Huawei has always been linked to the China military, long before China even joined the WTO.
Daft Sinkies never bother to find out more than what was spoonfed to them. No wonder 95% vaxtards lah. Even Israel didn't reach that number.
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Hamas use Huawei Phones and Electronic Devices, successfully circumvented Israelite Intelligence??
- Thread starter duluxe
- Start date
Huawei has always been linked to the China military, long before China even joined the WTO.
Daft Sinkies never bother to find out more than what was spoonfed to them. No wonder 95% vaxtards lah. Even Israel didn't reach that number.
Maybe key platform they used for communication was Wechat
This is wrong.
Depend on which site of the Red Team and Blue Team you are on. The new huawei mate 60 has satellite calling and messaging.
SG government advised civil servants not to use tiktok on their official phones. The threat of CCP is many times more severe than CIA.
We could do another round of Cold Store if the commies dare to disrespect the PAP.
TEL AVIV, Israel – Shortly before attackers from Gaza poured into Israel at dawn on Saturday, Israeli intelligence detected a surge in activity on some of the Gazan militant networks it monitors.
Realising something unusual was happening, they sent an alert to the Israeli soldiers guarding the Gazan border, according to two senior Israeli security officials.
But the warning was not acted on, either because the soldiers did not get it or the soldiers did not read it.
Shortly afterward, Hamas, the group that controls Gaza, sent drones to disable some of the Israeli military’s cellular communications stations and surveillance towers along the border, preventing the duty officers from monitoring the area remotely with video cameras.
The drones also destroyed remote-controlled machine guns that Israel had installed on its border fortifications, removing a key means of combating a ground attack.
That made it easier for Hamas assailants to approach and blow up parts of the border fence and bulldoze it in several places with surprising ease, allowing thousands of Palestinians to walk through the gaps.
These operational failures and weaknesses were among a wide array of logistical and intelligence lapses by the Israeli security services that paved the way for the Gazan incursion into southern Israel, according to four senior Israeli security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The brazen infiltration of more than 20 Israeli towns and army bases in that raid was the worst breach of Israel’s defences in 50 years and shattered the nation’s sense of security.
For hours, the strongest military in the Middle East was rendered powerless to fight back against a far weaker enemy, leaving villages defenceless for most of the day against squads of attackers who killed more than 900 Israelis, including soldiers in their underwear, abducted at least 150 people, overran at least four military camps and spread out across more than 30 square miles of Israeli territory.
The four officials said the success of the attack, based on their early assessment, was rooted in a slew of security failures by Israel’s intelligence community and military, including:
The first failure took root months before the attack, as Israeli security chiefs made incorrect assumptions about the extent of the threat that Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza.
Hamas stayed out of two fights in the past year, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller armed group in Gaza, to take on Israel alone. In September, Hamas leadership also ended a period of rioting along the border, in an agreement brokered by Qatar, giving the impression that they were not looking for an escalation.
In calls, Hamas operatives, who talked to each other when tapped by Israeli intelligence agents, also gave the sense that they sought to avoid another war with Israel so soon after a damaging two-week conflict in May 2021, according to two of the Israeli officials. Israeli intelligence, they said, is now looking into whether those calls were real or staged.
The next failure was operational.
Two of the officials said the Israeli border surveillance system was almost entirely reliant on cameras, sensors and machine guns that are operated remotely.
Israeli commanders had grown overly confident in the system’s impregnability. They thought the combination of remote surveillance and arms, barriers above ground and a subterranean wall to block Hamas from digging tunnels into Israel made mass infiltration unlikely, reducing the need for significant numbers of soldiers to be physically stationed along the border itself.
With the system in place, the military started reducing the number of troops there, moving them to other areas of concern, including the West Bank, according to Israel Ziv, a retired major general who commanded ground forces in the south for many years, served as the head of the IDF’s Operations Division from 2003 to 2005, and was recently recruited into the reserves again because of the war.
“The thinning of the forces seemed reasonable because of the construction of the fence and the aura they created around it, as if it were invincible, that nothing would be able to pass it,” he said.
But the remote-control system had a vulnerability: It could also be destroyed remotely.
Hamas took advantage of that weakness by sending aerial drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system, according to the officials and also drone footage circulated by Hamas on Saturday and analysed by The New York Times.
Without cellular signals, the system was useless. Soldiers stationed in control rooms behind the front lines did not receive alarms that the fence separating Gaza and Israel had been breached, and could not watch video showing them where the Hamas attackers were bulldozing the barricades. In addition, the barrier turned out to be easier to break through than Israeli officials had expected.
That allowed more than 1,500 Gazan fighters to surge through nearly 30 points along the border, some of them in hang gliders that flew over the top of the barricades, and reach at least four Israeli military bases without being intercepted.
Photos shared by one of the Israeli officials showed that scores of Israeli soldiers were then shot as they slept in their dorms. Some were still wearing their underclothes.
The second operational failure was the clustering of leaders from the army’s Gaza division in a single location along the border. Once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage, according to two of the Israeli officials.
That situation, combined with the communication problems caused by the drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response. This kept anyone along the border from grasping the full breadth of the assault, including the commanders who rushed from elsewhere in Israel to launch a counter-attack.
“Understanding what the picture was of the different terrorist attacks was very difficult,” said Brigadier-General Dan Goldfuss, an Israeli commander who helped lead the counterattack.
The fallout has been catastrophic for Israel’s security, as well as potentially damaging to its reputation in the region as a reliable military partner.
Before Saturday, “Israel was an asset to many countries in the region on security issues”, he said. “The image now is that Israel is not an asset.”
The Israeli security services do not dispute the scale of their initial failure. But they say that it can only be investigated after the war ends.
“We’ll finish this,” said military spokesman Richard Hecht, as the army attempted to regain control of the communities on Saturday. “You know that this will be investigated.” NYTIMES
Realising something unusual was happening, they sent an alert to the Israeli soldiers guarding the Gazan border, according to two senior Israeli security officials.
But the warning was not acted on, either because the soldiers did not get it or the soldiers did not read it.
Shortly afterward, Hamas, the group that controls Gaza, sent drones to disable some of the Israeli military’s cellular communications stations and surveillance towers along the border, preventing the duty officers from monitoring the area remotely with video cameras.
The drones also destroyed remote-controlled machine guns that Israel had installed on its border fortifications, removing a key means of combating a ground attack.
That made it easier for Hamas assailants to approach and blow up parts of the border fence and bulldoze it in several places with surprising ease, allowing thousands of Palestinians to walk through the gaps.
These operational failures and weaknesses were among a wide array of logistical and intelligence lapses by the Israeli security services that paved the way for the Gazan incursion into southern Israel, according to four senior Israeli security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The brazen infiltration of more than 20 Israeli towns and army bases in that raid was the worst breach of Israel’s defences in 50 years and shattered the nation’s sense of security.
For hours, the strongest military in the Middle East was rendered powerless to fight back against a far weaker enemy, leaving villages defenceless for most of the day against squads of attackers who killed more than 900 Israelis, including soldiers in their underwear, abducted at least 150 people, overran at least four military camps and spread out across more than 30 square miles of Israeli territory.
The four officials said the success of the attack, based on their early assessment, was rooted in a slew of security failures by Israel’s intelligence community and military, including:
- failure by intelligence officers to monitor key communication channels used by Palestinian attackers;
- over-reliance on border surveillance equipment that was easily shut down by attackers, allowing them to raid military bases and slay soldiers in their beds;
- clustering of commanders in a single border base that was overrun in the opening phase of the incursion, preventing communication with the rest of the armed forces;
- and a willingness to accept at face value assertions by Gazan military leaders, made on private channels that the Palestinians knew were being monitored by Israel, that they were not preparing for battle.
The first failure took root months before the attack, as Israeli security chiefs made incorrect assumptions about the extent of the threat that Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza.
Hamas stayed out of two fights in the past year, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller armed group in Gaza, to take on Israel alone. In September, Hamas leadership also ended a period of rioting along the border, in an agreement brokered by Qatar, giving the impression that they were not looking for an escalation.
In calls, Hamas operatives, who talked to each other when tapped by Israeli intelligence agents, also gave the sense that they sought to avoid another war with Israel so soon after a damaging two-week conflict in May 2021, according to two of the Israeli officials. Israeli intelligence, they said, is now looking into whether those calls were real or staged.
The next failure was operational.
Two of the officials said the Israeli border surveillance system was almost entirely reliant on cameras, sensors and machine guns that are operated remotely.
Israeli commanders had grown overly confident in the system’s impregnability. They thought the combination of remote surveillance and arms, barriers above ground and a subterranean wall to block Hamas from digging tunnels into Israel made mass infiltration unlikely, reducing the need for significant numbers of soldiers to be physically stationed along the border itself.
With the system in place, the military started reducing the number of troops there, moving them to other areas of concern, including the West Bank, according to Israel Ziv, a retired major general who commanded ground forces in the south for many years, served as the head of the IDF’s Operations Division from 2003 to 2005, and was recently recruited into the reserves again because of the war.
“The thinning of the forces seemed reasonable because of the construction of the fence and the aura they created around it, as if it were invincible, that nothing would be able to pass it,” he said.
But the remote-control system had a vulnerability: It could also be destroyed remotely.
Hamas took advantage of that weakness by sending aerial drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system, according to the officials and also drone footage circulated by Hamas on Saturday and analysed by The New York Times.
Without cellular signals, the system was useless. Soldiers stationed in control rooms behind the front lines did not receive alarms that the fence separating Gaza and Israel had been breached, and could not watch video showing them where the Hamas attackers were bulldozing the barricades. In addition, the barrier turned out to be easier to break through than Israeli officials had expected.
That allowed more than 1,500 Gazan fighters to surge through nearly 30 points along the border, some of them in hang gliders that flew over the top of the barricades, and reach at least four Israeli military bases without being intercepted.
Photos shared by one of the Israeli officials showed that scores of Israeli soldiers were then shot as they slept in their dorms. Some were still wearing their underclothes.
The second operational failure was the clustering of leaders from the army’s Gaza division in a single location along the border. Once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage, according to two of the Israeli officials.
That situation, combined with the communication problems caused by the drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response. This kept anyone along the border from grasping the full breadth of the assault, including the commanders who rushed from elsewhere in Israel to launch a counter-attack.
“Understanding what the picture was of the different terrorist attacks was very difficult,” said Brigadier-General Dan Goldfuss, an Israeli commander who helped lead the counterattack.
The fallout has been catastrophic for Israel’s security, as well as potentially damaging to its reputation in the region as a reliable military partner.
Before Saturday, “Israel was an asset to many countries in the region on security issues”, he said. “The image now is that Israel is not an asset.”
The Israeli security services do not dispute the scale of their initial failure. But they say that it can only be investigated after the war ends.
“We’ll finish this,” said military spokesman Richard Hecht, as the army attempted to regain control of the communities on Saturday. “You know that this will be investigated.” NYTIMES
PAP and CCP are best of buddies. PAP respects CCP and will not do anything to upset the Chinese.
LOL. You're shittin' me... the CCP is going to fire a missile over our heads? The CCP Ministry of State Security is decades behind the CIA is reach, technology and operational capabilities.
You're so typical of all these indians with their 'pukka sahib' wannabe mentality. You'd rather suck the cock of a white man than say 'yes, sir' to a fellow Asiatic.
Reminds me of a conversation in the '90s I had with an Indian SAF major who wanted to emigrate to Australia.
Me: Why would want yuou to settle down in Australia?
Indian friend: Singapore is getting more racist. The Speak Mandarin Campaign has made it harder for Indians to find jobs.
Me: Fair enough. But the Aussies are as racist, if not more so, than Singaporeans.
Indian friend: Well, at least there I'm second class to the white man. Here I'm second class to another Asian race.
Me: Duh...
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We could make you disfigured.
We could cut your balls off and make you eat them
That we chat way of chatting drives me up the wall.
You are very confused.
1. The PAP government made the security assessment, not me. The directive to civil servants is not issued by me, LOL!
https://www.todayonline.com/singapo...-use-tiktok-issued-devices-need-basis-2131846
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/singapore/story20230317-1373604
2. The PAP is sucking the cocks of AMDK, not me. US citizens do not require a VISA to enter SG, CCP China citizens require a VISA. Why you never make noise?
3. CCP also sucking AMDK cocks, why are you not tumbling your chest?
4. Last point, do not create an imaginable stance on me (which I never made), then you try to knock down the stance. You are making yourself look bad. LOL!
Singapore government says officers can only use TikTok on issued devices on a 'need-to basis'
https://www.todayonline.com/singapo...-use-tiktok-issued-devices-need-basis-2131846
SINGAPORE — Public officers are allowed to use TikTok on government-issued devices only on a "need-to basis" under existing policy, the Singapore government said on Thursday (March 16).
“Government-issued devices are meant for work and there are clear rules stipulating that only approved apps should be downloaded on such devices,” said a spokesperson for the Smart Nation and Digital Government Group (SNDGG).
“Currently, TikTok is only allowed for use by public officers on a need-to basis, such as for communications officers.”
Other apps, such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram, are also subject to the same policy, said SNDGG on Friday in response to further queries.
The SNDGG, which comprises the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office and the Government Technology Agency, oversees the digital transformation of the government and the country's key Smart Nation projects.
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Government-issued devices have security configurations to safeguard data, while public officers are regularly reminded to only download approved apps, it told CNA in response to queries about the recent security and privacy concerns over TikTok.
Some Singapore politicians are using the app, including Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, Health Minister Ong Ye Kung and Speaker of Parliament Tan Chuan-Jin, who each have thousands of followers on the platform. CNA has contacted them about the security concerns regarding the platform.
SECURITY CONCERNS
The popular video app has come under increasing scrutiny, with the United States, Canada, Belgium and several EU bodies among those that have banned the app from government devices.Britain announced on Thursday that it would ban TikTok on government phones with immediate effect.
TikTok is owned by Beijing-headquartered internet company ByteDance. The bans underscore mounting concerns that the app’s user data could end up in the hands of the Chinese government, undermining Western security interests.
The concerns raised are not new.
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The app, with more than 1 billion users worldwide, was caught in the crosshairs in 2020 when then-US president Donald Trump dubbed it a national security threat and attempted to block new user downloads in the US. TikTok has denied that it is a threat to US national security.
Like many other social media apps, Tiktok collects significant amounts of user data, including birthdays, email addresses and phone numbers, as well as tracks users’ likes, shares and search history.
But some experts said there are elements that are more unique to the app.
Dr Kevin Curran, professor of cybersecurity at Ulster University, pointed to the platform’s in-app browser, which "could potentially be collecting passwords and usernames typed in and tracking activity on the in-app browser".
TikTok’s privacy policy page states that the browsing history of the in-app browser is collected to “help make platform improvements, such as optimising page load times and ad measurement”.
Experts said concerns about TikTok lie primarily with uncertainties about whether these huge amounts of data can be exploited by the Chinese government.
READ ALSO
TikTok data collection, influence operations potential draw US NSA concern
“Many social media apps, including popular ones such as Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, collect significant amounts of user data, and TikTok is no exception,” said Singapore University of Technology and Design’s Assistant Professor Roy Lee.
“However, the primary concern regarding TikTok is whether the app shares its collected data with its parent company, ByteDance, which may in turn pass the data to the Chinese government."
“While TikTok has repeatedly stated that it does not share user data with the Chinese government and would not do so if asked, it is important to consider that ByteDance is legally compelled to comply with requests for user data under Chinese law, and it is unclear how ByteDance would resist such requests,” he added.
State exploitation of such data could have “severe consequences”, such as the app being manipulated to influence user behaviour or opinions and potentially become a propaganda tool, said Asst Prof Lee.
The lingering geopolitical rivalry between China and the West is a reason behind the growing concerns.
“The Ukraine war has not helped. It has stepped up concerns about an East versus West in the future,” said Dr Curran. “It comes down to a trust issue.”
That said, there are other studies that have shown TikTok poses no greater risk of either surveillance or influence operations than other social media platforms.
For example, a report released by the Georgia Institute of Technology in January found that Tiktok is “a commercially motivated enterprise, not a tool of the Chinese state”.
“The data collected by TikTok can only be of espionage value if it comes from users who are intimately connected to national security functions and use the app in ways that expose sensitive information,” authors from the university said.
“These risks arise from the use of any social media app, not just TikTok, and cannot be mitigated by arbitrarily banning one app.”
若非必要 本地公务员不可在政府设备用TikTok
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/singapore/story20230317-1373604
（早报讯）本地公务员只有在必要时，才能在政府发出的设备上使用中国短视频分享应用TikTok。
新加坡网络安全局和智慧国及数码政府工作团星期五（3月17日）回答《联合早报》询问时说，政府发给职员使用的设备是用来处理公事，当局也清楚列明这些设备只能下载获批准的应用。设备也设定了保安配置，以维护资料。目前，公务员如通讯官员只有在需要时才能下载使用TikTok。
网络安全局和智慧国及数码政府工作团也提到，网络安全局会发通知，提醒本地用户在下载和使用应用时要如何保持警惕。
例如，用户在安装应用前，应该查看应用的隐私政策以及所有要求的保安权限；当应用要求过多权限，如使用用户手机的位置、摄像头、麦克风、联络名单和浏览历史时，用户应该有所警惕，尤其当应用的核心功能不一定需要这些权限；用户也应该定期更新软件，以及定期使用最新的防毒软件扫描设备。
美国，印度、比利时、加拿大、欧洲委员会和欧洲议会等国家政府和机构，已部分或全面禁止在敏感设备中使用中国公司字节跳动拥有的这个视频共享应用。
If you deluded Tiong fanboys think China has nothing to do with this... that meeting of Winnie with Chuck Schumer and the statement given on the situation in Israel gave everything away.
Another Tiong fanboy, not only deluded but fcuking confused, maciam i have the power to command civil servants. He wants to censor this forum.
OK now we know you're also a PAP cocksucker like @JohnTan. LOL.
Touche. Didn't know I touched a raw nerve there with my 'pukka sahib' comment. Do seek help for your internalized racism, is my advice. And stop sucking AMDK cocks and spamming this forum with lies from AMDK media. No shame in looking up to an Asian power.4. Last point, do not create an imaginable stance on me (which I never made), then you try to knock down the stance. You are making yourself look bad. LOL!
And don't bring your subcontinent Hindu-Islamic animosities to our shore. Your PAP masters have said that we're a multi-racial multi-religious nation, and we mustn't rend the social fabric. LOL.
Hamas used Huawei phone because it is cheap. Why pay for a Samsung when you can so much more and pay less with a Huawei?
Actually it's because Huawei uses Harmony OS, not Android. Harder to hack and tap.
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