Analysis from OCBC
https://www.ocbc.com/assets/pdf/credit research/special reports/2019/ocbc asia credit - hyflux ltd special interest commentary - 210219.pdf
Highlights:
(Purple are my comments)
Further upside potential from contingent claims if they do not crystallise for Senior Unsecured Creditors.
If the contingent claims do not crystallise, there will be subsequent cash payouts and equity distribution from the Escrow Account, with senior unsecured lenders and bondholders receiving 80% of the cash payout and equity distribution while “Management Payout Recipients” will receive the remaining 20% of the cash payout and payout distribution. As per pg 32 of the affidavit, “Management Payout Recipients” are “management of the projects in respect of which the Contingent Claim has become Extinguished .”
Not all contingent claims are likely to crystallise
Based on the currently available disclosure, contingent claims include those relating to TuasOne, legal disputes, corporate guarantees, bankers guarantees, performance bonds and those in relation to two rental agreements with landlords. While some of these contingent claims could be crystallised, we think there is a good chance for a significant amount of contingent claims not to crystallise eventually (eg: rental related) post-restructuring, should the company emerge as a going concern post-restructuring.
Greater downside for Senior Unsecured Creditors if company falls into liquidation
Based on the liquidation analysis performed by company’s financial advisor, senior unsecured lenders and bondholders will only get 3.8% to 8.7% in recovery in liquidation. Given the large downside in liquidation versus the proposed recoveries in restructuring, we think senior unsecured creditors have more incentives to support the restructuring terms versus rejecting which may risk pushing the company into liquidation.
Lack of precedence
This is the first time in the SGD bond market that we are seeing a situation where there are a myriad class of creditors, in terms of seniority of ranking and investor profile with a large gap in bargaining power (in part due to large number of investors). Past Treasury Research & Strategy restructurings usually involved fewer stakeholders (i.e. just bank lenders and bondholders), which are more similar in ranking and homogenous within their groups.
Unity amongst N2H and BTWZ holders however will be crucial (PLEASE ATTEND TO VOTE NO)
While this may prove difficult given the sheer number of N2H and BTWZ holders (more than 34,000), it could ultimately be a source of strength in a negotiation. N2H and BTWZ holders still have a say in the restructuring outcome as senior creditors will be dependent on junior creditors to support a restructuring proposal to achieve a better return via a restructuring over absorbing bigger losses in liquidation.
Technical Default of BTWZ (Perpetual Bonds)
In our view, the missed distribution for BTWZ following the Dividend in specie may have breached a condition of HYFSP 6% PERP 27/05/2020 (“BTWZ”), which includes a dividend pusher with a 6-month look back. In other words, the distribution for BTWZ, which falls within 6 months of the payment of the Dividend in specie, cannot be deferred. Payment in specie (HyfluxShop) may have prejudiced the distribution for BTWZ
Pacifying the Management
If the contingent claims do not crystallise, there will be subsequent cash payouts and equity distribution from the Escrow Account, with senior unsecured lenders and bondholders receiving 80% of the cash payout and equity distribution while “Management Payout Recipients” will receive the remaining 20% of the cash payout and payout distribution. As per pg 32 of the affidavit, “Management Payout Recipients” are “management of the projects in respect of which the Contingent Claim has become Extinguished1 .Little is known of the profile of the Management Payout Recipients, and why they receive a return when they are not parties to the Scheme. What are the implications should they not receive the incentive to manage on-going projects?
Proceeds of the perpetuals and preference shares were used to fund Tuaspring
As per pg 10 of the affidavit, proceeds of the perpetuals and preference shares were used to fund Tuaspring. As per the non-exhaustive list of contingent claims from Schedule 2 on pg 87 of the affidavit, the majority of claims are banker’s guarantees. Given that Tuaspring is expressly excluded from the scheme, this could weaken the potential for proceeds from extinguishment of contingent liabilities to be shared.
(Although Tuaspring is retained now, perpetuals and preference shares suffered the steepest haircuts)
Financial information still lacking
reason given by HYF for the extension request is that release of financials during the reorganisation process “may potentially result in inaccurate and incomplete reflection of financial information”. This means however that investors may potentially only have access to dated financial information when assessing any restructuring or reorganization proposal if no further information is announced during the scheme meetings.
(Losses estimated to be in excess of a billion dollars for last FY due to inaccurate valuations in the past)
Infrastructure critical to Singapore’s future - Lending a helping hand
Recognizing the importance of reliable infrastructure as well as its significant cost, the government has flagged for two years running the possibility of support to fund large scale infrastructure projects. This is expected to come from both indirect support (Changi Airport Development Fund and Rail Infrastructure Fund) and potential direct support through the provision of government guarantees (Clifford Capital Pte Ltd, Changi Airport’s Terminal 5) or the government using its balance sheet and credit rating to lower the cost of building infrastructure. Most of the support announced so far is targeted towards transportation infrastructure. As important as transportation infrastructure is, it cannot operate without electricity. The same in effect goes for Singapore’s population – it cannot operate without water. The government has indicated as such that water security is critical to Singapore’s survival. While the Public Utility Board has step-in rights to take over Tuaspring and certain other mechanisms to protect its operations, there appears nothing similar to that currently proposed by the government to support its financial health or protect those that financed the infrastructure.