Commissar Tanwahtiu and LaoTze...some clip wayang clip for your afternoon wet dream

[k1976]

Ru lai ru wayang....seem like good knoŵledgr transfer from our world smartest Jiak Liao Bee

 

[JurongEast]

China never value the lives of its armies as China is the only country that is using 人海战术 to let its soldiers die for nothing

 

[Testing]

China never value the lives of its armies as China is the only country that is using 人海战术 to let its soldiers die for nothing

chicken feet, nothing as compared to Commie Mao the CB kia

 

[Testing]

Communist Cunt knows only how to self-masturbate and 自high

 

[syed putra]

I think our comrade has some issue with the commissars. Made to disappear.

 

[syed putra]

Military strategist says now is the time to invade Taiwan. US is stuck in Europe and middle East.

 

[JurongEast]

Military strategist says now is the time to invade Taiwan. US is stuck in Europe and middle East.

US is preparing to confront 3 wars at the same time

 

[k1976]

Military strategist says now is the time to invade Taiwan. US is stuck in Europe and middle East.

U underestimated Dai Nippon Titok liao

 

[k1976]

US is preparing to confront 3 wars at the same time

No doubt thisvis a better time to do so, but will PLAAF n PLAN suffer same fate of Beiyang fleet 1894-5？

 

[k1976]

The Decisive Fleet Engagement at the Battle of the Yalu River​

October 10, 2018 Guest Author Leave a comment

By Aidan Clarke
When war broke out between Japan and China in 1894, few expected a Japanese victory. Qing China had undergone its period of self-strengthening and modernization for much longer than the Japanese Meiji modernization period, had invested more money in its naval programs and platforms, and the Japanese Navy was supposedly outmatched both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, at the Battle off the Yalu River the Japanese defeated the Qing Northern Fleet in a decisive battle. So what went wrong in Qing self-strengthening? What left the Chinese so vastly unprepared for naval conflict?

Upon a close review of both primary and secondary sources, three key answers emerge. Firstly, the lack of a unified Chinese Navy under the Qing Empire proved fatal in the First Sino-Japanese War. Second, corruption and inefficiency in the institutions of the self-strengthening movement ensured poor commanders and a lack of equipment in the Beiyang Fleet. Finally, Japan’s unified command, professional officer corps, rigorous training, and use of French Jeune Ecole tactics won the day.