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Extracts from the article:
Why Singapore needs to learn from Noble’s failure
https://www.ft.com/content/12da7ca3-808e-355c-9a8b-2793311288a3
It is not clear that the key regulators in the Noble case have really learned any lessons from their own failures of oversight. SGX RegCo, the regulatory arm of Singapore’s stock exchange, and its overseers at the Monetary Authority of Singapore were given detailed information on Noble’s flawed accounting and excessive management compensation.
Arnaud Vagner, a former Noble employee, repeatedly approached both SGX and MAS officials to tell them about the group’s dubious asset valuations. They were not interested. Mr Vagner was not well known in Singapore, but he did make the acquaintance of Michael Dee, a former director of Temasek, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, who had some standing in the community.
In turn, Mr Dee connected Mr Vagner with officials at SGX RegCo and MAS. Both men urged the Singaporean authorities to engage an independent forensic accounting firm, not chosen by Noble, to directly determine whether the charges of flawed accounting were true. Mr Dee’s warnings were ignored, and the regulators sneered at Mr Vagner. As Mr Dee now says, “The whole response from the regulatory structure was to attack the messenger rather than dealing with the message.”
Why Singapore needs to learn from Noble’s failure
https://www.ft.com/content/12da7ca3-808e-355c-9a8b-2793311288a3
It is not clear that the key regulators in the Noble case have really learned any lessons from their own failures of oversight. SGX RegCo, the regulatory arm of Singapore’s stock exchange, and its overseers at the Monetary Authority of Singapore were given detailed information on Noble’s flawed accounting and excessive management compensation.
Arnaud Vagner, a former Noble employee, repeatedly approached both SGX and MAS officials to tell them about the group’s dubious asset valuations. They were not interested. Mr Vagner was not well known in Singapore, but he did make the acquaintance of Michael Dee, a former director of Temasek, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, who had some standing in the community.
In turn, Mr Dee connected Mr Vagner with officials at SGX RegCo and MAS. Both men urged the Singaporean authorities to engage an independent forensic accounting firm, not chosen by Noble, to directly determine whether the charges of flawed accounting were true. Mr Dee’s warnings were ignored, and the regulators sneered at Mr Vagner. As Mr Dee now says, “The whole response from the regulatory structure was to attack the messenger rather than dealing with the message.”
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