Preliminary findings about flooded tunnel raise more questions

[gatehousethetinkertailor]

https://yawningbread.wordpress.com/...s-about-flooded-tunnel-raises-more-questions/

 

[Seee3]

There is no need to guess as discharging water from a underground rain water holding tank is no rocket science.

In all basic design, there should be a sump (a rectangular hole) at the bottom of a rain water underground holding tank. The floor of the holding tank is sloped towards this sump so that water from light shower will fill up this sump first. There are at least 2 small pumps ( called jockey pumps ) inside this sump. Once the water rises to a certain level in the sump, a jockey pump will be activated by float or electrode sensor to discharge the water. If 1 pump cannot cope, another pump will be activated.

There must be at least 2 main pumps in the holding tank. When the small jockey pumps cannot cope and water continues to rise to a certain level, a main pump will be activated and more main pumps will be activated if the water continues to rise.

In all basic control panel, when the small pump fails to activate there should be an alarm. When main pumps fail to activate, there should further alarm. When water in the holding tank reaches critical level, there will ba alarm again. When water overflow out of the holding tank, it will again trigger another alarm.

All these alarms should be displayed as red light on the control panel. The cobtrol panel should be like a Christmas tree with red lights everywhere that day. However, it didn't happen. It took human eyes to realise that water has flooded the track.

What could have happened? The obvious confirmed fault is that ALL the pumps failed to discharge water fast enough from the holding tank. Sump pumps are hardy and for all to fail together is unilkely. Usually it is that the inlet is block by debris (nobody maintain lah) and the pumps are unable to operate efficiently. But then the control room should know when water over flow from the tank. One possibility is that all the control sensors didn't work. I don't think so. Second possibility is that the op staff have paid no attention to the panel on thecholding tank at all.

 

[Leckmichamarsch]

take big salaries but sleeping on the job.........nothing will happen to protected spcies.............look at WKS now doing light work but bigger pay!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

[zhihau]

If the maintenance team were paid millions, I'm pretty sure this kind of booboo wouldn't have taken place.

 

[glockman]

There is no need to guess as discharging water from a underground rain water holding tank is no rocket science.

In all basic design, there should be a sump (a rectangular hole) at the bottom of a rain water underground holding tank. The floor of the holding tank is sloped towards this sump so that water from light shower will fill up this sump first. There are at least 2 small pumps ( called jockey pumps ) inside this sump. Once the water rises to a certain level in the sump, a jockey pump will be activated by float or electrode sensor to discharge the water. If 1 pump cannot cope, another pump will be activated.

There must be at least 2 main pumps in the holding tank. When the small jockey pumps cannot cope and water continues to rise to a certain level, a main pump will be activated and more main pumps will be activated if the water continues to rise.

In all basic control panel, when the small pump fails to activate there should be an alarm. When main pumps fail to activate, there should further alarm. When water in the holding tank reaches critical level, there will ba alarm again. When water overflow out of the holding tank, it will again trigger another alarm.

All these alarms should be displayed as red light on the control panel. The cobtrol panel should be like a Christmas tree with red lights everywhere that day. However, it didn't happen. It took human eyes to realise that water has flooded the track.

What could have happened? The obvious confirmed fault is that ALL the pumps failed to discharge water fast enough from the holding tank. Sump pumps are hardy and for all to fail together is unilkely. Usually it is that the inlet is block by debris (nobody maintain lah) and the pumps are unable to operate efficiently. But then the control room should know when water over flow from the tank. One possibility is that all the control sensors didn't work. I don't think so. Second possibility is that the op staff have paid no attention to the panel on thecholding tank at all.

Good information. So the fault was obviously no maintenance and lousy quality staff (and management).

 

[Semaj2357]

all said and done, we've now cleared the ponding underground.
we now have to clear the swamp at the top. the usn has set an example for the recent incidents involving 2 of their warships with the head honchos taking accountability.

 

[halsey02]

all said and done, we've now cleared the ponding underground.
we now have to clear the swamp at the top. the usn has set an example for the recent incidents involving 2 of their warships with the head honchos taking accountability.

How much is the two Naval Chiefs paid, ? How much was the Rear-Admiral or was that a Vice-Admiral paid? The "Admiral" of our Transport Ministry is paid S$1,000,000 a year, his "fleet Admiral" at SMRT & the other heads, adds up to another 1 million. It is easier to swat 'flies' with bazooka, that is what they are doing , then to shoot 'peas' at the "Admirals".

We all just forget it..it is still a Honest Mistake..."we have bowed & apologised".. ( no harakiri!) , so move on.

 

[pakchewcheng]

Treble the bonuses to the top for their sincere apologies

Rotan the maintenance staff including the office ahsohs for their negligence.

 

[scroobal]

There is no one I know that can breakdown and explain clearly what the issues other than Alex Au. And no of his explanations over the years has been challenged by the authorities.

1) Design failure of the override switch
2) Failure of alarm switch
3) Maintenance failure

And lets not forget leadership failure after 5 years in the catbird seat. The whole concept of multiple redundancies failed.

 

[virus]

all said and done, we've now cleared the ponding underground.
we now have to clear the swamp at the top. the usn has set an example for the recent incidents involving 2 of their warships with the head honchos taking accountability.

Just like any good broth, the scum at the top must b removed

 

[Bigfuck]

Only one head needs to roll - Lee Hsieng Loong. After that, things will fall into place and the Jinx will become irrelevant. You can guess Honour Singapore dishonors Singapore.

 

[scroobal]

Your argument makes sense. How can everything fail. It will be interesting to see what the final report says.

There is no need to guess as discharging water from a underground rain water holding tank is no rocket science.

In all basic design, there should be a sump (a rectangular hole) at the bottom of a rain water underground holding tank. The floor of the holding tank is sloped towards this sump so that water from light shower will fill up this sump first. There are at least 2 small pumps ( called jockey pumps ) inside this sump. Once the water rises to a certain level in the sump, a jockey pump will be activated by float or electrode sensor to discharge the water. If 1 pump cannot cope, another pump will be activated.

There must be at least 2 main pumps in the holding tank. When the small jockey pumps cannot cope and water continues to rise to a certain level, a main pump will be activated and more main pumps will be activated if the water continues to rise.

In all basic control panel, when the small pump fails to activate there should be an alarm. When main pumps fail to activate, there should further alarm. When water in the holding tank reaches critical level, there will ba alarm again. When water overflow out of the holding tank, it will again trigger another alarm.

All these alarms should be displayed as red light on the control panel. The cobtrol panel should be like a Christmas tree with red lights everywhere that day. However, it didn't happen. It took human eyes to realise that water has flooded the track.

What could have happened? The obvious confirmed fault is that ALL the pumps failed to discharge water fast enough from the holding tank. Sump pumps are hardy and for all to fail together is unilkely. Usually it is that the inlet is block by debris (nobody maintain lah) and the pumps are unable to operate efficiently. But then the control room should know when water over flow from the tank. One possibility is that all the control sensors didn't work. I don't think so. Second possibility is that the op staff have paid no attention to the panel on thecholding tank at all.

 

[Bigfuck]

The key takeaway here is amateurs given positions above their ability. Redundancy does not mean redundant. Those are safety considerations in reliability engineering. To make redundancy measures redundant is liken to reducing the chambers in a revolver to one with one bullet loaded and then play Russian roulette.

 

[eatshitndie]

There is no need to guess as discharging water from a underground rain water holding tank is no rocket science.

In all basic design, there should be a sump (a rectangular hole) at the bottom of a rain water underground holding tank. The floor of the holding tank is sloped towards this sump so that water from light shower will fill up this sump first. There are at least 2 small pumps ( called jockey pumps ) inside this sump. Once the water rises to a certain level in the sump, a jockey pump will be activated by float or electrode sensor to discharge the water. If 1 pump cannot cope, another pump will be activated.

There must be at least 2 main pumps in the holding tank. When the small jockey pumps cannot cope and water continues to rise to a certain level, a main pump will be activated and more main pumps will be activated if the water continues to rise.

In all basic control panel, when the small pump fails to activate there should be an alarm. When main pumps fail to activate, there should further alarm. When water in the holding tank reaches critical level, there will ba alarm again. When water overflow out of the holding tank, it will again trigger another alarm.

All these alarms should be displayed as red light on the control panel. The cobtrol panel should be like a Christmas tree with red lights everywhere that day. However, it didn't happen. It took human eyes to realise that water has flooded the track.

What could have happened? The obvious confirmed fault is that ALL the pumps failed to discharge water fast enough from the holding tank. Sump pumps are hardy and for all to fail together is unilkely. Usually it is that the inlet is block by debris (nobody maintain lah) and the pumps are unable to operate efficiently. But then the control room should know when water over flow from the tank. One possibility is that all the control sensors didn't work. I don't think so. Second possibility is that the op staff have paid no attention to the panel on thecholding tank at all.

red alarms should go northbound to operations center, and it’s either the fcap system is actually f’ckup rather than fcap or red alarms mean jackshit at the control center. sinkie ops manager and techs must have seen the alarms and go back to sexting with their mistresses.

 

[tanwahtiu]

Too many women in workplaces these days and their kotex and tampons clogged the pipe holes.

Ban women more will solve clog problems

 

[virus]

Good retort best is dump those kotek in smrt n clog the longkang instead

 

[halsey02]

Only one head needs to roll - Lee Hsieng Loong. After that, things will fall into place and the Jinx will become irrelevant. You can guess Honour Singapore dishonors Singapore.

Remove the so-caled sELECTED president, it was suppose to be figurehead head of state, should be paid a 'figure head' salary & not the extraordinary high salary the president is paid....overhaul the renumeration system from top to bottom, where mistake made, or inefficiency should be dealt with like removal or salary & renumeration cuts to match the renumeration paid. Apologies, public admission of mistakes are cheap, if they bottom gets disciplined,it must go all the way to the top...only that, the 'culture' will be cultured!!.

 

[Leongsam]

There is no one I know that can breakdown and explain clearly what the issues other than Alex Au. And no of his explanations over the years has been challenged by the authorities.

1) Design failure of the override switch
2) Failure of alarm switch
3) Maintenance failure

And lets not forget leadership failure after 5 years in the catbird seat. The whole concept of multiple redundancies failed.

The rot that has set in at SMRT is like of the malignant variety.

In case everyone has forgotten the primary cause of this downhill spiral started when this woman:

appointed this woman.....

to run the show.

It will take more than a new maintenance team to stop the rot. Even replacing the CEO won't solve the deep rooted issues that face the organisation.

SMRT is owned by Temasek, the primary tumor.

 

[Blazars]

It will take more than a new maintenance team to stop the rot. Even replacing the CEO won't solve the deep rooted issues that face the organisation.

SMRT is owned by Temasek, the primary tumor.

But 5 years on the job! Isn't it enough time for the top man to fix any cultured issues??

 

[halsey02]

But 5 years on the job! Isn't it enough time for the top man to fix any cultured issues??

The benchmark set by the PAP is 52 years, that is all it needs to fix anything on their side, 5 years, is just too short a time!