An article perhaps the prospective emigrants should also take a look at before making a move.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer703/aer703.pdf
Abstract
Recent studies suggest that possible global increases in temperature and
changes in precipitation patterns during the next century will affect world agriculture. Because of the ability of farmers to adapt , however, these changes are not likely to imperil world food production. Nevertheless, world production of all goods and services may decline, if climate change is severe enough or if cropland expansion is hindered. Impacts are not equally distributed around the world. Agricultural production may increase in arctic and alpine areas, but decrease in tropical and some other areas. In the United States, soil moisture losses may reduce agricultural production in the Corn Belt and Southeast.
Keywords: Climate change, world agriculture
Summary
Possible changes in climate may spur geographic shifts in agricultural production and structure, but should not significantly affect the level of U.S. and world food production. We evaluate the effects of global climate change on world agriculture with a model that links climatic conditions to land and water resources and to production, trade, and consumption of 13 commodities throughout the world.
The model has three unique capabilities. First, it simulates the potential effects of global climate change on the availability and productivity of agriculturally suitable land. Second, it determines the extent to which farmers respond to climate change, such as by adopting alternative production systems and by expanding (or abandoning) agricultural lands. Third, it provides quantitative estimates of land and water use changes, because it simulates the competition between agriculture and the rest of the economy for these resources.
We evaluated four global-climate-change scenarios based on a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. These scenarios were derived
from results projected by meteorological models at the Goddard Institute for
Space Studies, the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, the United Kingdom Meteorological Office, and Oregon State University and embody a range of average global temperature and precipitation changes (2.8-5.2oC and 7.8-15.0 percent, respectively). Our principal results are:
(1) Global changes in temperature and precipitation patterns during the
next century are not likely to imperil food production for the world as a
whole. Although world production of nongrain crops is likely to decline (0.2-1.3 percent), production of wheat is likely to increase (0.5-3.3 percent) as well as livestock (0.7-0.9 percent). Changes in world production of other grains range from -0.1 to 0.4 percent, increasing in three scenarios. World production of processed foods, which is the primary source of food for households, would rise (0.2-0.4 percent).
(2) Farmer adaptations are the main mechanisms for keeping up world
food production under global climate change. By selecting the most profitable mix of inputs and outputs on existing cropland, for example, farmers may be able to offset from 79 to 88 percent of the 19- to 30-percent reductions in world cereals (wheat plus other grains) supply directly attributable to climate change. Including adjustments in domestic markets and international trade (but still holding cropland fixed) mitigates more than 97 percent of the original negative impacts. Farmers also are likely to adapt by increasing the amount of land under cultivation (up 7.1-14.8 percent). This enables world cereals production to actually increase (0.2-1.2 percent) under climate change.
(3) Costs and benefits of global climate change are not equally distributed
around the world. Warming in arctic and mountainous areas will increase the quantity of land suitable for farming and forestry, but warming in tropical and some other areas will reduce soil moisture, thereby causing decreases in farm and forestry productivity. These changes affect commodity production. In Canada, for example, output of wheat, other grains, nongrains, livestock, and forest products increases, while in Southeast Asia, output of these commodities generally decreases in all scenarios. Impacts on commodity production in mid-latitude regions are mixed. Real gross domestic product (GDP) tends to mirror agricultural and silvicultural activity. GDP in high-latitude regions, like Canada, increases under climate change, while GDP in tropical areas, like Southeast Asia, declines. Impacts on GDP in mid-latitudes vary by region, sometimes consistently increasing (Japan, other East Asia) or decreasing (European Community) across all climate change scenarios, and sometimes varying by scenario (the United States and a combined Australia and New Zealand region).
(4) Climate change is likely to affect the overall structure of agriculture
and food processing in the United States. Land suitable for farming and forestry is likely to increase, but soil moisture losses may reduce agricultural
possibilities in the Corn Belt and in the Southeast. Farmers are likely to adapt
by increasing wheat production and reducing production of other grains, primarily maize. As a result of less feed available, livestock production also decreases. Output of nongrains and forest products increases or decreases depending on the scenario. Production of processed food commodities generally declines. U.S. shares of world production move in the same direction as changes in production. Across scenarios, effects on GDP range from -0.1 to 0.1 percent annually (in 1990 dollars, from -$4.8 billion to $5.8 billion).
(5) World GDP may decline if climate change is severe enough or if cropland expansion is hindered. Across the four climate change scenarios, net annual impacts on world GDP range from -0.1 to 0.1 percent (in 1990 dollars, from -US$24.5 billion to US$25.2 billion). These results indicate that world GDP may decline if increases in agricultural and food production are more than offset by losses in other sectors. Also, when land use is constrained to 1990 activities, world GDP declines by 0.004 to 0.35 percent annually (in 1990 dollars, from US$0.7 billion to US$74.3 billion). World output of processed food declines as well (from 0.002 to 0.58 percent). This implies that the new temperature and precipitation patterns under climate change are likely to reduce the average productivity of the world’s existing agricultural lands.
(6) Land use changes that accompany climate-induced shifts in cropland and permanent pasture are likely to raise additional social and environmental issues. Although there are net increases in cropland for the world as a
whole, from 4.2 to 10.5 percent of existing cropland is converted to other uses under the climate change scenarios. In the United States, from 8.6 to 19.1 percent of existing cropland is converted. Farm communities in areas where the only economically viable adaptation is to abandon crop production could be severely disrupted. Also, forest land is likely to decrease under global climate change (3.6-9.1 percent, net). This could cause more conflicts over the environmental consequences of agriculture in some areas. In tropical regions, for example, competition from crop production could aggravate direct climate-induced losses of tropical rain forests.
(7) Although water supplies are likely to increase for the world as a whole
under climate change, shortages could occur in some regions. Across scenarios, world water supplies increase by 6.4 to 12.4 percent. In Japan, however, changes in water supplies range from -9.4 to 10.2 percent. In addition, the price of water in Japan increases by more than 75 percent in all scenarios. These results indicate likely conflicts over water in Japan. In the United States, the price of water increases in only one climate change scenario when farmers are allowed to fully adapt. If land use in the United States is constrained to 1990 activities, however, then water prices increase in all scenarios. This indicates that conflicts over water resources might increase in the United States.
A number of caveats and limitations remain. First, we do not consider the well-documented, beneficial effects of higher concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide on plant growth and water use. There remains considerable debate about the magnitude of this effect. Second, our simulations of water resources do not capture all potential impacts. The potential effects of too much water, such as flooding or water logging of soils, for example, are not evaluated. Finally, changes in socioeconomic conditions which might take place by the time climate changes occur were not considered.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer703/aer703.pdf
Abstract
Recent studies suggest that possible global increases in temperature and
changes in precipitation patterns during the next century will affect world agriculture. Because of the ability of farmers to adapt , however, these changes are not likely to imperil world food production. Nevertheless, world production of all goods and services may decline, if climate change is severe enough or if cropland expansion is hindered. Impacts are not equally distributed around the world. Agricultural production may increase in arctic and alpine areas, but decrease in tropical and some other areas. In the United States, soil moisture losses may reduce agricultural production in the Corn Belt and Southeast.
Keywords: Climate change, world agriculture
Summary
Possible changes in climate may spur geographic shifts in agricultural production and structure, but should not significantly affect the level of U.S. and world food production. We evaluate the effects of global climate change on world agriculture with a model that links climatic conditions to land and water resources and to production, trade, and consumption of 13 commodities throughout the world.
The model has three unique capabilities. First, it simulates the potential effects of global climate change on the availability and productivity of agriculturally suitable land. Second, it determines the extent to which farmers respond to climate change, such as by adopting alternative production systems and by expanding (or abandoning) agricultural lands. Third, it provides quantitative estimates of land and water use changes, because it simulates the competition between agriculture and the rest of the economy for these resources.
We evaluated four global-climate-change scenarios based on a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. These scenarios were derived
from results projected by meteorological models at the Goddard Institute for
Space Studies, the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, the United Kingdom Meteorological Office, and Oregon State University and embody a range of average global temperature and precipitation changes (2.8-5.2oC and 7.8-15.0 percent, respectively). Our principal results are:
(1) Global changes in temperature and precipitation patterns during the
next century are not likely to imperil food production for the world as a
whole. Although world production of nongrain crops is likely to decline (0.2-1.3 percent), production of wheat is likely to increase (0.5-3.3 percent) as well as livestock (0.7-0.9 percent). Changes in world production of other grains range from -0.1 to 0.4 percent, increasing in three scenarios. World production of processed foods, which is the primary source of food for households, would rise (0.2-0.4 percent).
(2) Farmer adaptations are the main mechanisms for keeping up world
food production under global climate change. By selecting the most profitable mix of inputs and outputs on existing cropland, for example, farmers may be able to offset from 79 to 88 percent of the 19- to 30-percent reductions in world cereals (wheat plus other grains) supply directly attributable to climate change. Including adjustments in domestic markets and international trade (but still holding cropland fixed) mitigates more than 97 percent of the original negative impacts. Farmers also are likely to adapt by increasing the amount of land under cultivation (up 7.1-14.8 percent). This enables world cereals production to actually increase (0.2-1.2 percent) under climate change.
(3) Costs and benefits of global climate change are not equally distributed
around the world. Warming in arctic and mountainous areas will increase the quantity of land suitable for farming and forestry, but warming in tropical and some other areas will reduce soil moisture, thereby causing decreases in farm and forestry productivity. These changes affect commodity production. In Canada, for example, output of wheat, other grains, nongrains, livestock, and forest products increases, while in Southeast Asia, output of these commodities generally decreases in all scenarios. Impacts on commodity production in mid-latitude regions are mixed. Real gross domestic product (GDP) tends to mirror agricultural and silvicultural activity. GDP in high-latitude regions, like Canada, increases under climate change, while GDP in tropical areas, like Southeast Asia, declines. Impacts on GDP in mid-latitudes vary by region, sometimes consistently increasing (Japan, other East Asia) or decreasing (European Community) across all climate change scenarios, and sometimes varying by scenario (the United States and a combined Australia and New Zealand region).
(4) Climate change is likely to affect the overall structure of agriculture
and food processing in the United States. Land suitable for farming and forestry is likely to increase, but soil moisture losses may reduce agricultural
possibilities in the Corn Belt and in the Southeast. Farmers are likely to adapt
by increasing wheat production and reducing production of other grains, primarily maize. As a result of less feed available, livestock production also decreases. Output of nongrains and forest products increases or decreases depending on the scenario. Production of processed food commodities generally declines. U.S. shares of world production move in the same direction as changes in production. Across scenarios, effects on GDP range from -0.1 to 0.1 percent annually (in 1990 dollars, from -$4.8 billion to $5.8 billion).
(5) World GDP may decline if climate change is severe enough or if cropland expansion is hindered. Across the four climate change scenarios, net annual impacts on world GDP range from -0.1 to 0.1 percent (in 1990 dollars, from -US$24.5 billion to US$25.2 billion). These results indicate that world GDP may decline if increases in agricultural and food production are more than offset by losses in other sectors. Also, when land use is constrained to 1990 activities, world GDP declines by 0.004 to 0.35 percent annually (in 1990 dollars, from US$0.7 billion to US$74.3 billion). World output of processed food declines as well (from 0.002 to 0.58 percent). This implies that the new temperature and precipitation patterns under climate change are likely to reduce the average productivity of the world’s existing agricultural lands.
(6) Land use changes that accompany climate-induced shifts in cropland and permanent pasture are likely to raise additional social and environmental issues. Although there are net increases in cropland for the world as a
whole, from 4.2 to 10.5 percent of existing cropland is converted to other uses under the climate change scenarios. In the United States, from 8.6 to 19.1 percent of existing cropland is converted. Farm communities in areas where the only economically viable adaptation is to abandon crop production could be severely disrupted. Also, forest land is likely to decrease under global climate change (3.6-9.1 percent, net). This could cause more conflicts over the environmental consequences of agriculture in some areas. In tropical regions, for example, competition from crop production could aggravate direct climate-induced losses of tropical rain forests.
(7) Although water supplies are likely to increase for the world as a whole
under climate change, shortages could occur in some regions. Across scenarios, world water supplies increase by 6.4 to 12.4 percent. In Japan, however, changes in water supplies range from -9.4 to 10.2 percent. In addition, the price of water in Japan increases by more than 75 percent in all scenarios. These results indicate likely conflicts over water in Japan. In the United States, the price of water increases in only one climate change scenario when farmers are allowed to fully adapt. If land use in the United States is constrained to 1990 activities, however, then water prices increase in all scenarios. This indicates that conflicts over water resources might increase in the United States.
A number of caveats and limitations remain. First, we do not consider the well-documented, beneficial effects of higher concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide on plant growth and water use. There remains considerable debate about the magnitude of this effect. Second, our simulations of water resources do not capture all potential impacts. The potential effects of too much water, such as flooding or water logging of soils, for example, are not evaluated. Finally, changes in socioeconomic conditions which might take place by the time climate changes occur were not considered.
