Chitchat What happened in Saudi Arabia in the last 3 days ?

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[scroobal]

Protest in Iranian cities enters its fourth day.

It goes to show how detached we are on what is going on the ground in Iran ( and I suppose elsewhere ) and that includes international observers, think tanks and political pundits. When MBS launched whatever one labels it in Saudi Arabia and pointed his finger at Iran, the comments that came out was that the Iranian people were falling behind their leaders and sense of nationalism was coming thru. What a load of rubbish it turned out to be.

Surely their new found sense of Nationalism could not have done a u-turn in matter of weeks.

These are not your usual protest. Even on end of day 1 of the protest, comments from the usual experts cited that these protest should not be treated as something that is national or large-scale or even a challenge against the regime in "toto" .

These protest are clearly not a bunch of liberals concerned with burning the bra or looking for the creation of unisex toilets. Neither are they the occasional opinion riots we see in India. My sense is that there are deep underlying issues. I do remember that in 1979, the jeans clad younger generation of men and women in equal numbers and importance storming the peacock throne. And the women paid dearly more than the men thereafter. Yes, it is a beautiful country and has a rich history of Persia and Persians. So did the Chinese with 4,000 years only to enter into Mao's World of the largest human tragedy in living memory. It just goes to show that rich history and heritage means little in our day and age.

I am beginning to think that Iran is operating the same Hobson's choice of Democracy that Singapore has firmly entrenched and followed since 1981.

Lets hope that the people of Iran emerge from this better.

 

[JohnTan]

These protest are clearly not a bunch of liberals concerned with burning the bra or looking for the creation of unisex toilets. Neither are they the occasional opinion riots we see in India. My sense is that there are deep underlying issues. I do remember that in 1979, the jeans clad younger generation of men and women in equal numbers and importance storming the peacock throne. And the women paid dearly more than the men thereafter. Yes, it is a beautiful country and has a rich history of Persia and Persians. So did the Chinese with 4,000 years only to enter into Mao's World of the largest human tragedy in living memory.

Mao did far less damage with his cultural revolution than the Arab invasion did with their Islam.

Islam is islam, regardless what the persians want to claim with their persian twist to the religion in the guise of Shia Islam. The ancient persian religion of Zoroastrianism is nearly extinct, and the persians know better the history of their Arab conquerors than their own real persian history.

I used to support the Arab Spring and hoped that it would have ushered in a new era of happiness for the Arab people. In the end, the Arab spring saw old dictators replaced with new ones and the rise of islamists groups. Very few revolutions turned out for the better, especially in the developing and islamic worlds. They just bring in worse dictators.

 

[whoami]

I am beginning to think that Iran is operating the same Hobson's choice of Democracy that Singapore has firmly entrenched and followed since 1981.

Lets hope that the people of Iran emerge from this better.

Yup! Just dont let foreign countries especially Dotard, interfere in Iran domestic affair.

Wtf, just cos some protesters on the streets MOron Dotard assumed they are doing the right things. A good govt cant please everyone. But only in Sinkieland "good" garment pleases the 70%

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

Protest in Iranian cities enters its fourth day.

It goes to show how detached we are on what is going on the ground in Iran ( and I suppose elsewhere ) and that includes international observers, think tanks and political pundits. When MBS launched whatever one labels it in Saudi Arabia and pointed his finger at Iran, the comments that came out was that the Iranian people were falling behind their leaders and sense of nationalism was coming thru. What a load of rubbish it turned out to be.

Surely their new found sense of Nationalism could not have done a u-turn in matter of weeks.

These are not your usual protest. Even on end of day 1 of the protest, comments from the usual experts cited that these protest should not be treated as something that is national or large-scale or even a challenge against the regime in "toto" .

These protest are clearly not a bunch of liberals concerned with burning the bra or looking for the creation of unisex toilets. Neither are they the occasional opinion riots we see in India. My sense is that there are deep underlying issues. I do remember that in 1979, the jeans clad younger generation of men and women in equal numbers and importance storming the peacock throne. And the women paid dearly more than the men thereafter. Yes, it is a beautiful country and has a rich history of Persia and Persians. So did the Chinese with 4,000 years only to enter into Mao's World of the largest human tragedy in living memory. It just goes to show that rich history and heritage means little in our day and age.

I am beginning to think that Iran is operating the same Hobson's choice of Democracy that Singapore has firmly entrenched and followed since 1981.

Lets hope that the people of Iran emerge from this better.

I don't believe the protests are symptomatic necessarily of "detachment" nor necessarily fair to characterise it as a "load of rubbish" - that would be a typical Saudi shrill route (and the current buzzword for Saudi hawks is the "echo chamber" in the Western media about this "uprising" - I would like to suggest a slightly different perspective based on the information I have been able to gather over the past 4 days (and also based on conversations with people actually on the ground rather than Western commentators based in Ankara or Beirut or Dubai). Please do be analytical/critical of the information I set out below but I believe quite a few of these observations/views have not been directly cited yet in MSM - and of course matters can escalate or de-escalate very quickly - do bear in mind that this is the same regime that intervened and propped up Assad in Syria when it was almost on its knees so let's not rule oit the Revolutionary Guard and Basij prematurely.

Quite abit (a significant understatement) has happened in a very short period of time so I will plug whatever info I have here in as coherent/sequential manner as possible:

Here is a map of the outbreak of protests so far (day 4):

The current timeline suggests that Ayatollah Alamolhoda, Mashhad's Friday prayer leader had led the initial incitement - although not mentioned by name the Iran Supreme National Security Council pulled him up yesterday to provide explanations at the meeting of SNSC,regarding his behind the scene roll which led to the breakout of anti-Rouhani protests (the report does not mention him by name though) - today Ayatollah Alamolhoda gave a very different sermon altogether (see below for translation) referring to the protestors )whom he had incited apparently) as "A bunch of mobsters and thugs gather and chant "leave Syria alone and solve our problems instead" - he had actually initially given a public statement sympathising with the protesters when the protests first started 4 days ago saying they had “a right” to be disgruntled - he even said that officials (himself included ) ought to be “ashamed” of how the economy had been managed over the past 40 years.

This news was carried on Tasnim and Fars, two of the most-read and followed semi-official news agencies which are seen as allied to hardline and ultra conservative factions that are deeply loyal to the security and religious establishment. This is significant because it showed that the Mashhad protests, whether spontaneous or not, in the very least had the sympathy and support of the hardline conservative establishment, particularly in the city itself.

As protests in Mashhad grew, it appeared from videos this wasn’t just about hatred aimed at Rouhani or price of eggs (which is serious, but by all accounts a one-off supply issue driven by avian influenza outbreak).

Chants broadened to include the entire state system, including its leadership. At this point the government started to show official reaction.

One of the first was 1st VP Jahangiri in a speech in Tehran saying that he understood people had concerns about the economy but that “something else is going on behind the curtain” he then said, addressing whoever it is he thinks that is (ostensibly hardline elements), that “their smoke blew back in their faces”, a Persian way of saying “you shot yourselves in the foot”. This Jahangiri statement showed a) govt and pro-Rouhanists like himself believe hardliner opposition and state security establishment provoked or even helped organise Mashhad demos and those organisers or "provocateurs" hadn’t factored-in the possibility that the demos would get overtaken by their own opponents calling for their own end.

A similar narrative was offered by Akbar Torkan, senior advisor to Rouhani in an interview to the Asr Iran newspaper.

He said that these protests, rather than being about the government, its handling of the economy and price rises, were more about the wider political system and the state system, and people are angry and unhappy about that, rather than their elected leaders. Also by Friday, seeing that things were escalating and spreading, both hardline and moderate media started calling the protests “counter revolutionary” couching them in terms of a seditionist effort to destabilise the Islamic Republic. This chimed with timely anniversary of “9th of Dey” marches, which are organised, pro-state rallies held by the state to mark the point it says it successfully quashed the 2009 protests.

So two competing narratives are at play in terms of how this is being viewed and handled politically in Iran. In addition to this it's unclear what the overarching objective of the protests is, there is no clear, single concern that can be distilled like in 2009. It is about broad discontent over disparities in wealth, fairness of access to wealth, expectations on economic recovery not being realised and the country's approach to social rules and norms.

The events may taken by surprise because of the speed with which they appear to happen and their strength/scope, but there is an acceptance in Iran themselves that there is no vacuum there.

Iranians have been angry about the banking and credit industry in Iran, for example, for a long time and the protests earlier this year outside credit institutions, which mushroomed, unauthorised, under Ahmadinejad, issuing millions of dollars in cheap debt to working class Iranians, were a precursor in some ways to what's happening now. Ordinary Iranians still can’t fathom how a small minority in Iran managed to get so rich during sanctions (think of the Rich Kids of Tehran Instagram account and the number of Ayatollah kids/grandkids were on there) and they still feel like they are bearing the downside of that wealth accumulation. There was belief that the nuclear deal would bring a deeper, broader economic recovery and while it helped spur GDP growth, telling that to a man who has three kids, works 2 part-time jobs and drives a Snapp car for five hours during the night, means little and here oil prices are also at play.

Where the government had managed to very successfully revive oil production and exports to former big customers, like the EU, and rejuvenate a key industry and economic driver, oil prices have dampened those revenues going back to Iranian anxieties over the economy,

Trump’s policy towards the deal does nothing but fuel this as well as disillusionment at the idea that officials, wherever they are in the world, want to help ordinary people live better lives while we’re on Trump, the impact of his tweets has been marginal at best. They’ve triggered a slew of angry comments, packed with ridicule. Across classes, factions and generations in Iran, there is a shared contempt for Trump whose policies look erratic and hypocritical.

Most people have been chanting political messages about regime Change and the Clergy. Protesters indicate that they neither want the Principalists nor the Reformists. It is fair to say that the protesters see these two parties as "two sides of the same coin".

In some of the Kurdish areas chant were heard in semi-support of separatism as some chanted: "If we lose Iran, we'll at least have Kurdistan!' (not a pro-Regime chant, the next chants demanded the death of Khamenei and Rouhani).

At first some analysts described the protests as "purely economical". A chant that leans towards the economical aspect is "While our money leaves us, the Mullahs feast!"

In Balochistan the police seemed to have sided with the people.

There are at least 6 others expressions from army/police that seem like "defections" or attempts to combine forces with the protesters. There have been cases of protesters burning Sharia Courts and they also burned the papers of other courts.

The protesters seem to agree on what they do not want: The current political structure. The closest thing to explicit demands are these two papers:

Rouhani just tweeted that he was not blaming foreigners for guiding protestors but rather saying, “It is not so that all protestors were guided by other places,” i.e. interpreted as meaning his domestic rivals.

Size of Protests

This is of particular significance in a contemporary Iranian context.

The protests have been going on and started in Mashhad in a protest by people who had lost their savings due to the closing & bankruptcy of some financial institutions, known as the “Caspian Affair”.

As a few similar protests took place in other cities & in a quick turn of events, some groups started slogans & protests about other issues, such as regime change, monarchy etc. While this turn of events did alienate many Iranians from joining the protesters but it also inspired other dispersed yet more aggressive & opportunistic interest groups to step in. As the opportunity presented itself and with the help of social media apps like Telegram, these marginal groups started organizing. This was almost done solely by one single Telegram channel, a foreign based & suspicious “AmadNews”.

This channel was taken off network twice after violating Telegram’s non-violence code, openly encouraging people 2 take up arms, attack police with homemade bombs.It now operates with another name,literally giving out protest directions every night, for the next day

What is interesting however is that the aggressiveness of the protest organizers has clearly led to a backlash. Some figures from the reformist camp, the traditional opposition in Iran that shaped the 2009 election riots, have condemned the riots.

It is being reported that after two days, no protest of considerable size has developed in Tehran. This is a very important signal of how protests will continue & how important they are for a vast group of people in the Iranian mainstream.

Tehran is home to about 16 million Iranians & when protests erupt, they are BIG. See this video of the usual size of the initial 2009 election protest rallies, compare it to videos of protests in Tehran in recent days.

Bear in mind that in the recent elections approximately 40 million people voted - you have 20 people tearing up mullah posters over the weekend (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39936577)

Based on the videos and images, a maximum of no more than 500 people have rallied in the recent protests in Tehran. Videos of larger protests belong to cities outside of the mega-capital of Tehran, places like Abhar, Doruk (between 500 -1000).

Based on the dozens of videos and images from opposition sources, protests in cities other than the aforementioned gatherings (with about 500-1000 demonstrators) amass usually between 50 to 300 protesters. So while there is NO large body of people rioting together in the streets, simultaneous protests/riots of 50-300 people are being orchestrated in about 30 cities, creating a lot of noise and images for "regime change hungry" MSM.

As of today it was reported small groups of protestors in Tehran shouting slogans (around Palestine Street) and security forces crawling everywhere on Tehran University and Englehab Street where protests occurred yesterday).

Commentators on the ground have noted that these protests are peculiar as historically big protests usually happen in Iran when a clear and specific issue lays the basis for a common view of injustice taking place (ex. 2009 election protests - the 2009 Election Riots were a very serious regime change scenario. Ahmadinejad won, but the opposition claimed otherwise. International MSM zealously claimed the elections were rigged - apparently independent polls which were done before and after the 2009 election, showed Ahmadinejad’s 62 % victory was in fact quite true. These reports only surfaced a few months after the riots, after the harm was done:

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT Iran Survey Report 0609.pdf

https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/...ion/101227_PRS-Iran_Poll_IPI_Policy_Forum.pdf

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_quaire.pdf

This time round,no specific unifying issue/clear objective has been cited.

In other words, the recent protests have never brought up anything relevant to be able to muster enough emotion yet, especially because the calls for regime change and things likes Trump's endorsement alienate people more - aka "exhaustion of dissent".

The protests are driven by socioeconomic grievances, not political aspiration. One should do the protesters justice by not reading anything bigger into them – at least, not for now.

Street protests are not really new under Rouhani’s presidency. Peaceful sit-ins, strikes & gatherings in front of ministries & state institutions have happened regularly in various parts of the country, as people continue to have unresolved/unaddressed economic grievances.

No government in Iran ever has taken demands of the socially weak seriously or beyond populist talk & policies. Social injustice has never been resolved, and its main root causes (corruption & patronage) remain rife.

Rouhani's voter base in 2017 was to a big part composed of economically motivated voters who believe he is more capable of improving their living conditions compared to his main competitor Raeisi.

But main socioeconomic issues - namely unemployment, underemployment (of youth and women), low purchasing power of ordinary citizens, slow economic recovery post-JCPOA - continue being key challenges to Rouhani administration.

Rouhani's opponents – particularly from hardline Principlist camp – capitalize on discontent among people and appear to instigate protests. But they too fall short of offering tangible alternatives/solutions to the people’s demands.

The Rouhani administration has not been entirely dismissive of current protests as being staged/provoked by its rival factions. It will have to mull a formula to address issues like high food prices, low purchasing power etc.

It remains unlikely (at this point) that these protests will turn into a bigger movement to shake and change the political order of Iran.

This is certainly not the beginning of a revolutionary movement. But the Rouhani government and Iran's entire political elite are being shaken to finally take socioeconomic grievances of ordinary Iranians seriously and address them properly.

Rouhani v Hardliners
It's been a while since moderates in Iran have been sandwiched between Trump and Iranian hardliners' shared plots. Trump ultimately wants regime-change. Hardliners want the next presidency and ultimately to success Ay. Khamenei. Thus they tacitly assist each other.

It started from mid 90s after Khatami's victory. A group of hardliners, trained by Ay. mesbah, have since taken over most strategic power positions and have slowly driven out reformists and even moderates in the course of two decades.

Hardliners completely silenced pro-reform religious thinkers like Soroush or Kadivar to hegemonize their own (Mesbah's) interpretation of the Islamic Republic, an Islamic North Korea: a centralized, isolated, and militarist police-state.

Hardliners also overcame their media problem. They closed or tamed reformist papers, enhanced quality of state television and their grip on it, and created hundreds of news websites while blocking most of their rivals.

2009 protests gave them best excuse to eradicate their rivals and secure at least another 12 years. But Ahmadinejad rebelled against his puppet-masters and ruined their plans. Rouhani won in 2013 and promised to lift nuclear sanctions.

Rouhani managed to partly separate Ay. Khamenei from Mesbahists and convince him to back the nuclear talks. Despite immense pressure by Mesbahists, Irandeal was signed. But after Trump's victory and his threat to the deal, they renewed their attempt to topple Rouhani.

In 2017, they mobilized their entire financial, political, media, and logistical support to defeat Rouhani and replace him with a better puppet (than Ahmadinejad), called Ebrahim Raisi. But Rouhani won again, shattering their dreams of instigating Raisi to succeed Ay. Khamenei.

Hardliners tried to obstruct every single campaign pledge by Rouhani. With help from clerical establishment in Qom, they blocked women as cabinet ministers and barred them from football stadiums. They intensified policing cities and social media for 'inaapropriate' lifestyles.

After victory, Rouhani quickly started to work with Ali Larijani, the moderate speaker of parliament and a confidant to Ay. Khamenei, who had a crucial role in making nuclear deal happen. Their short-term goal was to create jobs, attract foreign investment, and expand freedoms.

Their long-term plan was to pave way for Rouhani to succeed Ay. Khamenei and for Larijani to ascend to presidency in 2012. But for Mesbahists stakes were too high give up. They quickly designed a strategy: to disillusion Rouhani's main electoral base, youth and women.

Hardliners also blocked two already-elected representatives, a young woman and a Zoroastrian man, from local and national legislatives.

Recently, Rouhani widely publicized his proposed budget and encouraged social media discussions on it. Also began regulating messy state of private credit institutions and banks, some of which were bankrupted and had produced thousands of victims.

All this and a price rise of eggs gave the hardliners a fresh tide to ride. They quickly launched a massive media campaign, especially on state television, against Rouhani admin and tacitly encouraged protests.

Mesbahists organized a street protest this week in city of Mashhad, their constituency, and chanted against Rouhani and the economy. But others quickly joined and diverted that chants against the whole system and Ay. Khemenei.

It's not clear who these people were. What's clear is that suddenly all exiled opposition groups, especially the Trump supported Pahlavists, who were already looking for more media and logistical support, tried to turn it into a nation-wide organized protest.

To sum it up, this is a plot against the moderates by two unlikely allies, in DC and in Mashhad. Rouhani would either be completely defeated as a capable leader, or he'd manage to manipulate the force of the threat against its instigators, like a jujitsu master.

 

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

 

[scroobal]

The post was not in support of the Saudis or giving credence to MBS approach which I think is flawed. Taken in isolation, it is evident that Iran has internal problems of its own and these are no means minor nor isolated. Its also gives lie to the claim of new found Iranian nationalism in response to Saudis allegation of Iranian aggression. Unless my understanding of Nationalism is all wrong.

The post is also not a zero sum approach to the 2 protagonists - if Iranian are having issues then Saudis are right and vice versa. Its to highlight that no external parties, experts and all had indicated they were expecting protests of this extent anytime soon plus the claim of nationalism.

Its remind me of the immediate aftermath of 911 when the Intelligence community found they had no ethnic arabs within their midst. And the closest was a Lebanese (non gulf ) in the FBI who claimed that his oncerns were ignored.

The new posts on how the protests have developed are welcome and gives insight that I struggled to find in MSM. Thanks.

I don't believe the protests are symptomatic necessarily of "detachment" nor necessarily fair to characterise it as a "load of rubbish" - that would be a typical Saudi shrill route (and the current buzzword for Saudi hawks is the "echo chamber" in the Western media about this "uprising" - I would like to suggest a slightly different perspective based on the information I have been able to gather over the past 4 days (and also based on conversations with people actually on the ground rather than Western commentators based in Ankara or Beirut or Dubai). Please do be analytical/critical of the information I set out below but I believe quite a few of these observations/views have not been directly cited yet in MSM - and of course matters can escalate or de-escalate very quickly - do bear in mind that this is the same regime that intervened and propped up Assad in Syria when it was almost on its knees so let's not rule oit the Revolutionary Guard and Basij prematurely.

Quite abit (a significant understatement) has happened in a very short period of time so I will plug whatever info I have here in as coherent/sequential manner as possible:

Here is a map of the outbreak of protests so far (day 4):

View attachment 36933

The current timeline suggests that Ayatollah Alamolhoda, Mashhad's Friday prayer leader had led the initial incitement - although not mentioned by name the Iran Supreme National Security Council pulled him up yesterday to provide explanations at the meeting of SNSC,regarding his behind the scene roll which led to the breakout of anti-Rouhani protests (the report does not mention him by name though) - today Ayatollah Alamolhoda gave a very different sermon altogether (see below for translation) referring to the protestors )whom he had incited apparently) as "A bunch of mobsters and thugs gather and chant "leave Syria alone and solve our problems instead" - he had actually initially given a public statement sympathising with the protesters when the protests first started 4 days ago saying they had “a right” to be disgruntled - he even said that officials (himself included ) ought to be “ashamed” of how the economy had been managed over the past 40 years.

View attachment 36934

This news was carried on Tasnim and Fars, two of the most-read and followed semi-official news agencies which are seen as allied to hardline and ultra conservative factions that are deeply loyal to the security and religious establishment. This is significant because it showed that the Mashhad protests, whether spontaneous or not, in the very least had the sympathy and support of the hardline conservative establishment, particularly in the city itself.

As protests in Mashhad grew, it appeared from videos this wasn’t just about hatred aimed at Rouhani or price of eggs (which is serious, but by all accounts a one-off supply issue driven by avian influenza outbreak).

Chants broadened to include the entire state system, including its leadership. At this point the government started to show official reaction.

One of the first was 1st VP Jahangiri in a speech in Tehran saying that he understood people had concerns about the economy but that “something else is going on behind the curtain” he then said, addressing whoever it is he thinks that is (ostensibly hardline elements), that “their smoke blew back in their faces”, a Persian way of saying “you shot yourselves in the foot”. This Jahangiri statement showed a) govt and pro-Rouhanists like himself believe hardliner opposition and state security establishment provoked or even helped organise Mashhad demos and those organisers or "provocateurs" hadn’t factored-in the possibility that the demos would get overtaken by their own opponents calling for their own end.

A similar narrative was offered by Akbar Torkan, senior advisor to Rouhani in an interview to the Asr Iran newspaper.

He said that these protests, rather than being about the government, its handling of the economy and price rises, were more about the wider political system and the state system, and people are angry and unhappy about that, rather than their elected leaders. Also by Friday, seeing that things were escalating and spreading, both hardline and moderate media started calling the protests “counter revolutionary” couching them in terms of a seditionist effort to destabilise the Islamic Republic. This chimed with timely anniversary of “9th of Dey” marches, which are organised, pro-state rallies held by the state to mark the point it says it successfully quashed the 2009 protests.

So two competing narratives are at play in terms of how this is being viewed and handled politically in Iran. In addition to this it's unclear what the overarching objective of the protests is, there is no clear, single concern that can be distilled like in 2009. It is about broad discontent over disparities in wealth, fairness of access to wealth, expectations on economic recovery not being realised and the country's approach to social rules and norms.

The events may taken by surprise because of the speed with which they appear to happen and their strength/scope, but there is an acceptance in Iran themselves that there is no vacuum there.

Iranians have been angry about the banking and credit industry in Iran, for example, for a long time and the protests earlier this year outside credit institutions, which mushroomed, unauthorised, under Ahmadinejad, issuing millions of dollars in cheap debt to working class Iranians, were a precursor in some ways to what's happening now. Ordinary Iranians still can’t fathom how a small minority in Iran managed to get so rich during sanctions (think of the Rich Kids of Tehran Instagram account and the number of Ayatollah kids/grandkids were on there) and they still feel like they are bearing the downside of that wealth accumulation. There was belief that the nuclear deal would bring a deeper, broader economic recovery and while it helped spur GDP growth, telling that to a man who has three kids, works 2 part-time jobs and drives a Snapp car for five hours during the night, means little and here oil prices are also at play.

Where the government had managed to very successfully revive oil production and exports to former big customers, like the EU, and rejuvenate a key industry and economic driver, oil prices have dampened those revenues going back to Iranian anxieties over the economy,

Trump’s policy towards the deal does nothing but fuel this as well as disillusionment at the idea that officials, wherever they are in the world, want to help ordinary people live better lives while we’re on Trump, the impact of his tweets has been marginal at best. They’ve triggered a slew of angry comments, packed with ridicule. Across classes, factions and generations in Iran, there is a shared contempt for Trump whose policies look erratic and hypocritical.

Most people have been chanting political messages about regime Change and the Clergy. Protesters indicate that they neither want the Principalists nor the Reformists. It is fair to say that the protesters see these two parties as "two sides of the same coin".

View attachment 36935

In some of the Kurdish areas chant were heard in semi-support of separatism as some chanted: "If we lose Iran, we'll at least have Kurdistan!' (not a pro-Regime chant, the next chants demanded the death of Khamenei and Rouhani).

At first some analysts described the protests as "purely economical". A chant that leans towards the economical aspect is "While our money leaves us, the Mullahs feast!"

In Balochistan the police seemed to have sided with the people.

There are at least 6 others expressions from army/police that seem like "defections" or attempts to combine forces with the protesters. There have been cases of protesters burning Sharia Courts and they also burned the papers of other courts.

The protesters seem to agree on what they do not want: The current political structure. The closest thing to explicit demands are these two papers:
View attachment 36936
View attachment 36937

View attachment 36938

Rouhani just tweeted that he was not blaming foreigners for guiding protestors but rather saying, “It is not so that all protestors were guided by other places,” i.e. interpreted as meaning his domestic rivals.

View attachment 36939

Size of Protests

This is of particular significance in a contemporary Iranian context.

The protests have been going on and started in Mashhad in a protest by people who had lost their savings due to the closing & bankruptcy of some financial institutions, known as the “Caspian Affair”.

As a few similar protests took place in other cities & in a quick turn of events, some groups started slogans & protests about other issues, such as regime change, monarchy etc. While this turn of events did alienate many Iranians from joining the protesters but it also inspired other dispersed yet more aggressive & opportunistic interest groups to step in. As the opportunity presented itself and with the help of social media apps like Telegram, these marginal groups started organizing. This was almost done solely by one single Telegram channel, a foreign based & suspicious “AmadNews”.

View attachment 36943

This channel was taken off network twice after violating Telegram’s non-violence code, openly encouraging people 2 take up arms, attack police with homemade bombs.It now operates with another name,literally giving out protest directions every night, for the next day

View attachment 36944

What is interesting however is that the aggressiveness of the protest organizers has clearly led to a backlash. Some figures from the reformist camp, the traditional opposition in Iran that shaped the 2009 election riots, have condemned the riots.

It is being reported that after two days, no protest of considerable size has developed in Tehran. This is a very important signal of how protests will continue & how important they are for a vast group of people in the Iranian mainstream.

View attachment 36945

Tehran is home to about 16 million Iranians & when protests erupt, they are BIG. See this video of the usual size of the initial 2009 election protest rallies, compare it to videos of protests in Tehran in recent days.

Bear in mind that in the recent elections approximately 40 million people voted - you have 20 people tearing up mullah posters over the weekend (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39936577)

Based on the videos and images, a maximum of no more than 500 people have rallied in the recent protests in Tehran. Videos of larger protests belong to cities outside of the mega-capital of Tehran, places like Abhar, Doruk (between 500 -1000).

Based on the dozens of videos and images from opposition sources, protests in cities other than the aforementioned gatherings (with about 500-1000 demonstrators) amass usually between 50 to 300 protesters. So while there is NO large body of people rioting together in the streets, simultaneous protests/riots of 50-300 people are being orchestrated in about 30 cities, creating a lot of noise and images for "regime change hungry" MSM.

As of today it was reported small groups of protestors in Tehran shouting slogans (around Palestine Street) and security forces crawling everywhere on Tehran University and Englehab Street where protests occurred yesterday).

Commentators on the ground have noted that these protests are peculiar as historically big protests usually happen in Iran when a clear and specific issue lays the basis for a common view of injustice taking place (ex. 2009 election protests - the 2009 Election Riots were a very serious regime change scenario. Ahmadinejad won, but the opposition claimed otherwise. International MSM zealously claimed the elections were rigged - apparently independent polls which were done before and after the 2009 election, showed Ahmadinejad’s 62 % victory was in fact quite true. These reports only surfaced a few months after the riots, after the harm was done:

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT Iran Survey Report 0609.pdf

https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/...ion/101227_PRS-Iran_Poll_IPI_Policy_Forum.pdf

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_quaire.pdf

This time round,no specific unifying issue/clear objective has been cited.

In other words, the recent protests have never brought up anything relevant to be able to muster enough emotion yet, especially because the calls for regime change and things likes Trump's endorsement alienate people more - aka "exhaustion of dissent".

The protests are driven by socioeconomic grievances, not political aspiration. One should do the protesters justice by not reading anything bigger into them – at least, not for now.

Street protests are not really new under Rouhani’s presidency. Peaceful sit-ins, strikes & gatherings in front of ministries & state institutions have happened regularly in various parts of the country, as people continue to have unresolved/unaddressed economic grievances.

No government in Iran ever has taken demands of the socially weak seriously or beyond populist talk & policies. Social injustice has never been resolved, and its main root causes (corruption & patronage) remain rife.

Rouhani's voter base in 2017 was to a big part composed of economically motivated voters who believe he is more capable of improving their living conditions compared to his main competitor Raeisi.

But main socioeconomic issues - namely unemployment, underemployment (of youth and women), low purchasing power of ordinary citizens, slow economic recovery post-JCPOA - continue being key challenges to Rouhani administration.

Rouhani's opponents – particularly from hardline Principlist camp – capitalize on discontent among people and appear to instigate protests. But they too fall short of offering tangible alternatives/solutions to the people’s demands.

The Rouhani administration has not been entirely dismissive of current protests as being staged/provoked by its rival factions. It will have to mull a formula to address issues like high food prices, low purchasing power etc.

It remains unlikely (at this point) that these protests will turn into a bigger movement to shake and change the political order of Iran.

This is certainly not the beginning of a revolutionary movement. But the Rouhani government and Iran's entire political elite are being shaken to finally take socioeconomic grievances of ordinary Iranians seriously and address them properly.

Rouhani v Hardliners
It's been a while since moderates in Iran have been sandwiched between Trump and Iranian hardliners' shared plots. Trump ultimately wants regime-change. Hardliners want the next presidency and ultimately to success Ay. Khamenei. Thus they tacitly assist each other.

It started from mid 90s after Khatami's victory. A group of hardliners, trained by Ay. mesbah, have since taken over most strategic power positions and have slowly driven out reformists and even moderates in the course of two decades.

Hardliners completely silenced pro-reform religious thinkers like Soroush or Kadivar to hegemonize their own (Mesbah's) interpretation of the Islamic Republic, an Islamic North Korea: a centralized, isolated, and militarist police-state.

Hardliners also overcame their media problem. They closed or tamed reformist papers, enhanced quality of state television and their grip on it, and created hundreds of news websites while blocking most of their rivals.

2009 protests gave them best excuse to eradicate their rivals and secure at least another 12 years. But Ahmadinejad rebelled against his puppet-masters and ruined their plans. Rouhani won in 2013 and promised to lift nuclear sanctions.

Rouhani managed to partly separate Ay. Khamenei from Mesbahists and convince him to back the nuclear talks. Despite immense pressure by Mesbahists, Irandeal was signed. But after Trump's victory and his threat to the deal, they renewed their attempt to topple Rouhani.

In 2017, they mobilized their entire financial, political, media, and logistical support to defeat Rouhani and replace him with a better puppet (than Ahmadinejad), called Ebrahim Raisi. But Rouhani won again, shattering their dreams of instigating Raisi to succeed Ay. Khamenei.

Hardliners tried to obstruct every single campaign pledge by Rouhani. With help from clerical establishment in Qom, they blocked women as cabinet ministers and barred them from football stadiums. They intensified policing cities and social media for 'inaapropriate' lifestyles.

After victory, Rouhani quickly started to work with Ali Larijani, the moderate speaker of parliament and a confidant to Ay. Khamenei, who had a crucial role in making nuclear deal happen. Their short-term goal was to create jobs, attract foreign investment, and expand freedoms.

Their long-term plan was to pave way for Rouhani to succeed Ay. Khamenei and for Larijani to ascend to presidency in 2012. But for Mesbahists stakes were too high give up. They quickly designed a strategy: to disillusion Rouhani's main electoral base, youth and women.

Hardliners also blocked two already-elected representatives, a young woman and a Zoroastrian man, from local and national legislatives.

Recently, Rouhani widely publicized his proposed budget and encouraged social media discussions on it. Also began regulating messy state of private credit institutions and banks, some of which were bankrupted and had produced thousands of victims.

All this and a price rise of eggs gave the hardliners a fresh tide to ride. They quickly launched a massive media campaign, especially on state television, against Rouhani admin and tacitly encouraged protests.

Mesbahists organized a street protest this week in city of Mashhad, their constituency, and chanted against Rouhani and the economy. But others quickly joined and diverted that chants against the whole system and Ay. Khemenei.

It's not clear who these people were. What's clear is that suddenly all exiled opposition groups, especially the Trump supported Pahlavists, who were already looking for more media and logistical support, tried to turn it into a nation-wide organized protest.

To sum it up, this is a plot against the moderates by two unlikely allies, in DC and in Mashhad. Rouhani would either be completely defeated as a capable leader, or he'd manage to manipulate the force of the threat against its instigators, like a jujitsu master.

 

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OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Saudi Arabia’s Chance to Create a Liberal Kingdom
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A woman behind the wheel in March 2014 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as part of a campaign to defy the country’s ban on female drivers.CreditHasan Jamali/Associated Press
By Ensaf Haidar

Jan. 5, 2018
I was astonished when, in late September, Saudi Arabia decided to allow women to drive, putting an end to an old, discriminatory practice. This was only one of several cautious social reforms that have been introduced in the country. In the past two years, King Salman bin Abdulaziz has restricted the powers of the notorious religious police and relaxed male guardianship laws. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has spoken about embracing “moderate Islam” and increasing social freedoms.

Prince Mohammed is being credited for the effort to transform Saudi Arabia, but the changes might not have been possible without the Saudi activists and intellectuals who struggled and suffered over the years — enduring the loss of jobs, imprisonment and exile — to increase the freedoms in their country.

As I look forward to seeing Saudi women drive starting in June, I remember the 47 women who drove their cars in 1990. They were arrested, lost their jobs and were prohibited from traveling. Two years later they were allowed to return to their jobs. Some faded into private life; others focused on helping women at schools and universities and in programs for abused women and children.

The courage of Wajeha al-Huwaider, a women’s rights activist, is unforgettable. On Aug. 4, 2006, three days after the first anniversary of King Abdullah’s accession to power, she stood on Fahd Causeway — the bridgethat links Saudi Arabia and Bahrain — and held a poster with a single sentence written on it: “Give women their rights!” She was arrested but treated respectfully and released the same day.

In 2007, al-Huwaider and a colleague started a petition demanding that Saudi women be granted the right to drive. In March 2008, she filmed herself driving a car and uploaded the video on YouTube to remind the world of the prohibition.

When the uprisings of 2011 engulfed the Arab world, Saudi female activists started the “Women2Drive” campaign, using social media to organize. They called on women with international driver’s licenses to take to the roads.

Manal al-Sharif and Loujain al-Hathloul, two renowned activists, became the public face of the campaign. Ms. Sharif spent nine days in detention for posting a video of herself driving; Ms. Hathloul spent 73 days in prison after attempting to drive into Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates in 2014. If it were not for their willingness to struggle and sacrifice for what they believed in, we would never have achieved this change.

Other incremental social reforms have also illustrated the Saudi leadership’s responsiveness to years of protests and activism by women’s rights activists. Saudi women have long chafed under the “male guardianship” laws, under which a woman must have a male guardian — father, husband, uncle or son — without whose approval she cannot see a doctor, file a police complaint, leave a prison, travel outside the country, apply for a passport, marry or use various public services.

A movement against guardianship laws intensified in recent years, picking up steam after a 2016 Human Rights Watch report about it. About 14,000 women signed a petition calling for an end to the guardianship laws and advocated the change online using the hashtag #IAmMyOwnGuardian.

Though the guardian system remains on the books, a royal decree relaxedits grip in June and women are now allowed access to health care, education and travel without a guardian’s permission.

Advocacy, outrage and subsequent official responsiveness also helped in getting the Saudi women relief from the religious police, who focused on a prohibition of alcohol and drugs, maintaining gender segregation and aggressively targeting Saudi women who weren’t “appropriately” covered.

King Salman divested the religious police of authority to chase or arrest people suspected of breaking the strict moral regulations and directed the force to report its observations to the regular police. Saudi Arabia had seen widespread outrage in February 2016 after the religious police assaulted two young women outside a shopping mall in Riyadh.

But demanding greater social and political rights has often exacted a severe cost on Saudi activists and intellectuals. I know this from experience.

My husband, Raif Badawi, a blogger and activist, was a harsh critic of Saudi Arabia’s clerical establishment. He called for the elimination of the male guardianship system and insisted in his writings on restricting the powers of the religious establishment. In 2007, he acted as the spokesman for Salman al Harissi, a Saudi citizen who was arrested and killed by the religious police during interrogation. Raif exposed the torture by the religious police and demanded justice and compensation for Mr. Harissi’s family.

Raif founded the “Free Saudi Liberals” website in 2006, where like-minded bloggers discussed issues such as separation of state and religion, and women’s rights. I always remember how he defined liberalism: “For me, liberalism simply means live and let live.”

On June 17, 2012, Raif was detained on charges that included apostasy, cybercrime and disobeying his father. According to Saudi law, children can be separated from their parents if they are accused of apostasy. I feared that Raif’s father or my family might deprive me the custody of my children. Raif and I decided that I should leave the country to ensure that our children stay with me. Along with my children, I sought asylum in Canada.

In May 2014, Raif was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes, and fined a million Saudi Arabian riyal for creating an online forum for public debate and “insulting” Islam. On Jan. 9, 2015, Raif was struck with 50 lashesin a public square in Jeddah, but the lashing was stopped on medical advice. He remains in prison. Only a pardon from King Salman can get him released.

Prince Mohammed has the opportunity to rewrite Saudi history and bring freedom and openness to our country. He could start a process of national reconciliation by reconsidering the cases and imprisonment of prisoners of conscience like my husband. By securing their freedom, Prince Mohammed would give us hope and make our country a place exiles would prefer to return to and participate in building our collective future.

Ensaf Haidar is the president of the Raif Badawi Foundation for Freedom, named after her husband, who is in prison in Saudi Arabia.

 

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Hard-won UN debate sees US at odds with partners over Iran
America accused of ‘preposterous bullying’ by Iran as heated discussion lays bare deep rifts over Middle East’s future




British representative Matthew Rycroft speaks during the UN security council session over the ongoing protests in Iran. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Patrick WintourDiplomatic editor

Sat 6 Jan ‘18 00.31 GMTFirst published on Fri 5 Jan ‘18 19.29 GMT

The US successfully fought off a Russian-led attempt on Friday to block a UN security council discussion over the past week’s Iranian protests. But it immediately found itself at odds with its European partners, who used the subsequent debate to reject American efforts to make the protests an excuse for ditching the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

Russia had tried to stop the UN discussion on the grounds that it would represent an inappropriate interference in Iran’s internal affairs. But the US countered by finding the required votes on the 15-strong security council to press for a debate.

Russia claimed the US intended to use what it regarded as largely economic protests directed against austerity inside Iran as a means both to challenge the Iranian government’s authority and to undermine the Iranian nuclear deal signed in 2015.

In an often bitter discussion laying bare the deep ideological rifts over the future of the Middle East, Iran’s UN ambassador Gholamali Khoshroo added he had “hard evidence” that recent protests in Iran were “very clearly directed from abroad”.

Khoshroo joined Russia in saying the US had abused its power as a permanent member of the security council by calling for a meeting to discuss the protests.

“It is unfortunate that despite the resistance on the part of some of its members, this council has allowed itself to be abused by the current US administration in holding a meeting on an issue that falls outside the scope of its mandate,” Khoshroo said. He accused the US of “preposterous bullying” and searching for every possible straw to keep itself afloat.

Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif later tweeted that the episode was another US foreign policy blunder, saying the majority of the security council had “emphasised the need to fully implement the Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015 and to refrain from interfering in internal affairs of others”.

During the debate the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, warned the Iranian authorities that the world was watching as Tehran responded to anti-government protests. “The Iranian regime is now on notice: the world will be watching what you do,” she said.

“The Iranian people are rising up in over 79 locations throughout the country. It is a powerful exhibition of brave people who have become so fed up with their oppressive government that they are willing to risk their lives in protest.”

She said Iranians were telling their government to “stop the support for terrorism, stop giving billions of our money to killers and dictators, stop taking our wealth and spending it on foreign fighters and proxy wars”.

But the UN’s French representative distanced his country from the tone of the US strategy towards the protests. In an implicit rebuke to the US for calling the debate, François Delattre said: “However worrying the events of the last few days in Iran may be, they do not constitute per se a threat to international peace and security. We must be wary of any attempts to exploit this crisis for personal ends, which would have the diametrically opposed outcome to that which is wished.” The nuclear deal was a cornerstone for stability in the Middle East, he added.

The UK’s representative Matthew Rycoft said Britain remained fully committed to the JCPOA [the nuclear deal], describing it as one of the great diplomatic successes of recent memory. He added: “We encourage all member states to uphold all their commitments. A prosperous, stable Iran is beneficial to all.”

He urged Iran to allow peaceful protests and said too often the country’s legitimate security interests were pursued in ways that endangered others and undermined the Iranian economy.

 

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Iran stages pro-government rallies, cleric urges punishment for protest leaders

Parisa Hafezi
6 MIN READ

ANKARA (Reuters) - Tens of thousands of government supporters rallied across Iran on Friday, swearing allegiance to the clerical establishment and accusing arch-enemy the United States of instigating the biggest anti-government protests for nearly a decade, state TV reported.

Tehran’s Friday prayer leader called on authorities to deal “firmly” with those responsible for igniting over a week of demonstrations, in which 22 people have died and more than 1,000 have been arrested, according to Iranian officials.

(For graphic on Iranian protests, click tmsnrt.rs/2CXDYXZ)

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“But those ordinary Iranians who were deceived by these American-backed rioters should be dealt with based on Islamic clemency,” cleric Ahmad Khatami told worshippers at Tehran university, TV reported.

Khatami also called on the government to “pay more attention to people’s economic problems.”

Protests erupted on Dec. 28 in the holy Shi‘ite city of Mashhad after the government announced plans to raise fuel prices and cut monthly cash handouts to lower-income Iranians.

Unrest spread to more than 80 cities and rural towns as thousands of young and working class Iranians voiced anger at graft, unemployment and a deepening gap between rich and poor.

Some 42,000 people took part in the unrest across the country, Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli was quoted as saying by state TV.

To try to allay tensions, the government suspended its planned fuel price hikes and cash handout cuts. Ali Rabiei, Iran’s minister of cooperatives, labor and social welfare, said the government had plans to create over 900,000 jobs by March 2019, the state news agency IRNA reported on Friday.

Iranian officials said the protests were the result of foreign instigation and mocked U.S. President Donald Trump’s support of protesters against what he called a “brutal and corrupt” establishment.


The authorities have produced no evidence of any U.S. role in the demonstrations, which have lacked a unifying leader.

GUARDS QUELLED UNREST
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Iran’s statements that external influences fomented the unrest were not groundless and that Washington used any possible method to destabilize governments it disliked.

He added that U.S. calls for an extraordinary meeting of the U.N. Security Council to discuss the turmoil in Iran interfered with the country’s sovereignty, news agency Interfax said. The Council met on Friday to discuss Iran.

Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Gholamali Khoshroo told the U.N. Security Council meeting that the United States had abused its power as a permanent member of the Council by calling for a meeting on the turmoil in Iran.

People take part in pro-government rallies, Iran, January 3, 2018. Tasnim News Agency/Handout via REUTERS
He added that Iran had “hard evidence” that recent protests in Iran were “very clearly directed from abroad”.

But U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Nikki Haley said the United States stood “unapologetically with those in Iran who seek freedom for themselves, prosperity for their families, and dignity for their nation”.

“We will not be quiet. No dishonest attempt to call protesters ‘puppets of foreign powers’ will change that. The Iranian people know the truth. And we know the truth,” she told the U.N. meeting on Iran.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote on his Twitter account that the meeting was “another foreign policy blunder of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration”.

Residents contacted by Reuters in various cities said the protests had shown sign of abating since Thursday, after the establishment intensified a crackdown on the protesters by dispatching Revolutionary Guards forces to several provinces.

Iran’s elite Guards and its affiliated Basij militia suppressed the country’s 2009 unrest over alleged election fraud, in which dozens of pro-reform Iranians were killed.

UNITED FRONT
On Friday rallies, protesters chanted “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, carrying pictures of Iran’s top authority Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and waved Iranian flags.

Television footage of rallies in several cities showed people chanting “We support Imam Khamenei ... We will not leave him alone in his fight against enemies”.

“Demonstrators demand the punishment of those behind foreign-linked riots which insulted religion and our authorities,” state television reported, referring to unrest in which social media footage showed protesters tearing down pictures of Khamenei.

RELATED COVERAGE
Hardliner Khatami said the government should take more notice of Iranians’ economic problems.

“There are workers who say they have not received their salaries for months ... These problems should be resolved,” Khatami said, according to state TV.

Fearing that further unrest could undermine the Islamic republic altogether, Iran’s faction-ridden political elite has displayed a united front.

But Khamenei and his hardline allies have criticized Iranian President Hassan Rouhani for failing to revive the economy after most sanctions on Iran were lifted in 2016 under a deal reached between Tehran and major powers aimed at curbing the country’s nuclear program.

Rouhani secured the deal in 2015, raising hopes of better economic times among many Iranians, but discontent has since risen over the lack of broad improvement in living standards.

 

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Trump's hypocrisy, from Jerusalem to Tehran
by Halim Shebaya
11 hours ago

Trump is in many ways Ayatollah Khamenei's ideal foe, writes Shebaya [Reuters]
This is not a whataboutery piece. As such, the intent is by no means to belittle or discredit what is taking place in Iran by asking "what about Palestine".

The Iranian people - like most of their Arab counterparts - live under an oppressive regime that severely restricts the right to dissent, "arresting and imprisoning" according to Amnesty International, "peaceful critics and others after grossly unfair trials before Revolutionary Courts".

This is not a matter of contention among morally serious analysts given the abundance of documentation of human rights violations by rights organisations and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Iran.

Similarly, it is also a matter of consensus among morally serious individuals that the Palestinian people have been suffering for decades under an oppressive Zionist regimeand occupation that couldn't care less about international law and the human rights of the Palestinian people.

Trump: a "morally serious" president?
I am using the term "morally serious" here for two reasons.

First, it was used in reference to Donald Trump. The US president's reckless Jerusalem decision and recent support for the Iranian protests earned him the title of a "morally serious president" in a recent Haaretz op-ed by Jonathan Tobin.

The second reason is that, despite the ludicrous nature of such a proposition, thinking politically within the framework of "moral seriousness" can be a beneficial approach to assess Trump's - and any individual's - views.

Obviously, what can be described as "morally serious" depends on the moral system we ascribe to. And while the notion of "universal human rights" as a value-system upon which the world order ought to be driven by will sound superfluous, naive and even delusional, it nonetheless provides us with a useful framework whereby political decisions can be measured based on what is commonly referred to as "international human rights standards" - standards that should, in principle, govern the relations of UN member states with their citizens.

Let us then try to think within this rubric about Trump's positions and give him the benefit of the doubt. Is he really a morally serious president?

"The world is watching"
Take the human right to freedom of expression and assembly as a starting point.

Since the outset of the recent Iranian protests, Trump offered his unequivocal support to the "great Iranian people" and he defended their human rights, including their "right to express themselves".

Now it is reasonable to presume that a morally serious president would extend that same support to the Palestinian people. However, Trump has shown that he doesn't care about human rights violations if the perpetrator is a leadership he supports.

[Trump] is a 'useful enemy' in that he offers Iran's leaders an easy way out of addressing legitimate grievances, and from having to answer for their human rights violations

When it comes to Palestine, Trump not only declared Jerusalem Israel's capital with no regard for Palestinians' view on the matter, but he also implemented a policy of bullying and blackmail at the United Nations, without once being bothered by Palestinian protesters' legitimate grievances and frustrations.

Not even the killing of a double-amputee prompted him to denounce Israeli violence or send a tweet-in-support of oppressed Palestinians. Nor the fact that 77 children were arrested following his Jerusalem decision (between December 6 and 9). Or that an Israeli "journalist", Ben Caspit, was widely seen to be insinuating violent revenge on a child - Ahed Tamimi - in detention: "In the case of the girls, we should exact a price at some other opportunity, in the dark, without witnesses and cameras".

It is almost as if Palestinians do not exist in Trump's world view - except, of course, for being recipients of orders regarding what "peace plan" they should or should not accept, accompanied with threats to cut funding. Even though - in the case of UNRWA - this is something that could lead to a "humanitarian catastrophe".

Whereas Trump was quick to say that "the world is watching" Iran's protests because he considers the Iranian regime a foe (spurring debate among commentators whether he should speak up or be quiet), little did he care for the mother of the first teen killed by Israel in 2018 who said: "No one is listening to us - no one feels the pain that we're going through. The world is just silently watching."

If this is presidential moral seriousness, we might be better off forgetting the concept of morality in its entirety.

Trump loves yet bans Iranians
Trump also spoke in support of the Iranian people whose bravery he applauded and whose best interests he claimed to have at heart.

Yet, by denying Iranian citizens the right to enter the US, Trump is at the same time "playing games" with human lives. His Muslim Ban was widely denounced as a daily reminder of Trump's discrimination, prejudice and bigotry.

As the ACLU commented, it "takes away the ability of US citizens and green card holders to live with, or even be visited by, spouses, parents, children, grandparents, and other family members ... it will exclude friends and family from weddings, graduations, and funerals; prevent grandparents, uncles, and aunts from holding and caring for newborns; deny final visits to ailing relatives ..."

Another important point is that some Iranians living in the US are unable to go home for various reasons, including the risk of arrest or imprisonment should they return. The ban prevents their family members entry to the US, and adds further hurdles and costs in their already-precarious lives.

Trump is Khamenei's "useful enemy"
Trump's double standards and hypocrisy in dealing with internal and foreign policy issues leaves him desperately failing when it comes to his declared goal of restoring American leadership and respect on the world stage.

In fact, Trump is in many ways Ayatollah Khamenei's ideal foe.

He is a "useful enemy" in that he offers Iran's leaders an easy way out of addressing legitimate grievances, and from having to answer for their human rights violations. For example, Iranian President Rouhani's Chief of Office Mahmoud Vaezi referenced Trump's policies as evidence of the US' insincere support for the Iranian people.

Furthermore, Iran has been under increasing pressure since Trump took office, with increasing sanctions and efforts to annul the Nuclear Deal - an agreement that was welcomed by the Iranian people and seen to be a harbinger of better economic times.

Trump's appropriation of Israel and Saudi Arabia's obsession with Iran creates a regional environment of increased polarisation and tension, as we have seen during the Qatar crisis, and in Lebanon during Hariri's "Riyadh resignation". The appointment of the "Dark Prince" or "Ayatollah Mike" (Michael D'Andrea) to run the CIA's Iran operations was also interpreted as the onset of "a more muscular approach" by the US.

All this has created or solidified a state of anticipation for war - one that suits repressive regimes who use external threats to avoid discussing domestic affairs and to justify their policies and foreign-policy choices.

If indeed "the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice", there is much reason to be optimistic for a better future for Palestine, for the Iranian people, and for the Arab world more generally.

However, Trump's policies in the US and the Middle East have made the road longer, and harder, as he recklessly "plays games" with people's lives.

If Trump is serious about supporting people's struggles for freedom and for establishing societies based on the "rule of law' (understood in its proper sense of promoting the values of freedom, democracy, equality and non-discrimination), he should remember these timely words: "Every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad and every nation that insists on it abroad must enforce it at home".

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Halim Shebaya
Halim Shebaya is a Beirut-based political analyst and multi-disciplinary researcher.

 

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The U.S. Wanted to Discuss Iran. Russia Brought Up Black Lives Matter.
Image

Javad Safaei of the Iranian delegation and the American ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, during a Security Council meeting on Friday.CreditDrew Angerer/Getty Images


By Michael Schwirtz

Jan. 5, 2018
UNITED NATIONS — Efforts by the Trump administration to marshal a muscular international response to Iran’s crackdown on anti-government protesters appeared to backfire on Friday, as members of the United Nations Security Council instead used a special session called by the United States to lecture the American ambassador on the proper purpose of the body and to reaffirm support for the Iran nuclear agreement.

It was an afternoon of high diplomatic theater that began with a passionate denunciation of Iran’s “oppressive government” by the American ambassador, Nikki R. Haley, and ended with the Iranian ambassador delivering a lengthy history of popular revolt in the United States — from the violent demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in 1968 to the Occupy Wall Street protests in 2011.

In the interim, Council members did, one by one, condemn the Iranian government’s response during more than a week of protests. As of Friday, more than 20 people had been killed and hundreds had been arrested. The authorities have blocked access to social media and have blamed foreign “enemies” for instigating the unrest, a common refrain at times of upheaval that in this case the government has provided no evidence to support.

In her remarks, Ms. Haley said that the United States would remain steadfastly behind the Iranian protesters.

“Let there be no doubt whatsoever,” she said, “the United States stands unapologetically with those in Iran who seek freedom for themselves.”

But there was evidence of a mini-revolt brewing within the Security Council chamber, not only among traditional adversaries like Russia and China, but also among close allies like France and Sweden. Many seemed to fear that the outspoken criticism by the Americans was simply a pretext to undermine the Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump has long desired to scrap.

It is not precisely clear what Ms. Haley hoped to achieve by convening the session on Friday, which was not previously scheduled. Until the meeting began at 3 p.m., it was not even certain whether Ms. Haley would be able to secure the votes needed to call the session to order.

But even before the session began, France’s ambassador, François Delattre, warned against “instrumentalization” of the protests “from the outside.”

Speaking before the Council, he went further.

“We must be wary of any attempt to exploit this crisis for personal ends, which would have a diametrically opposed outcome to that which is wished,” Mr. Delattre said.

The Russian ambassador, Vasily A. Nebenzya, was more blunt. He asked rhetorically why the Security Council had not taken up the issue of Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson, Mo., which were at times also met with a violent police response.

“The real reason for convening today’s meeting is not an attempt to protect human rights or promote the interests of the Iranian people, but rather as a veiled attempt to use the current moment to continue to undermine” the Iranian deal, Mr. Nebenzya said.

Mr. Trump has repeatedly excoriated the deal, which was a signature diplomatic achievement of his predecessor, Barack Obama. In October, he refused to recertify the deal, though he left it to Congress to legislate changes to it. (None of the other world powers that signed the deal believes that renegotiation is possible.)

Later this month, Mr. Trump will again have to choose whether to continue to waive sanctions, as the deal requires, or chart a more confrontational approach that would further antagonize European allies.

Mr. Trump himself conflated the protests with the Iran nuclear deal this week, arguing that financial benefits received by the Iranian authorities as part of the accord had fueled the corruption that the country’s people were now protesting.

At the Security Council on Friday, most members insisted that these two issues were separate.

“It needs to be crystal clear to the international community that the situation in Iran does not belong on the agenda of the Security Council,” said Sacha Sergio Llorenty Solíz, the Bolivian ambassador.

Sweden’s representative, Irina Schoulgin Nyoni, concurred: “We have our reservations on the format and timing of this session.”

Such reticence to support the American position is the latest evidence of growing international resistance to the Trump administration’s foreign policy priorities, particularly at the United Nations. Last month, a large majority of United Nations members voted for a resolution denouncing the United States’ decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the American Embassy there.

Ms. Haley had to use her veto to block a similar resolution in the Security Council that was supported by every other member.

On Wednesday, the United States Mission to the United Nations held a cocktail reception for the nine countries that voted against the resolution in the General Assembly, which, aside from Israel, were Guatemala, Honduras, Togo, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru and Palau.

In a video message played at the reception, Mr. Trump thanked the attendees for “standing with the United States.”

He said that the vote would “go down as a very important date,” and that their support was “noted and greatly appreciated.”

 

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Why haven’t reformists joined the protests sweeping Iran?

By Mohammad Ali Kadivar January 5 at 4:00 PM
Arab Spring uprisings. Iranian reformists are a group that could have provided leadership but have so far decided to stay out of the action. Some have attributed reformists’ reluctance to their fear of Iran turning into Syria, their past support for Hassan Rouhani’s government or the incompatibility of reportedly aggressive tactics with peaceful reformist methods.

However, my research suggests this decision is actually rooted in the reformist strategic thinking formed during late 1990s.

Why would these protests need leaders?

Leaderlessness might be a blessing for such movements in the short-term, as the movement does not present any clear target for the regime to repress. In the long run, leaderlessness creates problems, undermining the movements’ capacity for strategizing and leaving them without agents to negotiate with authorities or articulate demands.

Iranian reformists provided such leadership and direction in 2009, when hundreds of thousands protested the fraudulent reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The 2009 movement featured massive protests in Tehran, but for the most part did not spread to provinces or effectively engage the working class. Activists and scholars highlighted both the middle-class and Tehrani background of the Green Movement as a defining feature, as well as an explanation for its decline.

The current protest wave offers an opportunity to bridge the gaps between Tehran and the provinces, and between the lower- and middle-classes, but this has not materialized.

How the reformists are distancing themselves from this protest wave

Reformists have drawn clear lines between themselves and the protesters.

Hamid Reza Jalayipour, a prominent reformist strategist, said such protests could destroy Iran and transform it into Afghanistan. He recognized protesters’ demands should be met, but said “we should tell our people, that our country’s problems cannot be resolved through streets.”

Mostafa Tajzadeh, another leading reformist, imprisoned for several years after 2009, said it is reformists’ duty to prevent clashes and not let Iran to turn into Syria.

Another prominent reformist leader, Abbas Abdi, called the protests uncalculated and irrational.

Online, reformist users have used #BelieveinReforms (#باوراصلاحات) to share their definition of reformism and explain why they distance themselves from the protest wave.

One user wrote no country has ever achieved democracy through the streets. Similarly, others wrote that the protest wave would only lead to further repression, even describing the protests as blind riots.

Why haven’t reformists sided with the protesters?

While these sentiments are all telling, pessimism about street protests dates back to the formation of the reform movement in Iran. In the late 1990s, reformists were a faction of the regime that tried to democratize the Islamic Republic from within. The rise of reformists within the executive and legislative branches after 1997 paralleled the massive mobilization of intellectuals, students, women and middle class with demands about democratization, social liberties and the rule of law.

As I have argued elsewhere, the dominant strategic thinking within the reform movement was initially pessimistic about the viability and consequences of protest. Grievances were so deep, they feared, that mass mobilization could stir up emotions, spawning radicalism and providing hard-liners with an excuse for repression, possibly leading to civil war.

Each time conservatives cracked down on reformist activists and blocked their initiatives within the state, the reformist leadership and intelligentsia called on the supporters to be calm. For example, when a prominent reformist leader was arrested, a reformist newspaper wrote that the arrest “might be a plan to agitate emotions, and we should not give any opportunity for repression. Thus, at this time, any [protest] gathering will serve the interests of authoritarians.”

One leading reformist organization even coined the term “active tranquility” for this strategy, which calls reformists to keep pushing for their demands but avoid confrontation, with a view to gain the trust of hard-liners. Reformists also saw the ballot box as the main pathway to peacefully push for political change and incompatible with mass mobilization.

So why did reformists engage in mobilization during the 2009 Green Movement?

The post-election uprising of 2009 occurred as a continuation of people’s street presence during the campaign. After the results were announced on June 12, a Friday night, angry Tehranis started protesting the following Saturday and Sunday without any invitation by the reformist leaders.

The reformist leaders asked the Interior Ministry for a permit to hold a demonstration on the following Monday, but their request was denied. The main opposition candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, went to the location of the protests that day, not to demand mobilization but because they were afraid people were unaware that no permit was issued and that they were involved in an illegal demonstration. They found people did not care about the Interior Ministry’s refusal. Millions showed up to the biggest demonstration in Iran since the 1979 revolution, setting in motion a protest wave in support of the reformist leaders, regardless whether they approved.

The dynamics for the Green Movement uprising had been set in motion from the 2009 election campaign, with reformist leaders mostly following the rank and file rather than them leading the protest. The sense of solidarity created during that movement perhaps made some reformists more receptive toward mass mobilization, but the protests’ eventual decline and the government’s subsequent crackdown strengthened others’ belief that contentious collective action may not be the proper method for political change in Iran.

The current protest wave in Iran has already shaken the political landscape of the regime and society. Some younger activists in the mid and lower reformist ranks have suggested channeling this wave to make their own demands through street demonstrations organized by reformist parties. However, the reformists’ response remains distant. If they are not able to overcome their fear of street protest, this could damage their credentials in the longer run as the main agent of democratic change within the country.

Mohammad Ali Kadivar is a postdoctoral fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Follow him @MAliKadivar

 

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