It is good to have you back DOA. I am sure many here missed your energetic and youthful presence last couple of weeks.
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Living in JB 2 (Johore)
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It is good to have you back DOA. I am sure many here missed your energetic and youthful presence last couple of weeks.
CPF Minimum Sum to be raised to S$139,000
Updated 12:13 PM May 30, 2012SINGAPORE - Central Provident Fund (CPF) members who turn 55 between July this year and Jun 30 next year have to set aside a Minimum Sum (MS) of S$139,000, higher than the S$131,000 last year.
The CPF Board and Ministry of Manpower (MOM) said in a statement today that the MS has been adjusted over the years to account for inflation, longer life expectancies and Singaporeans' rising expectations of their quality of life after retirement.
They said that since 2004, the MS has been increased by S$4,000 each year to reach S$120,000 in 2013, as recommended by the Economic Review Committee in 2003.
The actual increases in MS are also adjusted for inflation each year, and therefore have to be more than S$4,000 a year since the increase must account for inflation between 2003 and the time the increase is made.
The S$120,000 target in 2003 dollars is also adjusted for inflation between 2003 and the time the target is met, to preserves the real value of the target.
Based on inflation last year and incorporating the annual S$4,000 (in 2003 dollars) adjustment, the increase in MS due this year would have been S$12,000, which is relatively large compared with previous years.
In response to concerns over large increases in MS in any given year, the CPF Board and the MOM said they will spread out the remaining MS increases needed to reach the S$120,000 target over a longer period of four years. This means they will reach the target in 2015, instead of 2013.
With this change, the 2012 MS will be S$139,000, an increase of 6 per cent, or S$8,000, over last year. Without the change, the MS this year would have been S$143,000, or a 9-per cent increase, over last year.
Changes will also be made for contributions to the Medisave Minimum Sum (MMS) to help Singaporeans plan for their long-term healthcare needs.
From Jul 1, the MMS will be raised to S$38,500, from S$36,000 - an increase of 7 per cent.
The MMS is the amount that a person who turns 55 needs to set aside for hospitalisation expenses in subsidised Class B2 and C wards, subsidised outpatient treatment for selected chronic conditions and basic MediShield and ElderShield premiums.
Members will be able to withdraw their Medisave savings in excess of the MMS at or after age 55.
Another change - also from July - is in the Medisave Contribution Ceiling (MCC).
This is the maximum balance a member may have in his Medisave Account, and it is set at S$5,000 above MMS and would be increased correspondingly to S$43,500, from S$41,000.
Any Medisave contribution in excess of the prevailing MCC will be transferred to the Special Account if the member is below age 55, or to his Retirement Account if he is above age 55 and has a MS shortfall. CHANNEL NEWSASIA
Damn ! we can kiss goodbye to our cpf money by the time we reach the age to retire!
Updated 12:13 PM May 30, 2012SINGAPORE - Central Provident Fund (CPF) members who turn 55 between July this year and Jun 30 next year have to set aside a Minimum Sum (MS) of S$139,000, higher than the S$131,000 last year.
The CPF Board and Ministry of Manpower (MOM) said in a statement today that the MS has been adjusted over the years to account for inflation, longer life expectancies and Singaporeans' rising expectations of their quality of life after retirement.
They said that since 2004, the MS has been increased by S$4,000 each year to reach S$120,000 in 2013, as recommended by the Economic Review Committee in 2003.
The actual increases in MS are also adjusted for inflation each year, and therefore have to be more than S$4,000 a year since the increase must account for inflation between 2003 and the time the increase is made.
The S$120,000 target in 2003 dollars is also adjusted for inflation between 2003 and the time the target is met, to preserves the real value of the target.
Based on inflation last year and incorporating the annual S$4,000 (in 2003 dollars) adjustment, the increase in MS due this year would have been S$12,000, which is relatively large compared with previous years.
In response to concerns over large increases in MS in any given year, the CPF Board and the MOM said they will spread out the remaining MS increases needed to reach the S$120,000 target over a longer period of four years. This means they will reach the target in 2015, instead of 2013.
With this change, the 2012 MS will be S$139,000, an increase of 6 per cent, or S$8,000, over last year. Without the change, the MS this year would have been S$143,000, or a 9-per cent increase, over last year.
Changes will also be made for contributions to the Medisave Minimum Sum (MMS) to help Singaporeans plan for their long-term healthcare needs.
From Jul 1, the MMS will be raised to S$38,500, from S$36,000 - an increase of 7 per cent.
The MMS is the amount that a person who turns 55 needs to set aside for hospitalisation expenses in subsidised Class B2 and C wards, subsidised outpatient treatment for selected chronic conditions and basic MediShield and ElderShield premiums.
Members will be able to withdraw their Medisave savings in excess of the MMS at or after age 55.
Another change - also from July - is in the Medisave Contribution Ceiling (MCC).
This is the maximum balance a member may have in his Medisave Account, and it is set at S$5,000 above MMS and would be increased correspondingly to S$43,500, from S$41,000.
Any Medisave contribution in excess of the prevailing MCC will be transferred to the Special Account if the member is below age 55, or to his Retirement Account if he is above age 55 and has a MS shortfall. CHANNEL NEWSASIA
Damn ! we can kiss goodbye to our cpf money by the time we reach the age to retire!
Was Driving in On Saturday 27th May from 2nd link....noticed no cars going into Johor. Hmmm wonder if the majority of ppl wanted to hang out at the kopitiam @ Hougang?
Driving in after work, reaching custom 2nd Link @ 650pm yesterday, hmmm usually no Q but yesterday the Q lasted 15mins....
School Holiday Season Starts....
Have Fun.
Driving in after work, reaching custom 2nd Link @ 650pm yesterday, hmmm usually no Q but yesterday the Q lasted 15mins....
School Holiday Season Starts....
Have Fun.
A good explanation on why our CPF MS needs to be increased. A refreshing perspective from Christopher Balding in his blog. Please check it out.
Time to move assets out of SG when the dollar is still strong?
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The Mess that is Singapore: Part I Explaining the Debt
Posted on May 9, 2012
Ever since my paper on Temasek and Singapore was covered in Mostly Economics*writing a plea for “clarifications from Temasek and SG govt”, I have begun receiving emails and postings to either explain or defend something further. *Today, I will focus on the questions pertaining to the debt side.
The basic question numerous posters and email have raised is whether public Singaporean debt is actually attributable to state owned enterprises or the social security fund known as the Central Provident Fund? *There is a short answer and a long answer. *The short answer is that it doesn’t matter. *Think of a company like GE. *If GE Capital goes out and borrows money, there is still an increase in the total debt of GE the parent company. *So whether it is the Central Provident Fund or the state owned enterprises, at the end of the day there is still a rapid increase in the total debt of Singapore.
The longer more detailed answer is even more unpalatable. *While there is most definitely a significant portion of Singaporean public debt issued by the Central Provident Fund but guaranteed by Singapore, the important part is not*who holds the debt, but rather what happened to the money that was borrowed. **If the Singapore state issues debt, whether it is to a foreigner, a private citizen, or the Central Provident Fund, Singapore now has more funds that they must either spend or invest. *That inflow from issuing debt does not just disappear.
Since 1990, the Singaporean government has realized cash flow from increasing borrowing of $250 Billion SGD. *To add on to this, the Singaporean government has enjoyed public surpluses of $262 Billion SGD. *Think about that for one minute: free cash flow into government coffers between additional borrowing and surpluses averaging more than 16% of GDP between 1991 and 2010. *Since 1991 alone, without factoring in revenue from interest, accumulated cash flow from additional borrowing and*government surpluses has totaled $512 Billion SGD.
To give you two numbers to help you wrap your head around that number, that is equal to 155% of 2011 Singaporean GDP or roughly equal to the combined assets of Temasek the the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore (The GIC does not publish assets under management but most estimates have it in the $250-300 billion USD range). *The $500 billion dollar question then is: where did all this money go? *In other words, how does the total increase in debt and*the total government surpluses equal the estimated amount of assets under management? *(It is also important to remember that this data only*goes back to 1990, not the 1974 since Temasek inception).
Now let’s turn to where the money has gone. *Here is a graph of the hypothetical growth of assets under management by government linked entities such as Temasek or the CPF.
Hypothetical Asset Growth of Singapore, Inc.
If these free cash flows averaged annual growth of only*1%, assets would still amount to more than Temasek and the GIC combined. *If annual growth was the GIC average of 7%, Singapore would still be sitting on more than $1 trillion SGD rather than the current estimate of around $500 billion. *A 10% rate of return would leave Singapore with $1.4 trillion*SGD. *If public surpluses and borrowing were invested and returned even a balanced portfolio average, the current assets managed by public bodies in Singapore would truly be staggering.
As was noted in the original paper, this implies one of two things: *1) the returns are fictitious and there has been a lot of money lost OR*2) there are enormous unreported holdings controlled by Singaporean public entities. *You simply cannot explain $500 billion SGD in surpluses and increased indebtedness without asking where that money has gone. *As of right now, there is no record of public Singaporean assets to match what we would expect to find. *Show me additional assets that should be there. *Temasek and GIC don’t have them. *Where is the missing money? *If it wasn’t spent, and there is no public record of that, then it should be a financial asset under public Singaporean control
As a last point, if these surpluses and additional borrowing even matched the rate the CPF pays out to Singaporean citizens of 4% would equal approximately $750 billion SGD. *This is 50% more than the estimated holdings of Temasek and the GIC. *Unless someone can find hundreds of billions of unreported Singaporean public assets, we should assume this money has gone to money heaven.
Next time, I will describe exactly how the Central Provident Fund plays in to all this and why Singaporean should be worried…..very very *worried.
*
This entry was posted in Singapore, Temasek Holdings, Uncategorized and tagged Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek Holdings by christop. Bookmark the permalink.
http://christopherbalding.com/2012/05/09/the-mess-that-is-singapore-part-i-explaining-the-debt/
Time to move assets out of SG when the dollar is still strong?
------------------------------------------------------
The Mess that is Singapore: Part I Explaining the Debt
Posted on May 9, 2012
Ever since my paper on Temasek and Singapore was covered in Mostly Economics*writing a plea for “clarifications from Temasek and SG govt”, I have begun receiving emails and postings to either explain or defend something further. *Today, I will focus on the questions pertaining to the debt side.
The basic question numerous posters and email have raised is whether public Singaporean debt is actually attributable to state owned enterprises or the social security fund known as the Central Provident Fund? *There is a short answer and a long answer. *The short answer is that it doesn’t matter. *Think of a company like GE. *If GE Capital goes out and borrows money, there is still an increase in the total debt of GE the parent company. *So whether it is the Central Provident Fund or the state owned enterprises, at the end of the day there is still a rapid increase in the total debt of Singapore.
The longer more detailed answer is even more unpalatable. *While there is most definitely a significant portion of Singaporean public debt issued by the Central Provident Fund but guaranteed by Singapore, the important part is not*who holds the debt, but rather what happened to the money that was borrowed. **If the Singapore state issues debt, whether it is to a foreigner, a private citizen, or the Central Provident Fund, Singapore now has more funds that they must either spend or invest. *That inflow from issuing debt does not just disappear.
Since 1990, the Singaporean government has realized cash flow from increasing borrowing of $250 Billion SGD. *To add on to this, the Singaporean government has enjoyed public surpluses of $262 Billion SGD. *Think about that for one minute: free cash flow into government coffers between additional borrowing and surpluses averaging more than 16% of GDP between 1991 and 2010. *Since 1991 alone, without factoring in revenue from interest, accumulated cash flow from additional borrowing and*government surpluses has totaled $512 Billion SGD.
To give you two numbers to help you wrap your head around that number, that is equal to 155% of 2011 Singaporean GDP or roughly equal to the combined assets of Temasek the the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore (The GIC does not publish assets under management but most estimates have it in the $250-300 billion USD range). *The $500 billion dollar question then is: where did all this money go? *In other words, how does the total increase in debt and*the total government surpluses equal the estimated amount of assets under management? *(It is also important to remember that this data only*goes back to 1990, not the 1974 since Temasek inception).
Now let’s turn to where the money has gone. *Here is a graph of the hypothetical growth of assets under management by government linked entities such as Temasek or the CPF.
Hypothetical Asset Growth of Singapore, Inc.
If these free cash flows averaged annual growth of only*1%, assets would still amount to more than Temasek and the GIC combined. *If annual growth was the GIC average of 7%, Singapore would still be sitting on more than $1 trillion SGD rather than the current estimate of around $500 billion. *A 10% rate of return would leave Singapore with $1.4 trillion*SGD. *If public surpluses and borrowing were invested and returned even a balanced portfolio average, the current assets managed by public bodies in Singapore would truly be staggering.
As was noted in the original paper, this implies one of two things: *1) the returns are fictitious and there has been a lot of money lost OR*2) there are enormous unreported holdings controlled by Singaporean public entities. *You simply cannot explain $500 billion SGD in surpluses and increased indebtedness without asking where that money has gone. *As of right now, there is no record of public Singaporean assets to match what we would expect to find. *Show me additional assets that should be there. *Temasek and GIC don’t have them. *Where is the missing money? *If it wasn’t spent, and there is no public record of that, then it should be a financial asset under public Singaporean control
As a last point, if these surpluses and additional borrowing even matched the rate the CPF pays out to Singaporean citizens of 4% would equal approximately $750 billion SGD. *This is 50% more than the estimated holdings of Temasek and the GIC. *Unless someone can find hundreds of billions of unreported Singaporean public assets, we should assume this money has gone to money heaven.
Next time, I will describe exactly how the Central Provident Fund plays in to all this and why Singaporean should be worried…..very very *worried.
*
This entry was posted in Singapore, Temasek Holdings, Uncategorized and tagged Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek Holdings by christop. Bookmark the permalink.
http://christopherbalding.com/2012/05/09/the-mess-that-is-singapore-part-i-explaining-the-debt/
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More from Christopher Balding.
--------------------------------------
The Mess that is Singapore: Part II Explaining the Role of the CPF
Posted on May 10, 2012
In our last post, I gave a short and a long answer to questions about the importance of who owns the debt. *The short answer is that it doesn’t matter who the government of Singapore owes money to, it still owes money to them. *Some readers and posters said that if the Central Provident Fund (Singaporean social security) owns the debt issued by the Singaporean government, then it doesn’t really matter. *Let’s examine that question in greater detail.
The CPF collects mandatory contributions from Singaporean citizens and pays a statutory rate of return to its account holders currently ranging from 2.5% to 4% depending on the type of account. *The contributions are intended to be used for old age income support and health care among other basic services. *The CPF holds $185 billion SGD of investment assets under management but also $185 in liabilities in the form of member accounts with a net surplus $1.9 billion. *In other words, there is only a small amount of net assets under management at the CPF.
According to CPF financial statements, 95% of CPF investment assets are “special issues of Singapore Government securities”. *In other words, the CPF is the primary purchaser of the debt issued by the government of Singapore.
The CPF is then part of a large circle that takes money from the citizens pays them interest and lends it to the government Singapore matching the interests rates between the two rather closely. *This *leads to three important and inescapable conclusions.
1. *The CPF has minimal net assets under management and cannot*really add to our search for missing assets. *In other words, the CPF cannot add to our understanding of where we might find large amounts of net public assets.
2. *Singaporean citizens have provided enormous free cash flow to the Singaporean government in the form of structural budget surpluses and large amounts of lending. *As I said in the last post, from 1991 to 2010 alone*the sum of budget surpluses and net lending totaled $512 billion SGD.
3. *All roads still lead to the Singaporean government. *The enormous volume of free cash flow in the form of budget surpluses and increased borrowing flowed through Singaporean government finances and was under their management.
Returning to the question I posed in the previous post, if the Singaporean government enjoyed free cash flow from budget surpluses and borrowing totaling $512 billion SGD between 1991 and 2002, where did the money go?
To be clear there is no public record of expenditures by the Singaporean government to account for the $512 billion SGD in free cash flow since 1991. *Nor is there as public record of assets held by Temasek, GIC, *or other public body in large enough amount to account for such a large discrepancy. *Remember if this $512 billion earned the 7% GIC claims to have earned there should be more than $1 trillion*in assets.
The reason the CPF matters and should concern Singaporeans is simple. *The government of Singapore is borrowing money from its citizens through the CPF payed 2.5-4% and investing that money in other assets through GIC and Temasek hoping to earn a higher return. *Publicly, GIC and Temasek claimed to have earned 7% and 17% since inception meaning they are earning a comfortable spread above the 2.5-4% they must pay for those funds. *If Temasek and GIC earn less than the 2.5-4% they pay to the CPF, the government must essentially subsidize the losses to keep the CPF whole.
According to the data published by Temasek and the best estimates of GIC, they hold around $500 billion SGD essentially matching the $512 billion SGD in budget surpluses and increased borrowing or a total return of about 0%. *This leads to two frightening conclusions.
1. *While estimated GIC and Temasek assets essentially produce a 0% nominal return, when factoring in inflation, this produces real*investment losses of about 35%!!
2. *The government of Singapore has essentially been subsidizing GIC and Temasek losses by paying their implied obligations to the CPF even though the they have not earned a rate of return sufficient to cover the cost of debt capital. *In other words, the government of Singapore is subsidizing GIC and Temasek losses to the amount of the rate of return earned by GIC or Temasek minus the 4% it pays to CPF account holders. *Financial losses attributable to GIC and Temasek but covered by the government of Singapore, significantly increase the risk of CPF deposits.
There are two final points worth mentioning. *First, we continue to search for enormous amounts of missing assets. *For instance, it has been suggested that GIC and Temasek have not produced accurate accounts that would reconcile the difference. *Given that there is a minimum of $500 billion SGD in missing assets, I am very skeptical that this is simply due to sloppy accounting. *However, the fundamental point is to focus on locating in public records the missing assets. *There needs to be a bare minimum of $500 billion SGD in unreported assets to begin to bridge the gap between what exists and what should*exist.
Second, due to the length of this post, I only covered the CPF today and could not cover the Monetary Authority of Singapore and its foreign reserves. *In the next post on Monday, I will analyze the MAS. *Needless to say, it doesn’t in anyway change the analysis.
This entry was posted in Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek Holdings, Uncategorized and tagged Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek by christop. Bookmark the permalink.
http://christopherbalding.com/2012/...apore-part-ii-explaining-the-role-of-the-cpf/
--------------------------------------
The Mess that is Singapore: Part II Explaining the Role of the CPF
Posted on May 10, 2012
In our last post, I gave a short and a long answer to questions about the importance of who owns the debt. *The short answer is that it doesn’t matter who the government of Singapore owes money to, it still owes money to them. *Some readers and posters said that if the Central Provident Fund (Singaporean social security) owns the debt issued by the Singaporean government, then it doesn’t really matter. *Let’s examine that question in greater detail.
The CPF collects mandatory contributions from Singaporean citizens and pays a statutory rate of return to its account holders currently ranging from 2.5% to 4% depending on the type of account. *The contributions are intended to be used for old age income support and health care among other basic services. *The CPF holds $185 billion SGD of investment assets under management but also $185 in liabilities in the form of member accounts with a net surplus $1.9 billion. *In other words, there is only a small amount of net assets under management at the CPF.
According to CPF financial statements, 95% of CPF investment assets are “special issues of Singapore Government securities”. *In other words, the CPF is the primary purchaser of the debt issued by the government of Singapore.
The CPF is then part of a large circle that takes money from the citizens pays them interest and lends it to the government Singapore matching the interests rates between the two rather closely. *This *leads to three important and inescapable conclusions.
1. *The CPF has minimal net assets under management and cannot*really add to our search for missing assets. *In other words, the CPF cannot add to our understanding of where we might find large amounts of net public assets.
2. *Singaporean citizens have provided enormous free cash flow to the Singaporean government in the form of structural budget surpluses and large amounts of lending. *As I said in the last post, from 1991 to 2010 alone*the sum of budget surpluses and net lending totaled $512 billion SGD.
3. *All roads still lead to the Singaporean government. *The enormous volume of free cash flow in the form of budget surpluses and increased borrowing flowed through Singaporean government finances and was under their management.
Returning to the question I posed in the previous post, if the Singaporean government enjoyed free cash flow from budget surpluses and borrowing totaling $512 billion SGD between 1991 and 2002, where did the money go?
To be clear there is no public record of expenditures by the Singaporean government to account for the $512 billion SGD in free cash flow since 1991. *Nor is there as public record of assets held by Temasek, GIC, *or other public body in large enough amount to account for such a large discrepancy. *Remember if this $512 billion earned the 7% GIC claims to have earned there should be more than $1 trillion*in assets.
The reason the CPF matters and should concern Singaporeans is simple. *The government of Singapore is borrowing money from its citizens through the CPF payed 2.5-4% and investing that money in other assets through GIC and Temasek hoping to earn a higher return. *Publicly, GIC and Temasek claimed to have earned 7% and 17% since inception meaning they are earning a comfortable spread above the 2.5-4% they must pay for those funds. *If Temasek and GIC earn less than the 2.5-4% they pay to the CPF, the government must essentially subsidize the losses to keep the CPF whole.
According to the data published by Temasek and the best estimates of GIC, they hold around $500 billion SGD essentially matching the $512 billion SGD in budget surpluses and increased borrowing or a total return of about 0%. *This leads to two frightening conclusions.
1. *While estimated GIC and Temasek assets essentially produce a 0% nominal return, when factoring in inflation, this produces real*investment losses of about 35%!!
2. *The government of Singapore has essentially been subsidizing GIC and Temasek losses by paying their implied obligations to the CPF even though the they have not earned a rate of return sufficient to cover the cost of debt capital. *In other words, the government of Singapore is subsidizing GIC and Temasek losses to the amount of the rate of return earned by GIC or Temasek minus the 4% it pays to CPF account holders. *Financial losses attributable to GIC and Temasek but covered by the government of Singapore, significantly increase the risk of CPF deposits.
There are two final points worth mentioning. *First, we continue to search for enormous amounts of missing assets. *For instance, it has been suggested that GIC and Temasek have not produced accurate accounts that would reconcile the difference. *Given that there is a minimum of $500 billion SGD in missing assets, I am very skeptical that this is simply due to sloppy accounting. *However, the fundamental point is to focus on locating in public records the missing assets. *There needs to be a bare minimum of $500 billion SGD in unreported assets to begin to bridge the gap between what exists and what should*exist.
Second, due to the length of this post, I only covered the CPF today and could not cover the Monetary Authority of Singapore and its foreign reserves. *In the next post on Monday, I will analyze the MAS. *Needless to say, it doesn’t in anyway change the analysis.
This entry was posted in Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek Holdings, Uncategorized and tagged Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, Singapore, Temasek by christop. Bookmark the permalink.
http://christopherbalding.com/2012/...apore-part-ii-explaining-the-role-of-the-cpf/
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Quote:"The actual increases in MS are also adjusted for inflation each year, and therefore have to be more than S$4,000 a year since the increase must account for inflation between 2003 and the time the increase is made. "
It seems the govt remember only to adjust minimum sum for inflation but forgot to adjust for inflation the interest earned for cpf savings.
It seems the govt remember only to adjust minimum sum for inflation but forgot to adjust for inflation the interest earned for cpf savings.
I guess when one is earning multiple millions, inflation doesn't really factor into their calculations?
I am just surprised at the uncharacteristic omission or error that the top notched scholars wouldn't normally make in their exam answers.
Thanks Wuqi for your detailed analysis. I am more convinced now than before that GG is safer. my original thinking was based on believing that there are indeed more break-ins in GG than non GG. Guess that cannot be true based on your analysis.
Cheers
Thanks for your reply. I am actually less concerned about selling better as my intention is not to sell but to stay. My main concern is security and whichever is safer is going to be my choice. I did joke with my wife the other day about prison being the safest and that for some desperate people who are not able to make ends meet in society with increasing costs and going without food and no roof over their heads that indeed prison meets all their basic needs of food and shelter. Who knows, maybe we are beginning to see some desperate people resorting to crime since its win win for them. Get away with it is a win and being caught will have all their basic needs met. Free medical some more. Where to get in Singapore?
careful now, you are on somebody's radar screen already.
That's the whole idea, but made to look like its always helping you all the time!
Wages also not adjusted for inflation. In Australia, their wage increments are based on yearly inflation rate.
Hopefully I didn't hear wrongly... because 50-60 is a lot... hopefully Crystal is right. As for the service apmts, not much of a concern really on where they build it. Different access gates and if they have insufficient parking space, hopefully the residents won't occupy too much of the outside road to park their cars.50 - 60 still quite a lot. Thought I saw ah tiong updated that only a few units remained
Personally, I think the service apartment should had been planned at the land where phase 7 is, and build more semi-d or clusters or higher class of terraces at 8B. What do u owners feel?
Been to HOLA wonder land ... I'm always full of actions depending on which aspects you are looking at, bro gunner
That's a brilliant choice of word. Fashionably late - love it
You are still not too late, in fact you guys are fashionably late.
Kudos to you too for being brave enough to take action.
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