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Regulators Refusing to Act - Hyflux & Noble Group's Decline

Hyflux: Management Hopeful, Unsecured Lenders staring at a 33-66% Haircut


Wishful Thinking?
Observers are questioning the optimism of Hyflux's management pertaining to the approval from PUB, for the new Indonesian investors to control a 60% stake in Hyflux. Earlier PUB denied all foreign investors from purchasing Tuaspring (water and power plant) and a 60% ownership in Hyflux is technically a Change-of-Control for Tuaspring. Any PUB's blessing for the deal will contradict their earlier stand on Tuaspring

Indonesian firms hand Hyflux S$530m lifeline, but questions raised on whether deal would get green light

Are the Indonesian buyers serious about the investment or their backing was made, to pressure local GLCs to come up with a better deal for Hyflux? By and large, Singapore will not be pleased to see Tuaspring falling into Maybank's control, but analysts are also questioning the indifference of the state investment vehicle, Temasek Holdings in the recent months. It appears that there are many prospective foreign buyers and investors in Tuaspring and Hyflux respectively but PUB is engineering a situation whereby Tuaspring will be subjected to low-ball offers from approved GLCs.



No News is Bad News.
Olivia Lum refused to reveal details about the debt-restructuring prerequisites for the deal to go through.

As part of the deal, the Indonesian investors demanded a final 60% stake and some secured assets to back their $100-130m loan, leaving the remaining 40% stake to be split among unsecured bank creditors, noteholders, perpetual bondholders, preference shareholders, and ordinary shareholders, and management staff with a combined exposure in excess of $3 billion.

However, the credit-ratings of the energy-partner in the deal, Medco Energi is not really better than Hyflux (before Hyflux's suspension). With the continued decline in Indonesian Rupiah, and reiterations of no core-asset disposal for Hyflux, one can only conclude that the profits or value that the Indonesians attain from Hyflux will be derived from the magnitude of the debt write-downs of Hyflux's unsecured stakeholders.

https://www.moodys.com/credit-ratings/Medco-Energi-Internasional-Tbk-PT-credit-rating-600070745



BCA vs DBS
The earlier rumor about DBS's sudden engagement was probably not without basis. Salim Group's Bank Central Asia (BCA) is expected to be involved in the deal and Hyflux was a darling of DBS bank since the IPO-days, retail preference shares, bonds, and perpetual bonds offerings.

Before the recent weakness in rupiah, BCA had surpassed DBS in market capitalisation since 2016.

DBS toppled by Indonesia-based Bank Central Asia as South-east Asia's largest bank
And now, even more disappointing, one can only conclude that not only our local GLCs low-balled Hyflux, DBS also offered less supports to an old friend (Hyflux) who helped promoted many within DBS's ranks.




Haircut Inevitable for Retail Investors if Hyflux Falls into Indonesian Hands
The biggest winners in the deal will be the Indonesian investors and Hyflux's management.

In simple maths, Indonesia's investment ($400m for 60%) will give Hyflux a $666.7m market cap valuation, assuming the Indonesian investors convince unsecured stakeholder absorb capital-losses.

Hyflux's next 6 months will not likely be profitable, due to penalties from overdues, operating losses and delays in Tuas-One. Hyflux has a near-zero NTA in the last reporting and with continued losses, it is not unreasonable to assume that Hyflux's NTA is almost zero now.

If Hyflux's $666m market-cap presents a 1/3 discount to NTA (after restructuring) due to it's the reasons cited in the earlier paragraph, Hyflux's NTA will about $1billion after the debt-restructuring. Taking away the value of $400m injected, it hints that unsecured stakeholders need to write-down over $600m in exposure.

Unfortunately, most of Hyflux's retail investors are ranked-last in terms of debt-seniority and a full absorption of the $600m debt-reduction out of their $900m exposure will equate to a 66% haircut for the perpetual bonds and preference shareholders (The figure could be lowered by half to approximately 33%, if other unsecured bankers bear a smaller haircut for their exposures).




Still Hoping for a State Bailout
Hyflux's downfall can be attributed to three main external factors; overcapacity in power generation, "use-or-burn" requirement in gas-contracts and PUB's regulatory hindrance.

Olivia Lum's willingness to engage the Indonesian squashes earlier rumours that she hindered any ownership-change.

Hyflux is the largest corporate-collapse in the history of Singapore, affecting over 50,000 retail investors. Combined-exposures to Hyflux bonds, perpetual bonds, preference shares and ordinary shares exceed $1.5billion. Numerous lower/middle-incomed and retirees were exposed to Hyflux's retail offerings.

Hyflux may be highly-indebted but it is not uncommon for utility companies. She was drowned by regulations and policy-failures; and in similar plight, Singapore did engineered a bail-out for SMRT. Likewise, Singapore also bailed out Olam when there were flagged by Muddy Waters.

In a recent Zaobao article on 14th Oct 2018, the author concludes, "If the government insists that the water and power plant can only be sold to a local company, then the solution has be a government intervention; through privatization or sale to a GLC at a reasonable price, to protect national interests. Otherwise, Singapore should consider the recent market-liberalization model of our public bus sector (foreign ownership). "

Olam's listed debts surged above par, after Termasek's takeover. If there is a state takeover of Hyflux for a majority stake, there will not even be serious need for haircuts to restructure any debts and bankers will keenly refinance existing debts at significantly better rates. Hyflux will no longer be sunk by debts and easily return to profitability. Doing so, will restore and create value for every stakeholder.

With so many Singaporeans affected and their immediate dependents, we shall still be hopeful that the state will assist very soon to avoid disruptions and erosion in public-confidence.
 
Heng that I don’t have much Hyflux exposure.
If really become 0 value my preferences share
Then I just lost 4000+
Lesson learnt and don’t trust those high debt company !
Once the company in debt, will forever in debt and with huge debt

Be more realistic, it is hard for investors, be it share holders and bond holders to recover money from this.
Who to blame? Hyflux, government not bail hylufx out or ourselves?
I will only blame myself for silly mistake and greedy and never do my homework properly.
 
Hyflux has a near-zero NTA in the last reporting and with continued losses, it is not unreasonable to assume that Hyflux's NTA is almost zero now. If Hyflux's $666m market-cap presents a 1/3 discount to NTA (after restructuring) due to it's the reasons cited in the earlier paragraph, Hyflux's NTA will about $1billion after the debt-restructuring. Taking away the value of $400m injected, it hints that unsecured stakeholders need to write-down over $600m in exposure.

Unfortunately, most of Hyflux's retail investors are ranked-last in terms of debt-seniority and a full absorption of the $600m debt-reduction out of their $900m exposure will equate to a 66% haircut for the perpetual bonds and preference shareholders (The figure could be lowered by half to approximately 33%, if other unsecured bankers bear a smaller haircut for their exposures).



小投资者应做好心理准备
Today's article - Retail investors should be mentally prepared.
http://beltandroad.zaobao.com/beltandroad/news/story20181022-901099
 
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In both Noble & Hyflux saga, yours truly feels that the happiest people are the management.
They didn't put the interests of the investors before their's.

Both companies clearly protect the rice-bowls of the management while retail investors face huge write-offs.

Noble Group files Chapter 15 papers as it seeks restructuring
https://splash247.com/noble-seeks-chapter-15-protection-in-new-york

Olivia Lum - "Today's A Happy Day"
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...knights-put-s530m-hyflux-rescue-plan-on-table

Seriously, how could they have the heart to be so happy?
 
For the deal to go through, Hyflux will also require “a full and final settlement, discharge and/or redemption of the unsecured financial debt” through a debt restructuring.
https://www.bondsupermart.com/main/article/Bond-Market-Monitor-22-Oct-2018-595

Things will get very ugly in the days ahead for Hyflux. Take clue from Noble Group.

FULL & FINAL SETTLEMENT discharge or redemption for unsecured debts - bonds, preference shares and perpetual bonds
They don't have all the money to redeem, so means haircut (write-off) or convert the bonds to later maturity with lower coupons and/or lower par value.

If retail investors reject whatever is thrown at their faces, corporate lawyers will gladly file Hyflux under the new debt restructuring laws, which will raise Singapore's profile as a heaven for insolvent companies to seek court protection.

New Omnibus Bill Introduced to Update and Strengthen Singapore’s Insolvency and Debt Restructuring Laws
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/min...gapore-insovlency-debtrestructuring-laws.html
 
Temasek is willing to invest in companies like Hainan Airlines which issues bonds at 13.17% yield?
https://www.reuters.com/article/hna...raises-100-mln-bond-pays-12-pct-idUSL3N1X51CS

HONG KONG, Oct 24 (Reuters) - HNA-affiliated Hainan Airlines - China’s fourth-largest carrier - has sold $100 million in two-year U.S. dollar bonds carrying a 12 percent coupon, in a sign of the financing strains felt by units of the indebted Chinese conglomerate. The new bonds were priced at a slight discount, meaning they will yield 13.17 percent to maturity.

In June, it outlined plans to acquire aviation assets worth $1.6 billion, to be funded by a share issue to investors including Singapore state investor Temasek Holdings, after which control of Hainan Airlines would pass to HNA-affiliated Hainan Province Cihang Foundation.
 
Buying Preference Shares and Perpetual bonds is like buying HDB right?

Legally, issuer or HDB are not obliged to buy back from you, but everyone is under the impression that the Preference Shares / Perpetual Bonds will be redeemed on first-call date and HDB will buy back all older HDB through SERS.
 

Attachments

Going for broke - A restructuring that is going nowhere
Like an Alvanache, Hyflux’s Creditors just realized that nobody knows how much Hyflux is hiding from us, where the voids are under the fingers of snow that is pulling more down as each day passes.

Highlights from 29th Oct’s Court Hearings:-
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/new...k-four-month-extension-of-moratorium-10882860
  • Additional Hidden Losses - TuasOne waste-to-energy plant, which has seen costs double “in just a matter of months” from S$85 million in May to S$172 million according to the latest affidavit filed this month.
  • Based on creditors’ own computations, Hyflux was seeing a “cash burn of S$1.7 million” per week since the reorganisation started.
  • Priority Treatment in Debt seniority for new fundings from Indonesia, in the event Hyflux collapses completely.
 
Actually the retail investors will have some money left if Hyflux liquidates because water and power assets are highly-sought after. Because Olivia put up a struggle and refuse to cede her leadership, she is going to resort to the new DIP financing legislation which will allow her to retain her position while enjoying fresh source of financing which are ranked higher than all other debts. If this goes through, and if she continues to not do well, all current bonds, preference shares and perpetual shareholders have nothing left during liquidation. understand?
Super priority -
The rationale is that "it is only where there is some evidence that the company cannot otherwise get financing that it would be fair and reasonable to reorder the priorities on winding up, giving the rescue financier the ability to get ahead in the queue for assets." Therefore, the applicant should prove to the court that "reasonable attempts at trying to secure financing" were made in order to seek super priority status.

DIP financing legislation
The current Hyflux restructuring, relating to a water treatment group in Singapore, has seen the debtor company reportedly engage with more than 20 potential rescue lenders with a view to utilising the new DIP financing legislation.
http://www.mondaq.com/x/732782/Fina...sia+Considerations+For+Financial+Institutions

Olivia's dream came true. No wonder that she was so happy about the Indonesian deal.

BT_20181019_MRHYFLUX_3593769.jpg


Hyflux applies for super priority for rescue financing
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...plies-for-super-priority-for-rescue-financing

In both Noble & Hyflux saga, yours truly feels that the happiest people are the management.
They didn't put the interests of the investors before their's.

Olivia Lum - "Today's A Happy Day"
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...knights-put-s530m-hyflux-rescue-plan-on-table

Seriously, how could they have the heart to be so happy?
 
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Salim pays $400m to control 60% of Hyflux. It sounds like a rape as we deep further into the underlying debt-restructuring terms and conditions.

Saving Hyflux is no sweat for the Temasek or PUB.
 
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Worried friends have been calling about what is our take on Hyflux’s “application for super priority for rescue financing” in the courts. Without delving into details, for there is none that the public can avail themselves to, we can only guess that the cash injection will not be going towards paying off creditors anytime soon and we are looking at boom times for the lawyers.

Talking about poor treatment of creditors and bond investors getting the thumbs down at restructuring meetings such as an alleged incident of a certain chairman who yelled “You can walk out of here, you won’t get a cent back”, to a substantial bond holder, we also have other chairmen of bankrupted companies appearing on Straits Times Me & My Property section a few months post-default, with no mention of the default, of course.

Wait a minute here. Nobody should buy a bond with the thought of default which defeats the purpose of buying a bond in the first place. We certainly do not think that way when we buy equities and they are certainly higher up the risk ladder than bonds.

Locally, the Singapore bond market has other problems besides Hyflux and CW Advanced Technologies’s default in June this year.

  • What about Lippo Group (linked to Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust, OUE and First Reit etc) whose deputy chairman’s home was raised last month on corruption charges?
  • What about Vibrant Group (S$ 66 million in bonds outstanding) which suffered a “suspicious fire” in China that led to the destruction of vital accounting information?
  • Lendlease Group (LLC AU), Singapore investors’ favourite Australian real estate bond issuer with S$650 million in bonds outstanding, had to call off a US$ 500 million bond issue on Friday after shocking A$350 million writedown that wiped 18.3% off its share price.

The other bigger concern for the layman and investors would be market liquidity—the availability of finding bids or offers for bond instruments.
As we have been informed, it is considerably harder to get prices these days and we are not referring to Vibrant or Lippo Reit bonds which, as we understand, have not traded for a long time.


http://www.hnworth.com/article/2018/11/12/we-all-love-to-hate-the-bond-market
 
Liquidity is gone in SGD bond space.

Meltdown in Offshore & Marine counters, Noble Group and Hyflux had left many DBS Treasures' clients high & dry and SCB to instruct their RMs to stop promoting bonds to their bank clients.
 
JAIL THE MOTHERFUCKERS IN NOBLE's MANAGEMENT, hyflux better watch your back

Noble Group Under Investigation by Singapore Over Accounts
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...nder-investigation-by-singapore-over-accounts

Commodity trader Noble Group Ltd. and one of its units is being investigated by the authorities in Singapore for suspected false and misleading statements and breaches of disclosure requirements under the Securities and Futures Act and potential non-compliance with accounting standards.

The probe is being conducted by the Commercial Affairs Department, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, the agencies said in a statement on Tuesday. The trader’s shares are suspended this week amid its planned debt-for-equity restructuring. An external spokeswoman for the company declined to comment.

The Commercial Affairs Department, or CAD, is responsible for probing white-collar crime in the city-state. “Anything involving Singapore’s CAD is very serious,” said Alex Turnbull, managing partner at Keshik Capital Pte. “It’s good that they finally got round to taking a deeper look at this situation.
 
May i ask why is no one sueing them? SGX is fucked up i know, what other recourse is there?
 
May i ask why is no one sueing them? SGX is fucked up i know, what other recourse is there?

If you look at the earlier posts in this thread, you would notice local and foreign analysts and academics are asking the same question as you. Both companies refused to write-down their assets' valuation and continued to seek issue more bonds to tide things over.

Hyflux definitely can be sued because they XD their perpetuals and did not pay. This is an obvious case but regulators did not act for six months.

A few hours ago, i shared about the guidance by banks' management. It is getting ugly.

There is a saying now that there are a lot of auctions in our local property scene in the past six months because a lot of investors went bust because of Noble Group and Hyflux's defaults. These are the first wave that used leverage on Noble Group and Hyflux shares/bonds. Next, many more will have to downgrade their dwellings to patch the colossal share and bond losses to fund their retirement or kids' education. Not just the private properties, even HDB is affected as many Hyflux investors are commoners.

Domino Effect expected in local property market 2019. GE2019 will be interesting to watch.
 
More troubles in Hyflux, their plant in Algeria is gone

https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...chase-contract-for-hyflux-jv-plant-in-algeria

INSOLVENT water project developer Hyflux said on Tuesday that the offtakers of its Souk Tleta desalination plant in Algeria are trying to terminate their water purchase agreement. The Souk Tleta plant supplies water to Algérienne des Eaux, the state-owned national water company of Algeria, and Sonatrach, the national oil company.
The offtakers have sent a "purported notice of termination" to Almiyah Attilemcania, the project developer, and its 51 per cent shareholder Tlemcen Desalination Investment Company (TDIC). Hyflux owns 30 per cent of TDIC.
 
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