal fishing to Chinese encroachment, it had been conceived as a purely American operation until local partners demanded a role and US officials backed down and brought them in.
India offers a more layered portrait of America’s evolution, pointing to sustained US interest in long-term, comprehensive plans for working closely with an increasingly confident New Delhi – even if that means quieting down concerns about its democratic backsliding.
In interviews, some Indian officials said that a turning point arrived when the US pulled out troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, leaving behind scenes of stunning chaos that suggested more input from the region would have been useful.
“The US did very little consultation in the run-up to withdrawal, and started doing much more after that,” one senior Indian diplomat said.

In meetings at the US Embassy in India’s capital, against a backdrop of congressional hearings on the Jan 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, US officials softened and talked more about shared shades of grey in their democracies.
Diplomats from both countries said concerns about the Indian government’s promotion of Hindu nationalism or suppression of dissent were sanded down to: “We have a lot of commonalities – extremism, hate speech, disinformation. How are you dealing with it?”
Along with a change in how US officials talked about their own country came a broadening of how they saw India: not just as a huge market, with the world’s largest population, but also a multiplier for innovation.
India graduates more than 1.4 million engineers each year, on a par with China. At a time when the US has become worried about Chinese advances in electric vehicles, missiles, quantum computing and other technologies, India could offer a pool of talent to help keep up.
It all came together in a strategic defence and technology-focused agreement unveiled during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in 2023.
New Delhi was most excited about the co-production of fighter jet engines, which it had been seeking for years.
But the White House emphasised in its own announcement that with shared investment in everything from nuclear energy to microchips, “no corner of human enterprise is untouched” by a partnership that spans “the seas to the stars”.
Pushed by other countries, the US may finally be learning that a humbler approach can yield powerful results, said retired diplomat Ryan Crocker, who served as US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon.
“A certain degree of humility does not mean weakness,” he said. “We can’t do it all, we shouldn’t do it all. We have these relations and alliances, let’s figure out who does what.”

The risks of American actions​

In conversations about the US with defence leaders from the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia and other countries, there is often a hint of happy customers reviewing a bazaar.
The US under President Joe Biden has been selling and giving out quite a lot. Tomahawk missiles for Japan. Coast guard boats for Vietnam. Improved runways for the strategically located island nation of Palau. Training for seemingly everyone in Asia who asks.
Is there danger in all that generosity?
Some analysts fear that America’s effort to spread its wares across a more fragmented world adds to the sensitive touch points for brinkmanship with China, raising the risk of a misunderstanding that could become a conflict.
“Washington’s pursuit of an increasingly complex lattice of security ties is a dangerous game,” wrote defence researchers in Washington Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael D. Swaine in a recent essay for The New York Times.
Clearly, Beijing is not happy about the growth of US partnerships.
At the Singapore conference in early June, China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun railed against what he described as “exclusive military alliances” that he said “cannot make our region safer”.
But if one risk of America’s collective approach involves doing too much, possibly sparking a confrontation, another could involve the US failing to lock in enough from its partners.
There is a lot of ambiguity in the coalitions that increasingly define American power in Asia.
How would the region respond if the Philippines stumbled towards a violent clash in the South China Sea? Or in a war over Taiwan – a centre of the global chip business that China sees as its own lost territory – would the countries co-developing military equipment with the US, or welcoming longer runways, actually spring into action?

It is also not clear how Washington itself would respond to Chinese aggression. And that uncertainty, according to many, is what countries are desperate to understand as they pull America closer.
“In the over 40 years I’ve known the United States, I’ve seen you go through troughs of being overly self-critical and waves of hubris,” said Mr Bilahari Kausikan, one of Singapore’s most experienced diplomats. “One should not make the mistake of believing either is a permanent condition.”
The challenge for Asia and the world, he added, is that the US is increasingly dysfunctional and “still indispensable”: No other country does as much to protect the order that other nations and economies need.
What has changed is that a growing number of US officials now acknowledge that more assistance is needed, from more than just familiar allies.
In a time of disorienting challenges – Gaza, Ukraine, China, North Korea, pandemics, climate change, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons – their jobs now involve convincing others that humility can be as American as confidence and that it is built into a strategy that will last, no matter who is president. NYTIMES

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

TikTok’s Singapore links are deep, but so are US suspicions​

Krist Boo
Senior Business Correspondent

TikTok is now one of the biggest tech employers in town, with close to 4,000 workers. ST PHOTO: LUTHER LAU
Updated

Jul 16, 2024

SINGAPORE - TikTok’s association with Singapore goes back to 2017, when it registered itself in the Republic, joining the ranks of foreign-owned companies that have chosen to be based here.
The video-sharing social media platform went on an expansion drive from 2020. It is now one of the biggest tech employers in town, with close to 4,000 workers.
Yet, even as a TikTok spokeswoman cited figures and the ways in which Singapore plays a substantial role in the company, its connection to the country is being queried amid mentions of “Singapore-washing”.
The label – which can be traced back to late 2022 in a Financial Times article – has been used on Chinese companies and family offices that establish a presence in Singapore to ride on the country’s neutrality to mitigate geopolitical risks.
These companies also leverage Singapore’s reputation to improve their global image.
In July, opposition MPs Jamus Lim and Louis Chua called in Parliament for more oversight of “Singapore-washing” behaviour.
TikTok has never been specifically cited for “Singapore-washing”: The question levelled by its critics is whether executive decisions are being made by TikTok’s international leadership – based in Singapore, the United States and Ireland – and not at its parent company ByteDance’s headquarters in Beijing, as TikTok has indicated.

The Singapore draw​

According to the Economic Development Board (EDB), Singapore’s largest investment sources have, in recent years, expanded from the US, Europe and Japan to include China, India and South-east Asia.
With South-east Asia projected to grow into being the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2030, global companies are drawn to Singapore to tap the region’s opportunities.
There are more than 60,000 majority foreign-owned companies in Singapore, employing about 1.2 million Singaporeans, EDB said.

Dr Tracy Loh, senior lecturer of communication management at Singapore Management University, said while it would be an overplay to say that Singapore’s neutrality had led to TikTok’s decision to set up base here, the company should expect to face scrutiny.
“Because of the fact that they are Chinese, they are from China, and the views of the Chinese government amid the geopolitical tensions – so fair or not, it is not an unexpected question,” she said.
Professor Terence Lee, a politics and communication scholar at the Sheridan Institute of Higher Education, said Singapore is a strong association to have.
He said: “Politically, Singapore is seen as neutral. Commercially, companies that operate out of Singapore are often deemed legit.”
All companies here are expected to abide by Singapore’s laws and safeguards, EDB said in response to queries from The Straits Times.
Like other major tech companies, its spokeswoman said, TikTok has supported the development of the local digital ecosystem and workforce.
She cited TikTok’s Tech Immersion Programme, which offers three weeks of free teaching to 5,000 tertiary students, and its participation in the Government’s SG Digital Leadership Accelerator to develop local tech leaders.

What TikTok does here​

TikTok’s close to 4,000-member team here leads the app’s support of its 325 million users throughout South-east Asia.
It handles research and development, data science, content safety, product development, advertising sales and corporate functions, TikTok said in response to queries from ST.
And, despite its small 3.4 million user base, Singapore houses TikTok’s Asia-Pacific Trust and Safety Hub.
Recommendations on critical issues such as online safety user protection and content moderation are made here, shaping TikTok’s policies across the region.
When TikTok set up its first Transparency and Accountability Centre in the Asia-Pacific, Singapore was its pick. The centre has received more than 300 invited visitors since opening in late 2023.
Singapore is one of only two global bases the social media company has. The other is Los Angeles.
In March 2023, its Singaporean chief executive, Mr Chew Shou Zi, became a household name after being grilled by the US Congress about purported Chinese influence over the app and its safety and security.
But, since his appointment in May 2021, Mr Chew has granted only one interview here – to fashion magazine Vogue Singapore.
In May, when news surfaced about job cuts across its global operations, TikTok Singapore would not confirm if local employees were affected. Nor would it say then how many employees it had here.
TikTok is an unlisted corporation. This means, unlike public-listed corporations, it is not subject to public scrutiny of investors or analysts.

US pressure​

When grilled by Senator Tom Cotton during the 2024 US House inquiry about whether he had ever been a member of the Communist Party of China, Mr Chew had replied: “Senator, I’m Singaporean. No.”
Sheridan’s Prof Lee noted that one could question if TikTok’s CEO leveraged his Singapore nationality to fend off criticisms about TikTok’s allegiances.
Except that TikTok and Mr Chew’s Singaporean status have so far cut no ice in the US.
And amplifying its Singapore links risks the probing eyes of the Chinese government, said Prof Lee.
“It’s not necessarily because they have done anything secretive or wrong,” he said.
Mr Benjamin Ang, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said: “US politicians have already argued many times that the parent company ByteDance is from China and have swept aside or ignored the fact that the CEO is Singaporean, and that the office is in Singapore.
“Some critics, especially from the US, have accused Chinese companies of registering offices in Singapore to make themselves look less connected to China.”
TikTok maintains that it is a multinational company with a global footprint.
“TikTok is not available in mainland China,” said its spokeswoman.
She added that global institutional investors such as Carlyle Group, General Atlantic and Susquehanna International Group own about 60 per cent of ByteDance, followed by employees, who hold 20 per cent.
“The remaining 20 per cent is owned by the company’s founder, who is a private individual and is not part of any state or government entity,” she said.
In April, US President Joe Biden signed into law a Bill that would push ByteDance to sell TikTok within 270 days or exit the country. About one in two Americans, or 170 million, are on TikTok.
TikTok, which Statista ranks as the fifth most-used social media platform with 1.5 billion users worldwide, is contesting the decision.

Tackling the US-China divide​

TikTok will do better – globally and in the US – if it engages more and is more transparent.
Prof Lee said: “TikTok appears to rely on its users to promote and sell the brand. But it needs to be more than that if it wants to be taken seriously.
“It’s very frightening in many ways, because it’s so powerful, and yet we know very little about it.”
Professor Lim Sun Sun, who teaches communication and technology at SMU, would like TikTok to do more in adding nudges and highlighting its features that protect young people and guard against disinformation.
Such moves will help TikTok address criticisms – fair or otherwise – that it is not transparent.
Mr Bensen Koh, consultant with tech regulatory consultancy Access Partnership, said TikTok has in fact engaged regional governments more in recent years.
But, like many Chinese companies, it tends to centre on regulatory compliance over policy advocacy and discourse.
“Compliance focuses on specific regulatory parameters and ends with a yes or no answer. The focus on a specific regulatory parameter may come across as evasive,” he said.
Professor Ang Peng Hwa of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information at Nanyang Technological University said expectations of transparency and accountability for TikTok show up double standards.
“No platform is doing it. It could be due to the effort and expense. It could be due to fears of revealing corporate details or secrets,” he said.
“Because no one is doing it, if TikTok does it, and especially now, it will be perceived as a public relations exercise, which then creates its own backlash.”
As the company walks a tightrope, its Singapore connection could be the part that projects balance.
Prof Ang said: “US media is suspicious of China and therefore TikTok. On the other hand, Chinese nationals in their response tend to be jingoistic.
“We may well be the neutral party in this issue.”

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

US, China should avoid escalating tensions as presidential campaigning hots up: DPM Heng​

DPM Heng Swee Keat noted that candidates from both the US Democratic Party and the US Republican Party may point fingers at China in the heated campaigning. PHOTO: LIANHE ZAOBAO
Yew Lun Tian
Senior Correspondent

Sep 04, 2024

As campaigning for the US presidential election intensifies, the US and China should take steps to prevent existing tensions from escalating, even if both are unlikely to agree on many areas for long-term cooperation, said Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat at an SPH Media event on Sept 3.
Speaking at the Lianhe Zaobao Conversation, part of SPH Media’s Asia Future Summit 2024, DPM Heng said: “Is it possible for both sides to seek common ground and foster a mutually beneficial relationship amid competition? I believe the answer is yes.”
He noted that in the heated campaigning ahead of the US election in November, candidates from both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party may point fingers at China.
“Therefore, maintaining an open dialogue mechanism and continuing to build strategic goals are an important way to ease tensions and seek cooperation,” he said.
DPM Heng said he is encouraged by the recent meetings between leaders from China and the US, capped by US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s visit to Beijing in August.
He added that the candidates for the US presidential election may be tempted to rile up voters by highlighting what they see as unfair trade practices; they may also implement protectionist trade measures after they get elected.
If trade friction leads to military conflict between the two nuclear states, that would be a “catastrophe for the whole world”, he said.

DPM Heng noted that both sides want the same thing – for their countries and their peoples to prosper – and have made efforts to upgrade their economies.
He urged the US to be confident about its economy as it has a vibrant civil society, deep capacity for innovation, well-developed financial market and the ability to attract global talent.
But he would like the US to ensure that the fruits of growth reach more people to support economic globalisation.

DPM Heng also hopes China can push for economic reforms to narrow the country’s income gap and promote high-quality economic development, while paying more attention to the training of scientific and technological talent to conduct further research in areas including solar energy and electric vehicles.
“Every economy, especially the advanced economies, must constantly restructure and transform itself in the face of the growth and development of emerging economies. This is the basis for mutually beneficial trade.”
DPM Heng urged the world’s two largest economies, which together account for 43 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product, to work together to tackle global challenges such as climate change and infectious diseases.
“There is much room for cooperation even as China and the US continue competing,” he said.

At the event, presented by OCBC Bank and OCBC Premier Banking, Professor Da Wei of China’s Tsinghua University and OCBC’s head of global wholesale banking Tan Teck Long spoke about the impact of the US presidential election on China-US relations.
Prof Da said that if Democratic candidate Kamala Harris wins the election, China-US relations could enter a “new normal” phase that is mostly stable, with a chance that Washington may even “reconceptualise” its relationship with Beijing to move away from “strategic competition”.
But if Republican candidate Donald Trump were to win, Prof Da anticipates it would take at least two to three years longer before relations can stabilise.
When asked by the moderator, Lianhe Zaobao associate editor Han Yong Hong, to say who Beijing would prefer, Prof Da said those who want to see the US lose to China may hope that Trump becomes president – because they think his policies against China, including tariffs, will end up hurting the US more.
But for those who worry that a weak US economy will end up hurting the Chinese economy and Chinese jobs, they may not want to see Trump back in power. “If the US suffers, China may not benefit,” Prof Da said.
On Taiwan, OCBC’s Mr Tan thinks that the chance of the US and China fighting an all-out war over the island is very small.
The US and China are, after all, closely linked in many ways and any full-blown conflict would not only impact both countries but also have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world.
Mr Tan pointed out that when push comes to shove, for example, the US could cut Chinese banks’ access to the international clearing system, and that would be devastating for China’s economy.
For China, its ownership of hefty US government debts could arguably be weaponised for retaliation, he said.
“China is a country that has a lot of patience. As its national strength increases, Taiwan will naturally be drawn closer to China. This can be China’s longer-term strategy,” he said.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

S’poreans view China’s influence as slightly more positive than that of US​

Singaporeans believe that China far outstrips the US in influence over Asia, and that the gap will only widen in 10 years’ time, an IPS survey found. PHOTO: REUTERS

Chin Soo Fang
Senior Correspondent

Sep 27, 2024

SINGAPORE - China’s influence on Asia and the world is viewed slightly more positively than that of the US, according to a survey of some 1,000 Singapore citizens aged 21 and above.
Singaporeans also believe that China far outstrips the US in influence over Asia, and that the gap will only widen in 10 years’ time.
Both the US and China are perceived to have a very similar level of influence over Singapore, and the Republic did not lean towards either power compared with respondents from other Asian countries, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) found.
These were the key findings from the latest Asian Barometer Survey released on Sept 27, an occasional cross-national survey of attitudes and values towards governance and democracy in 15 countries and territories.
The Singapore edition is conducted by IPS, with the latest wave carried out between September and November 2023.
Half of the Singaporean respondents saw the US’ influence on Singapore today as positive, compared with 57.5 per cent who saw China’s influence here in the same light.
Meanwhile, 28.2 per cent more respondents said China has the most influence over Asia today, rather than the US. The perceived gap nearly doubled when respondents were asked if China (59.1 per cent) or the US (6.9 per cent) would be more influential in the region in a decade’s time.

That said, Singaporeans have cooled somewhat on the amount of influence China has on Asia, compared with in the last survey in 2020.
The number of respondents who felt that China has the most influence over Asia today fell by more than 20 percentage points, while those who saw China exerting a great deal of influence over Singapore receded by 17 percentage points.
Dr Tan Ern Ser, adjunct principal research fellow and academic adviser at IPS Social Lab, said this could be due to China’s declining economic miracle. China is grappling with a real estate crisis, while youth unemployment climbed to 18.8 per cent in August amid a flagging economy.

Responses collected from the last three waves (2014, 2020 and 2023) found that, on aggregate, the extent of influence of both the US and China on Singapore was very close, with a slight edge to China.
The 2020 edition found that Chinese and older respondents here were more likely to view China as the more influential power, but Dr Tan said there were no significant differences between races for the latest survey.
Researchers analysed the latest data for variables such as political interest, age, gender and ethnicity, and found that they had no effect on how Singaporeans assessed the quality of influence the US and China had on Singapore.
Income was the only significant variable – those with higher incomes were more likely to see the US and China as equally influential on Singapore.

In contrast, such variables could predict how respondents in Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines viewed the quality of influence of the US and China on their respective societies, said IPS.
For instance, older Filipino respondents aged 56 and above were more likely to have a more positive view of the US. The Philippines was an American colony until 1946, and remains a close US ally.
In Taiwan, those aged 36 and above – and particularly those who were 56 years old and above – were more likely to be pro-China. Older citizens may have a stronger affinity with or even have their own personal histories tied to mainland China, noted IPS senior research fellow Gillian Koh, who was the principal investigator for the survey.
Meanwhile, Vietnamese respondents with stronger attachment to authoritarian values were likely to be pro-China, as their political values were more aligned to the political system of the Chinese regime, she added.
That Singaporeans view the two major powers in the same way suggests that people here see their merits in equal measure, said Dr Koh, adding: “No political values, nothing ideological, so to speak, is at play.”

(From left) IPS Social Lab adjunct principal research fellow Tan Ern Ser, IPS senior research fellow Gillian Koh and SMU law don Eugene Tan at an IPS panel on the survey results on Sept 27. ST PHOTO: GIN TAY
Separately, the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) said a demographically representative telephone poll it conducted in June 2024 found that Singaporeans felt the Republic’s relationship with the US and China had improved in the last few years.
Six in 10 Singaporeans rated the relationship with both China and US as good or very good, and said that the Republic should maintain the current level of closeness to both powers, said MDDI.
The poll of more than 2,000 citizens aged 15 years and above also showed that Singaporeans expect the Government to act in Singapore’s best interests, notwithstanding their personal views on the US or China.
More than eight in 10 polled said Singapore should act in its best interests and not take sides, said the ministry on Sept 27.

 

[bigozt]

George, come back from jungle to Aljunied and fight like a man! Stop licking Tiong CCB

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

S’pore aims to be a trusted, neutral hub for collaboration in global AI race: Chan Chun Sing​

Education Minister Chan Chun Sing (centre) said that AI developers here must be proficient in various AI models. ST PHOTO: GIN TAY

Osmond Chia

Oct 07, 2024

SINGAPORE – Singapore aims to be a trusted and neutral destination for collaboration in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) as US-China competition intensifies over demand, technology adoption and policy clashes.
AI developers here must be proficient in various AI models and not get entangled in an increasingly fragmented world, said Education Minister Chan Chun Sing on Oct 7.
Mr Chan was speaking at a panel discussion at The Business Times Asia Future Summit 2024, which is presented by OCBC Bank and organised in partnership with Huawei. The one-day conference at Shangri-La Singapore focused on AI.
Regarding the Government’s plans to grow the nation’s proficiency in AI, Mr Chan cited a discussion he had with the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD).
“I gave them a challenge: Can SUTD be an institution unique in the world where you can have the best of both the American and Chinese (AI) models working side by side?” he told the audience of nearly 200 guests.
“We want to be seen as a trusted and neutral place where people can bring the best of technology together to collaborate and not just to compete.”
Mr Chan’s remarks came as countries keep a close watch on developments between the US and China, which can impact global trade, innovation and other benefits of cooperation between the two tech powerhouses.

Adoption of the technology developed in different countries is not a matter of prioritising where the AI models come from, but choosing the tools that will benefit the nation, said Mr Chan.
“We are practical people,” he said, adding: “Our test of the pudding is whether it is going to benefit us, wherever it comes from – India, China, US or Europe, or anywhere.”
Singapore also cannot simply adopt AI tools for the sake of it, but has to ensure that they are useful.

In reply to The Straits Times, SUTD president Phoon Kok Kwang said the university is open to using AI from various countries and works with global AI partners such as Meta from the US and China’s Alibaba.
SUTD aims to specialise in design and AI in its next phase of growth, which will see more partnerships in AI projects across the university, Professor Phoon said.
Growing expertise in AI for less sensitive uses like design, for instance, is a suitable area for Singapore to carve a niche and “to build trust in a fragmented world”, said Mr Chan.
He also cited Singapore’s South-east Asian Languages In One Network (Sea-Lion) as an example of the Republic plugging a gap in the market.
Developed by AI Singapore, the agency driving the growth of the technology here, Sea-Lion is a network of ChatGPT-like large language models that are specifically trained for South-east Asian uses to ensure that there is an AI that captures the region’s cultural nuances and languages.
The panel discussion also featured OCBC group chief operating officer Lim Khiang Tong, AI Singapore senior director of AI products Leslie Teo and moderator Claressa Monteiro from The Business Times.
Asked if OCBC would bring on board Sea-Lion, Mr Lim said that localised AI models and their ability to generate coherent responses in a local context are useful for OCBC in its regional markets.
The bank’s internal chatbot called Buddy, which helps employees get information on internal policies or documents, grew in use from around 10,000 monthly queries in 2019 to more than 250,000 monthly queries currently, said Mr Lim.
He added that in rolling out AI, the bank continually spends time educating employees on the impact of AI and ways that they can become more productive.

Not an “arms race”​

While the conference is themed “The Next Arms Race”, Mr Chan cautioned the audience against viewing global AI developments as an “arms race” where one party gains at the expense of the other.
“I’m not sure it has the right nuance. When people talk about an arms race, it connotes a competitive dynamic, which is a zero-sum game,” he said.
“If we do this well, (AI) can benefit all of us,” said Mr Chan, noting AI’s potential to boost productivity in the economy.
Agreeing with Mr Chan, AI Singapore’s Dr Teo said the country’s AI developers work together with big tech players such as Google and Meta for greater representation of the region’s needs.
“I don’t like this ‘arms’ kind of mindset,” said Dr Teo. “We are working together... And in doing so, we give Singaporeans an opportunity to play at the global level.”
He also said that Singapore’s small size is an advantage for collaborators in AI development as systems can be deployed faster than in larger countries.

 

[myfoot123]

Natives of most south east asian countries have dealt with chinese before in their own way so xi jinping wlecome to test their resolve.

Many Japanese men married Chinese woman. There is still a huge market for Chinese, even Donald Trump didn't deny Chinese is better than Ang Mo in America.

 

[Hypocrite-The]

Chicon land claiming Fuckeins islands again..