America’s dilemma: How to meet the China challenge without scaring S-E Asian countries
Top US admiral’s recent ‘3 noes’ remarks reflect the inherent tensions.
James Crabtree
The US has, of late, been trying to push back against China’s rising power. PHOTO: REUTERS
MAR 21, 2023
Admiral John Aquilino, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (Indopacom), arrived in Singapore last week on a mission. The US has, of late, been trying to push back against China’s rising power. But its actions mean many in the region worry that it is Washington, rather than Beijing, that may be becoming the more provocative of the two regional superpowers.
Adm Aquilino seemed to note this, and
began his speech last Thursday by reassuring his audience: “First and foremost: the United States does not seek conflict.” That statement is likely to be welcome. But will it be believed? And why was it necessary to make it in the first place?
These two questions contain within them deeper challenges for US strategy. To take one example, President Joe Biden in March launched the
next stage of the Aukus security pact with Australia and Britain to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
Viewed from Washington, actions of this kind are needed to fashion a new regional balance of power. But they are also just the kind of actions that risk making it appear that Washington is responsible for rising regional temperatures.
Adm Aquilino is an intriguing figure to deliver these messages of reassurance. Based in Hawaii, he leads Indopacom, a giant military operation responsible for an area that ranges from the Indian Ocean to the US west coast.
Running a US “combatant command” – there are some 375,000 military and civilian personnel in the region Indopacom covers – means a core focus on war-fighting. If China and the US do go to war, Adm Aquilino is the person most responsible for ensuring the US prevails.
But he is also a senior diplomat able to meet prime ministers and presidents. “US combatant commanders are the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls – well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centres of US foreign policy”, as The Washington Post once put it.
The 3 Noes
That being said, the three-point salvo with which Adm Aquilino began his lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last Thursday is worth repeating.
The US does not seek conflict, he began. “Nor do we seek to contain China. As stated in US strategy, we are engaged in a robust competition”, he went on. And the US “has not changed our policies towards Taiwan, and we do not support Taiwan independence”.
On the first point, the US might not seek conflict, but the tone of its domestic debate over China has undeniably grown more pugilistic. I spent a week in Washington in February and was struck by common discussion of scenarios involving conflict with Beijing.
The US has also of late rolled out prominent new anti-China measures, from Aukus to its policies
stopping Chinese access to advanced semiconductors. More are likely in the coming months too, including measures stopping US companies from investing in Chinese technology businesses.
China certainly claims the US is bent on conflict. “If the US side does not hit the brakes but continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guard rails can prevent derailing or a crash and there will be conflict and confrontation”, as
Foreign Minister Qin Gang put it on March 7.
The US disputes this, saying its measures are merely a response to China’s increasingly assertive actions. “The rules-based international order is under direct assault by authoritarian regimes”, as Adm Aquilino put it in his lecture.
On this account, it is Beijing that uses coercive actions with respect to Taiwan, not Washington. It was China which, to take just one recent example,
used a military-grade laser to target Philippine ships in the South China Sea in February, prompting Manila to lodge a diplomatic protest.
Adm Aquilino’s second point of reassurance suggested the US does not seek to “contain” China. This responds to claims by China’s President Xi Jinping in March that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development”.
US diplomat George Kennan introduced the idea of containment in the Cold War, recommending a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies”.
US policy towards China today is not an exact copy of this. Indeed, the idea of containing China makes little sense, given
its economy is so closely intertwined with the rest of the world, in a way that was never true of the Soviet Union. That said, in the technological domain, the US is now following a roughly analogous policy, seeking to stop China’s access to advanced technology from semiconductors to AI.
Taken together, what might be styled as Adm Aquilino’s “three noes” were designed in part to reassure Beijing. But they were also aimed at anxious audiences in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and elsewhere.
Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, speaking on the subject of Managing Strategic Competition and the Quest for an Enduring Future in the Indo-Pacific at the Shangri-La Hotel on March 16, 2023. ST PHOTO: DESMOND FOO
Here the US faces a complex calculation. In private, its balancing actions tend to be supported by local security elites. Few in South-east Asia look forward to a future of Chinese regional hegemony. Most therefore want the US to continue to play a balancing role, alongside Australia, Japan, India and others.
That said, regional leaders are also anxious about Washington’s deteriorating ties with Beijing. The Chinese response to then Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last August was one low point. The recent contretemps over Chinese surveillance balloons hardly inspired confidence either.
Two different challenges
This leaves the US with two different challenges, the first of which involves managing the regional reaction to their initiatives to re-establish deterrence. Here Aukus again provided an interesting example.
In public, Malaysia and Indonesia have long expressed concerns about the deal, citing worries over nuclear proliferation. In private, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta are often more relaxed. But last week, Malaysia still put out a statement urging “all parties to avoid any provocation and arms competition in the region”.
There is something of a double standard here. Australia’s plans will produce up to eight nuclear-powered submarines. But China already has six ballistic-missile submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines and 46 diesel attack submarines, according to IISS data. Neither Malaysia nor anyone else asked China to avoid “arms competition” as it built up this force.
The second US challenge is to ask whether it is doing enough to balance China in the first place? Here, the picture is mixed.
Measures like Aukus give a sense of energy. The US is building deeper partnerships with allies like Japan and India. Its ties with the Philippines have been notably positive too, with President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos surprising many senior officials in Washington with
his willingness to cooperate.
Progress has been slower in other areas, however. President Biden in March unveiled the largest US peacetime defence budget request in history, asking for US$886 billion (S$1.2 trillion). Yet even this vast sum will quickly get gobbled up by priorities from Ukraine to long-term research and development. Over at Indopacom, Adm Aquilino will inevitably get less than he would like.
Indeed, Indopacom’s shopping list is lengthy. It wants funds to bulk up defences at its base in Guam, a tiny US island territory in Micronesia. It aims to build new facilities distributed around the Pacific too. Then it wants new weapons, notably long-range missiles, as well as deeper stockpiles. And all of this when a creaking US industrial base is struggling to produce weapons to supply Ukraine, let alone any future scenarios in the Indo-Pacific.
However they move forward with these priorities, the US and its partners must ultimately take two contradictory steps at once. First, they must continue to take bold steps to increase deterrence and fashion a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. But second, they must also do this in a way that is not seen to be excessively provocative, and which reassures non-aligned nations in South-east Asia and elsewhere.
Many in South-east Asia hope for a period of de-escalation. Implicitly, this puts the ball in Washington’s court, and asks what President Biden and his team might do to cool temperatures. Less attention is paid to the kind of measures China might also contribute to build confidence and dialogue. But given Beijing and Washington are both preparing measures to compete with each other, unilateral or mutual de-escalation sadly does not look terribly likely.
What might the US do instead? First, it can keep offering reassurance about its intentions, as Adm Aquilino did with his “three noes” last week. Second, it can put extra effort into communication, as it did in trying to address regional concerns prior to the recent Aukus announcement. And third, it can try to build stronger ties with the South-east Asian countries themselves, in order to build trust and mutual understanding.
Ultimately, however, this balance of action and reassurance presents a tension for US strategy. Tensions between China and the US are not occurring because of a short-term breakdown in communication, but for far more fundamental reasons.
As the Chinese proverb puts it: “One mountain cannot contain two tigers.” Those watching anxiously in South-east Asia must keep hoping their region’s two tigers can come to live with each other after all.
- James Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.