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IDF Maj.-Gen. Dan Goldfus considers that his breakthrough in overcoming Hamas’s tunnel warfare is not about a single moment in which he had an epiphany but the result of hard, exhaustive work.
INCOMING NORTHERN Corps and Multi-Domain Joint Maneuver Array Maj.-Gen. Dan Goldfus. (photo credit: SETH J. FRANTZMAN)
There is a reason that incoming Northern Corps and Multi-Domain Joint Maneuver Array Maj.-Gen. Dan Goldfus is considered one of the rising stars of the IDF.
Israel Defense Forces Brig.-Gen. Itzik Cohen of Division 162, along with Brig.-Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa of Division 36 (also becoming a major general but in a less upwardly mobile position), Brig.-Gen. Barak Hiram of Division 99, and Brig.-Gen. Moran Omer of Division 252 have all played important roles in the invasion of northern Gaza. So what is so special about Goldfus?
One of the reasons that South African-Israeli Goldfus – promoted from brigadier general to major general in May – is joining the high command (others to hold his next post have gone on to become IDF chief, IDF deputy chief, and IDF intelligence chief) is that he is both the hero of Hamas’s defeat in Khan Yunis and the general who broke up the terrorist group’s network of tunnels.
How did Dan Goldfus overcome Hamas's tunnel networks and defeat them in Khan Yunis?
The Magazine has learned that Goldfus considers that his breakthrough in overcoming Hamas’s tunnel warfare is not about a single moment in which he had an epiphany but the result of hard, exhaustive, and continuous work.If, at first, the soldiers in his Division 98 – considered almost a special forces unit – had to slowly and clumsily feel their way around in the dark of the Hamas tunnels, they eventually became, in his view, the first army in modern history to carry out large-scale, full-unit invasions, maneuvering throughout the Hamas tunnel network.
The Magazine learned that in the initial stages of the war, Goldfus’s forces were required to focus on basics, such as recording the size of the tunnels, their volume, and their depth. Likewise, they just needed to get used to the aspect of the tunnels and to dig into them, gather photos, and study them. Over time, this systematic approach began to help build more confidence.
Goldfus and his troops would slowly explore various tunnel depths and examine the types of equipment Hamas used in differing tunnels but with very targeted and circumscribed goals and missions.
WHEN HE and his forces went in, Goldfus, being a soldier’s soldier, insisted on entering a huge number of tunnels himself to see them up close despite the extra risk to his person, as they usually did not yet know what to expect.
The Magazine understands that they would have a specific goal for each area in question, usually starting with tunnels about which Goldfus had received more extensive pre-operation intelligence from Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and IDF intelligence sources – particularly if Hamas was putting up a bigger fight to fend off IDF advances from a particular tunnel shaft.
At the outset, neither Goldfus nor any of the other generals allowed full units to maneuver down into the tunnels. So, even in early January, three months into the war and a full month after the then-brigadier general had invaded Khan Yunis, IDF soldiers very rarely ventured into the tunnels.
