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GIC lost 41%? Accountabiliity please!
- Thread starter Goh Meng Seng
- Start date
Germany had the perfect opportunity to wipe out the Allies before they evacuated from Dunkirk. But Hilter was sleeping and no one dared to wake him up nor make a decision to launch a massive attack. By the time Hilter woke up "naturally", it was too late. They missed the chance of their lifetime.
The decision to invade Russia was right, but the timing was deadly wrong. It will be foolish to tink one can rule the entire Europe without taking down the russians.
Dear London
Well written and well debated. I would agree with you that they misread the severity of the ongoing crisis, were excessively bullish and timed the investments wrongly. Some degree of caution was well advised but the argument or dispute with GMS is over whether it was a ' Risky Bet." which he characterized as "hedge fund " like :_)) Something I disagree with.
Locke
Well written and well debated. I would agree with you that they misread the severity of the ongoing crisis, were excessively bullish and timed the investments wrongly. Some degree of caution was well advised but the argument or dispute with GMS is over whether it was a ' Risky Bet." which he characterized as "hedge fund " like :_)) Something I disagree with.
Locke
Dear GMS
Ok another series of questions and definitely more legitimate ones. The extent of due diligence done before the deal and the extent to which both GIC and Temasek were aware of the losses on valuation uncertainty on the books of the banks. Something which definitely should be raised and something I can agree on.
Firstly can we agree that they GIC did not definitely take on "risky bet" like or act like hedge funds or are you still sticking to that blanket hyperbole,
Now if we can remove that ridiculous hedge fund assertion out of the way , the question becomes the degree of "risk" undertaken in the deals done by Temasek and GIC and the extent of due dilligence done beforehand.
I believe we are in agreement that SWF's should seek better returns through investments globally in equities. The question currently which should be asked was the extent of due dilligence done before the deal by both GIC, Temasek and Merrill and the amount of protection sought in case of furthur dilution or nationalization.
Again I would state everyone knew of trouble ahead, the only question was the extent of trouble and one's judgement of timing would be based around those evaluations.
Locke
Ok another series of questions and definitely more legitimate ones. The extent of due diligence done before the deal and the extent to which both GIC and Temasek were aware of the losses on valuation uncertainty on the books of the banks. Something which definitely should be raised and something I can agree on.
Firstly can we agree that they GIC did not definitely take on "risky bet" like or act like hedge funds or are you still sticking to that blanket hyperbole,
Now if we can remove that ridiculous hedge fund assertion out of the way , the question becomes the degree of "risk" undertaken in the deals done by Temasek and GIC and the extent of due dilligence done beforehand.
I believe we are in agreement that SWF's should seek better returns through investments globally in equities. The question currently which should be asked was the extent of due dilligence done before the deal by both GIC, Temasek and Merrill and the amount of protection sought in case of furthur dilution or nationalization.
Again I would state everyone knew of trouble ahead, the only question was the extent of trouble and one's judgement of timing would be based around those evaluations.
Locke
Dear Locke,
Let me rephrase it for you.
1) We should agree that GIC and Temasek are SWF that SHOULD NOT place HIGH RISKY BETS, just like other hedge funds.
2) The principal aim of GIC and Temasek as SWFs are to PRESERVE THE VALUE of the National reserves and NOT MAKING LOTS of money from risky investment.
3) Then the question now is, WHY THE HELL are they losing so much money as bad as HEDGE FUNDS and other commercially run funds?
4) Are they investing JUST LIKE any other HEDGE FUNDS or commercially run funds which result in the similarly percentage losses?
5) By observations on their investments in Shin Corp and those failing banks with HUGE AMOUNT of money in the last few years, ARE THEY BEHAVING accroding to SWF's first two principles or are they behaving more like Hedge Fuinds?
6) To determine number 5, then questions should be asked, ARE THOSE BETS made on Shin Corp and failing banks HIGH RISKY BETS? I guess other than you, almost everybody here agree that they are HIGH RISKY BETS made AT THAT POINT OF TIME with ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION, regardless of whether these are WISE or Foolish BETS.
7) Thus, the conclusion is that these two SWFs of ours are not performing accordingly which resulted in hefty losses by taking UNNECESSARY HIGH RISKY BETS.
8) And the most important point is that we CANNOT use the argument that because all other HEDGE FUNDS are losing the same percentage of money therefore GIC and Temasek's losses are " ACCEPTABLE" because they are NOT SUPPOSED to be like hedge funds in the first place!
9) Thus, because SWFs are PUBLIC MONEY and thus POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY has to be sort after.
Quite easy and logical argument I have here.
Goh Meng Seng
Let me rephrase it for you.
1) We should agree that GIC and Temasek are SWF that SHOULD NOT place HIGH RISKY BETS, just like other hedge funds.
2) The principal aim of GIC and Temasek as SWFs are to PRESERVE THE VALUE of the National reserves and NOT MAKING LOTS of money from risky investment.
3) Then the question now is, WHY THE HELL are they losing so much money as bad as HEDGE FUNDS and other commercially run funds?
4) Are they investing JUST LIKE any other HEDGE FUNDS or commercially run funds which result in the similarly percentage losses?
5) By observations on their investments in Shin Corp and those failing banks with HUGE AMOUNT of money in the last few years, ARE THEY BEHAVING accroding to SWF's first two principles or are they behaving more like Hedge Fuinds?
6) To determine number 5, then questions should be asked, ARE THOSE BETS made on Shin Corp and failing banks HIGH RISKY BETS? I guess other than you, almost everybody here agree that they are HIGH RISKY BETS made AT THAT POINT OF TIME with ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION, regardless of whether these are WISE or Foolish BETS.
7) Thus, the conclusion is that these two SWFs of ours are not performing accordingly which resulted in hefty losses by taking UNNECESSARY HIGH RISKY BETS.
8) And the most important point is that we CANNOT use the argument that because all other HEDGE FUNDS are losing the same percentage of money therefore GIC and Temasek's losses are " ACCEPTABLE" because they are NOT SUPPOSED to be like hedge funds in the first place!
9) Thus, because SWFs are PUBLIC MONEY and thus POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY has to be sort after.
Quite easy and logical argument I have here.
Goh Meng Seng
"the argument or dispute with GMS is over whether it was a ' Risky Bet." which he characterized as "hedge fund " like :_)) Something I disagree with."
Locke,
I don't regard that investment decison as particularly "hedge fund like" mainly because of the lack of leverage. Here is an example of a "hedge fund like" portfolio:
Total Assets = $125 billion
Investor Base = $4 billion
Leverage = >30 times
I don't think GIC or Temasek fit that description.
However, I have to agree with GMS's "Risky Bet" assertion.
My reasons:
The investment was highly concentrated, which was unusual for GIC's Public Mkts Team (Temasek does make concentrated bets). Warren Buffet (you mentioned him before) is rather fond of concentrated bets. He acknowledges that a high degree of concentration is very risky but manages that risk by imposing a set of very strict criteria ie. the fundamentals are fantastic and the price is cheap!
So, did this particular concentrated bet by GIC, Temasek & other SWFs satisfy such a criteria?
1. At the beginning of 2008, the near (and medium) term fundamentals for a balance sheet distressed US money centre or investment bank was pretty dire to say the least! Even the long term picture was cloudy with the prospect of more regulation, revised capital requirements (ie. more capital needed=less leverage=less profit) and the very real prospect of large bank failures looming. The Swiss and German banks looked in pretty much the same shape.
2. The bank balance sheets were chock full of CDSs etc.. that were nearly impossible to value! You couldn't even mark to mkt because much of that mkt had evaporated. So you used stale prices, marked to model, imposed "going concern" prices, stress tested using "liquidation" prices = hmmm things looked kinda bankrupt! The bal sheet problem was further compounded by counterparty risks ie. the fate of my bal sheet seems to depend on some one else's bal sheet too.
3. The mkt was already talking about the need for Federal capital injections if the big banks started to stress ie. they couldn't raise enough additional investor capital. A govt capital injection = shareholders get screwed big time. GIC and Temasek did note that risk and had some protection built into their investments. So the question is "why the need for protection if the fundamentals were so good????" and if the fundamentals were not so good, WHY INVEST AT ALL????
4. You should have noted that the investments were made very quickly because of the banks' urgent need for new capital. I can't for the life of me see how the GIC and Temasek teams managed to examine the books and reach a CLEAR understanding of their position. Buffet was quoted as saying that the only clear understanding he had of the banks' financials was that he couldn't comprehend them! (or something to that effect)
5. Liquidity was getting tight. Any one making a a concentrated investment in this situation had to acknowledge that there would be no escape routes if you screwed it up.
So can we agree that the fundamentals were crap or at the very least uncertain? So why did the SWFs invest? Here is a collection of views I got from people in the business:
a. They couldn't pass up an opportunity to acquire such a large stake. These banks had been top of the food chain and it had been difficult to acquire large holdings. So people got greedy when the buffet table started to open up.
b. The price was cheap by historical standards so it had to go up when we got back to business as usual right??? But that's only half of the Buffet criteria ie. cheap yes but the fundamentals??? Also, history tends to repeat itself until one day it stops repeating.
c. The guys who worked at GIC, Temasek & other SWFs had extremely close relationships with CITIC, Merrill, UBS etc.. Many of them were also alumni. What I kept hearing was that they had immense confidence in the businesses because they were so intimately acquainted and had the inside track so to speak.
d. CITIC, Merrill, UBS etc. were coming off a decade + of very impressive performance. We now know that a lot of that performance was hot air. So we had a bunch of guys in the SWFs who were still thinking and living in the past.
To summarize:
The SWFs bought concentrated stakes in an increasingly illiquid environment with the prospect (which they acknowledged themselves) of fundamentals getting worse before possibly recovering (and maybe recovering into a new less profitable environment). That looks like a pretty risky bet to me even without applying leverage.
Since we're on the topic, here is what I (as a singaporean and default shareholder) expect from my SWFs:
1. First order : To preserve capital
2. Second order : investment returns
3. I accept losses because they are in the risk taking business afterall. However, the returns should LAG during a BULL mkt (indicating caution) and LEAD during a BEAR mkt (indicating capital preservation).
4. Transparency : we have any at the moment????
5. So what kind of performace do I expect over 2008:
down <20% would be quite good
down between 20-25% would be my expectation
down up to 30% would be bad
down 41% is very disappointing
anymore than that and heads should start rolling
Hope this makes for informative reading
cheers
Locke,
I don't regard that investment decison as particularly "hedge fund like" mainly because of the lack of leverage. Here is an example of a "hedge fund like" portfolio:
Total Assets = $125 billion
Investor Base = $4 billion
Leverage = >30 times
I don't think GIC or Temasek fit that description.
However, I have to agree with GMS's "Risky Bet" assertion.
My reasons:
The investment was highly concentrated, which was unusual for GIC's Public Mkts Team (Temasek does make concentrated bets). Warren Buffet (you mentioned him before) is rather fond of concentrated bets. He acknowledges that a high degree of concentration is very risky but manages that risk by imposing a set of very strict criteria ie. the fundamentals are fantastic and the price is cheap!
So, did this particular concentrated bet by GIC, Temasek & other SWFs satisfy such a criteria?
1. At the beginning of 2008, the near (and medium) term fundamentals for a balance sheet distressed US money centre or investment bank was pretty dire to say the least! Even the long term picture was cloudy with the prospect of more regulation, revised capital requirements (ie. more capital needed=less leverage=less profit) and the very real prospect of large bank failures looming. The Swiss and German banks looked in pretty much the same shape.
2. The bank balance sheets were chock full of CDSs etc.. that were nearly impossible to value! You couldn't even mark to mkt because much of that mkt had evaporated. So you used stale prices, marked to model, imposed "going concern" prices, stress tested using "liquidation" prices = hmmm things looked kinda bankrupt! The bal sheet problem was further compounded by counterparty risks ie. the fate of my bal sheet seems to depend on some one else's bal sheet too.
3. The mkt was already talking about the need for Federal capital injections if the big banks started to stress ie. they couldn't raise enough additional investor capital. A govt capital injection = shareholders get screwed big time. GIC and Temasek did note that risk and had some protection built into their investments. So the question is "why the need for protection if the fundamentals were so good????" and if the fundamentals were not so good, WHY INVEST AT ALL????
4. You should have noted that the investments were made very quickly because of the banks' urgent need for new capital. I can't for the life of me see how the GIC and Temasek teams managed to examine the books and reach a CLEAR understanding of their position. Buffet was quoted as saying that the only clear understanding he had of the banks' financials was that he couldn't comprehend them! (or something to that effect)
5. Liquidity was getting tight. Any one making a a concentrated investment in this situation had to acknowledge that there would be no escape routes if you screwed it up.
So can we agree that the fundamentals were crap or at the very least uncertain? So why did the SWFs invest? Here is a collection of views I got from people in the business:
a. They couldn't pass up an opportunity to acquire such a large stake. These banks had been top of the food chain and it had been difficult to acquire large holdings. So people got greedy when the buffet table started to open up.
b. The price was cheap by historical standards so it had to go up when we got back to business as usual right??? But that's only half of the Buffet criteria ie. cheap yes but the fundamentals??? Also, history tends to repeat itself until one day it stops repeating.
c. The guys who worked at GIC, Temasek & other SWFs had extremely close relationships with CITIC, Merrill, UBS etc.. Many of them were also alumni. What I kept hearing was that they had immense confidence in the businesses because they were so intimately acquainted and had the inside track so to speak.
d. CITIC, Merrill, UBS etc. were coming off a decade + of very impressive performance. We now know that a lot of that performance was hot air. So we had a bunch of guys in the SWFs who were still thinking and living in the past.
To summarize:
The SWFs bought concentrated stakes in an increasingly illiquid environment with the prospect (which they acknowledged themselves) of fundamentals getting worse before possibly recovering (and maybe recovering into a new less profitable environment). That looks like a pretty risky bet to me even without applying leverage.
Since we're on the topic, here is what I (as a singaporean and default shareholder) expect from my SWFs:
1. First order : To preserve capital
2. Second order : investment returns
3. I accept losses because they are in the risk taking business afterall. However, the returns should LAG during a BULL mkt (indicating caution) and LEAD during a BEAR mkt (indicating capital preservation).
4. Transparency : we have any at the moment????
5. So what kind of performace do I expect over 2008:
down <20% would be quite good
down between 20-25% would be my expectation
down up to 30% would be bad
down 41% is very disappointing
anymore than that and heads should start rolling
Hope this makes for informative reading
cheers
Last edited:
Dear London
Fair enough and thanks for a well written contribution, but I wish you well in convincing my friend that GIC did or acted like a "hedge fund" in making such a risky bet.
I would suggest that you take a look at the Norwegian Pension fund which is a paragon of transparency. As a shareholder of GIC and Temasek and yes its my money and not the Governments money I agree fully that disclosure, debate and discussion is in the order of the day. It will as well hopefully stop some of the more insane "coffeeshop comments" like " GIC is a hedge fund" being bandied around without thought or care.
1. The Norwegians have an absolute limit on the amount of stock it can hold in anyone company. For discussion sake do u think its wise ? Norwegians have it at under 1%, should GIC be limited similarly ? Should we spread our bets over all companies or spread our bets over a few good ones.
2. Risk versus Returns. You have raised a good point about the "possibility" of group think and an inability of like minded alumnus or masters of the universe to conceive of the sky falling around them. Anyway to hire a diversity of opinion ?
3. How much due diligence is done for buying such a large stake. For example the Abu Dubai people and Warren, did they comparatively do more due diligence ?
4. I would still disagree about a risky bet though I personally did not believe the bottom of the market was near at that period, was in cash still in cash, but I do know loads of small investors who believed that the pricing was good historically and the macro picture would not collapse to the extent that it did. For what its worth I do not consider it a risky bet at that moment because the financial reporting of that period was generally more positive. Its more negative and gloom and doom so my belief is they probably overshot on the down side.
Cheers
Locke
Fair enough and thanks for a well written contribution, but I wish you well in convincing my friend that GIC did or acted like a "hedge fund" in making such a risky bet.
I would suggest that you take a look at the Norwegian Pension fund which is a paragon of transparency. As a shareholder of GIC and Temasek and yes its my money and not the Governments money I agree fully that disclosure, debate and discussion is in the order of the day. It will as well hopefully stop some of the more insane "coffeeshop comments" like " GIC is a hedge fund" being bandied around without thought or care.
1. The Norwegians have an absolute limit on the amount of stock it can hold in anyone company. For discussion sake do u think its wise ? Norwegians have it at under 1%, should GIC be limited similarly ? Should we spread our bets over all companies or spread our bets over a few good ones.
2. Risk versus Returns. You have raised a good point about the "possibility" of group think and an inability of like minded alumnus or masters of the universe to conceive of the sky falling around them. Anyway to hire a diversity of opinion ?
3. How much due diligence is done for buying such a large stake. For example the Abu Dubai people and Warren, did they comparatively do more due diligence ?
4. I would still disagree about a risky bet though I personally did not believe the bottom of the market was near at that period, was in cash still in cash, but I do know loads of small investors who believed that the pricing was good historically and the macro picture would not collapse to the extent that it did. For what its worth I do not consider it a risky bet at that moment because the financial reporting of that period was generally more positive. Its more negative and gloom and doom so my belief is they probably overshot on the down side.
Cheers
Locke
The text book theories always come too late. The question now is how can Singaporean for once take responsibility and stop the vault from bleeding further. Any constructive ideas?
Thanks for the write-up. You are actually too kind. 15% loss is acceptable, anything more than that requires a broad inquiry with an independent team. Value/Capital preservation should be one and only primary apporach for national reserves. I think they must have been tempted by the SWFs of the middle East.
Dear Locke,
You still don't get the FUNDAMENTAL point after reading such detailed analysis!
The fundamental point is NOT about how many percentage SWFs should hold in various equity or bonds combinations!
The FUNDAMENTAL POINT is that SWFs are SUPPOSED to PRESERVE the value of the capital that they are being entrusted with!
And the FUNDAMENTAL POINT is NOT about whether the RISK RETURN ratio is comparable but rather SWFs ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO MAKE HIGH RISKY BETS AT ALL!
The comparison made between Hedge Fund and SWFs are to point out the difference in the Risk Profiles that each supposed to have. If SWFs begin to take high risks, then it is no difference from Hedge Fund as the fundamental principle of investment rule is to make as much money as possible by taking comparably HIGH RISK!
The difference SWFs SHOULD HAVE from hedge funds is that their fundamental role is to PRESERVE CAPITAL VALUE from the erosion of inflation INSTEAD OF taking high risky bets to get high return!
Goh Meng Seng
Dear Londontrader,
Thanks for such a wonderful write up but apparently Locke does not really get the fundamental point right.
Goh Meng Seng
Thanks for such a wonderful write up but apparently Locke does not really get the fundamental point right.
Goh Meng Seng
Dear GMS
If you want preservation of capital then I would suggest holding a 100% bond portfolio QED. If you want growth and returns it means taking on some degree of risk especially with an equity portfolio in any form
Now what exactly do u mean blithely when you just proclaim preservation of capital, equities no equities, or a pure bond portfolio, AAA of all sorts.
Now do SWF funds make such bets ? Yes Abu Dubai and Barclays stands out as one.
This issue though technical is a series one and merits serious discussion not pontificating and politicking from politicians or ex politicians
Is a SWF in equity high risk ? If the Norwegians have a 60% portfolio weightage in equities is that high risk ? Is the very act of being in equities itself high risk ?
Again read london's reply, the amount of risk taken by a SWF in taking a stake is infinitely smaller than the risk underlying a similar hedge fund bet. They are fundamentally different and in no way alike
Was the GIC investment a risky bet ? I would disagree with him and note it as a badly timed investment with a bad read of the macro economics. However there are questions which are relevant and which should be clarified especially with regards to methodology and with timing or evaluation of timing
Can we accept that there will always be a risk of some form with an equity portfolio especially a large one ? How should that risk be mitigated and balanced of with better returns ? Should there be limits on absolute stakes and maximum amounts for investment ?
Locke
If you want preservation of capital then I would suggest holding a 100% bond portfolio QED. If you want growth and returns it means taking on some degree of risk especially with an equity portfolio in any form
Now what exactly do u mean blithely when you just proclaim preservation of capital, equities no equities, or a pure bond portfolio, AAA of all sorts.
Now do SWF funds make such bets ? Yes Abu Dubai and Barclays stands out as one.
This issue though technical is a series one and merits serious discussion not pontificating and politicking from politicians or ex politicians
Is a SWF in equity high risk ? If the Norwegians have a 60% portfolio weightage in equities is that high risk ? Is the very act of being in equities itself high risk ?
Again read london's reply, the amount of risk taken by a SWF in taking a stake is infinitely smaller than the risk underlying a similar hedge fund bet. They are fundamentally different and in no way alike
Was the GIC investment a risky bet ? I would disagree with him and note it as a badly timed investment with a bad read of the macro economics. However there are questions which are relevant and which should be clarified especially with regards to methodology and with timing or evaluation of timing
Can we accept that there will always be a risk of some form with an equity portfolio especially a large one ? How should that risk be mitigated and balanced of with better returns ? Should there be limits on absolute stakes and maximum amounts for investment ?
Locke
Dear Scroobal
I think that is a bit unrealistic in light of the fact that serious investors like Warren are down at least 30, all major indices are down and the Norwegians will broadly follow the market indices
Locke
I think that is a bit unrealistic in light of the fact that serious investors like Warren are down at least 30, all major indices are down and the Norwegians will broadly follow the market indices
Locke
Dear Locke,
Preservation of the VALUE of the capital OVER errosion of capital.
And bonds are not 100% safe, mind you.
The point is not even about whether SWF portfolio is high risk or not, it should not even think about high risk investment!
What other imprudence and technically wrong direction does not make ours right. So what if other countries' SWF has the tendency to make high risk bets? By the way, do you mean implicitly that you agree such investment in Shin Corp and failing banks are high risk?
As I have made my points very clearly. Whatever portfolio you have, the most important thing is that when you made the decision to invest with all the information available, you should not be indulging in high risks high return tendency!
So it means that there is nothing wrong to invest in banks at normal times with information available that these banks are very healthy. But if 5 years down the road, the banks made very bad investments and lose money, the problem does not lie on the initial decision on investing in them by the SWF because at the point of deciding the investment, the risk taken was moderate.
Now, in the present case, I think most people would agree that such HUGE investment with the prevailing conditions and information that are available. So, the quesiton should be, even if this is the same banks 5 years ago, but under such circumstances, is it the proper role for SWFs like GIC and Temasek to invest with such risk level?
Risk, changes with time, even with the same entities. The question is about the investment strategy n risk profile. Risk depends very much on the TIMING itself! How could you use this as an excuse, I really wonder! Same bank 10 years ago would have very much less risk than 2007!
I give up.
Goh Meng Seng
Preservation of the VALUE of the capital OVER errosion of capital.
And bonds are not 100% safe, mind you.
The point is not even about whether SWF portfolio is high risk or not, it should not even think about high risk investment!
What other imprudence and technically wrong direction does not make ours right. So what if other countries' SWF has the tendency to make high risk bets? By the way, do you mean implicitly that you agree such investment in Shin Corp and failing banks are high risk?
As I have made my points very clearly. Whatever portfolio you have, the most important thing is that when you made the decision to invest with all the information available, you should not be indulging in high risks high return tendency!
So it means that there is nothing wrong to invest in banks at normal times with information available that these banks are very healthy. But if 5 years down the road, the banks made very bad investments and lose money, the problem does not lie on the initial decision on investing in them by the SWF because at the point of deciding the investment, the risk taken was moderate.
Now, in the present case, I think most people would agree that such HUGE investment with the prevailing conditions and information that are available. So, the quesiton should be, even if this is the same banks 5 years ago, but under such circumstances, is it the proper role for SWFs like GIC and Temasek to invest with such risk level?
Risk, changes with time, even with the same entities. The question is about the investment strategy n risk profile. Risk depends very much on the TIMING itself! How could you use this as an excuse, I really wonder! Same bank 10 years ago would have very much less risk than 2007!
I give up.
Goh Meng Seng
Dear Locke,
You shouldn't even compare GIC & Temasek with Warran Buffet in that sense because the risk profile should be very different! Low risk low return but also low loss. GIC & Temasek should have much LOWER LOSSES than Warran Buffet, not COMPARABLE!
Goh Meng Seng
You all voted and voted for that bastard LKY and his stinking scums in white.
So that LKY can fuck and bleed 400++ billions of your money into his Temmasick and GIC
WHAT FUCKING ACCOUNTABILITY DID YOU EXPECT FROM THAT BASTARD LKY WHEN YOU ALL KNEW THAT HE IS SUCH A FUCKING BASTARD?
YOU DID NOT HAVE THE BALLS OR BRAINS TO SEE WHAT HE WAS DOING TO YOU AND DID NOT VOTE HIM OUT
OPEN YOUR LEGS AND LET HIM CONTINUE TO SCREW YOU
So that LKY can fuck and bleed 400++ billions of your money into his Temmasick and GIC
WHAT FUCKING ACCOUNTABILITY DID YOU EXPECT FROM THAT BASTARD LKY WHEN YOU ALL KNEW THAT HE IS SUCH A FUCKING BASTARD?
YOU DID NOT HAVE THE BALLS OR BRAINS TO SEE WHAT HE WAS DOING TO YOU AND DID NOT VOTE HIM OUT
OPEN YOUR LEGS AND LET HIM CONTINUE TO SCREW YOU
Are u metally retarded or mentally myopic?Its sinkies like you with their brain in their arses that have driven us to the fucked up situation we are in now!!
Firstly, Kuwait. You think Iraq invaded Kuwait due to its large national reserve? U are a fucking moron. National reserves are all computerized, and spread around the world. just because Kuwait or singapore has 100s of billion dollars in reserves does not mean that the reserves are IN COUNTRY. They are in investment accounts around the world. Unless all our national reserves
are converted to gold and locked up in the Istana, there is nothing here for them to loot. Iraq wanted the huge Kuwait oil reserves. Do we have any valuable natural resource like that?
Second, Indonesia. Indonesia can ask all the kopi money they want from us. So what if we don;t give it? They will invade us? How? They got huge problems just mobilising a rescue fleet to go to bandar Acheh. They will need to land at least 100,000 soldiers with arty and armour support to invade us. How the shit they are going to do that?
Use ur brains if you have any. No one is flaunting their wealth here. Only an idiot liek you thinks that.
Z
Zombie
Guest
The objectives of GIC: To preserve and enhance the international purchasing power of Singapore's reserves, by achieving a real rate of return over and above the G3 inflation rate over a long-term horizon.
http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_profile_mission.htm
It is therefore, preserve + taking risk (but a question of how much over and above ie how much risk - I leave this for you to decide)
GMS assumed only the "preserve" role.
