Published: 7:00am, 4 Nov, 2019, Updated: 5:57pm, 18 Dec, 2019
Philip Liu Hsiao-pong
China, friend or foe to Singapore? How a wily Lee Kuan Yew made it both in building his nation
- Beijing has largely been seen as a hindrance to the Singaporean statesman’s efforts to construct a country after World War II
- But a new paper by Taiwanese scholar Philip Liu argues Lee and China had a tacit understanding that pragmatic cooperation trumped ideological divides
China has long been considered an obstacle to
Singapore’s nation-building efforts of the post-war period. This is mainly because Beijing was suspected of using its ethnic links to encourage Singapore’s communist rebellions in the 1950s and 1960s as founding father
Lee Kuan Yew was working towards establishing the city state.
It has widely been believed that Lee and his People’s Action Party (PAP) wanted to create Singapore’s own multiracial national identity, and therefore downplayed overseas “Chineseness” to persuade Chinese-educated Singaporeans to buy into the national consciousness.
By establishing English as Singapore’s common language, Lee created a national identity separate from that of China. Lee said he understood that “the PRC aimed to increase the loyalty of the overseas Chinese to Beijing”, so when he visited China for the first time in 1976, all meetings were conducted in English “to avoid any suspicion that Singapore was influenced by kinship ties with China”.
But Lee was a Straits Chinese, whose identity was usually situational, and thus he was not necessarily always opposed to invoking a Chinese identity, especially for commercial gain.
He said of business opportunities in China: “We would be foolish not to use the ethnic Chinese network to increase our reach and our grasp.”
The PAP government meanwhile encouraged enterprises “to exploit their dual identity as ethnic Chinese and Singaporean”.
And if Chinese identity could be situational in order to maximise interests, then so could political identity. Beijing actually responded positively to requests from Lee for support, as the Singapore statesman gave China the impression he was building an anti-colonial, pro-China nation. Beijing sided with him against his domestic political rivals and even acquiesced in his suppression of Chinese-speaking “communists” in Singapore. In addition, Beijing boosted Lee’s position against Tunku Abdul Rahman, who led neighbouring
Malaysia from 1955 to 1970, and supported Singapore’s independence, while also lobbying
Indonesia to recognise Lee’s territory as a separate state. China thus actually played a helpful role rather than a hindrance in Singapore’s nation building.
Playing for both sides
In front of Beijing, Lee and his top officials often tried to maintain Chinese images of what Singapore should look like, and behaved like Chinese kinsmen who were building a third China. But the identities Lee and his colleagues displayed at this time depended on their situation.
Although he was an anti-colonialist, Lee also formed a united front with the British against communism when it suited his interests, and would later shift his public stance when the need arose.
This pragmatism was reciprocated by Beijing. China prioritised anti-colonialism over communism, so tacitly sided with Lee instead of communists in Singapore for strategic reasons. Chinese leaders even looked the other way as communists were suppressed.
From the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, a mutually beneficial relationship therefore spurred cooperation between Lee and China. For Beijing, economic and nationalistic goals generally took priority over ideological ones. After the end of the Korean war, China adopted a “peaceful coexistence” policy in order to concentrate on economic development at home and cultivate newly established Asian governments, and these included bourgeois nationalist or capitalist regimes which were independent of the
United States.
Singapore was an important source of foreign exchange for China, alleviating its domestic economic difficulties and providing a channel for the import of modern technologies. Beijing’s relations with the city state were marked by the same pragmatism that governed its treatment of
Hong Kong, because trade is a powerful bait with which to overcome ideological antipathies.
Anti-colonialism over communism
Examples of Lee’s attempts to extract political capital from Beijing can be seen in his extensive use of pro-China language.
“[The] Chinese are immensely proud of the achievement of Mao Zedong. A government that in five years can change a corrupt and decadent administration into one that can withstand the armed might of the Americans in Korea deserves full praise,” he said.
In June 1955 he was quoted in a Chinese government briefing praising communism.
“If I had to choose between colonialism and communism, I would vote for communism and so would the great majority,” he reportedly enthused.
After Lee became prime minister in 1959, he once again resorted to using anti-colonial rhetoric and promoting his Chinese ethnicity to muster Beijing’s support.
Immediately following his election success, he commended then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and the
Communist Party for not interfering in Singapore’s affairs, saying it was “absolutely correct”. He also criticised British colonial rule as well as the financial involvement in Singapore’s election process of the US, which had funded his opposition.
China meanwhile was more focused on the US than
Britain, believing the Americans to be a greater enemy than London, and Lee impressed Beijing with his anti-US rhetoric amid Chinese suspicions about his intentions. Lee explained to Zhou that he would only keep a British military base in Singapore to keep out the US. Zhou, happy with the position, praised Lee for being a progressive anti-colonial “statesman” who significantly contributed to “Asian and world peace”, and he encouraged Lee to unite the British and Malays against US imperialism, thereby backing his nation-building efforts.
‘Kinsmen’
In 1962 Lee again exploited his ethnic Chinese identity. He intentionally used Mandarin, which was not his mother tongue, in all his discussions with Beijing that year. He emphasised to Beijing that the Chinese in Singapore had deep affection for China, hoping that the country would side with him in his disputes with Malaysia.
In September that year, he spoke to Chinese ambassador Chen Shuliang in Mandarin. Lee said in a meeting between the pair that he understood China’s policies because he frequently listened to Beijing’s broadcasts. He claimed it was natural for him to have affection for China, and Lee’s wife told Chen that all three of their children were studying at a Chinese school. The ambassador later reported back to Beijing that Lee had affirmed his southern Chinese ethnicity, and the diplomat praised Lee for publicly revealing his personal affection for the country.
China’s approach to Lee and other foreigners of ethnic Chinese descent should be understood through the prism of history. Beijing regarded emigrants who retained their Chinese citizenship as “overseas Chinese” who should obey the laws of their host countries. Those who took on the nationality of their country of residence would be regarded as “ethnic Chinese” – foreigners who had severed their national links with China. Beijing saw the latter as kinsmen because of their cultural and consanguineous links, similar to British relationships with
Australia or
New Zealand.
As Singapore’s Chinese population had mostly obtained new citizenship, premier Zhou refused to discuss “overseas Chinese” issues with Lee, but he would discuss “ethnic Chinese” affairs. Seeing the Chinese in Singapore as foreigners, Beijing therefore expected Lee to unite Singapore’s ethnic Chinese population and Malays to establish a country in opposition to US imperialism. Thus, Beijing’s involvement in Singapore’s struggle for national independence was helpful rather than harmful.
Lee meanwhile sought to play Beijing and his opponents off against one another for his own gain. Between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s he cancelled several planned visits to China, demonstrating that bilateral relations with Beijing were not the priority for Singapore. Rather, the trips were organised for leverage to manage challenges from his political rivals. Lee used the race card and a perceived “Chinese threat” when he cooperated with London and Kuala Lumpur so that he could suppress his domestic opponents. After the British left Singapore, this Chinese threat continued to scare Malays. Lee then elevated his status by exaggerating the risk posed by Beijing.
China supported Singapore’s nationalist struggle, but Lee portrayed communist China as an enemy in order to maintain his legitimacy as well as his political party’s interpretation of nation building.
Philip Liu Hsiao-pong is a professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, and director of the International Master’s Programme in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. This edited excerpt is based on an article titled “Love the Tree, Love the Branch: Beijing’s Friendship with Lee Kuan Yew, 1954-1965”, published in The China Quarterly by Cambridge University Press
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