In conclusion, the perception that contemporary Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.
Soviet SAM Operations - SEA Versus MidEast Theatres
In South East Asia, the Soviet S-75/SA-2 Guideline was used exclusively, with batteries deployed widely across North Vietnam from the mid 1960s. Sources vary widely on numbers, but a common figure is 50 batteries rotating between 150 fixed SAM sites. Figures on the number of SAMs fired per kill also vary, with declassified data suggesting dozens of rounds per kill, increasing over time as the US improved its defence suppression technique and technology.
The Soviet S-75/SA-2 Guideline was designed primarily as a “strategic SAM”, intended to provide area defence of fixed target areas against attacking aircraft at medium to high altitudes. The command link guided weapon had a variable thrust liquid propellant rocket sustainer motor, and was supported typically by an X-band RSNA-75 Fan Song engagement radar, and a P-12 Spoon Rest 2D VHF-Band acquisition radar. Nominal redeployment time for a battery was several hours, dependent in part on battery crew proficiency, and in part on terrain, as a large convoy of vehicles was required for movements.
Perhaps most contentious matter in this discussion is what constitutes the best “measure of effectiveness” for assessing the PAVN SAM force. Over North Vietnam (NVN), most losses were statistically produced by PAVN Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) batteries, in fact total US Air Force losses of 740 F/RF-4, F-105 and F-100 tactical fighters between 1964 and 1973 can mostly be credited to AAA in NVN and Laos. Declassified US statistics show a good fraction of the these losses resulted from low altitude attacks on SAM sites, and most others from low altitude attacks on other targets in an attempt to stay below the medium to high altitude engagement envelope of the SA-2. While direct losses to SAM firings appear modest, the percentage of kills to SAMs was as high as 31.5% for F-4 in 1971-73, and 17 B-52s were lost, mostly to SAMs.
Usually supported by experienced Soviet or Warsaw Pact instructors, the PAVN operated the SA-2 to best effect, exploited its limited mobility fully, and used the SA-2 to bait “flak traps”, as well as to drive US aircraft into the envelope of dense AAA fire. In addition, the large and ongoing effort to suppress or destroy SAM systems absorbed a large proportion of sorties flown into NVN.
The simple metric of counting direct losses to enemy weapon types is not a particularly good “measure of effectiveness” for assessing the effect and impact of air defence weapon types in a mixed threat environment. With no SAMs deployed in a theatre, the effectiveness of visually aimed and radar directed AAA is poor, as aircraft can attack unhindered from medium and high altitudes, out of the useful envelope of barrelled weapons. By the same token, in a SAM rich environment where AAA would be absent, aircraft can attack unhindered from low altitudes, exploiting terrain masking and performance limitations in SAMs and their supporting radar systems.
In NVN operations, the PAVN followed period Soviet doctrine very closely, and that doctrine dictated the use of mutually supporting and overlapping air defence weapons through the whole altitude envelope. The effect is synergistic, in the sense that no portion of the altitude envelope then presents a low penetration risk for the attacker.
When assessing the combat effectiveness of SAMs, on a per system basis, a much better measure is the number of kills produced per round fired, per engagement. The difficulty in producing hard analysis is that without hard data on rounds expended, this measure is difficult to produce with any accuracy. While raw statistics on losses to AAA would appear to favour AAA over SAMs in SEA operations, what proportion of the aircraft sorties flown would have entered the AAA engagement envelope had SAMs been absent, and what number of AAA systems was deployed at what personnel and expended munitions cost, in comparison with PAVN SAM battery numbers?
There are two illustrative examples from the NVN air campaigns, both falling into the latter period of the conflict.
The first is the use of the F-111A during the 1972 Linebacker I/II campaigns. Flying at very low altitudes using automatic terrain following radar, the aircraft defeated both radar directed AAA and SAMs, and incurred statistically per sortie the lowest loss rates in these campaigns.
The highest per type loss rate during Linebacker II was incurred by the B-52 fleet, exclusively to S-75/SA-2 SAM shots, despite the heavy use of onboard EW, support jamming aircraft, defence suppression aircraft, chaff bombers and fighter escorts. Had SAMs been absent from the theatre, it is unlikely any B-52s would have been lost.
The statistical loss rate of 15 x B-52D/G across 729 flown sorties is around 2 percent, the limit for sustainable losses in an attrition strategy campaign, despite the concerted defence suppression effort directed against the PAVN SAM force. Importantly, once the PAVN expended most of its warstock of S-75/SA-2 SAM rounds, no further B-52s were lost.
A factor frequently ignored in lay analyses of such campaigns is the fraction of total effort expended in providing defence suppression support for penetrating aircraft. A large proportion of tactical aircraft sorties flown during Linebacker II, including much of the F-111 effort, was directed against PAVN S-75/SA-2 SAM sites. Effort expended and losses so incurred are directly correlated with SAM deployment.
Any objective analysis of the combat effect of SAMs in SEA operations must therefore consider not only losses directly attributable to SAM hits or SAM combat damage, but also effort expended and losses to all other causes arising from operational measures taken to suppress or evade SAM batteries. From this perspective, Soviet SAMs were the single most effective component of the PAVN IADS.
Data from Middle Eastern conflicts, other than Desert Storm, is far more fragmentary, and more than often contaminated by a reluctance on the part of the Israelis, Egyptians and Syrians to fully disclose combat losses. There have been ongoing public arguments ever since over “who killed what when” .
Major clashes involving the use of Soviet SAMs were the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt, the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
The first Soviet SAMs in the region were 15 to 25 SA-2 batteries delivered during the late 1960s, but were not particularly effective. They were crewed by Egyptians with Soviet instructors, and some were captured in the Sinai advance of 1967. Syria during this period deployed the SA-2 and fielded 18 batteries, later supplemented by 16 SA-3 batteries.
In early 1970, the Soviets initiated Operation Caucasus, and deployed an overstrength division of Soviet PVO air defence troops, comprising 18 battalions in three brigades, led by General Smirnov of the PVO, and drawn from PVO units in the Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, Leningrad and Belarus districts. Each battalion comprised four SA-3 batteries, a platoon of ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs and supporting SA-7 MANPADS teams. While these units were ostensibly “instructors”, they were dressed in Egyptian uniforms and provided full crewing for the deployed SAM systems. Through early 1970 the PVO units were deployed along the Suez Canal. Operational doctrine was similar to NVN, with batteries relocating frequently, and setting up ambushes for Israeli aircraft, using multiple mutually supporting batteries.
The Soviet S-125/SA-3 Goa was designed primarily to provide point defence of fixed target areas against attacking aircraft at low to medium altitudes. The command link guided weapon had a fixed thrust solid propellant rocket sustainer motor, and was supported typically by an X-band SNR-125 engagement radar, and a P-15 Flat Face UHF-Band acquisition radar, with respectable low altitude clutter rejection performance. Nominal redeployment time for a battery was several hours, not unlike the S-75/SA-2, dependent in part on battery crew proficiency, and in part on terrain, as a large convoy of vehicles was required for movements.
In subsequent engagements against the Israelis, the Soviets are claimed to have shot down five Israeli aircraft using the SA-3, making for a cumulative total of 22 lost to SA-2, SA-3 and AAA during this period.
The Egyptians sought to retake their 1967 losses in 1973, and to support that campaign procured three brigades of SA-6 Gainful, comprising 18 batteries. Unlike Soviet batteries using the “shoot and scoot” 1S12 Long Track radar, Egyptian SA-6 batteries mostly used the semi-mobile P-15 Flat Face and P-15M Squat Eye UHF radars. Syria is claimed to have procured two brigades.
When the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal, and the Syrians stormed the Golan Heights, their ground forces and strategic targets were protected by SAM and AAA units. It is widely acknowledged that the Israelis suffered heavy losses of aircraft during the fighting in 1973. Exactly how many were lost to SAMs, and to which type of SAM, has been less well documented. Israeli public claims are that 303 aircraft were lost in combat, and other sources identify 40 of these as lost to SAMs, and between 4 and 12 to Arab fighters. This puts most Israeli losses as a result of low altitude AAA fire, and emulates the pattern observed in SEA – SAMs denying the use of high and medium altitude airspace, driving aircraft down into the envelope of high density AAA.
The Soviets were cast out of Egypt in early 1976, followed by Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel and Egypt’s realignment away from conflict with the West. Chinese and Western contractors took over support of the Soviet SAM systems.
The next major conflict to see SAMs used in anger was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, named “Operation Peace for Galilee”, and intended to drive the PLO out of Lebanon. This well thought out and planned campaign was an absolute rout of the Syrian SAM belt installed in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The first attack of the 9th June, 1982, saw 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM batteries annihilated, the Israelis using airborne standoff jammers extensively, and supported by emitter locating systems, also fired large numbers of AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missiles, in addition to domestically modified Shrikes with rocket boosters, launched from trucks like Katyusha rockets. Crippled and defenceless SAM batteries were then annihilated with free fall bombs.
The Soviet doctrine of ambush attacks, SAM system mobility, clever use of emission control and decoys, camouflage of SAM sites, and the use of supporting electronic warfare assets was abandoned by the Syrians completely. Hurley’s summary of Syrian behaviour in the Winter 1989 issue of Air Power Journal is perhaps the best summary:
“Syrian SAM operators also invited disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling.
As noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines -- seriously.” The Syrian practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical advantage on the eve of battle. Even so, the Syrians might have been able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to “hide” them, which actually made them easier to spot from the air. It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage. According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defenses.”
The 1982 Bekaa Valley debacle was repeated on a much larger scale in January, 1991, when US led Coalition air forces annihilated Saddam’s SAM defences, the decisive blows inflicted in the first few hours. While that campaign is well documented in detail elsewhere, like the 1982 campaign, large scale use was made of anti-radiation missiles, support jamming, and precision weapons. The deployment pattern of Saddam’s forces also differed little, with few batteries attempting to exploit any inherent mobility in their systems, and often undisciplined emissions permitting easy location, targeting and attack. The composition of Saddam’s SAM force comprised much the same SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8 and SA-9 SAM systems, supplemented by some modern French supplied Thales Roland SAMs and Tiger series radars.
