SINGAPORE ELECTIONS: TEMASEK MISCOUNT PROFITS?
RE: TEMASEK MISRECORDED INVESTMENT PROFITS BY $40 BILLION OR MORE?
Multi-billionaire Warren Buffett has endorsed my financial expertise well before I reviewed Temasek Holding's annual reports. Buffett's endorsement of my expertise has been authenticated and published in a McGraw-Hill book by a former journalist who has known Buffett for many years. The book is available in institutions worldwide like Harvard and National University of Singapore Hon Sui Sen Memorial Library.
For years, I assumed that Temasek Holding's summary data on its investment profits are beyond human error. However, when I finally looked up the annual reports, many questions arise that call for superurgent review by the Singapore Government.
Our Government has won global praises and respect by being willing to identify and admit even the mistakes of organizations under its oversight. On this basis, can th e Singapore Government please examine evidences that Temasek Holdings may have misrecorded its investment profits by $40 billion or more?
Will the reputation of Singapore and the pride of many Singaporeans be damaged if such a GIGANTIC mistake is allowed to persist?
Page 22 of the 2010 Temasek Holdings Report and page 16 of the 2006 Report both show a sharp rise in Temasek market value in 1993 from less than $20 billion to more than $60 billion. This is attributed to the listing of SINGTEL. Was this rise of more than $40 billion misrecorded as investment profits? Was SINGTEL transfered to Temasek in the same year 1993 at an extremely low book value before listing rather than at fair market value? Isn't "inherited money" supposed to be recorded as capital infusions instead?
What was the precise amount that might be misrecorded? Was it $41 billion, $48 billion, $53 billion or $61 billion?
To see why certain accounting is questionable, let us look at a hypothetical AAA fund manager with a wealthy uncle called Sam. Mr. AAA inherited a GIFTEL company in 1993 from Uncle Sam with a market value of $60 billion. However, the historical book value of GIFTEL was only $20 billion. Hence, GIFTEL was transfered into Mr. AAA's portfolio at the historical value of only $20 billion. In the same year 1993, GIFTEL was listed on the stock exchange with a market value of $60 billion. Mr. AAA delightfully attributed the $40 billion rise in value of his portfolio from $20 billi on to $60 billion to his supreme fund management skill.
Is it morally right or wrong for Mr. AAA to treat the inherited money of $40 billion as performance profits? If it is wrong for Mr. AAA to do so, why should it be alright for Temasek to do the same? Isn't it necessary for Mr. AAA to treat the $40 billion rise in value as capital infusion rather than performance profits? Why did Temasek fail to treat the $40 billion or higher rise in value during listing as capital infusions also? This is especially so when SINGTEL was transfered to Temasek only in 1993 - the same year SINGTEL was listed. (Page 98 of 2008 Temasek Report)
The above illustrates that inherited money must never be recorded as performance profits. Moreover, SINGTEL did not rise in multi-billion dollars value within one single year. It took many years of toil, sweat, tears and intelligence of many people for this to happen. Has Temasek taken over the credit that belongs to the tough work and smart work of many other people by a mere accounting stroke?
Are there any other companies besides SINGTEL that might have boosted Temasek's performance record in a controversial manner? Shouldn't Temasek revamp its accounting to take away the effects of the many billion dollars worth of "inherited money" on its portfolio performance?
Sincerely,
J.P. Tan
RE: TEMASEK MISRECORDED INVESTMENT PROFITS BY $40 BILLION OR MORE?
Multi-billionaire Warren Buffett has endorsed my financial expertise well before I reviewed Temasek Holding's annual reports. Buffett's endorsement of my expertise has been authenticated and published in a McGraw-Hill book by a former journalist who has known Buffett for many years. The book is available in institutions worldwide like Harvard and National University of Singapore Hon Sui Sen Memorial Library.
For years, I assumed that Temasek Holding's summary data on its investment profits are beyond human error. However, when I finally looked up the annual reports, many questions arise that call for superurgent review by the Singapore Government.
Our Government has won global praises and respect by being willing to identify and admit even the mistakes of organizations under its oversight. On this basis, can th e Singapore Government please examine evidences that Temasek Holdings may have misrecorded its investment profits by $40 billion or more?
Will the reputation of Singapore and the pride of many Singaporeans be damaged if such a GIGANTIC mistake is allowed to persist?
Page 22 of the 2010 Temasek Holdings Report and page 16 of the 2006 Report both show a sharp rise in Temasek market value in 1993 from less than $20 billion to more than $60 billion. This is attributed to the listing of SINGTEL. Was this rise of more than $40 billion misrecorded as investment profits? Was SINGTEL transfered to Temasek in the same year 1993 at an extremely low book value before listing rather than at fair market value? Isn't "inherited money" supposed to be recorded as capital infusions instead?
What was the precise amount that might be misrecorded? Was it $41 billion, $48 billion, $53 billion or $61 billion?
To see why certain accounting is questionable, let us look at a hypothetical AAA fund manager with a wealthy uncle called Sam. Mr. AAA inherited a GIFTEL company in 1993 from Uncle Sam with a market value of $60 billion. However, the historical book value of GIFTEL was only $20 billion. Hence, GIFTEL was transfered into Mr. AAA's portfolio at the historical value of only $20 billion. In the same year 1993, GIFTEL was listed on the stock exchange with a market value of $60 billion. Mr. AAA delightfully attributed the $40 billion rise in value of his portfolio from $20 billi on to $60 billion to his supreme fund management skill.
Is it morally right or wrong for Mr. AAA to treat the inherited money of $40 billion as performance profits? If it is wrong for Mr. AAA to do so, why should it be alright for Temasek to do the same? Isn't it necessary for Mr. AAA to treat the $40 billion rise in value as capital infusion rather than performance profits? Why did Temasek fail to treat the $40 billion or higher rise in value during listing as capital infusions also? This is especially so when SINGTEL was transfered to Temasek only in 1993 - the same year SINGTEL was listed. (Page 98 of 2008 Temasek Report)
The above illustrates that inherited money must never be recorded as performance profits. Moreover, SINGTEL did not rise in multi-billion dollars value within one single year. It took many years of toil, sweat, tears and intelligence of many people for this to happen. Has Temasek taken over the credit that belongs to the tough work and smart work of many other people by a mere accounting stroke?
Are there any other companies besides SINGTEL that might have boosted Temasek's performance record in a controversial manner? Shouldn't Temasek revamp its accounting to take away the effects of the many billion dollars worth of "inherited money" on its portfolio performance?
Sincerely,
J.P. Tan
