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Is there a bigger SPF apologist and asshole than former Police Commissioner Khoo Boon Hui. This is the most garbage I have seen come out of one mouth in a long time. This fucktard has the temerity to say that Baton Charges and Tear Gas are old tactics and suggests that is why they were not employed during the Little India riot. He said that strong arm tactic like tear gas and baton charges were deemed not acceptable today. Are you sure or not? Deemed by whom? He also goes on to say that riots should be quelled with minimum casualties to the rioters!! What a fucking clown. If you riot, u should expect to get hurt, what is this minimal casualty crap. He goes on to give many cock excuses for the fuck ups that happened that night. Truly, he is a por lumpar cock sucker.
SINGAPORE - The way riots are handled in Singapore has evolved from a force-first approach using tear gas and baton charges decades ago to one that is more calibrated.
Still, "there is no textbook solution", according to former police commissioner Khoo Boon Hui, who submitted a six-page report to the Committee of Inquiry (COI) looking into the Little India riot.
The 59-year-old Senior Deputy Secretary of the Home Affairs Ministry said last Friday: "You have to use your head, use your judgment. Doctrines and manuals cannot be exhaustive and should not preclude the innovative use of strategies and tactics."
Tracing the evolution of riot doctrine, he explained how riot squads - the predecessor of the Special Operations Command (SOC) - were first formed in 1952, after the Maria Hertogh riots.
In the early years, aggressive tactics were needed because of extreme violence seen in incidents like the 1960s communal riots.
But strong-arm tactics such as the use of tear gas and baton charges would no longer be deemed acceptable today, said Mr Khoo, who was police chief from 1997 to 2010.
Passive resistance tactics have been adopted by the SOC, following studies of measures taken up overseas, said Mr Khoo, who also served as Interpol president from 2008 to 2012.
Today, police commanders approach public order incidents with three objectives in mind.
First, riots should be quelled "with minimum casualties, especially to innocent bystanders, responders and, of course, the rioters themselves". While minimising any spillover or escalation of the riot, the police must be seen to take "resolute but appropriate" action. Lastly, the police have to instil public confidence by decisively resolving the incident.
"At the end of the day, you can't just stand by and then in the end let the rioters escape. You have to bring people to justice," said Mr Khoo.
He prefaced his testimony last Friday by saying he would not judge police actions taken on Dec 8 because he was then in Qatar on official duties, and had not been involved in the active management of the incident since.
During the inquiry, committee members have questioned how the police responded at the scene.
They pointed out that the decision to hold the ground instead of facing rioters head on could have emboldened troublemakers, who ended up damaging 23 emergency vehicles. The incident also left 49 Home team officers injured
How much force to use is a controversial issue, said Mr Khoo.
"But my sense is that it must be commensurate with the level of public order threat, (be) fair and even-handed."
Using insufficient force could embolden the crowd, but excessive force can inflame the situation, he said, citing foreign examples to prove his point. In the London riots of 2009, a newspaper vendor trying to make his way home died after he was pushed over and hit by the police. "It gave the British police a very, very bad image," he said. "In the heat of things they did something (that) brought the whole police force into disrepute."
Also critical are the capabilities and size of the force deployed. "If you have the numbers, do you have people who are welltrained?" said Mr Khoo. "If you don't have numbers, you risk escalating the level of violence because you resort to lethal force when it may not be necessary because you are threatened."
A riot in Hong Kong in 2005 involved the use of 2,000 troops to deal with a sit-in involving more than 900 people. All the protesters were arrested, but they were later let off because officers could not distinguish the role of each suspect. "In the end all the evidence got mixed up and people just got away," said Mr Khoo.
The use of warning shots, too, could backfire. COI chairman and former Supreme Court judge G. Pannir Selvam noted: "Firing a warning shot in a big congregation is a real problem."
Mr Khoo agreed: "People in front may know what is happening, but people behind don't. Some may be running back, some may be surging forward."
Mr Selvam added: "The other psychology is (that) if you are going to kill me and I'm going to die, I might as well die fighting you."
Mr Khoo in his report, which was praised by the committee, concluded: "It would be a Pyrrhic victory should the police use excessive force to quell a riot, only for heightened tensions and unrest to erupt in other parts of Singapore."
The inquiry resumes on Tuesday, with Police Commissioner Ng Joo Hee expected to testify
SINGAPORE - The way riots are handled in Singapore has evolved from a force-first approach using tear gas and baton charges decades ago to one that is more calibrated.
Still, "there is no textbook solution", according to former police commissioner Khoo Boon Hui, who submitted a six-page report to the Committee of Inquiry (COI) looking into the Little India riot.
The 59-year-old Senior Deputy Secretary of the Home Affairs Ministry said last Friday: "You have to use your head, use your judgment. Doctrines and manuals cannot be exhaustive and should not preclude the innovative use of strategies and tactics."
Tracing the evolution of riot doctrine, he explained how riot squads - the predecessor of the Special Operations Command (SOC) - were first formed in 1952, after the Maria Hertogh riots.
In the early years, aggressive tactics were needed because of extreme violence seen in incidents like the 1960s communal riots.
But strong-arm tactics such as the use of tear gas and baton charges would no longer be deemed acceptable today, said Mr Khoo, who was police chief from 1997 to 2010.
Passive resistance tactics have been adopted by the SOC, following studies of measures taken up overseas, said Mr Khoo, who also served as Interpol president from 2008 to 2012.
Today, police commanders approach public order incidents with three objectives in mind.
First, riots should be quelled "with minimum casualties, especially to innocent bystanders, responders and, of course, the rioters themselves". While minimising any spillover or escalation of the riot, the police must be seen to take "resolute but appropriate" action. Lastly, the police have to instil public confidence by decisively resolving the incident.
"At the end of the day, you can't just stand by and then in the end let the rioters escape. You have to bring people to justice," said Mr Khoo.
He prefaced his testimony last Friday by saying he would not judge police actions taken on Dec 8 because he was then in Qatar on official duties, and had not been involved in the active management of the incident since.
During the inquiry, committee members have questioned how the police responded at the scene.
They pointed out that the decision to hold the ground instead of facing rioters head on could have emboldened troublemakers, who ended up damaging 23 emergency vehicles. The incident also left 49 Home team officers injured
How much force to use is a controversial issue, said Mr Khoo.
"But my sense is that it must be commensurate with the level of public order threat, (be) fair and even-handed."
Using insufficient force could embolden the crowd, but excessive force can inflame the situation, he said, citing foreign examples to prove his point. In the London riots of 2009, a newspaper vendor trying to make his way home died after he was pushed over and hit by the police. "It gave the British police a very, very bad image," he said. "In the heat of things they did something (that) brought the whole police force into disrepute."
Also critical are the capabilities and size of the force deployed. "If you have the numbers, do you have people who are welltrained?" said Mr Khoo. "If you don't have numbers, you risk escalating the level of violence because you resort to lethal force when it may not be necessary because you are threatened."
A riot in Hong Kong in 2005 involved the use of 2,000 troops to deal with a sit-in involving more than 900 people. All the protesters were arrested, but they were later let off because officers could not distinguish the role of each suspect. "In the end all the evidence got mixed up and people just got away," said Mr Khoo.
The use of warning shots, too, could backfire. COI chairman and former Supreme Court judge G. Pannir Selvam noted: "Firing a warning shot in a big congregation is a real problem."
Mr Khoo agreed: "People in front may know what is happening, but people behind don't. Some may be running back, some may be surging forward."
Mr Selvam added: "The other psychology is (that) if you are going to kill me and I'm going to die, I might as well die fighting you."
Mr Khoo in his report, which was praised by the committee, concluded: "It would be a Pyrrhic victory should the police use excessive force to quell a riot, only for heightened tensions and unrest to erupt in other parts of Singapore."
The inquiry resumes on Tuesday, with Police Commissioner Ng Joo Hee expected to testify
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