Chitchat What happened in Saudi Arabia in the last 3 days ?

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

TM outdoes himself in gushing all over MBS - he even manages to wrangle Hamilton into the article (obviously so his NY audience can relate):

...in the Middle East in Beirut in 1979, and so much of the region that I have covered since was shaped by the three big events of that year: the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Saudi puritanical extremists — who denounced the Saudi ruling family as corrupt, impious sellouts to Western values; the Iranian Islamic revolution; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These three events together freaked out the Saudi ruling family at the time, and prompted it to try to shore up its legitimacy by allowing its Wahhabi clerics to impose a much more austere Islam on the society and by launching a worldwide competition with Iran’s ayatollahs over who could export more fundamentalist Islam. It didn’t help that the U.S. tried to leverage this trend by using Islamist fighters against Russia in Afghanistan. In all, it pushed Islam globally way to the right and helped nurture 9/11.

Indeed, M.B.S. instructed me: “Do not write that we are ‘reinterpreting’ Islam — we are ‘restoring’ Islam to its origins — and our biggest tools are the Prophet’s practices and [daily life in] Saudi Arabia before 1979.” At the time of the Prophet Muhammad, he argued, there were musical theaters, there was mixing between men and women, there was respect for Christians and Jews in Arabia. “The first commercial judge in Medina was a woman!”

So if the Prophet embraced all of this, M.B.S. asked, “Do you mean the Prophet was not a Muslim?”

Then one of his ministers got out his cellphone and shared with me pictures and YouTube videos of Saudi Arabia in the 1950s — women without heads covered, wearing skirts and walking with men in public, as well as concerts and cinemas. It was still a traditional and modest place, but not one where fun had been outlawed, which is what happened after 1979.

...and that Lebanese soprano Hiba Tawaji will be among the first woman singers to perform a women-only concert here on Dec. 6. And M.B.S told me, it was just decided that women will be able to go to stadiums and attend soccer games. The Saudi clerics have completely acquiesced.

If this virus of an antipluralistic, misogynistic Islam that came out of Saudi Arabia in 1979 can be reversed by Saudi Arabia, it would drive moderation across the Muslim world and surely be welcomed here where 65 percent of the population is under 30.

On foreign policy, M.B.S. would not discuss the strange goings on with Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon coming to Saudi Arabia and announcing his resignation, seemingly under Saudi pressure, and now returning to Beirut and rescinding that resignation. He simply insisted that the bottom line of the whole affair is that Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, is not going to continue providing political cover for a Lebanese government that is essentially controlled by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia, which is essentially controlled by Tehran.

The dysfunction and rivalries within the Sunni Arab world generally have prevented forming a unified front up to now, which is why Iran indirectly controls four Arab capitals today — Damascus, Sana, Baghdad and Beirut. That Iranian over-reach is one reason M.B.S. was scathing about Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran’s “supreme leader is the new Hitler of the Middle East,” said M.B.S. “But we learned from Europe that appeasement doesn’t work. We don’t want the new Hitler in Iran to repeat what happened in Europe in the Middle East.” What matters most, though, is what Saudi Arabia does at home to build its strength and economy.

 

[Kotekbengkok]

Academics and so called experts can write and pontificate all they want about the so called great work being done by MBS but the genie that was let out of the bottle in 1979 is going to be very difficult to put back in. MBS is firing on too many fronts and sooner or later one of this is going to misfire badly come right back to bite him and this will take the wind out of all the other "good " things he is trying to do. My opinion is that he should just have just stuck with the anti corruption campaign which appears to have some traction and used that to lead the way for the rest of the things he wants to achieve i.e. a more tolerant islam etc , sort of the the thin end of the wedge. Rushing and trying to take on Iran full frontal for example without having the same cunning, influence and experience of the Iranians is this young man's folly and Achilles heel. The Iranians took on Saddam. It was at great cost to them but they never gave up. Saddam thought it was going to be easy. The Sunni Arabs will always be disunited because they don't even trust each other. The Shia Muslims in comparison tend to be are more united and determined. The Iranians are not going to take all this name calling by MBS lightly. Expect some sort of reprisals.

TM outdoes himself in gushing all over MBS - he even manages to wrangle Hamilton into the article (obviously so his NY audience can relate):

...in the Middle East in Beirut in 1979, and so much of the region that I have covered since was shaped by the three big events of that year: the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Saudi puritanical extremists — who denounced the Saudi ruling family as corrupt, impious sellouts to Western values; the Iranian Islamic revolution; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These three events together freaked out the Saudi ruling family at the time, and prompted it to try to shore up its legitimacy by allowing its Wahhabi clerics to impose a much more austere Islam on the society and by launching a worldwide competition with Iran’s ayatollahs over who could export more fundamentalist Islam. It didn’t help that the U.S. tried to leverage this trend by using Islamist fighters against Russia in Afghanistan. In all, it pushed Islam globally way to the right and helped nurture 9/11.

Indeed, M.B.S. instructed me: “Do not write that we are ‘reinterpreting’ Islam — we are ‘restoring’ Islam to its origins — and our biggest tools are the Prophet’s practices and [daily life in] Saudi Arabia before 1979.” At the time of the Prophet Muhammad, he argued, there were musical theaters, there was mixing between men and women, there was respect for Christians and Jews in Arabia. “The first commercial judge in Medina was a woman!”

So if the Prophet embraced all of this, M.B.S. asked, “Do you mean the Prophet was not a Muslim?”

Then one of his ministers got out his cellphone and shared with me pictures and YouTube videos of Saudi Arabia in the 1950s — women without heads covered, wearing skirts and walking with men in public, as well as concerts and cinemas. It was still a traditional and modest place, but not one where fun had been outlawed, which is what happened after 1979.

...and that Lebanese soprano Hiba Tawaji will be among the first woman singers to perform a women-only concert here on Dec. 6. And M.B.S told me, it was just decided that women will be able to go to stadiums and attend soccer games. The Saudi clerics have completely acquiesced.

If this virus of an antipluralistic, misogynistic Islam that came out of Saudi Arabia in 1979 can be reversed by Saudi Arabia, it would drive moderation across the Muslim world and surely be welcomed here where 65 percent of the population is under 30.

On foreign policy, M.B.S. would not discuss the strange goings on with Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon coming to Saudi Arabia and announcing his resignation, seemingly under Saudi pressure, and now returning to Beirut and rescinding that resignation. He simply insisted that the bottom line of the whole affair is that Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, is not going to continue providing political cover for a Lebanese government that is essentially controlled by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia, which is essentially controlled by Tehran.

The dysfunction and rivalries within the Sunni Arab world generally have prevented forming a unified front up to now, which is why Iran indirectly controls four Arab capitals today — Damascus, Sana, Baghdad and Beirut. That Iranian over-reach is one reason M.B.S. was scathing about Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran’s “supreme leader is the new Hitler of the Middle East,” said M.B.S. “But we learned from Europe that appeasement doesn’t work. We don’t want the new Hitler in Iran to repeat what happened in Europe in the Middle East.” What matters most, though, is what Saudi Arabia does at home to build its strength and economy.

View attachment 33885
View attachment 33886
View attachment 33887
View attachment 33888
View attachment 33889
View attachment 33890
View attachment 33891
View attachment 33892
View attachment 33893

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[scroobal]

Friedman always had a unique style and very unusual for a journalist. Firstly they are very informative yet he allows his candidate to spin their own story but drops comments suggesting caution, doubt and even caveats of his own in them plus compliments and endorsements. Note the comment - "But if the process ends up feeling arbitrary, bullying and opaque, ............................." This is typical of Friedman in all his interviews, where such comments are for the readers as well as the candidate that he is interviewing.

I liked what I hear from MBS especially the need to roll back 1979 and particularly the Islam of the past via the 1950s film clip. I also liked how he went after those who plundered the state. However he succeeding with so many open fronts is a tactical nightmare and makes for bad strategy.

I was surprised by MBS grasp of European appeasement failures. And thats a powerful point.

Thanks for the article. Keeps us all excited.

TM outdoes himself in gushing all over MBS - he even manages to wrangle Hamilton into the article (obviously so his NY audience can relate):

...in the Middle East in Beirut in 1979, and so much of the region that I have covered since was shaped by the three big events of that year: the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Saudi puritanical extremists — who denounced the Saudi ruling family as corrupt, impious sellouts to Western values; the Iranian Islamic revolution; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These three events together freaked out the Saudi ruling family at the time, and prompted it to try to shore up its legitimacy by allowing its Wahhabi clerics to impose a much more austere Islam on the society and by launching a worldwide competition with Iran’s ayatollahs over who could export more fundamentalist Islam. It didn’t help that the U.S. tried to leverage this trend by using Islamist fighters against Russia in Afghanistan. In all, it pushed Islam globally way to the right and helped nurture 9/11.

Indeed, M.B.S. instructed me: “Do not write that we are ‘reinterpreting’ Islam — we are ‘restoring’ Islam to its origins — and our biggest tools are the Prophet’s practices and [daily life in] Saudi Arabia before 1979.” At the time of the Prophet Muhammad, he argued, there were musical theaters, there was mixing between men and women, there was respect for Christians and Jews in Arabia. “The first commercial judge in Medina was a woman!”

So if the Prophet embraced all of this, M.B.S. asked, “Do you mean the Prophet was not a Muslim?”

Then one of his ministers got out his cellphone and shared with me pictures and YouTube videos of Saudi Arabia in the 1950s — women without heads covered, wearing skirts and walking with men in public, as well as concerts and cinemas. It was still a traditional and modest place, but not one where fun had been outlawed, which is what happened after 1979.

...and that Lebanese soprano Hiba Tawaji will be among the first woman singers to perform a women-only concert here on Dec. 6. And M.B.S told me, it was just decided that women will be able to go to stadiums and attend soccer games. The Saudi clerics have completely acquiesced.

If this virus of an antipluralistic, misogynistic Islam that came out of Saudi Arabia in 1979 can be reversed by Saudi Arabia, it would drive moderation across the Muslim world and surely be welcomed here where 65 percent of the population is under 30.

On foreign policy, M.B.S. would not discuss the strange goings on with Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon coming to Saudi Arabia and announcing his resignation, seemingly under Saudi pressure, and now returning to Beirut and rescinding that resignation. He simply insisted that the bottom line of the whole affair is that Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, is not going to continue providing political cover for a Lebanese government that is essentially controlled by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia, which is essentially controlled by Tehran.

The dysfunction and rivalries within the Sunni Arab world generally have prevented forming a unified front up to now, which is why Iran indirectly controls four Arab capitals today — Damascus, Sana, Baghdad and Beirut. That Iranian over-reach is one reason M.B.S. was scathing about Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran’s “supreme leader is the new Hitler of the Middle East,” said M.B.S. “But we learned from Europe that appeasement doesn’t work. We don’t want the new Hitler in Iran to repeat what happened in Europe in the Middle East.” What matters most, though, is what Saudi Arabia does at home to build its strength and economy.

View attachment 33885
View attachment 33886
View attachment 33887
View attachment 33888
View attachment 33889
View attachment 33890
View attachment 33891
View attachment 33892
View attachment 33893

 

[scroobal]

Agree on the 1979 and putting the genie back. Malaysia is a sterling example of Saudi exported Whabbism and what it has done. Nearly all 55 Muslims majority countries have been trained including Shia majority countries. The question is to what extent to separate them.

As to Iran, it now very clear why Saudis hosted the grand jamboree for Trump. Its beginning to make sense.

Academics and so called experts can write and pontificate all they want about the so called great work being done by MBS but the genie that was let out of the bottle in 1979 is going to be very difficult to put back in. MBS is firing on too many fronts and sooner or later one of this is going to misfire badly come right back to bite him and this will take the wind out of all the other "good " things he is trying to do. My opinion is that he should just have just stuck with the anti corruption campaign which appears to have some traction and used that to lead the way for the rest of the things he wants to achieve i.e. a more tolerant islam etc , sort of the the thin end of the wedge. Rushing and trying to take on Iran full frontal for example without having the same cunning, influence and experience of the Iranians is this young man's folly and Achilles heel. The Iranians took on Saddam. It was at great cost to them but they never gave up. Saddam thought it was going to be easy. The Sunni Arabs will always be disunited because they don't even trust each other. The Shia Muslims in comparison tend to be are more united and determined. The Iranians are not going to take all this name calling by MBS lightly. Expect some sort of reprisals.

 

[scroobal]

Here is the irony - James Dorsey is employed by the Govt of Singapore and he is preaching about accountability, transparency, details not made public, "that effort appears undermined by the fact that the alleged investigations and arrests have a selective or arbitrary taste to them" etc.

Quite comical.


James M. Dorsey, Contributor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Senior fellow
Tackling Corruption: Why Saudi Prince Mohammed’s approach raises questions
11/25/2017 03:05 am ET

• 
  
  

By James M. Dorsey

Leave aside for a moment questions of due process. Analysis of Saudi Arabia’s three largest corporate failures explains why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s recent moves look more like a power and asset grab than a credible effort to eradicate corruption.

Dependency on government contracts was at the core of the bankruptcy of Saudi Oger, owned by the family of embattled Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and the near-demise of the Saudi Bin Laden Group.

Granted, the $22 billion downfall of 70-year old Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers Company (AHAB) that took down two Bahraini banks as well as the Saad Group in one the largest financial collapses of the 2009 global credit crunch, occurred because of mismanagement, lacking corporate and financial governance, and allegations of fraud, theft and forgery.

Yet, like the Bin Ladens and the Hariris, a major chunk of the group’s business was with the government, selling steel piping to Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s national oil and natural gas behemoth. The settlement of the collapse with more than 100 banks was long viewed as a litmus test for foreign investors.

For Saudi Oger and Bin Laden, the government’s predicament meant cancellation of projects and failure to pay. The government’s default had a ripple effect, including the companies’ inability to pay their workers, who in a country in which protests are banned, took their plight to the streets.

What emerges from the failures is the vulnerability of major private corporations at a time that government, the dominant economic player, was forced to diversify, rationalize, and cut costs. The failures also highlighted the lack of oversight of corporate governance.

Ironically, a raid on the Saudi mansion of the head of the Saad Group, Kuwaiti billionaire Maan al-Sanea, two weeks before Prince Mohammed’s arrest of some 200 princes, officials and businessmen on charges of corruption, set the stage for the purge.

The history of the troubled companies as well as Mr. Al-Sanea’s detention speak to a system in which beyond private enterprise dependency, members of the ruling family were rentiers of the state since its founding and allowed to drink at the trough, and concepts of conflict of interest were non-existent.

Transparency and accountability did not enter the equation in a country that did not tax companies or individuals except for zakat, a religious obligation for all Muslims who meet the necessary criteria of wealth. Instead, the social contract that is now being unilaterally rewritten by Prince Mohammed involved popular surrender of political rights, adherence to a strict social code, and acceptance of an absence of transparency and accountability in exchange for cradle-to-grave welfare.



Subscribe to The Morning Email.
Wake up to the day's most important news.
Despite citizens being asked to increasingly contribute by moves towards market rates for services and the planned introduction of indirect taxes like a highway toll, there is no accountability with billions of dollars that the inhabitants of Riyadh’s Ritz Carlton Hotel-turned-gilded prison are being asked to surrender and transfer to a finance ministry account in exchange for their freedom. What happens to those funds once they have been transferred remains unclear.

In other words, transparency and accountability do not figure in Prince Mohammed’s top-down moves. Aides to Prince Mohammed have asserted that the arrests were the result of almost three years of investigations. No details of those investigations have been made public nor have their results been interrogated by a credible and independent judiciary.

The assertion would explain why the government announced the establishment of a new anti-corruption commission headed by Prince Mohammed only hours before the purge and why its functions were seemingly primarily defined as an arm of law enforcementrather than a vehicle to create an anti-corruption legal structure that would also govern the commercial relationship between the government and members of the ruling family. The commission’s powers include the ability to detain suspects, seize their assets and ban them from travel.

The impression that power and assets rather than anti-corruption drove Prince Mohammed in his purge is enhanced by the fact that it appears designed to intimidate and put the kingdom’s elite on notice. There has been neither a decree nor a process in the country’s Shura or Advisory Council to draft legislation as well as rules and regulation that would create a legal anti-corruption infrastructure, govern the way government agencies do business, and set a template for defining and preventing conflict of interest.

While one could argue that Prince Mohammed needed to set an example, that effort appears undermined by the fact that the alleged investigations and arrests have a selective or arbitrary taste to them. Fact of the matter is that in the permissive environment that was written into the kingdom’s DNA at founding, few, if any, members of the ruling family are likely to emerge with flying colours.

All of this, explains with the kingdom’s elite was caught off guard even though Mr. Al-Sanea’s arrest should have set off alarm bells. Instead, the ruling family and the business community saw the arrest as a one-off event in a long-standing financial sage. It also clarifies why the elite grossly underestimated Prince Mohammed’s brashness and ruthlessness and ignored his warning in June that “no one who got involved in a corruption case will escape, regardless if he was a minister or a prince.”

For anti-corruption to be perceived as the main driver of the purge, Prince Mohammed will have to introduce due process, transparency and accountability to the process. In theory, that would mean targeting all who potentially could be under suspicion, an approach that would be tough, if not impossible, in an environment in which the suspicion of guilt is likely to include many who were not detained, rather than only some. Instead, Prince Mohammed would be better advised to focus on structural and institutional change.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title as well as Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

One of James' biggest cheerleaders is none other than Bilahari - there are times that he veers into absolute BS but he does seem to be well-connected enough to get information quite quickly and processes it well.

One paragraph in his recent article on the Qatar crisis certainly earned major brownie points from my perspective because he mentioned a little reported (in the Western press) aspect of tribal relations between KSA-Qatar i.e. that the Qataris had stripped members of the Al Ghafran tribe of citizenship during the early phase of the blockade as a response (my info was that the figure was much higher at 50000):


Sheikh Taleb bin Lahem bin Shraim, the head of the Qatari branch of another tribe, the Al Ghafran, fled to Saudi Arabia in September after Qatar stripped him and 54 of his relatives of their Qatari citizenship. Sheikh Taleb said he had been penalized for refusing “to insult the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Sheikh Taleb was one of several Al Ghafran tribal leaders who met with Prince Mohammed in early September. Sheikh Sultan al-Murri, who attended the meeting in Jeddah convened at the request of the tribal leaders, accused Qatar of resorting to “lies and attempts to distort the tribes of Qatar in order to tear up the tribal social fabric in favour of the minority of Iranians.” Qatar has a minority of Shiites and Qatari nationals of Iranian descent.

Relations between Qatar and the Al Ghafran have long been strained. Qatar revoked the citizenship of the entire Al Ghafran clan, some 5-6000 people, after ten of its leaders were accused of plotting a coup in cooperation with Saudi Arabia in 1996. More members of the tribe have lost their Qatari nationality since 2004.

Many have since won a reprieve, but thousands remain in limbo, according to Misfer al-Marri, a tribe member who lives in exile in Scotland. Signalling its support for the clan, than Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud met in 2010 with the coup plotters after their release from Qatari prison.

For now, the promotion of opponents of Sheikh Tamim appears to be more of a public relations stunt and fixture of the media war than a serious challenge in a country that has witnessed a wave of nationalist sentiment in response to the boycott. Yet, the longer the Gulf crisis drags on and the longer Qatar sustains its refusal to accept Saudi and UAE demands, the more difficult it becomes to find a way out in which all parties can save face.


I chatted to a well-versed and connected oil company executive in London a while back and Dorsey's name came up - his dismissiveness of Dorsey was articulated as follows:

"Singapore is out of Beijing's favour. Its a family run country and RSIS is basically an arm of the defence ministry in SG...you don't want to be a lone country in that part of the world".

So it goes back to another point you raised in the HC thread - that the Old Man ultimately subjugated an entire generation and the one after that into moral and political apathy/paralysis by making singkies genuinely believe they are special in the eyes of the world. Then you hear the same complain of being discriminated against because of their race (not nationality) and those that migrate complain of "loneliness" because the world outside is different and they miss the food. SIngkies don't want to breath the air of freedom. You want them to aspire you must make sure to give them their $3.50 plate of chicken rice. And then you have those who do migrate believe they have integrated/assimilated and then sneer down at newcomers who may not be of the same social status or possess the immediate cultural acumen expected of them when they arrive. Those are in my mind the worse kind of hypocrites because even after spending 20 years in Western country they are still rabid petty arrogant singkies.

 

[scroobal]

Bilahari !... now that makes sense. One good thing about bringing into academia well horned journalist who have been in the trenches for long periods is their hard earned ground knowledge and contacts. On the other hand in the same school we have Rohan Gunaretna who has been proven a dud and we still keep him. The Aussie were the first to question his credentials. Even the ISD have given up on him. Only the SAF have been hanging on to his every word.

The way we have evolved in a generation is frightening. That are lots of smart people around but struggle to connect the dots. I remember when I was advocating emmigration the single most common excuse was that they did not want to be second class citizens in the western world. I could never fathom why they came to that.

As to the Qatari crisis and its origins including the 1996 is still a amateur research in progress. The currency is sliding, they are losing billions to prop it up, they might fold sooner rather than later due to the economy.

One of James' biggest cheerleaders is none other than Bilahari - there are times that he veers into absolute BS but he does seem to be well-connected enough to get information quite quickly and processes it well.

One paragraph in his recent article on the Qatar crisis certainly earned major brownie points from my perspective because he mentioned a little reported (in the Western press) aspect of tribal relations between KSA-Qatar i.e. that the Qataris had stripped members of the Al Ghafran tribe of citizenship during the early phase of the blockade as a response (my info was that the figure was much higher at 50000):

Sheikh Taleb bin Lahem bin Shraim, the head of the Qatari branch of another tribe, the Al Ghafran, fled to Saudi Arabia in September after Qatar stripped him and 54 of his relatives of their Qatari citizenship. Sheikh Taleb said he had been penalized for refusing “to insult the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Sheikh Taleb was one of several Al Ghafran tribal leaders who met with Prince Mohammed in early September. Sheikh Sultan al-Murri, who attended the meeting in Jeddah convened at the request of the tribal leaders, accused Qatar of resorting to “lies and attempts to distort the tribes of Qatar in order to tear up the tribal social fabric in favour of the minority of Iranians.” Qatar has a minority of Shiites and Qatari nationals of Iranian descent.

Relations between Qatar and the Al Ghafran have long been strained. Qatar revoked the citizenship of the entire Al Ghafran clan, some 5-6000 people, after ten of its leaders were accused of plotting a coup in cooperation with Saudi Arabia in 1996. More members of the tribe have lost their Qatari nationality since 2004.

Many have since won a reprieve, but thousands remain in limbo, according to Misfer al-Marri, a tribe member who lives in exile in Scotland. Signalling its support for the clan, than Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud met in 2010 with the coup plotters after their release from Qatari prison.

For now, the promotion of opponents of Sheikh Tamim appears to be more of a public relations stunt and fixture of the media war than a serious challenge in a country that has witnessed a wave of nationalist sentiment in response to the boycott. Yet, the longer the Gulf crisis drags on and the longer Qatar sustains its refusal to accept Saudi and UAE demands, the more difficult it becomes to find a way out in which all parties can save face.

I chatted to a well-versed and connected oil company executive in London a while back and Dorsey's name came up - his dismissiveness of Dorsey was articulated as follows:

"Singapore is out of Beijing's favour. Its a family run country and RSIS is basically an arm of the defence ministry in SG...you don't want to be a lone country in that part of the world".

So it goes back to another point you raised in the HC thread - that the Old Man ultimately subjugated an entire generation and the one after that into moral and political apathy/paralysis by making singkies genuinely believe they are special in the eyes of the world. Then you hear the same complain of being discriminated against because of their race (not nationality) and those that migrate complain of "loneliness" because the world outside is different and they miss the food. SIngkies don't want to breath the air of freedom. You want them to aspire you must make sure to give them their $3.50 plate of chicken rice. And then you have those who do migrate believe they have integrated/assimilated and then sneer down at newcomers who may not be of the same social status or possess the immediate cultural acumen expected of them when they arrive. Those are in my mind the worse kind of hypocrites.

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

Bilahari !... now that makes sense. One good thing about bringing into academia well horned journalist who have been in the trenches for long periods is their hard earned ground knowledge and contacts. On the other hand in the same school we have Rohan Gunaretna who has been proven a dud and we still keep him. The Aussie were the first to question his credentials. Even the ISD have given up on him. Only the SAF have been hanging on to his every word.

The way we have evolved in a generation is frightening. That are lots of smart people around but struggle to connect the dots. I remember when I was advocating emmigration the single most common excuse was that they did not want to be second class citizens in the western world. I could never fathom why they came to that.

As to the Qatari crisis and its origins including the 1996 is still a amateur research in progress. The currency is sliding, they are losing billions to prop it up, they might fold sooner rather than later due to the economy.

Don't get me started on that nincompoop RG! Where do they find these dregs and they hang on to them. The only one I rate locally on SE terrorism is Bilveer. I've heard good things about his son too.

Re: Qatar crisis - they are still in denial and insist things are hunky dory and booming. They genuinely believe that the "world" is rallying for them when in reality outside the GCC the only Qatari-linked prospects people are genuinely concerned about is whether it is safe to travel on Qatar Airways and whether they will be impacted by the stopover in Doha. They do have really fabulous planes and service (except the plane used for the flight to Berlin from Doha which is the only one I encountered that was worse than SQ).

 

[scroobal]

His questionable credentials were well known before he was recruited by Singapore and that it was common place for the Australians and some Europeans to bait him with invitation to spill out more hubris. ISD claims that it was not them. They had more respect for Sydney Jones out of Indonesia thought they had hated her guts.

By the way Susan Sim and RG are best buddies and all linked to Ali Soufan.

Don't get me started on that nincompoop RG! Where do they find these dregs and they hang on to them. The only one I rate locally on SE terrorism is Bilveer. I've heard good things about his son too.

Re: Qatar crisis - they are still in denial and insist things are hunky dory and booming. They genuinely believe that the "world" is rallying for them when in reality outside the GCC the only Qatari-linked prospects people are genuinely concerned about is whether it is safe to travel on Qatar Airways and whether they will be impacted by the stopover in Doha. They do have really fabulous planes and service (except the plane used for the flight to Berlin from Doha which is the only one I encountered that was worse than SQ).

 

[scroobal]

This was in 2003 and the Canadians have also discredited this chap and SAF relies on him.

The Age: Analyse This

Gary Hughes, 20 July 2003

Whenever a comment has been needed about al-Qaeda or terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna has been there to supply it. Who is he? Gary Hughes reports.

Whenever a comment has been needed about al-Qaeda or terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna has been there to supply it. Who is he? Gary Hughes reports. Rohan Gunaratna describes as a spiritually defining moment the day in March 2001 when he learned that the Taliban regime in Kabul had ordered the demolition of the ancient, giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan in Afghanistan.

But it was the destruction six months later of an icon of the modern world – New York’s World Trade Towers – that changed his life in a more practical way, launching a stellar new career as a global authority on international terrorism.Gunaratna was the right person in the right place at the right time.

Gunaratna was the right person in the right place at the right time.


The world’s media outlets were looking for experts to interpret how and why the world had changed and the Sri Lanka-born academic was great “talent”, providing dire warnings about the threat of Osama bin Laden’s shadowy al-Qaeda network.

No one seemed to worry that, until the September 11 attacks, Gunaratna’s acknowledged expertise had been largely confined to the activities of Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or the Tamil Tigers.

In May 2002, as Australian SAS troops were hunting bin Laden’s followers south-east of Kabul, Gunaratna’s book Inside Al Qaeda : Global Network of Terror became an instant bestseller and his reputation grew accordingly, being described as one of the world’s foremost experts on Islamic terrorism.

Gunaratna, 42, had ridden a wave of success driven by the basic laws of supply and demand – there were not enough experts to meet the demand from the media and publishers for intelligence analysts able to provide a catchy quote or headline. And Gunaratna appeared happy to break the mould of the public’s traditional idea of an academic analyst, making at times startling claims based on what he said were his own intelligence “sources” and criticising governments – including Canberra – for not doing enough and being too concerned about civil liberties.

Gunaratna was also seized upon by the Australian media, including newspapers published by Fairfax, and promoted virtually unquestioningly as the leading authority on Islamic terrorism, particularly after the Bali bombing in October last year.

But Gunaratna and others who belong to this new breed of media-friendly commentators, who blur the distinction between academic analysis and politics and base research on information from anonymous intelligence sources, are causing concern in some circles.

Members of Australia’s intelligence community, and in particular ASIO, are known to be dismissive of many of Gunaratna’s more sensational statements.
Also under scrutiny are the financial links between analysts who highlight the dangers posed by terrorists and private corporations that stand to make money from an increased atmosphere of fear.

Members of Australia’s intelligence community, and in particular ASIO, are known to be dismissive of many of Gunaratna’s more sensational statements, such as claims that alleged military chief of the Jemaah Islamiyah network and senior al-Qaeda member Hambali had regularly visited Australia.

In Britain, The Observer newspaper’s home affairs editor and long-time writer on Islamic terrorist groups, Martin Bright, describes Gunaratna as “the least reliable of the experts on bin Laden”. He says Gunaratna is often used by the British authorities as an expert witness in the prosecution of Islamist terror suspects because they can rely on him to be apocalyptic.

In Australia, journalist and commentator on intelligence issues Brian Toohey is one of the few to have openly questioned Gunaratna’s credentials, describing him as a “self-proclaimed expert” and dismissing some of his claims as “plain silly”. He uses as an example a warning by Gunaratna published in November 2001 in the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council Review that terrorist groups might try to influence Australian politicians by rallying “10,000 or 20,000 votes” in their electorates.

David Wright-Neville is senior research fellow at the Centre for Global Terrorism at Monash University and until 2002 was a senior terrorism analyst in the Office of National Assessment. Although he won’t comment directly on Gunaratna, or any other individual analyst, he says that, like in any other profession, the abilities of so- called terrorism experts ranges from the very good down to questionable.

The lack of scrutiny of their abilities, says to Wright-Neville, is partly due to the shortage of analysts and experts available to meet the massive demand for public knowledge.

He says problems arise when analysts don’t make it clear when they leave the secure ground of known facts and enter into their own extrapolation when commenting to the media. The results can been headlines based on conjecture rather than reality.

Another factor, says Wright-Neville, is the use of unidentified intelligence or security sources by some analysts. Not all intelligence organisations are equally reliable and, particularly in some south-east Asian countries, can be highly politicised and running agendas for their governments. Individuals in intelligence agencies can selectively leak information to analysts – or to the media – to influence public debate.

REALITY CHECK

The claim: In his book Inside al-Qaeda and in several interviews, Rohan Gunaratna gives graphic details of how terrorists planned to hijack a British Airways jet at London’s Heathrow Airport on September 11, 2001, and fly it into the British Houses of Parliament. The plot was foiled when aircraft in Britain were grounded immediately after the attack on New York’s twin towers. The source for the information was Indian intelligence interrogations of Mohammed Afroz, a 25-year-old Muslim and suspected member of al-Qaeda, arrested in Mumbai on October 3, 2001. Afroz told interrogators he had been to flying schools in Victoria and Britain and also planned to fly a plane into Melbourne’s Rialto Towers.


The reality: Afroz was released by an Indian court on indefinite bail in April, 2001 after Indian police failed to bring charges. As part of the investigation, Indian intelligence agents flew to Australia in February 2001 to check out his claims. It was reported after his release that New Delhi police believed Mumbai police made up the sensational claims allegedly made by Afroz. ASIO said in its 2002 annual report that none of the allegations made by Afroz that related to Australia could be corroborated and they were assessed “to be lacking in credibility”.

The claim: Hambali, the operation commander of the terrorist group behind the Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiah, and other leaders had visited Australia a dozen times, according to the Australia edition of Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside al-Qaeda.

The reality: Attorney-General Daryl Williams said checks within Australia and overseas had failed to find any record of Hambali having travelled to Australia “under his own name or any known aliases”.

“The context in which information is obtained is vital,” he says.

It is also important not to put too much weight on intelligence sources. “Intelligence is an imprecise science,” says Wright-Neville.

Gunaratna’s credentials in biographical information published in books, magazines, newspapers and on the internet, are at first glance impressive. His book Inside Al Qaeda states: “Rohan Gunaratna, the author of six books on armed conflict, was called to address the United Nations, the US Congress and the Australian Parliament in the wake of September 11, 2001. He is a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St Andrews University, Scotland. Previously, Gunaratna was principal investigator of the United Nations’ Terrorism Prevention Branch and he has served as a consultant on terrorism to several governments and corporations.”

After The Sunday Age made detailed checks on Gunaratna’s biographical details, he confirmed last week that there was no such position as principal investigator at the UN’s Terrorism Prevention Branch and he worked there in 2001-02 as a research consultant. He also confirmed that, rather than directly addressing the UN, Congress and the Australian Parliament, he had actually spoken at a seminar organised by the parliamentary library, given evidence to a congressional hearing on terrorism and delivered a research paper to a conference on terrorism organised by the UN’s Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Gunaratna’s first six books on armed conflict were all relatively obscure works on the Tamil Tigers. One of the books, South Asia at Gunpoint, brought him to notice in Australia in October 2000 with claims that a Tamil Tiger support network had shipped a small helicopter and micro-light aircraft to Sri Lanka and that a Tamil Tiger arms smuggling ship had visited Australia in 1993. Although the local Tamil community was outraged, at least one of the allegations was shown to have a basis in fact. An SBS Dateline report telecast that same month tracked down the Newcastle shop owner who had been questioned by ASIO after being approached by an alleged Tamil Tiger sympathiser in 1994 wanting to buy hang gliders and have them shipped to Malaysia.

The information appears to have come through Gunaratna’s very close links with Sri Lanka’s intelligence service. Gunaratna worked for the Sri Lanka Government between 1984 and 1994.

The trail of financial support and weapons supplies to the Tamil Tigers took Gunaratna into the wider world of international terrorism, including Afghanistan, where the Tamil Tigers obtained small arms. His research into the Tamil Tigers and their methods also made him an authority on suicide bombers – knowledge that would stand him in good stead following the September 11 suicide attacks in New York and Washington.

In July 2001, he co-authored (with three others) an article called Blowback in Jane’s Intelligence Review, which looked at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in light of evidence from the then recently completed trials of those behind the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The article was one of the first detailed examinations of bin Laden and the origins of al-Qaeda. It quickly became a point of reference after September 11.

One former Australian intelligence officer says a problem with Gunaratna’s approach is that he tends to look at international terrorism from the perspective of how it relates to the Tamil Tigers, who declared a truce in December 2001 and opened peace negotiations.

Gunaratna did much of his work on the Tamil Tigers’ international links while studying in the United States in 1995-96. It was then that he began establishing important friends in the small world of intelligence analysis.

He did a master of arts at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University in 1996 and research at the University of Illinois and University of Maryland. While at Maryland, he worked with Admiral Stansfield Turner, one-time head of US intelligence. While at Notre Dame, he linked up with the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at Scotland’s St Andrews University and its massive database on terrorist incidents going back to 1968. He also got to know the centre’s then head, Dr Bruce Hoffman, with whom he has co-authored a yet to be published book on terrorism.

Gunaratna moved to Scotland to complete his doctorate at St Andrews and work as a research fellow at the terrorism and political violence centre. He also got open access to the centre’s large terrorism database, one of just a small handful of such databases scattered around the world.

The database is a combination of material gathered by St Andrews and the Rand Corporation, the non-profit US thinktank established by the US Air Force. Now known as the RAND-St Andrews database on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict, it is largely maintained and updated by more than 30 students who comb the internet and newspapers and magazines from around the world for information on terrorist operations.

The database is not the only link between Rand and St Andrews and Rand and Gunaratna. Bruce Hoffman, the founder of the St Andrews centre for terrorism study, is now a vice-president of Rand and chief of its Washington office. And Rand, St Andrews, Gunaratna and Jane’s worked together last year as private advisers to Risk Management Solutions, helping the private American corporation develop a “US terrorism risk model” to sell to insurance companies worried about terrorist strikes.

Rand, in turn, is linked to the $US3.5 billion Carlyle Group, which holds stakes in some of the world’s biggest arms and defence corporations, through the former US defence secretary and deputy CIA director Frank Carlucci, who is chairman of the group and a Rand board member.

The Carlyle Group employs former President George Bush as a senior adviser, uses former US Secretary of State James Baker as its senior counsellor and has former British Prime Minister John Major as chairman of its European arm. Earlier this year, it bought a third of QinetiQ, the company floated by Britain’s Ministry of Defence to commercially exploit non-secret security and defence technology. QinteQ has been negotiating with the British Government to buy the soon-to-be-privatised Security, Languages, Intelligence and Photography College, where British spies are trained.

In his biographical details on the site of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, where he is an assistant professor, Gunaratna states one of his past positions was “principal investigator, QinetiQ Project on Terrorist Information Operations”.

Gunaratna moved to Singapore this year to help establish a regional centre for terrorism research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, where he is titled assistant professor. Not surprisingly, the centrepiece of the new research centre is a database on terrorist activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Gunaratna says his expertise on al-Qaeda comes from interviews with the group’s “penultimate leadership” and rank and file members, hundreds of documents seized after the invasion of Afghanistan and the debriefings of al-Qaeda suspects in more than a dozen countries.

It was that kind of information that led him in March to state definitively that Australian David Hicks, who has been detained at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba after his capture in Afghanistan, was “not a member of al-Qaeda”, “did not plan to attack civilian targets”, “never intended to attack a civilian target” and was a “romantic” not taken seriously by other Taliban fighters.

Eyebrows were raised among fellow intelligence analysts when Gunaratna reversed his position on Hicks two weeks ago, after the US announced the Australian was one of six detainees it had enough evidence against to put before a military tribunal. This time Gunaratna, said Hicks had undergone “more advance and more specialised training” with al-Qaeda, which “had some special plans for him”.

Gunaratna attributed his change of heart to information gained from “more recent investigations” and given to him by sources he refused to identify.

Another person with raised eyebrows was Hicks’ Adelaide lawyer, Frank Camatta, who maintains that Gunaratna could not possibly have had access to transcripts of his client’s interrogations in Guantanamo Bay. “We’d sure like to know who his sources are,” says Camatta.


Pacific Journalism Review (PDF): The legitimising of terror fears: Research or Psy Ops?

Peter Cronau, 2003



ABC: The Media Report, 11 September 2003

Armed conflict and military intelligence are staples of the evening news, so “experts” haunt our media. But does the media rely too much on “experts”, and has their presence changed the way ideas are discussed.

Program Transcript

Mick O’Regan: Hello, and welcome to the program.

As we open the newspapers this morning and listen to the radio and TV, it’s all too obvious that the scourge of terrorist violence continues to wreck lives around the world. Writing in The Australian newspaper, the Prime Minister, John Howard, acknowledges the millions of words that have been written about September 11th, and comments that the volumes of analysis cannot disguise the fact that the attacks were ideological statements by fanatics.

To understand these attacks and the people behind them, the media has increasingly relied on expert commentators to unravel the complex, historical, religious and political elements that underpin them.

So today, conscious that September 11th is much more than just a date on the calendar, it’s an international shorthand for remembrance, for war, and for a world view, we’re going to consider how experts are used in the media, by talking to some.


John Walker: Its difficult to see that the world is either a safer place or that there are less causes of terrorism either in our region or in the Middle East over the last two years. What concerns me is that these things are not central issues for debate.

Andrew Norton: Well I actually think people are vastly better informed about these issues than they were two years ago. Two years ago most people hadn’t heard of the Taliban, were only dimly aware of Islamic fundamentalism, so I actually think that even if the detail is lacking like it is for every issue in the public mind. At a broadbrush level, people actually are much more aware of the issues than they were two years ago.

Scott Burchill: I think the lesson is very clear, that if you want to really understand these issues, you need to wait for considered opinion by people who perhaps haven’t made career moves to present themselves as experts on terrorism, but who can draw on their long-held experience and knowledge of history and international politics to place what is a very complex series of events in some sort of historical context. So that’s unfortunately a waiting game, you will need to wait for considered analysis which will come some time after these events.

Mick O’Regan: Our experts: Scott Burchill, lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University; Andrew Norton, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, and John Walker, from the Australian Defence Forces Academy.

At the moment I think the community is increasingly reliant on expert information to better understand policy responses to key problems in the areas of security, military conflict and terrorism.

Now it helps that some commentators are very clear about their views, and the sort of policy outcomes they seek. Earlier this week one very prominent American commentator, William Kristol, spoke to Peter Thompson on the Radio National Breakfast program. Kristol has had a long career as an advisor to Republican politicians in the States, and is now the editor of the conservative political magazine ‘The Weekly Standard’.

Regarding the debate now raging in America about the adequacy of US strategy in the Middle East, William Kristol focused on how the debate was framed.

William Kristol: You know, it depends how you look at it obviously. I think that’s the key really, in a way. The Administration, since the war has not framed the issue quite as dramatically as it really deserves to be framed, I really think we’re at a turning point, a hinge-point, for the 21st century. Either the Middle East will improve and the world will get safer, or it won’t improve, and then we really face an awfully scary prospect over the next 10, 20, 30 years.

Peter Thompson: You and your co-author use the term that the US may need to ‘wage perpetual war for perpetual peace’; what do you mean by that?

William Kristol: That might have been a slight rhetorical overstatement. Well I do mean that I don’t think war is going to disappear from the future of the human race, I think we always will need to be prepared for war, I think the US does have a particular role as the world’s strongest nation, and certainly the strongest nation on behalf of freedom and democracy to be willing to, if necessary alone, but hopefully with friends and allies, to beat back threats, whether terrorist threats or dictators who are invading their neighbours, so I don’t think we should kid ourselves, as some Europeans tend to, that war is going to disappear or that the whole world is going to start looking like Switzerland or even like the European Union.

So whether for East Asia or in the Middle East, I think strength is necessary, I do think the terrorist attacks on us in particular were invited by weakness over the last 10 or 20 years in response to Middle East terrorism on our part, and that’s been a problem of both Republican and Democratic Administrations from Reagan on really. So I think we face the need to fight, and I think we will fight, and I think we’ll win. I just wish we had a greater sense of urgency and had committed more resources to Iraq in particular.

Mick O’Regan: William Kristol, editor of the conservative American journal, ‘The Weekly Standard’, speaking to Peter Thompson earlier this week.

Kristol’s acknowledgement that the framing of debates is crucial to communicating your political message highlights one way expert commentary is used in the media, providing a context in which actions can be understood. It’s also critical to realise the interaction of the political cycle with the release of information. Throughout the war on terror, information about the nature of risks and the best way to counter threats has been of the utmost political significance, as Scott Burchill explains.

Scott Burchill: I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. Both mid-term Congressional elections, but I think more significantly now, the Presidential election in November next year, effectively rules out of consideration the United States opening a new front in what is called the war on terror. It’s often said now in many of the discussions about US politics, that the war campaign has been handed over to Karl Rove, who is President Bush’s electoral and opinion poll advisor, and the first edict that he issued was that there are to be no more fights, no more wars, until the election is over. So I think it’s impossible to remove this as an issue.

But I’d like to come back to one issue also about the lead-up to the war in Iraq, and show you how these things can be easily confused. There was a considerable discussion about the legality of the war, and many listeners will remember that the Australian government issued a very brief legal advice to suggest that intervention in Iraq was legal without a further Security Council resolution. Well the fact is that the overwhelming body of legal advice suggested that without another Security Council resolution the war in Iraq was in fact illegal.

However, it’s fairly easy to find dissenting voices, so the public is left trying to evaluate exactly where the truth is, when the government tells them one thing, but without actually finding some advice on the internet or reading very widely in the legal area, they wouldn’t be aware in fact the government’s advice on this was minority advice, which was well out of step with broader legal opinion. So how do they evaluate?

Mick O’Regan: Well how should they evaluate? Should that have been a task for the media to undertake, to actually show up those inconsistencies, or should there have been different advice offered?

Scott Burchill: Well I think what the media can do is locate the nature of that advice in the general view of this particular issue. So instead of simply arguing or reproducing the government’s position and saying, ‘Well, there is another position but the government is on firm ground’, the public probably needed to be told that the overwhelming majority of international lawyers who specialise in the use of force in international affairs, felt there was absolutely no legal basis for a war against Iraq, and that the government’s position was well out of step with the broad opinion. But they weren’t told that, and therefore they weren’t really in a position to contest the issue on that basis. The issue effectively was neutralised by the government doing that particular strategy.

Mick O’Regan: Scott Burchill, from Deakin University.

So, is the media, with its reliance on format and brevity, up to the task of untangling the intersecting lines of spin, expert commentary, and political tactics?

Scott Burchill: Well we’ve seen a small number of experts who have been regularly employed to offer short sound bites in response usually to events on the ground whether they be a terrorist attack or as we saw during the war in Iraq, progress during the campaign, and clearly I think perhaps the disappointing aspect for me is that the priority seems to be to get a voice that is coherent, who can express their views concisely in small sound bites, but not really challenge the content of what they say.

And I think this is only partly the fault of the media, because perhaps journalists aren’t in the position to follow up and question some of the assumptions and claims that are being made. And so we get a sort of an ubiquitous presence of some leading commentators on terrorism, who claim to be experts, but we’re not really getting a very diverse range of opinions.

Andrew Norton: In defence of the media there are only a limited pool of people who actually are qualified to comment on these, and they’re usually on a very short time line, and therefore they go for whatever expert happens to be available. But the difficulty is the lack of mechanisms after that to balance what has been said in the immediate aftermath of an event like Bali.

Mick O’Regan: So when you talk about mechanisms, what do you mean? Some sort of follow-up to evaluate the predictions that people have made?

Andrew Norton: Well you can have things like that, but even say programs like in the United States where you get several people on a panel arguing together at the same time, which gives viewers or listeners a chance to actually evaluate claim and counter-claim as they’re being made, rather than days or weeks after the event, trying to remember what was originally said, and then weigh it against the next expert you happen to be listening to.

Mick O’Regan: Andrew Norton from the Centre for Independent Studies and before him, Scott Burchill.

The sharp end of the debate over expert commentary in Australia at the moment concerns the appropriate response to the threat of international terrorism, primarily from South East Asia and in particular from Indonesia.

In the aftermath of the Bali bombings we wanted every shred of information we could get about terrorist threats in Indonesia. Enormous energy was expended, analysing what happened in Bali, while comparatively little was devoted to the spate of deadly bombings at the end of 2000.

It’s as if terrorism had arrived in the archipelago in October last year.

However for many people the real terrorism in Indonesia for the past 25 years has been State terrorism, conducted by its own military and security forces. This sometimes seems to escape the newly-minuted experts on global terror, such as the Sri Lankan academic, Rohan Gunaratna, the author of ‘Inside Al-Qaeda: global network of terror’.

Gunaratna’s career has developed rapidly from dealing with the specifics of the civil war in his homeland to being an international authority on global terrorism. He’s widely quoted in the media where his unequivocal predictions ensure celebrity. In May this year he was interviewed on the ABC Lateline program by Tony Jones.

Rohan Gunaratna: The Australian government has taken this threat very seriously because Australia is aware of a number of operations Al-Qaeda attempted against Australian targets, starting with the December 2001 plan to destroy the Australian mission in Singapore. Subsequently of course we witnessed Bali, but even before that, there has been a number of attempts to destroy Australian targets. So I believe that the Australian government has taken appropriate steps to better respond to this kind of threat.

Although interestingly, the Australian government decided not to close its embassy in Saudi Arabia when both Britain and the United States did that; was that a wise move? I mean was it thought that that threat had already passed?

Rohan Gunaratna: I think that threat to an Australian target in that region would be much less than a threat to an Australian target say in South East Asia, because other than al-Qaeda, there are a number of associate groups of Al-Qaeda, such as Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Sayaf Group, Moral Islamic Liberation Front, Lashkar Jundullah, these groups that are targeting Australian interests in South East Asia.

Mick O’Regan: During the interview, Rohan Gunaratna went on to outline the links that he argues exist between Al-Qaeda and various South East Asian groups, especially Jemaah Islamiyah.

Rohan Gunaratna: Jemaah Islamiah although is a regional South East Asian group, it is also acting as the South East Asian arm of Al-Qaeda, because the operational head of Jemaah Islamiyah, Hambali, is also a member of the military committee of Al-Qaeda. Because of that, Jemaah Islamiah is in many ways acting as an extension of Al-Qaeda in South East Asia.

Mick O’Regan: Rohan Gunaratna, with Tony Jones on Lateline back in May.

The media’s need for detailed commentary on terrorist groups has resulted in Gunaratna being seen as an objective commentator on terrorism, but his analysis of the situation in Indonesia gives cause for concern.

The linkages he poses are based on information from leaked intelligence documents, and as a forthcoming article in The Pacific Journalism Review notes:

‘His trust in Indonesian intelligence officers and in intelligence reports prepared by the very security forces who have themselves been implicated in incitement and even direct involvement in violent conflict, is nothing short of astounding.’

Those linkages are also a problem for other researchers who focus on the historical contexts in which different groups have emerged in Indonesia, and their disparate political goals.

John Walker lectures at the Defence Forces Academy.

John Walker: I think over the last two years movements and groups who have a fairly longstanding history in Indonesia, and intellectual debates in Indonesia, which have been around since the 1920s, are suddenly being couched in new global terms. So things like the Acehnese Independent Movement, people are now trying to link it to Al-Qaeda. Well there may or may not be links, the point about the Free Aceh Movement is, as with many things in Indonesia, the proper context is not global terrorism, the proper context is the post-Soeharto era, it’s 25 years of State terrorism, not this new thing that is of concern particularly to US policymakers.

And my concern I suppose is that because Scott mentioned, something happens on the ground, defence and strategic analysts and a very small number of them, have to comment. They accept the policy parameters, and whilst it’s one thing for governments to deal in policy terms, I think it’s quite different for analysts to, because if you just accept the parameters, then that sets up the debate. And that may or may not provide the insights.

Mick O’Regan: The sort of insights that Rohan Gunaratna has provided seem to depend on information which is difficult to verify and emerges from a very narrow band of sources.

Critics of his work, such as John Walker, highlights a tendency to use generalised notions of global terrorist networks rather than studying the distinctive historical and political attributes of specific groups.

This is especially important when speculating upon the links between Al-Qaeda and other groups.

John Walker: If you look at the three, say best-known Indonesian ones at the moment: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka the Acehnese independence movement, Jemaah Islamiaah and Laskar Jihad. Jemaah Islamiaah is purported to want a pan-national Islamic caliphate in sort of maritime South-East Asia. So bigger than the Indonesian State. Laskar Jihad appear to be ultranationalists determined to attack anybody who threatens the boundaries of the Indonesian Republic as it exists. And the Acehnese want a separate Acehnese Islamic Sultanate in North Sumatra.

Now these three movements, all of which are broadly I suppose, Islamic militant, actually have three, not just different goals, but mutually exclusive goals. So it’s far from clear that that labelling them as Islamic militants, furthers any sort of understanding. And it gets worse than that because there is evidence that Laskar Jihad, or members of former Laskar Jihad, because it claims to have disbanded, have actually gone to Aceh in the last six months to engage with the Acehnese and to fight the Acehnese. So these are mutually exclusive objectives and there’s scope for conflict. And yet in media debates they’re all Islamic militants. It just seems to be not to be at all helpful.

Mick O’Regan: John Walker.

Scott Burchill also has reservations about Gunaratna’s work, suggesting the Sri Lankan’s confidence in his own conclusions and his availability to the media are critical factors in his profile.

Scott Burchill: And that’s why in the war against terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna was so ubiquitous, is because he didn’t have any shades of grey, he was absolutely certain in what he said. He could say things like Hambali, the Jemaah Islamiaah senior operative, had visited Australia 12 times, when in fact the Attorney-General could find no evidence of him ever having visited Australia at all, either under that name or a range of aliases. Now if he says that with great certainty, then journalists, even if they’re not that impressionable, come away with the view that this is a man who knows what he’s talking about because he shows no ambiguity, there’s no doubts in what he says, and it gets duly reported that way.

Mick O’Regan: The information that underpins much of Rohan Gunaratna’s work is also the subject of concern within the academic community.

The analysis of his work in The Pacific Journalism Review includes the following remarks about the footnotes in the section of his book dealing with Indonesia:

‘Ten of the 25 footnotes state the source as Indonesian intelligence officers or the intelligence report. Another eight cite press articles. His writing here on Indonesia reveals a remarkably narrow selection of sources, a profound lack of knowledge, and a flawed understanding of the history of the Indonesian armed forces and of their intelligence operates.’

For John Walker, this represents a major problem with Gunaratna’s work.

John Walker: If you want to talk in any sort of detail, say for example about Al-Qaeda, or Jemaah Islamiyah, without access to classified information, the providence of which you don’t know, you’re left being very sceptical. When dramatic events happen like the Bali bombing or the hotel bombings in Jakarta, the media actually don’t want people being sceptical. There is a requirement to have some explanatory power, and I think that’s where Rohan Gunaratna has found his metier. And he relies very heavily on apparently leaked security documents from the United States government, which people just are unable to verify.

The texts are not available, so we can’t see whether he’s interpreted them correctly, and intelligence documents or intelligence material is actually very hard to analyse, it’s a very subtle process. So even if the documents that he claims to have access to, whether the records of interview that he has access to, are real and have not been spun by the people providing them, we still don’t know whether his analysis is necessarily accurate. And there is I think a tendency to avoid people who will say things like ‘Why a war on terror?’ I mean the branding’s very important, so a nice catchy phrase like ‘a war on terror’, you don’t have time in a 2-minute grab for radio to deconstruct that. And I think that’s also a real problem.

Scott Burchill: If you think of the amount of attention which has been given to the Bali attacks on October 12th 2002, we still don’t know with any degree of confidence whether Australians were specifically targeted, whether it was a mistake and that Americans were targeted, or whether it was a generic anti-Western attack. Now the actual answer to that question is very significant for the kinds of strategies that you may develop to counter these kinds of threats. Claims by Mr Gunaratna that this was definitely specifically targeted at Australians, without any supporting evidence of any kind, doesn’t leave the public with any way of adjudicating or verifying, as John said.

Mick O’Regan: The issue of classified, official documents finding their way into the hands of people not meant to read them has been big news this week in Australia.

The media coverage has centred on the cross-examination of Andrew Wilkie, who resigned from the Office of National Assessments, the ONA, because of disagreements over the government’s characterisation of the threat posed by Iraq.

The Labor Party now wants to know how details of Wilkie’s report found their way into the public domain.

John Faulkner: Can the Minister confirm that all ONA documents are routinely classified, numbered, bar-coded, and individually grammatically configured to identify the source of leaked documents? Can the Minister also confirm that all of these safety measures would have been used on the ONA report on Iraq written by Andrew Wilkie, and dated December 2002? Does the Minister therefore believe that these measures will assist the Australian Federal Police to quickly and accurately identify both the source of the leak of that document and also any person who receives and uses the content of that classified report?

Mick O’Regan: Senator John Faulkner, demanding answers on why some classified documents end up in the wrong hands.

It’s not a new problem, but in the context of political arguments over the war on terror, leaking sensitive information to the media has become an important element in how the public debate is conducted.

As Scott Burchill explains, filtering information through acknowledged ‘experts’ is a tried and tested way of promoting government policy.

Scott Burchill: I think some of the experts have been in receipt of deliberate leaks of government information and intelligence, if you like they’ve been used as conduits for government propaganda, and if you look at the sources of some of the recently published books on Al-Qaeda and anti-Western Islamic terrorism generally, you’ll often see that the sources of some of the claims are confidential intelligence briefings. Now what that means is that the expert has been in receipt of a document and has faithfully reproduced it as argument. Well that’s one way in which governments get their own particular spin on events out into the public domain without having to actually say it directly to the public, they do it through what is essentially a compliant and supportive academic.

Mick O’Regan: Of course compliant academics are a lot easier to deal with than angry bureaucrats. The scandal in Britain over the suicide death of weapons scientist David Kelly highlighted the fact that often the people with the most knowledge on a subject are the ones limited in what they can say, they’re the ones forbidden to speak.

But given the government’s need for confidential information, is it foolish to think that public servants should ever be able to speak on the record?

Scott Burchill: Not really, because in fact in the case of Dr Kelly he was backgrounding journalists in the full knowledge of his departmental minders and masters. And you can hardly blame him, given that the Ministers in the Blair government were leaking information, backgrounding journalists, comprising intelligence dossiers that were heavily weighted to present a particular argument. So they can’t really blame the bureaucrats if they were simply emulating the behaviour of their political masters. But on the other hand, of course, their first and primary responsibility is to provide independent advice to government, and if they do get into the public realm and they do start speaking about their issues, then of course it makes it more difficult for them to offer government advice which is unaffected by public debate and their role within that debate.

Mick O’Regan: Where the public debate has been robustly taken up is by think-tanks, where research is more likely to be focused on specific policy outcomes, especially compared to university research.

John Walker: Very few academics come to an issue wanting to achieve a policy outcome. I can’t imagine that anyone coming out of a think-tank to speak on an issue isn’t cogniscant of the broader policy implications and trying to effect a policy. And I think that has disadvantages I think in terms of the provision of information for the public, but it’s good for journalists because governments put out policy, there is a policy framework there, and think-tanks immediately engage in those terms. So it’s digestible, it’s not confusing to the public, and of course they are very practised in being concise and sticking to message.

Andrew Norton: Look I actually think there’s a broader range of inputs into the debate. I don’t think there’s less than in the past. The sheer fact that satellite means we can bring in American experts I think is on the whole a good thing, that we get this kind of immediate diversity of views that we can’t provide in Australia because we’ve got a relatively small local set of experts, plus we’ve got the think-tanks which now employ people so they can actually participate in public debates in a way they perhaps couldn’t if they held jobs within a bureaucracy or jobs in academia where they were too busy teaching or doing other research. So while I think there may be some problems in the access that some people have to the media, overall I think there’s a wider variety of voices being heard.

Scott Burchill: Well the ABC for example, makes extensive use of US-based think-tanks for commentary on foreign policy developments, and has done particularly during the war against terrorism and the war against Iraq. But in my cynical moments, I suspect that what really motivates the journalists who choose these people, is not so much the content of what they say but their ability to present an issue in a concise and lucid way. And I think think-tanks are much better attuned in many ways of doing this, they’re much more media savvy than the universities are.

The universities don’t have in most cases, a systematic way of providing that short-notice expert opinion, whereas the think-tanks I think are ever ready to provide speakers on a range of issues who can reduce the complexity of issues to a few short lines. Now there are problems in doing that because you do miss the complexity, the context, the background and the historical lead-up to events. But in my experience of being in the media, it’s not so much what you say, it’s how you say it.

Mick O’Regan: And ain’t it just the truth?

Our experts talking about experts today were Scott Burchill, from Deakin University in Victoria; and also my thanks to Andrew Norton, from the Centre for Independent Studies and to John Walker from the Australian Defence Forces Academy.

We endeavoured to speak to Rohan Gunaratna about his work and the criticisms of it, and we will keep trying because obviously we’re very keen to hear from him.

And that’s The Media Report for this week. As always, thanks to producer Andrew Davies and to our technical producer, Jim Ussher.

Scoop: Terrorism Expertise of Rohan Gunaratna Questioned

David Small, 24 August 2004

Rohan Gunaratna will take part in a week-long seminar on terrorism and counter-terrorism organised by the Religious Studies Department at Wellington’s Victoria University.

Gunaratna is a self-styled expert on Islamic groups and terrorism. He is still being described as “the former principle (sic) investigator for the United Nations Terrorism Prevention branch” [Sunday Star-Times. 15 August 2004] although Australian journalists have established that no such post has ever existed.

Martin Bright, the home affairs editor of the Observer and long-time writer on Islamic terrorist groups has described Gunaratna as “the least reliable of the experts on bin Laden”.

Gunaratna’s current project to establish a data base of Asian terrorist groups has been said to blur the line between freedom of academic research and intelligence-gathering for governments.



Gunaratna tends to rely on what he claims are inside contacts within intelligence networks. By their very nature, however, no claims based of these sorts of sources can be independently tested.

To the extent that they can be investigated, there are many instances where they have been found to be questionable. For example:
Gunaratna’s claim that Hambali, said to be the commander of Jemaah Islamiah the group behind the Bali bombings, had visited Australia a dozen times was refuted by Australian Attorney-General DarylWilliams who said there was no evidence of him ever visiting Australia.

Gunaratna’s claims of an Australian connection with an alleged plot to fly planes into the British Houses of Parliament were described be ASIO as “lacking in credibility”.

In March 2003, Gunaranta claimed (without producing evidence) that Australian Gunantanamo Bay prisoner, David Hicks, was “not a member of al-Quaeda” and “never intended to attack a civilian target”. In July, after the US announced Hicks would be tried as a terrorist, again without evidence, Gunaratna alleged that Hicks had undergone “more advanced and more specialised training” with al-Quaeda. “A person does not receive that level of training unless both he and his trainers had some special plans for him”.

The British publisher of Gunaratna’s book, Inside al-Quaeda, took the extraordinary step of issuing a disclaimer as a “Publisher’s note” advising the reader to treat the book’s contents as mere “suggestions”.

In January 2003, Gunaratna told the New Zealand Herald (again without evidence) that “there are a few sympathisers and supporters of various terrorist groups in New Zealand” and claimed to have seen their fundraising leaflets. Now he alleges that there are about a dozen groups linked to terrorist support networks operated in New Zealand, fundraising, recruiting and distributing propaganda. Although this would be against New Zealand law, the latest (April 04) government report about the unit responsible for dealing with such matters, New Zealand’s Financial Intelligence Unit, reveals that they have not identified or had suspicions about any terrorist-related assets in New Zealand, and have not frozen any assets with suspected connections to the financing of terrorism.
Commentary from Dr David Small:

Before he was exposed, Gunaratna’s impact in Australia was to heighten people’s sense of fear and suspicion, particularly in relation to Islamic groups and migrant communities. He was also assisting the justifications for laws that undermined hard-won human rights and civil liberties. Now he is bringing this message to New Zealand with claims that “the terrorist threat to New Zealand is not very different to the threat to Australia”.

New Zealanders have demonstrated through our most recent terrorist experience, the Rainbow Warrior bombing, that we don’t need to be on a heightened state of alert to notice terrorists in our midst, and we don’t need special legislation to catch them.

Gunaratna is cloaking his own personal views in a veneer of objective academic expertise in order to push New Zealand further into the War on Terrorism.

New Zealanders should treat his views with scepticism, continue to be welcoming and trusting of migrant communities, and rely on our common sense about the right balance between actual risk and the value we have long placed place on human rights and civil liberties.

At the very least, Gunaratna should be asked to hand over to the Police all the evidence that he claims to have about terrorist support networks operating in New Zealand.

For further comment, phone David Small on 021-1323739. Dr Small is a human rights advocate, an academic at the University of Canterbury, and an Advisory Board member of the Action, Research and Education Network of Aotearoa

Crikey: Richard Farmer’s chunky bits

Richard Farmer, 28 October 2009

Repetition I know but still valuable advice. I am reminded again this morning by the big run given to Rohan Gunaratna in The Australian of how helpful it is to give yourself a grand title if you want to be quoted as an expert on something. In Mr Gunaratna’s case he is “of the Singapore-based International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research” which sounds much better than being a “former student in Finland, claiming to be a recipient of an untraceable Australian-Europe award to study American-Australia diplomatic and security co-operation” as he was described in Crikey earlier this week by the maverick former Aussie diplomat Bruce Haigh.

The good doctor feeds the insatiable appetite of journalists for so-called experts whenever there is a terrorist or security crisis. He keeps bobbing up on all kinds of media — he is clearly an ABC favourite — because the first thing a reporter does when covering a new story is look up the press cuttings or Google references to see who has given a view on a subject before. Thus in The Oz today Rohan Gunaratna, talking as “a leading terrorism expert”, was allowed to authoritatively reveal that a “small number” of Tamil Tigers are in immigration detention in Indonesia having been intercepted on their way to Australia.

What was not disclosed was that the Professor, himself a Sinhalese Sri Lankan, previously was employed by his government. That knowledge might have helped readers understand what was meant by his comment that “I am unable to disclose (how many) because it is now a matter of investigation. But certainly you can ask the Australian authorities because they’re also aware of those investigations.” The comment certainly made him sound like a real insider unable to disclose everything he knows about the murky world of Tamil Tigers.

For an assessment other than Bruce Haigh’s on Prof Gunaratna’s academic abilities you might care to start with a look at some views expressed on the blog site of Michael K Connors of the City University in Hong Kong.

 

[scroobal]

Saudi Arabia detentions: Living inside 'five-star prison'

Lyse DoucetChief international correspondent@bbclysedouceton Twitter

• 26 November 2017
  

Media captionA peek inside the Ritz-Carlton as it hosts those suspected of corruption
Riyadh's palatial Ritz-Carlton hotel, branded as "a retreat for those who simply desire the royal treatment", now finds itself transformed into a nerve centre for an audacious manoeuvre by an ambitious crown prince.

It's not the treatment more than 200 of Saudi Arabia's richest and most powerful ever expected, and certainly never desired, when 32-year old Mohammed Bin Salman launched what was billed as an unprecedented drive against corruption and abuse of power and privilege in the kingdom.

Three weeks on, Riyadh's most prestigious hotel is still the talk of the town. But since the midnight raids which snared at least 11 princes and some of the biggest Saudi billionaires, only snippets have surfaced. Rumours swirl around Riyadh and many capitals beyond about what's really happening inside this gilded prison.

No one goes in or out of its swirling black metal gates now without official permission.

Image captionThe BBC's Lyse Doucet and Philip Goodwin were the first journalists to be allowed into the hotel
Just past midnight last week, we were allowed to drive in under police escort, down a sweeping avenue towards the sprawling complex washed in golden light.

As we alighted, we were greeted by some of the impeccable hotel staff still offering round the clock five star service. But there was a sterner reception from Saudi officials now involved in this crackdown: no faces to be filmed by our crew; no conversations recorded during a first visit by journalists.

A stay lasting a few hours, surrounded by officials, could never yield a full account. But it provides glimpses of life inside.

Even in the dead of night there are huddles of men, dressed in traditional white robes and red and white chequered headdress, speaking in hushed tones in dark corners of the cavernous lobby. Hardly anyone raises their eyes. Only an occasional tinkle of silver spoons on porcelain tea cups or glasses of foaming café lattes breaks an eerie silence.

Who are the 'special guests'?
The mood, around the same hour on 4 November, must have been starkly different when some of Saudi Arabia's most privileged elite were forcibly checked in.

"They didn't believe what was happening," says an official who identifies himself as belonging to the "Special Committee" pursuing this anti-corruption operation. "They thought it was just a show which wouldn't last long."

"Sure they were angry," he admits, with barely concealed satisfaction. "If you tell someone 'you are a thief', they get angry. Imagine if they are a VIP."

We're sitting in one of the lobby's elegant clusters of sofas and plush chairs along with an official from the public prosecutor's office, and what's described as an independent human rights society. We're provided with a briefing, on the condition that no-one is quoted by name.

Why bring them here? "We were afraid some people would have escaped so we had to keep them inside", is the explanation for this strange, if not shocking, fate for people they refer to as "special guests".

Image copyrightREUTERS
Image captionThe Ritz-Carlton has hosted presidents, prime ministers and royalty
There's been no official announcement of this Saudi 'who's who' list. But high profile names had surfaced quickly, including the well-known and wealthy Prince Alwaleed bin Talal who owns shares in everything from Twitter and Apple to the Four Seasons Hotel and London's Savoy.

The crown prince's cousin Miteb bin Abdullah, who headed the elite National Guard, is now said to spend his nights in the Ritz too.

And why these people, not others, which led to assertions that this was more of a ruthless move against royal rivals and critics?

"Everyone here has a file," replies the sombre-faced official from the Public Prosecutor's Office. "Everything is documented."

Over the past two years, under the crown prince's direction, a team has been compiling alleged evidence in great secrecy with some documents dating back decades.

Then, once a new anti-corruption committee was announced by royal decree, the money hunters made their move.

Questions about legality are met with references to Saudi law and the independence of the Public Prosecutor.

The judicial official clarifies that this is still "a pre-investigation". "We're asking people who took the money to give it back," he says.

"It's a friendly process," chimes in the anti-corruption official who says everyone was told "we'll show you the evidence and we'll solve the problem".

Medical crises and mistreatment rumours

An image is painted of a process taking place behind closed doors, mainly inside hotel rooms where 201 detainees are now said to spend most of their time. Most, we are told, want to avoid running into others. Most want to just focus on finding a way out of here.

The mood now is described as "very serious".

• Who is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed?
• Saudi corruption arrests 'just the start'

An official rattles off the Ritz-Carlton's new register of guests which includes experts from government ministries, the treasury, stock market, ex-bankers, specialists in money laundering, justice, as well as real estate. They're said to be on shift 24 hours a day, seven days a week to help process these cases.

Some stay in the hotel and some work from their own offices. Along with medical teams and security guards, more than 500 people are now registered as staying at Ritz-Carlton, at the Kingdom's expense.

As of a few days ago, seven suspects had walked free. Accounts provided inside the hotel, and confirmed by sources outside, say they had been able to clarify what was in their file and prove their innocence.

Official sources say 4% of the accused say they'll take their case to court. But 95% of people on the list are now reportedly ready to come to a deal. That would mean handing over significant amounts of cash or assets to the Saudi treasury in exchange for their freedom.

A businessman in Riyadh, who has seen some of the documents, had told me 1,900 bank accounts, including ones belonging to family members of suspects, were frozen. I ask officials in the Ritz-Carlton about reports of cash and assets totalling 800 billion dollars.

"Even if we get 100 billion back, that would be good," replies the official from the Special Committee.

His zeal is palpable. "You see this," he says as he picks up a gold-rimmed coffee cup to explain his point. "It should cost 10 dollars. But with corruption, it costs 100 dollars." Then he cities examples from his files including unfinished schools, and hospitals which cost 100 million dollars whose price tag should have been less than a third of that.

Outside this inner sanctum, rumours surface about mistreatment and medical crises.

"Some guests are old, and some suffer from diabetes, heart problems, or other conditions," the human rights official explains in our briefing.

He says a health centre is staffed around the clock by doctors and nurses, rooms are checked, and special medicines are brought from homes.

Image captionMany of those held in the hotel are believed to be powerful and wealthy individuals
It's not hard to imagine the extraordinary anger and stress which must also fill this hotel.

Saudis who once held sway in the kingdom are now being held captive against their will.

"If you do surgery, there will be pain," says the anti-corruption official matter-of-factly. "And some people outside are angry because their bosses, or their family members, are in here."

But he insists that "when it comes to percentages, 99% of Saudis are happy".

'I stay in my room'

It's hard to be scientific about public opinion here. But conversations outside the Ritz's metal gates underline there is broad support for tackling what is known to be rampant corruption.

"It's like losing your watch and then you find it," a young real estate developer tells me. "It's your watch, so you want it back."

"Our documents are going through government offices more quickly," remarks a prominent business executive who says no-one dares ask for bribes now.

But there's anxiety too. "It's a nightmare," exclaims a Saudi doctor. " My son's boss is inside and we're all worried." She speaks of rumours of abuse during interrogations and of heart doctors being called in.

In my Ritz briefing, we only hear of what are called "lifestyle problems".

"They can have everything they want in this five star plus hotel," one official says.

"But we can't bring special food from a special country," he adds. When I ask for more details, I'm told of a request for Russian caviar. Others are said to have asked for their own barber, their own masseuse.

Saudis used to calling the shots have had their mobiles taken away. Now they can only make calls on what's described as a hotphone in their rooms. Lawyers and family members are being rung.

There are also calls and visits from officials working in their own companies so they can keep business running. Visitors enter through back doors to guard their privacy. Emails can also be arranged.

Image captionDespite the luxurious surroundings, most of those detained are focusing on their cases
In the early hours of the morning, a few men are working out in the gym, a shimmering swimming pool is empty, and music blares in an empty bowling alley.

I'm offered a meeting with a suspect chosen by our escorts.

"I'm spending most of my time in my room with my lawyer focusing on my case," a Saudi man with a grey-flecked beard tells me as he sits next to a television broadcasting Premier League football. "I speak to my family on the phone every day but prefer not to have them visit me here."

My escorts tell me not to ask about his case. In such conditions, surrounded by officials in charge of his fate, I don't ask many questions.

As we leave, he quickly speaks up.

"I'm sorry that I forgot our traditions," he says with an apologetic smile. "I should have offered you something to eat or drink."

Until this Ritz-Carlton moment is over, a fuller truth about this extraordinary saga won't be known. Officials say they hope everyone will be checked out of this hotel by the end of this year or early January.

"The crown prince has to close this chapter quickly," a prominent Saudi investor tells me in a whispered conversation in Riyadh. "If it drags on, questions will continue to be asked."

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]