Only Russian war planes! Now Mikoyan MiG-29 can maneuver like Shukoi SU-35 Video

[Cerebral]

It is alway before that stage there is maneuvering to dodge, once missile reach within the kill spherical coverage radius, it is game over. Eject if possible, or die. Missile do not have very big radius to kill planes, becos that means big heavy warheads, big payload, bigger rocket engine, heavier fuel. Less mobile launching units and deployment limitations.

So far no AA missile use tactical nuke warhead although the killing sphere of that would be huge.

Before kill zone, it does not turn on actuve tracking. There is no way for the pilot to know

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

It is alway before that stage there is maneuvering to dodge, once missile reach within the kill spherical coverage radius, it is game over. Eject if possible, or die. Missile do not have very big radius to kill planes, becos that means big heavy warheads, big payload, bigger rocket engine, heavier fuel. Less mobile launching units and deployment limitations.

So far no AA missile use tactical nuke warhead although the killing sphere of that would be huge.

Oh FUCK! There are (was) nuke anti-aircraft. KNN kiasu!

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Nuclear_anti-aircraft_weapons

 

[frenchbriefs]

all these lamo jackos usa cock suckers,if want to talk about missiles why not talk about s300 and s400?russian anti air missiles are the best in the world,tested since the korean war,the vietnam war and israeli wars.with a half decent airforce and a series of russian anti aircraft sam batteries,its a almost certain death zone no fly zone for any pilots israeli,american or nato.eygpt's anti air was so effective that it is widely acknowledged even by the israelis that their air force suffered heavy losses,over 300 aircraft.the only mistake the eygptians did was to leave the umbrella of protection and advance their tanks,otherwise the outcome of the war would have been much much different.

todays sam missiles are in a class of its own,with a massive range of 300 to 400km,and max speed of 14 mach and a effective height of 35km and clearance height of low low 25m,these missiles are better than anything a aircraft can carry.their radars are gigantic monstrosities mounted on trucks designed to be almost unjammable and deliver higher peak power-aperture performance to engage lower signature targets.Some modern SAM engagement radars are claimed to provide a basic LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) capability, making their detection and tracking difficult.These systems will be difficult to locate, jam and guide anti-radiation missiles against. No less importantly they have modern highly automated digital fire control systems.The demands for proficiency and technical understanding of operation by crews seen in early Cold War SAM systems no longer exist – operators have sophisticated LCD panel displays with synthetic presentation. In deployment, these systems are heavily automated, using mostly hydraulic rams to elevate and unfold key system components, and thus little operator skill is needed to set up or relocate a battery – most can shoot and scoot in five minutes.

 

[frenchbriefs]

The 40N6 very long range missile is capable of destroying airborne targets at ranges up to 400 km (250 mi). Active radar homing head. (expected in 2012)[35] To engage targets out of sight from the ground (for homing missile can) is designed to find the target.[26] System S - 400 can hit targets at a height of 185 km.[36]
The 48N6DM long range missile is capable of destroying airborne targets at ranges up to 250 km (160 mi). Semi-active radar homing head.
The 48H6E3/48H6E2 – The 250/200 km, target speed 4,800 metres per second (17,000 km/h; 11,000 mph; Mach 14)/2,800 metres per second (10,000 km/h; 6,300 mph; Mach 8.2), rocket speed 2,000 metres per second (7,200 km/h; 4,500 mph; Mach 5.9).[14]
The 9M96E2[37] extended range missile is capable of destroying airborne targets at ranges up to 120 km (75 mi), flying altitude 5 m to 30 km,. It has the highest hit probability against fast, manoeuvrable targets such as fighter aircraft. Weight 420 kg. Active radar homing head. The probability for single missile to destroy the target without taking into account the operational reliability is: (piloted stealth / UAV) of is actively maneuvering = 0.9 / 0.8.[12]
The 9M96E medium range missile (40 km), flying altitude 20 km, weight 333 kg. Active radar homing head.[38]
The 9M96(not for exporting) medium range missile. Range more 120 km, a high probability of target destruction 1 rocket (0.9 for the aircraft and UAV maneuvering – 0.8). Can maneuver at a height of 35[39] km with an overload of more than 20 g, which greatly increases the efficiency of destruction of ballistic missiles medium and short range.[25]
The ABM capabilities are near the maximum allowed under the (now void) Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
The new anti-ballistic missiles 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 to enter service in 2014 supposedly add inert/kinetic anti-ballistic capability to the system.[40] The same missiles will also be used by the S-500, which has a clearly stated anti-ICBM role.[41]

 

[Papsmearer]

This is Exactly what Russian planes are good at. Out-maneuver missiles.

Missiles have speed, not maneuvering capabilities. In particular, missiles are never made to do SHARP TURNS nor SPEED VARIATIONS. Russian planes just let missile come closer reduce own speed while changing direction, and suddently turn very sharply to opposite direction. Missile will overshoot the Russian jet, have to turen a BIG ARC to come back looking for target. Mostly near out of rocket fuel.

Anti-air Missiles does not have fuel for very long flights. Most of them are mafe to self detonate when missed or overshot. Their locks on targets are to get closer and closer, if the distance to target starts to Increase instead of decrease, their usual designs are to blast immediately, in the hope that some fragments still hit the target. Very few missile can turn around to re-locate a target that broke lose from lock. To do that they need complicated ground commands and ground radar to guide them, subjected to fuel spending.

When a jet managed to dodge a missile once, it hardly need to worry about it twice.

Bullshit. Until a Russian plane can be proven to consistently out manuevre an AAMRAM or the latest generation of Western air to air missiles, all these videos is just bullshit. No serious air force buys this crap. A F-35 will simply sneak up behind this Russian jet, and pop him with a missile before he even knows he is there and way before he can do any of this fancy manuevring.

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

Bullshit. Until a Russian plane can be proven to consistently out manuevre an AAMRAM or the latest generation of Western air to air missiles, all these videos is just bullshit. No serious air force buys this crap. A F-35 will simply sneak up behind this Russian jet, and pop him with a missile before he even knows he is there and way before he can do any of this fancy manuevring.

Sad reality for you is Putin's warplanes are selling lucratively and massively, and saturated production capacities. Xijinping bought actally ENTIRE NEW ASSEMBLY LINE.

Not only the F-22 & F-35 maneuvering capabilities lost ultra badly, due to the completely FAILED STEALTH silly dreams, their MOST BASIC 4 FUNDAMENTAL flying capabilities are all far too compromised to a very sad state of certain defeat:
1=max speed
2=max range
3=max altitude
4=max combat payloads

Go check on these also add:
5=overall $$COST$$
Which limits your Total Fleet Strength for the $$financial budget$$ / $$GDP$$ / $$DEBTS$$

For same amount of funds each F-22's price tag can build several Sukhoi Mikoyan to COUNTER FIGHT.

In overall conclusions, Russians won hands down in HUGE MAGNITUDE, 500~600% over ballless beggars US. Nothing to dream further. Hellish Reality instead of just nightmares.

 

[Brightkid]

Show them what our RSAF planes can do. That will put all the Russians, Pakistanis, Etc., to sleep!

Bcos it takes too much efforts to wait for these RSAF to reach them, so felled asleep!

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

http://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chinese-russian-radars-track-see-u-s-stealth


Chinese and Russian Radars On Track To See Through U.S. Stealth
By: Dave Majumdar
July 29, 2014 11:01 AM • Updated: July 30, 2014 1:05 PM
An F-35B Lightning II aircraft takes off from the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1) in 2013. A former senior Navy official told USNI News its stealth protection could be pierced by new Chinese and Russian radars. US Navy Photo

An F-35B Lightning II aircraft takes off from the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1) in 2013. A former senior Navy official told USNI News its stealth protection could be pierced by new Chinese and Russian radars. US Navy Photo

A growing trend in Russian and Chinese radar could make U.S. stealth fighters easier to see and — more importantly — easier to target for potential adversaries, a former senior U.S. Navy official told USNI News.

U.S. fighters — like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) — are protected by stealth technology optimized for higher frequency targeting radars but not for lower frequency radars.

Until now a focus on higher frequencies have not been a problem because low frequency radars have traditionally been unable to generate “weapons quality tracks.”

JSF and the F-22 are protected from higher frequencies in the Ku, X, C and parts of the S bands. But both jets can be seen on enemy radars operating in the longer wavelengths like L, UHF and VHF.

In other words, Russian and Chinese radars can generally detect a stealth aircraft but not clearly enough to give an accurate location to a missile

But that is starting to change.

“Acquisition and fire control radars are starting to creep down the frequency spectrum,” a former senior U.S. Navy official told USNI News on Monday.
With improved computing power, low frequency radars are getting better and better at discerning targets more precisely.

“I don’t see how you long survive in the world of 2020 or 2030 when dealing with these systems if you don’t have the lower frequency coverage,” the former official said.

Further, new foreign rival warships are increasingly being built with both high and low frequency radars.

“Prospective adversaries are putting low frequency radars on their surface combatants along with the higher frequency systems,” the former official said.

Chinese warships like the Type 52C Luyang II and Type 52D Luyang III have both high and low frequency radars, the former official said.
The first of the People's Army Liberation Navy Type 052D Luyang III destroyer. PLAN Photo

The first of the People’s Army Liberation Navy Type 052D Luyang III destroyer. PLAN Photo

“If you don’t have the signature appropriate to that [radar], you’re not going to be very survivable,” he said.
“The lower frequency radars can cue the higher frequency radars and now you’re going to get wacked.”

Nor will the Navy’s vaunted Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) do much to help the situation. Firstly, given the proliferation of low frequency radars, there are serious questions about the ability of the F-35C’s survivability against the toughest of air defenses, the former official said.

“All-aspect is highly desirable against this sort of networked [anti-air] environment,” he said.
Secondly, the Chinese and Russians are almost certain to use cyber and electronic attack capabilities to disrupt NIFC-CA, which is almost totally reliant on data links.

“I question how well all these data links are going to work in a heavily contested [radio frequency] environment where you have lots and lots of jamming going on,” the former official said.

Moreover, in certain parts of the world potential adversaries —China and Russia— are developing long-range anti-radiation missiles that could target the central node of the NIFC-CA network—the Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye.
E-2D Hawkeye from the Pioneers of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 1 on Aug. 27, 2013. US Navy Photo

E-2D Hawkeye from the Pioneers of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 1 on Aug. 27, 2013. US Navy Photo

“I think the anti-radiation homing weapons that are passive and go long-range are very, very difficult for the NIFC-CA concept to contend with,” the former official said.

Fundamentally, the Navy’s lack of an all-aspect broadband stealth jet on the carrier flight deck is giving fuel to advocates of a high-end Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft that can tackle the toughest enemy air defenses.

Without such capability, the Navy’s carrier fleet will fade into irrelevance, the former official said.
Article Keywords: China, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, F-22 Raptor, F-35, joint strike fighter, NIFC-CA, PLAN, Radars, Russia, Stealth, US Air force, us navy
Categories: Aviation, Budget Industry, Foreign Forces, News & Analysis, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/10/12/why_the_f-35_is_a_sitting_duck_for_the_flankers_38959


Why the F-35 is a sitting duck for the Flankers
12 October 2014 Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Outgunned by the Su-30 family of aircraft and suffering critical design flaws, the American F-35 is staring down the barrel of obsolescence – and punching a gaping hole in western air defences.
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aviation, su-30, f-35
Su-35. Source: Sukhoi.org
Su-35. Source: Sukhoi.org

Built to be the deadliest hunter killer aircraft of all time, the F-35 has quite literally become the hunted. In every scenario that the F-35 has been wargamed against Su-30 Flankers, the Russian aircraft have emerged winners. America’s newest stealth aircraft – costing $191 million per unit – is riddled with such critical design flaws that it’s likely to get blown away in a shootout with the super-maneuverable Sukhois.

Stubby wings (that reduce lift and maneuverability), a bulbous fuselage (that makes it less aerodynamic) low speed and a super hot engine (which a half decent radar can identify) are just a few of the major flaws that will expose its vulnerability during air combat.

With more than 600 Flankers (Sukhoi-27s and its later iterations such as the Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 Super Flanker) flying with air forces around the world, the fate of the fifth generation F-35 seems decidedly uncertain. Aerospace experts across the world are veering around to the view that America’s most expensive fighter development programme (pegged at $1.5 trillion) will be a sitting duck for the flankers.
пустым не оставлять!!

Flanker fleet down, but not out

“It’s a turkey,” declares aerospace engineer Pierre Sprey in an interview to Dutch television. Few people are as qualified to speak about fighter aircraft as Sprey. He is the co-designer of the F-16 Falcon jet and the A-10 Warthog tank buster, two of the most successful aircraft in the US Air Force (USAF).

Winslow T. Wheeler, Director of the US’ Straus Military Reform Project, Centre for Defense information, agrees. “The F-35 is too heavy and sluggish to be successful as a fighter,” he says. “If we ever face an enemy with a serious air force we will be in deep trouble.”

So far the US has been lucky it has never really encountered a “serious” military. Over the skies of war-weary Iraq, tiny Libya and utterly defenceless Afghanistan, the American aircraft operated with impunity. But luck can run out – if they ever come up against the air forces of Russia, China or India the outcome won’t be so one-sided. In particular, the Indian Air Force has beaten the USAF’s fourth generation fighters using both third and fourth generation jets.

The biggest problem with the F-35 is that its US designers are betting on stealth and long range radar to compensate for its lack of speed and maneuverability. But stealth is not really all that it is cracked up to be; it is not the cloak of invisibility.

Plus, Russia’s already excellent radars are getting better. Says Defense Industry Daily (DID): “Meanwhile, key radar advances are already deployed in the most advanced Russian surface-to-air missile systems, and existing IRST (infra-red scan and track) systems deployed on advanced Russian and European fighters are extending enemy detection ranges against radar-stealthy aircraft. Fighter radar pick-up capability of up to (46km) by 2020 is proposed against even ultra-stealthy aircraft like the F-22, coupled with IRST ability to identify Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile firings and less infrared-stealthy aircraft at (92km) or more.”
Military
Read section:
Defence and Security

At the same time, there is no such thing as one radar in a war. “There are lots of radars,” Sprey explains. “And you can’t be nose-on or dead-level to every radar in the theatre. There are always going to be radars that are going to be shining up (from below) or looking from above – they can all see you.”

Short on firepower

Another issue is with the American aircraft’s overall shape. “Most great airplanes are beautiful because you are trying to reduce drag,” Sprey says. “But here because of stealth they had to make it very bulbous, very big as they had to carry the weapons inside because as soon as you carry the weapons outside they reflect radar. So this is a huge penalty to the performance of the aircraft which is now big and lumbering like a bomber.”

Lower internal payload means the designers at Lockheed-Martin have signed the F-35’s death warrant. The aircraft carries just two large bombs and four small ones, and a maximum of four beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles (AAMs).

The USAF claims the F-35’s advanced radar will see the enemy aircraft first and be able to take it out with one of its four long-range AAMs. But BVR kills are still the stuff of dreams for fighter pilots and are quite rare.

In fact, the reliance on the radar acquisition and AAMS can prove suicidal – as indeed it was once upon a time. During the Vietnam War the USAF was so smitten with the concept of BVR combat that the first F-4 fighters were armed only with missiles. But after the Vietnamese Air Force pilots shot them down by the bucket load, the Americans reintroduced cannons in the F-4.

In fact, Russia, which has the most advanced and varied range of BVR missiles in the world, arms its Flankers with at least eight missiles for the simple reason that it takes several shots at a fast moving target to score a kill.

That the Americans ignored this basic lesson of air combat is mindboggling.
пустым не оставлять!!

Sukhois shift the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific

In theory, American pilots would play ‘video games’ and take out enemy aircraft at 1000 km. In practice, air combat is like a knife fight. According to DID, the F-35 is very likely to wind up facing many more “up close and personal” opponents than its proponents suggest, while dealing with effective BVR infrared-guided missiles as an added complication. Unlike the F-22, the F-35 is described as “double inferior” to modern Su-30 family fighters within visual range combat.”

The much larger and varied inventory of missiles combined with super-maneuverability, therefore, bestows the Flankers with an edge that’s unparalleled in modern air combat.

Fleet availability

According to the new philosophy of air combat that is being defined by USAF-Lockheed-Martin careerists, the one-size-fits-all F-35 will replace all other fighters as well as ground support aircraft.

But here’s the rub. Because the F-35 is such an expensive aircraft, air forces will buy fewer units. For instance, Japan currently has 100 F-15s but it will replace them with just 70 F-35s. Again, because the F-35 will also be expensive to fly and maintain, air forces will limit pilot flying hours. (Already, spending cuts have forced the USAF to eliminate more than 44,000 flying hours and ground 17 combat air squadrons).

Besides, ‘stealth’ comes with a price. On the F-35 most of the maintenance is on the stealth coating. “It is a ludicrous impediment to combat,” Sprey says. “You are sitting on the ground for 50 hours fiddling on the aircraft trying to make it stealthy when it’s not stealthy anyhow.”
пустым не оставлять!!

Dissecting a dogfight: Sukhoi vs USAF at Red Flag 2008

Plus, 100 per cent fleet availability is a logistical impossibility. The USAF averages around 75 per cent – which is pretty decent – but when it comes to stealth aircraft the figures nosedive. The USAF’s super-secret B2A stealth bomber has an availability rate of just 46.7 per cent. And America’s most expensive fighter, the F-22, despite its $350 million price tag has a fleet availability rate of only 69 per cent.

So if you are, say, the Australian air force, just 48 of your planned fleet of 70 F-35s will be battle ready at any given time. Your chances against the Chinese who have 400 Flankers are smaller than small. You can bet the Aussies won’t be joining the knife fight unless escorted by big brother USA.

Wheeler, who has dealt with US national security issues for over three decades, lays out the implications for western air forces planning to induct the F-35: “The pilots will get worse as they’ll get much less training, which is most important than any technical issue. There’ll be far fewer pilots as the whole force will have to shrink, and you will basically have a showpiece aircraft that can’t do anything. It’s useless, it’s truly monumentally useless, it will ruin any air force that uses it.”

The dogfight hasn’t yet started and the Flankers are up 1-0.

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/no-the-f-35-can-t-fight-at-long-range-either-5508913252dd

No, the F-35 Can’t Fight at Long Range, Either
Stealth fighter can’t see, shoot or survive

by JOSEPH TREVITHICK

The Pentagon’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is dead meat in a close battle against even a dated two-seat F-16D fighter jet, according to a scathing test pilot report War Is Boring obtained.

Don’t sweat it, JSF-maker Lockheed Martin responded. “The F-35’s technology is designed to engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances,” Lockheed’s F-35 team wrote in a press release on July 1.

As a rebuttal to the test pilot report, Lockheed’s claim is a cynically useful one — it sidesteps the criticism without really confirming or denying it. But that doesn’t mean the company’s test-report rebuttal is actually true.

Can the F-35 really engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances? There are reasons to believe it can’t. The stealth fighter lacks the sensors, weapons and speed that allow a warplane to reliably detect and shoot down other planes in combat. Especially when those planes are shooting back.

In short—the F-35 isn’t much of a dogfighter. And it’s probably not very good at long-range aerial combat, either.

In any air-to-air duel, the pilot who spots his target first and shoots first is, nine times out of 10, the victor.

To this end, the F-35 does have a high-tech radar, high-fidelity cameras and other advanced gear that can detect airplanes. But foremost, Lockheed optimized these sensors for spotting targets on the ground — and at relatively short distances.

The F-35 can see great. It just can’t see all that great into the air. At least not compared to modern Chinese- and Russian-made jets — the planes the F-35 is most likely to face in battle in some future war.
Above—an Air Force F-35A during weapons tests. At top—another F-35A. Air Force photos
Dueling sensors

First, we have to look at how the F-35’s sensors compare to its rivals. The latest Russian radars, such as the one on the new Sukhoi Su-35, at least match the JSF’s APG-81, according to data compiled by Carlo Kopp at Air Power Australia.

While the specific details remain secret, Kopp estimates the APG-81 can detect an aircraft with a radar cross-section of three square meters—a MiG-29, for example—just over 100 miles away. Russian radar-maker Tikhomirov claims the Su-35’s Irbis-E can spot a similar-size target at greater than twice that distance.

But it’s possible radar range is irrelevant. In an aerial battle between stealthy jets — with each side trying to stay undetected as long as possible — it’s likely that none of the opposing pilots would even want to activate their radars at all. That’s because most fighters carry gear that can sense radar waves and pinpoint their origins.

Instead, modern planes in a high-tech war would probably rely on their undetectable, “passive” infrared sensors to locate each other in the air. The F-35, Su-35, Russian T-50 and Chinese J-20 all possess IR sensors that look for heat.

But that doesn’t mean these aircraft are equals when it comes to emitting and detecting that heat. Remember, the F-35 has one huge and very hot engine.

True, Lockheed designed the JSF’s fuel tanks to help sop up some of the extra thermal energy the plane generates. But take a look at the F-35’s engine nozzle. It’s round. Highly stealthy planes such as America’s B-2 bomber and F-22 fighter both boast flat engine nozzles that spread out their exhaust plumes, cutting back on the telltale IR signature.

Even with its radar off, an F-35 could struggle to hide from enemy planes — to say nothing of enemy forces on the ground. Consider all those long-wavelength, low-band radars that Russia, China and Iran are building right next to potential hotspots in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East.

“You can’t stealthify against long-wavelength radars,” says Pierre Sprey, an experienced engineer who worked on both the F-16 and the A-10 ground attack plane.

These giant arrays can detect tiny objects at great distances. Tehran insists its Ghadir radar can spot jets more than 300 miles away. Russian arms-dealer Rosoboronexport claims the Rezonans-NE can detect stealth planes nearly 750 miles distant.

Using these radars, earthbound spotters could point warplanes toward incoming F-35s, even if the planes’ pilots can’t find the JSFs with their own radars or heat sensors. “You’re not invisible,” Sprey says of anyone flying the F-35.
An inert missile falls from the F-35A’s cramped weapons bay during tests on the ground. Air Force photo
Missile duel

JSF pilots shouldn’t expect to automatically get the jump on their enemies. And once everyone has detected everyone else and the long-distance shooting starts, the F-35 is in even more trouble.

The American AIM-120, the Russian R-77 and the Chinese PL-12 are all comparable long-range missiles, each with a nominal range of around 60 miles. But the F-35 is slower than rival Russian or Chinese fighters, making it a less effective missile-shooter.

A fast-flying jet can impart extra energy to any weapon it fires. That means a “supercruising” fighter such as the Su-35 — that is, a fast-flying plane that exceeds the speed of sound without a fuel-guzzling afterburner — can potentially fling its missiles farther than a missile’s advertised range.

Unable to supercruise like its rivals, the JSF can’t launch its own weapons with nearly as much extra power.

More importantly, depending on the variant, the R-77 boasts radar guidance or can home in on heat signatures — a fighter pilot can also use his plane’s radar to point the weapon near its target, at which a passive sensor on the missile takes over.

By contrast, the AIM-120 only comes in one flavor — on-board active radar guidance.

This gives Russian or Chinese pilots more ways to kill their opponents. Radar jammed? Fire a heat-seeker. IR sensor on the fritz? Let your next missile try to follow your opponent’s own electronic signals.

Not that the F-35 has much room for different kinds of missiles. In stealth mode, with its weapons tucked into an internal bay, the F-35 can only carry four AIM-120s. And that’s only if it’s not also carrying its standard load of GPS-guided bombs.

The Chinese J-20 apparently has room for four missiles inside its main weapons bay, along with two more missiles in smaller bays on the sides of the fuselage. The more conventional Su-35 can carry a whopping 10 missiles under its wings and fuselage.

There’s a good reason to carry lots of missiles. A single AIM-120 or R-77 or PL-12 doesn’t translate into an automatic kill. Far from it. The missile could malfunction or miss.

“You up your chances of success with a multiple-missile shot,” says Thomas Christie, an analyst who worked with legendary Air Force Col. John Boyd on his “energy-maneuverability” dogfighting concept. In the past, fighter pilots trained to fire two missiles at a time, Christie explains.

Using this method, a JSF flier might get just one shot or two before he’s out of missiles. Meanwhile, Russian or Chinese jets could easily manage twice as many individual engagements — or boost their chances of a kill by firing three or more missiles at a time.
Buy ‘Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War.’

By now the Pentagon should be well aware of the JSF’s shortcomings. The F-35’s limited weaponry was one of the major problems that a controversial simulation highlighted back in 2008.

In the Pacific Vision war game, which the California think-tank RAND conducted on behalf of the Air Force, F-22s and F-35s lost a simulated aerial battle over the Taiwan Strait.

Two dozen Chinese J-11 fighters brought nearly 250 long-range missiles to the mock fight. The same number of F-35s carried fewer than 100 AIM-120s. Beijing’s jets easily overwhelmed the Americans. And the J-11 isn’t even China’s best fighter.

With limited sensors, compromised stealth, not enough energy and too few weapons, the F-35 is probably already outclassed in a long-range fight. Never mind merely staying out of short-range dogfights. America’s new stealth fighter should probably avoid aerial duels at any distance.

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html


Sukhoi Flankers
The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power

Technical Report APA-TR-2007-0101

by Dr Carlo Kopp, AFAIAA, MIEEE, PEng
January, 2007
Updated September, 2009
Updated April, 2012
Text, Line Art © 2003 - 2012 Carlo Kopp

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

Russian always has Superior Thermal IRST to whack USAF planes FIRST before US could see the Russians:

 

[nkfnkfnkf]

https://defenseissues.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/cdi-the-f-22-not-what-we-were-hoping-for/

CDI: The F-22: not what we were hoping for

Posted by picard578 on March 15, 2014

by James Stevenson and Pierre Sprey

The F-22 fighter aircraft’s focus on stealth brings big disadvantages in cost, weight and manoeuvrability, argue Pierre Sprey and James Stevenson

For decades, the US Air Force has pushed the F-22 as its fighter for the 21st century. Advocates tout its technical features: fuel-efficient, high-speed ‘super-cruise’; advanced electronics; and reduced profile against enemy sensors, known as ‘stealth’.

However, on measures that determine winning or losing in air combat, the F-22 fails to improve the US fighter force. In fact, it degrades our combat capability.

Careful examination of actual air-to-air battles tells us that there are five attributes that make a winning fighter. These attributes shaped the F-15 and the F-16.

They are: (1) pilot training and ability; (2) obtaining the first sighting and surprising the enemy; (3) outnumbering enemy fighters in the air; (4) outmanoeuvring enemy fighters to gain a firing position; and (5) consistently converting split-second firing opportunities into kills.

The F-22 is a mediocrity, at best, on (4) and (5). It is a liability on (1), (2) and (3).

The most important attribute – pilot quality – dwarfs the others. Air combat history from both small and large wars makes that obvious. After the Israel Air Force (IAF) swept Syrian MiGs from the sky in Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon with an 82-0 exchange ratio, the IAF Chief of Staff told US congressional staffers that the result would have been the same had the Syrian and Israeli pilots switched aircraft.

Great pilots get that way by constant dogfight training. Between 1975 and 1980, at the Navy Fighter Weapons School (‘Topgun’), instructor pilots got 40 to 60 hours of air combat manoeuvring per month. Their students came from squadrons getting only 14 to 20 hours per month. Flying the cheap, simple F-5, the robustly trained instructors consistently whipped the students in their ‘more capable’ F-4 Phantoms, F-14 Tomcats and F-15 Eagles. Today, partly thanks to the pressure on the air force’s training budget from the F-22’s excessive purchase and operating costs, an F-22 pilot gets 12 to 14 hours of flight training per month. For winning future air battles, this is a huge step backward.

For half a century, the air force has been attempting to get the jump on enemy fighters through expensive, complex technology.

Billions of dollars were spent trying to perfect long-range radar missiles to achieve ‘beyond-visual-range’ (BVR) kills. Extraordinary kill rates, as high as 80 to 90 per cent, were promised when projects were being sold. Success rates in actual combat were below 10 per cent. Simple, more agile, shorter-range infra-red missiles and guns were far more successful and effective.

Worse, the ‘identification friend or foe’ (IFF) systems that must distinguish enemies from friends before launching BVR missiles failed in every war. As recently as Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003, misidentified allied aircraft were lost to US systems. The air force now tells us the only way to get the jump on enemy fighters supposedly launching BVR missiles is with stealth. But stealth solves neither the problem of less effective, high-cost BVR radar missiles nor the IFF conundrum. Moreover, stealth has failed to make our fighters invisible to radar and it brings crippling disadvantages.

In Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in 1991, according to the Government Accountability Office, so-called stealthy F-117s were significantly less effective bombers than the air force described publicly – there is anecdotal evidence that ancient Iraqi radars detected them. In the war against Serbia in 1999, non-stealthy F-16s had a lower loss rate per sortie than the F-117s. The F-22 will not be invisible to radar in real combat, where it cannot control detection angles and radar types.

The most obvious disadvantage stealth brings to the F-22 is extraordinary cost; it grossly reduces the numbers we will buy. New Department of Defense data shows the total unit cost of the F-22 has grown from about USD130 million to over USD350 million per aircraft. Result? The original buy of 750 is now down to 185.

Moreover, stealth plus the F-22’s complexity result in unprecedented levels of maintenance downtime. That further reduces numbers in the air; 185 F-22s will support about 120 deployed fighters. They will be lucky to generate 60 combat sorties per day: a laughable number in any serious air war. In World War II, the Luftwaffe could field only 70 of its revolutionary jet: the Me-262. It caused alarm among Allied pilots but had negligible effect on the air battle.

Furthermore, the stealth requirement adds significant drag, weight and size. Size is the most crippling. Why? Because real-world combat is visual combat. Because the F-22 is much bigger than most fighters, it will be detected first, reversing the theoretical advantage it derives from stealth. Topgun had a saying: “The biggest target in the sky is always the first to die.”

Once seen, the F-22 has trouble outman-oeuvring the enemy. Its weight hurts the key performance measures of turning and accelerating. Put simply, both the F-15A and F-16A out-turn and out-accelerate the F-22.

Finally, stealth harms the F-22’s quick-firing ability. To retain stealth, the gun and missiles must be buried behind doors that take too long to open to exploit instantaneous opportunities.

The air force will argue strenuously that we are wrong and the F-22 has excelled in air-to-air exercises against all comers. However, our information is that these are ‘canned’ engagements in which the F-22 is pitted against opponents in joust-like scenarios set up to exploit the F-22’s theoretical advantages and exclude its real-world vulnerabilities.

There is a way to find out who is right. A serious test of F-22 capabilities would pit it against pilots and aircraft the air force does not control using rules of engagement dictated by combat and the ratio of F-22s to enemies that the tiny F-22 inventory should expect in hostile skies.

We both would be delighted to observe any such realistic exercises and to report back to this magazine. Nothing would please us more than to find that we are wrong and US fighter pilots have been given the best fighter in the sky.

 

[Papsmearer]

At the end of the day, all this is just talk and speculation. The only real test is actual combat. That will happen some day and then we can really see who is right and who is wrong. I recall when the T-72 came out, all the western powers were crapping in their pants about how good it was. Turns out it could be defeated by a M-60, don't even need the M1 to kill it. Same for the Mig-29 which was shot down in droves over Syria by the Israelis.

 

[Force 136]

http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/singapore-and-the-f-35b-joint-strike-fighter/

In a wide-ranging interview with the Defense Writers Group in late July, General Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle was asked about Singapore’s interest in the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and if an initial sale had been made. He had this to say:

“I talked to their CDF (Singapore’s Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant-General Ng) Chee Meng. I was just in Singapore. Singapore’s decided to buy the B model, the VSTOL variant to begin with. But I don’t know where they’re at in putting it into their budget. I know that’s a decision that’s been made and that’s why they’re part of the program, but I don’t know where they’re at in putting that in the budget”


===================================

Ng Chee Meng - Let this forum be a record of either your folly, or your incompetence.

In the years to come, you will be cursed by history if you make a silly decision....

 

[Cerebral]

https://defenseissues.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/cdi-the-f-22-not-what-we-were-hoping-for/

CDI: The F-22: not what we were hoping for

Posted by picard578 on March 15, 2014

by James Stevenson and Pierre Sprey

The F-22 fighter aircraft’s focus on stealth brings big disadvantages in cost, weight and manoeuvrability, argue Pierre Sprey and James Stevenson

For decades, the US Air Force has pushed the F-22 as its fighter for the 21st century. Advocates tout its technical features: fuel-efficient, high-speed ‘super-cruise’; advanced electronics; and reduced profile against enemy sensors, known as ‘stealth’.

However, on measures that determine winning or losing in air combat, the F-22 fails to improve the US fighter force. In fact, it degrades our combat capability.

Careful examination of actual air-to-air battles tells us that there are five attributes that make a winning fighter. These attributes shaped the F-15 and the F-16.

They are: (1) pilot training and ability; (2) obtaining the first sighting and surprising the enemy; (3) outnumbering enemy fighters in the air; (4) outmanoeuvring enemy fighters to gain a firing position; and (5) consistently converting split-second firing opportunities into kills.

The F-22 is a mediocrity, at best, on (4) and (5). It is a liability on (1), (2) and (3).

The most important attribute – pilot quality – dwarfs the others. Air combat history from both small and large wars makes that obvious. After the Israel Air Force (IAF) swept Syrian MiGs from the sky in Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon with an 82-0 exchange ratio, the IAF Chief of Staff told US congressional staffers that the result would have been the same had the Syrian and Israeli pilots switched aircraft.

Great pilots get that way by constant dogfight training. Between 1975 and 1980, at the Navy Fighter Weapons School (‘Topgun’), instructor pilots got 40 to 60 hours of air combat manoeuvring per month. Their students came from squadrons getting only 14 to 20 hours per month. Flying the cheap, simple F-5, the robustly trained instructors consistently whipped the students in their ‘more capable’ F-4 Phantoms, F-14 Tomcats and F-15 Eagles. Today, partly thanks to the pressure on the air force’s training budget from the F-22’s excessive purchase and operating costs, an F-22 pilot gets 12 to 14 hours of flight training per month. For winning future air battles, this is a huge step backward.

For half a century, the air force has been attempting to get the jump on enemy fighters through expensive, complex technology.

Billions of dollars were spent trying to perfect long-range radar missiles to achieve ‘beyond-visual-range’ (BVR) kills. Extraordinary kill rates, as high as 80 to 90 per cent, were promised when projects were being sold. Success rates in actual combat were below 10 per cent. Simple, more agile, shorter-range infra-red missiles and guns were far more successful and effective.

Worse, the ‘identification friend or foe’ (IFF) systems that must distinguish enemies from friends before launching BVR missiles failed in every war. As recently as Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003, misidentified allied aircraft were lost to US systems. The air force now tells us the only way to get the jump on enemy fighters supposedly launching BVR missiles is with stealth. But stealth solves neither the problem of less effective, high-cost BVR radar missiles nor the IFF conundrum. Moreover, stealth has failed to make our fighters invisible to radar and it brings crippling disadvantages.

In Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in 1991, according to the Government Accountability Office, so-called stealthy F-117s were significantly less effective bombers than the air force described publicly – there is anecdotal evidence that ancient Iraqi radars detected them. In the war against Serbia in 1999, non-stealthy F-16s had a lower loss rate per sortie than the F-117s. The F-22 will not be invisible to radar in real combat, where it cannot control detection angles and radar types.

The most obvious disadvantage stealth brings to the F-22 is extraordinary cost; it grossly reduces the numbers we will buy. New Department of Defense data shows the total unit cost of the F-22 has grown from about USD130 million to over USD350 million per aircraft. Result? The original buy of 750 is now down to 185.

Moreover, stealth plus the F-22’s complexity result in unprecedented levels of maintenance downtime. That further reduces numbers in the air; 185 F-22s will support about 120 deployed fighters. They will be lucky to generate 60 combat sorties per day: a laughable number in any serious air war. In World War II, the Luftwaffe could field only 70 of its revolutionary jet: the Me-262. It caused alarm among Allied pilots but had negligible effect on the air battle.

Furthermore, the stealth requirement adds significant drag, weight and size. Size is the most crippling. Why? Because real-world combat is visual combat. Because the F-22 is much bigger than most fighters, it will be detected first, reversing the theoretical advantage it derives from stealth. Topgun had a saying: “The biggest target in the sky is always the first to die.”

Once seen, the F-22 has trouble outman-oeuvring the enemy. Its weight hurts the key performance measures of turning and accelerating. Put simply, both the F-15A and F-16A out-turn and out-accelerate the F-22.

Finally, stealth harms the F-22’s quick-firing ability. To retain stealth, the gun and missiles must be buried behind doors that take too long to open to exploit instantaneous opportunities.

The air force will argue strenuously that we are wrong and the F-22 has excelled in air-to-air exercises against all comers. However, our information is that these are ‘canned’ engagements in which the F-22 is pitted against opponents in joust-like scenarios set up to exploit the F-22’s theoretical advantages and exclude its real-world vulnerabilities.

There is a way to find out who is right. A serious test of F-22 capabilities would pit it against pilots and aircraft the air force does not control using rules of engagement dictated by combat and the ratio of F-22s to enemies that the tiny F-22 inventory should expect in hostile skies.

We both would be delighted to observe any such realistic exercises and to report back to this magazine. Nothing would please us more than to find that we are wrong and US fighter pilots have been given the best fighter in the sky.

I think this article is flawed. If you are familiar with air operations, you will not put so mich emphasis on the pilots. First sightings are from ground based radars or AWACs. These are then fed to pilots to execute. Most aircraft has a narrow cone of radar and very limited range, maybe 30nm thereabouts and visual sighting is around 10nm or less. The fight will begin way before detection range and AIM120D fired at optimum range. Dogfights will almost never exist. However, for magazines and scholars, when comparing aircrafts, they will talk about features, which will never really be tested. In all the conflict zones in recent times, how many dog fights have you heard?

I am not defending the F22, but an aircraft that is invisible to the radar, will be able to sneak up to target, stand off and fire and then return safely back to base. The cross section of F22 is so small that most radar algoritums will classify it as clutter, hence why the Americans decided on this route. Pilots and aircraft are very expensive to train and create, hence they want to minimise losses. And that is why they are developing drones to drop bombs and fire missiles. It is their military doctrine. What is China's doctrine, i have yet to see something clear and concrete.

My 2 cents worth. For discourse and debate.

 

[virus]

exactly dog fight does not exist. even then, firing a missile way ahead from the optimum push allow enemy plane to avert and fire flares to evade them.

even when it comes to drone, the americans have come up with dummy drones design to confuse by baiting enemy planes from the real target, just like football match.