u.s. also relied on commercial shipping lines such as apl to transport heavy military equipment to both afghan and iraqi theaters during several operations there. however, since the ships were exclusively and fully loaded with u.s. military equipment routes taken were more direct and transit stops for refueling were made at "friendly" ports. imagine the pentagon allowing apl to suka suka optimize their routes and make stops of convenience at hostile ports in pre/post arab-spring tunisia, libya, yemen, somalia and godknowswhere in the middle east. they wouldn't take those moronic chances as a primary customer paying premium prices could call the shots on preferred routes, secure stops, and protection enroute. mindef could have ensured the same best practice when it cums to shipping military hardware of any nature, sensitive or otherwise. in fact, all military material traversing international routes and ports should be considered sensitive and classified. afterall, intell agencies are busy tracking each other cuntries' military shipments left and right 24 by 7, especially cuntries with nuclear and long range missile capabilities - including but not limited to fatso kimchi hermit kingdom. fatso and his ilk play punk by registering ships in 3rd party shipping lines in 3rd world cuntries, flying their flags, but carrying smuggled junk and military imports. every port has the right to interdict such bogus shipments disguised as commercial cargo.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/world/asia/20shipping.html
http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/co...-sail-under-alias-when-carrying-illicit-cargo
as far back as 2002 and before, nk was using agents in sg to register ships in cambodia to carry illicit cargo.
"When a Spanish warship stopped a freighter carrying cement to Yemen four years ago, the cargo vessel turned out to be carrying 15 Scud missiles and was registered in Cambodia.
The two freighters had something in common: Although registered in different places, both were owned by North Korea.
The incidents illustrated North Korea's adroit use of so-called flags of convenience to camouflage the movement of its cargo vessels as they engage in tasks that sometimes violate international laws.
The North Korean ploy could simplify and complicate the efforts to carry out the U.N. Security Council's resolution authorizing countries to inspect cargo entering or leaving North Korea to see if it includes illicit weapons, shipping executives, lawyers and security experts said.
The use of flags of convenience could weaken moves like Australia's on Monday to ban North Korean-flagged vessels from its ports to protest the country's nuclear test.
But if Western nations suspect that a North Korean-owned vessel flying another country's flag is carrying illicit weapons, boarding the vessel could be simpler than if it carried North Korea's flag, said Jonathan D. Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific studies at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.
A Western nation could ask the country that registered the vessel for permission to board it even if the vessel was not entering or leaving North Korean waters. Almost any country would be more cooperative about giving permission for a search than North Korea, Pollack said.
Changing the registration of a ship -- and therefore its flag -- is fairly simple. A ship owner simply sends the necessary paperwork to a country's ship registry, along with a fee of as little as $1,000. The vessel is not required to visit the country where it is registered, or even go to port.
Until 2002, North Korea tended to register its ships as Cambodian, using a registration office that the Cambodian government had authorized in Singapore.
Cambodia canceled the right of its Singapore agents to register ships in 2002. Several shipping executives said in interviews that they believed North Korean ships were sailing under Mongolian and Tuvaluan flags now."