Chitchat China’s Air Force — 1,700 Combat Aircraft Ready for War

[pakchewcheng]

China’s Air Force — 1,700 Combat Aircraft Ready for War

Beijing's impressive aerial fleet grew quickly

WIB AIR October 30, 2017 Sebastien Roblin

China39
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force of China and its sister branch, the PLA Naval Air Force, operate a huge fleet of around 1,700 combat aircraft — defined here as fighters, bombers and attack planes. This force is exceeded only by the 3,400 active combat aircraft of the U.S. military.

Moreover, China operates a lot of different aircraft types that are not well known in the West.

However, most Chinese military aircraft are inspired by or copied from Russian or American designs, so it’s not too hard to grasp their capabilities if you know their origins.

Above — Chinese J-7I at the Beijing Military Museum. Max Smith photo via Wikimedia. At top — a Chinese Su-30. Photo via Wikimedia
The Soviet-era clones
The Soviet Union and communist China were best buddies during the 1950s, so Moscow transferred plenty of technology including tanks and jet fighters. One of the early Chinese-manufactured types was the J-6, a clone of the supersonic MiG-19, which has a jet intake in the nose.



Though China built thousands of J-6s, all but a few have been retired. However, about 150 of a pointy-nosed ground-attack version, the Nanchang Q-5, remain in service, upgraded to employ precision-guided munitions.

Sino-Soviet friendship ended in an ugly breakup around 1960. But in 1962, the Soviets offered China a dozen hot new MiG-21 fighters as part of a peace overture. Beijing rejected the overture but kept the fighters, which were reverse-engineered into the sturdier — but heavier — Chengdu J-7. Production began slowly due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, but between 1978 and 2013 Chinese factories turned out thousands of the pencil-fuselage jet fighters in dozens of variants.

Nearly 400 J-7s still serve in the PLAAF and PLANAF.

The J-7 is a 1950s-era hot rod in terms of maneuverability and speed — it can keep up with an F-16 at Mach 2 — but it cannot carry much fuel or armament, and it has a weak radar in its tiny nose cone. Still, China has worked to keep the J-7 relevant. The J-7G introduced in 2004 includes an Israeli doppler radar (detection range: 37 miles) and improved missiles for beyond-visual range capabilities, as well as a digital “glass cockpit.”

These aircraft would struggle against modern fourth-generation fighters that can detect and engage adversaries at much greater ranges, though hypothetically mass formations could attempt to overwhelm defenders with swarm attacks. Still, the J-7s allow China to maintain a larger force of trained pilots and support personnel until new designs come into service.

An H-6 bomber. Photo via Wikimedia
China’s B-52
Another Soviet-era clone is the Xi’an H-6, a twin-engine strategic bomber based on the early-1950s era Tu-16 Badger.

Though less capable than the U.S. B-52 or Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers, the air-refuelable H-6K remains relevant because it could lug heavy long-range cruise-missiles hit naval or ground targets as far as 4,000 miles from China without entering the range of air defenses.

The H-6 was originally tasked with dropping nuclear weapons, but the PLAAF no longer seems interested in this role. Xi’an is reportedly developing a new H-20 strategic bomber, though there’s little information available so far.



A Chinese J-10. Photo via Wikimedia
Domestic innovations
In the mid-1960s, China began working on genuinely home-designed combat jets, leading to the Shenyang J-8 debuting in 1979. A large twin-turbojet supersonic interceptor that could attain Mach 2.2 and resembled a cross between the MiG-21 and the larger Su-15, the J-8 lacked modern avionics and maneuverability.

However, the succeeding J-8II variant (about 150 currently serving) improved on the former with an Israeli radar in a new pointy-nose cone, making it a fast but heavy weapons platform a bit like the F-4 Phantom. Around 150 are still operational.

The 200-plus Xi’an JH-7 Flying Leopards, which entered service in 1992, are beefy two-seat naval-attack fighter-bombers that can lug up to 20,000 pounds of missiles and have a top speed of Mach 1.75. Though they wouldn’t want to get in a dogfight with opposing contemporary fighters, they may not have to if they can capitalize on long-range anti-ship missiles.

The Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon, by contrast, is basically China’s F-16 Fighting Falcon, a highly maneuverable, lightweight multi-role fighter leaning on fly-by-wire avionics to compensate for its aerodynamically unstable airframe.

Currently dependent on Russian AL-31F turbofans, and coming several decades after the F-16 debuted, the J-10 seems may not seem earthshaking, but the J-10B model comes out of the box with 21st-century avionics such as advanced infrared search-and-track systems and a cutting-edge Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which cannot be said for all F-16 types.

However, the fleet of 250 J-10s has suffered several deadly accidents possibly related to difficulties in the fly-by-wire system.

A Chinese J-11 photographed from a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon. U.S. Navy photo
The Flanker comes to China — and stays there
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a Russia starved for cash and no longer concerned about ideological disputes was happy to oblige when Beijing came knocking at the door asking to buy then state-of-the-art Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, a highly maneuverable twin-engine jet comparable to the F-15 Eagle with excellent range and payload.

This proved a fateful decision: today a sprawling family of aircraft derived from the Su-27 form the core of China’s modern fighter force.

After importing the initial batch of Su-27s, Beijing purchased a license to domestically build their own copy, the — Shenyang J-11 — but to Russia’s dismay, began independently building more advanced models, the J-11B and D.

Moscow felt burned, but still sold 76 modernized ground- and naval-attack variants of the Flanker, the Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2 respectively, which parallel the F-15E Strike Eagle. Chinese designers also churned out their own derivative of the Su-30: the Shenyang J-16 Red Eagle, boasting an AESA radar, and the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, a carrier-based fighter based on a Russian Su-33 acquired from Ukraine.

Around 20 now serve on China’s Type 001 aircraft carrier Liaoning. There’s even the J-16D, a jamming pod-equipped electronic-warfare fighter styled after the U.S. Navy’s EA-18 Growler.

The Chinese Sukhoi derivatives are theoretically on par with the fourth-generation fighters like the F-15 and F-16. However, they are saddled with domestic WS-10 turbofan engines, which have had terrible maintenance problems and difficulty producing enough thrust.

Jet-engine tech remains the chief limitation of Chinese combat aircraft today. Indeed, in 2016 China purchased 24 Su-35s, the most sophisticated and maneuverable variant of the Flanker so far — likely to obtain their AL-41F turbofans engines.

Chinese J-20s in 2016. Alert5 photo via Wikimedia
Stealth fighters
In a remarkably short timeframe, China developed two distinct stealth fighter designs. Twenty Chengdu J-20s entered PLAAF service in 2017. Unlike the F-22 Raptor, designed to be the ultimate air superiority fighter, or the single-engine multi-role F-35 Lightning, the J-20 is a huge twin-engine beast optimized for speed, range and heavy weapons loads at the expense of maneuverability.

The J-20 might be suitable for surprise raids on land or sea targets — though its larger rear-aspect radar cross section could be problematic — or to sneak past enemy fighters to take out vulnerable support tankers or AWACs radar planes. Special-mission stealth fighters make sense for a country that is only just getting into the business of operating such technically demanding aircraft.

Meanwhile, the smaller, privately developed Shenyang J-31 Gyrfalcon (or FC-31) is basically a twin-engine remodeling of the F-35 Lightning — quite possibly using schematics hacked off Lockheed computers. Chinese designers may have developed an aerodynamically superior airframe by ditching elements supporting vertical-takeoff-or-landing engines.

However, the J-31 probably won’t boast the fancy sensors and data fusion capabilities of the Lightning.

Currently, the J-31 appears intended for service on upcoming Type 002 aircraft carriers, and for export as a cut-price F-35 alternative. However, while there are flying Gyrfalcon prototypes with Russian engines, the type may only begin production when sufficiently reliable Chinese WS-13 turbofans are perfected.

Military parade over Beijing in 2015. Kremlin photo
Toward the future
Roughly 33 percent of the PLAAF and PLANAF’s combat aircraft are old second-generation fighters of limited combat value against peer opponents, save perhaps in swarming attacks. Another 28 percent include strategic bombers and more capable but dated third-generation designs.

Finally, 38 percent are fourth-generation fighters that can theoretically hold their own against peers like the F-15 and F-16.

Stealth fighters account for one percent.

However, the technical capabilities of aircraft are just half the story; at least as important are training, organizational doctrine and supporting assets ranging from satellite recon to air-refueling tankers, ground-based radars and airborne command posts.

For example, China has the intel resources, aircraft and missiles to hunt aircraft carriers. However, the doctrine and experience to link these elements together to form a kill chain is no simple matter. A 2016 Rand report alleges Chinese aviation units are scrambling to reverse a lack of training under realistic conditions and develop experience in joint operations with ground and naval forces.

At any rate, Beijing seems in no rush to replace all its older jets with new ones. Major new acquisitions may wait until the Chinese aviation industry has smoothed out the kinks in its fourth-generation and stealth aircraft.

 

[pakchewcheng]

108 U.S F-35s Won’t Be Combat-Capable

$21 billion worth of 'concurrency orphans'

FEATUREDWIB AIR October 16, 2017 Dan Grazier

F-3532
The new F-35 program executive officer, U.S. Navy vice admiral Mat Winter, said his office is exploring the option of leaving 108 aircraft in their current state because the funds to upgrade them to the fully combat-capable configuration would threaten the Air Force’s plans to ramp up production in the coming years.

These are most likely the same 108 aircraft the Air Force reportedly needed to upgrade earlier in 2017. Without being retrofitted, these aircraft would become “concurrency orphans” — airplanes left behind in the acquisition cycle after the services purchased them in haste before finishing the development process.

Left unsaid so far is what will become of the 81 F-35s purchased by the Marine Corps and Navy during that same period. If they are left in their current state, nearly 200 F-35s might permanently remain unready for combat because the Pentagon would rather buy new aircraft than upgrade the ones the American people have already paid for.

What makes this particularly galling is the aircraft that would be left behind by such a scheme were the most expensive F-35s purchased so far. When the tab for all the aircraft purchased in an immature state is added up, the total comes to nearly $40 billion.



That’s a lot of money to spend on training jets and aircraft that will simply be stripped for spare parts.


Empty promises
The Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have been assuring the American people for years that the price tag for the F-35 is on its way down. Much of that effort was part of the campaign to convince Congress to approve the Economic Order Quantity, or multiple-year block buy of F-35 components.

They claimed that would lead to even more cost savings. But it’s difficult to be enthusiastic about the prospect of saving $2 billion when the program could potentially have wasted up to 10 or perhaps 20 times that amount.

The services will have nearly 800 F-35s either on hand or in the manufacturing pipeline before the design is fully proven through testing under the current plans.

Upgrades are unusually complex for the F-35 because of the design process being used for the program. The program is developing the F-35 in several phases, called blocks. Each block has more capabilities than the earlier version. According to the Lockheed Martin website, Block 1A/1B combined basic training capabilities with some security enhancements.

Block 2A remained a training version, with the ability to share data between aircraft. Blocks 2B and 3I are the first versions with any combat capabilities. The only significant difference between 2B and 3I is the aircraft’s computer processor.

The first version expected to have full combat capabilities is Block 3F. This version has yet to be completed and is only expected to begin realistic combat testing next year.



The Marine Corps controversially declared Initial Operational Capability with Block 2B aircraft in 2015. But this version is hardly ready for combat. The Pentagon’s testing office has repeatedly said that any pilots flying Block 2B F-35s who find themselves in a combat situation would “need to avoid threat engagement and would require augmentation by other friendly forces.”

In other words, the 108 Air Force F-35s in question, or any of the Block 2B aircraft, would need to run away from a fight and have other aircraft come to their rescue.

Art via POGO
Expensive trainers
Getting to the bottom of exactly how much money has been wasted buying potentially combat-incapable fighters is a bit of a challenge. There are various ways to calculate the cost of weapon systems. To make it even more difficult, the numbers have been deliberately obscured by the Pentagon and the defense industry over the years.

Using Lockheed Martin’s own numbers for aircraft deliveries, it’s possible to make a few calculations to begin to get an idea about how much money may have been spent on these potential concurrency orphans.

The defense industry likes to use the Unit Recurring Flyaway cost. This is just the material cost of the airframe plus the fee to have it put together. This figure sometimes does not include the cost of the engine and it does not include the support and training equipment, spare parts, software upgrades or contractor fees necessary to actually make the aircraft work.

Under the best case scenario, the only aircraft that would remain concurrency orphans are the 108 Air Force Block 2B and 3I F-35As. Without knowing exactly when the 108 aircraft in question were built, it’s impossible to know precisely how much was spent to procure them.

But using publicly available information, it is possible to calculate a reasonably approximate figure since the Air Force acquired its first 108 F-35As in Low Rate Initial Production lots one through nine.

Using the Lockheed Martin/Air Force figures — which are much lower than the real costs — for the first 108 F-35As purchased, the American people spent approximately $14.117 billion to purchase fighter planes that will never be fully combat capable unless the Air Force spends the money to upgrade them.

When you factor in the cost of the engine and the support equipment necessary to acquire an aircraft that is actually capable of operating, the dollar amounts are much different than what the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin advertise. This figure can be called the procurement unit cost.

By simply multiplying the number of aircraft purchased per lot by average procurement unit cost for the corresponding year, the American people spent approximately $21.4 billion for those 108 orphaned F-35As. That is slightly more than has been spent on the entire four-year fight against Islamic State.

What remains to be seen is what will happen to all of the Block 2B aircraft remaining in the other services. During the period in question, the Marine Corps purchased approximately 53 Block 2B F-35Bs and the Navy purchased 28 Block 2B F-35C variants.

The Project on Government Oversight submitted questions to the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin regarding whether the Navy and Marine Corps aircraft will be upgraded to the fully combat-capable 3F software configuration along with the other concurrency modifications, such as structural reinforcements.

So far, no reply from either office.

When the costs to purchase all variants of the F-35s bought between 2007 and 2014 — the approximate timeframe the first 108 F-35As were purchased — are added together, taxpayers have spent $39.4 billion.

Art via POGO
The natural result of concurrency
The risk that the services would be stuck with less than capable aircraft is one that the Pentagon knowingly took when leaders decided to overlap the development and testing of the program with the production. That overlap is what is known as concurrency.

The F-35 program is one of the most concurrent programs in history. The services will have nearly 800 F-35s either on hand or in the manufacturing pipeline before the design is fully proven through testing under the current plans. This is something former Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall called “acquisition malpractice.”

While the F-35 program is still technically in “low rate initial production,” this is really only true in a strictly legalistic sense. Lockheed Martin is expected to produce more than 90 F-35s in 2018.

This, like the 266 previously bought and contracted for — all U.S. F-35s purchased through 2017 — seems to go somewhat beyond the “the minimum needed to provide production representative test articles for operational test and evaluation … to establish an initial production base for the system and provide efficient ramp up to full-rate production” standard established in the Department of Defense acquisition regulations.

The danger of purchasing hundreds of aircraft before a program produced a stable and fully tested design has been well known for years. Concurrency, as a RAND Corporation analyst explained in testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform on May 10, 2000, is rooted “in the politics of the acquisition process.”

As POGO has pointed out before, this practice serves to limit the available political options for restructuring programs experiencing significant test failures or cost overruns. When the Pentagon makes substantial procurement commitments well before development or testing is complete, it severely increases the political costs of cancelling the program due to all the money already invested and all the jobs already created.

Dr. Michael Gilmore, the now-retired director of operational test and evaluation, warned that the services would likely have to send aircraft back to the maintenance depots for modification. The list of modifications is already quite extensive. The Air Force lists 213 change items in its 2018 budget request.

The modifications required go far beyond mere software upgrades. They include serious structural upgrades including fixes to the landing gear, ejection seats and the aircraft’s bulkhead structures.

Some aircraft would have to undergo this process several times before they could be in the full combat configuration.

This is an expensive process. The Government Accountability Office identified $1.8 billion worth of retrofitting costs to the program in 2016, with $1.4 billion going to already known problems and another $386 million worth of anticipated fixes that had yet to be identified.

These figures are almost certainly much lower than the true cost to retrofit the aircraft already purchased because, as the testing process continues, it’s natural that more and more problems will be revealed. The F-35 program is expected to cost $406.5 billion in development and procurement costs alone.

The true cost to upgrade the earlier generation aircraft must be much higher than what is being publicly reported if the Pentagon has deemed it cheaper to purchase more aircraft.

In total, Congress has authorized—and the Pentagon has spent—nearly $40 billion purchasing approximately 189 F-35s that, in their current configuration, will never be able to perform the way they were expected to when taxpayer dollars were used to buy them. This is hardly the right way to do business.

Any future program must abide by the true spirit of the “fly before you buy” business model—unless of course neither Congress nor the Pentagon nor the manufacturers really care about producing an effective and affordable system.

 

[Taksama_b_l]

TS thread title not quite accurate. PLA 1700 aircrafts yes, but not just PLA air force only. PLA got Navy Air Corp 海军航空兵, and also got Army Air Corp 陆军航空兵.
习近平 organized the PLA into

• 军兵种
  • 4.1 陆军
  • 4.2 海军
  • 4.3 空军
  • 4.4 火箭军
  • 4.5 战略支援部队
  So can be expected quite soon that Missile Army and Strategic Support Army also have their own air corps, to cover their own needs, and develop and deploy their own new aircraft models.

Within next few month we can expect this new PLA toy, which is going to be Big and Advanced, at least 2 of these 1st version are currently being built inside shipyards, and launched to sea within next few months, they are for landing on Taiwan:

 

[Taksama_b_l]

Duterte thanked China for sending 22 thousand guns to fight ISIS, and mentioned Chinese sniper guns killed the 2 ISIS leaders from about 1km distance.

 

[eatshitndie]

and only 69% will be able to land safely.

 

[pakchewcheng]

TS thread title not quite accurate. PLA 1700 aircrafts yes, but not just PLA air force only. PLA got Navy Air Corp 海军航空兵, and also got Army Air Corp 陆军航空兵.
习近平 organized the PLA into

That article included PLA Naval as well.

Another thing is the 3,400 planes of USA or scattered in the world. In Europe , Afghan and elsewhere and USA.
Chinese planes are all in China and based in China in air bases in China. Not sure how many air bases USA got within the 2nd island chain.

So Chinese planes will have very fast turn around time from nearby bases to be up in the air again.

Even old Chinese planes can fire off high tech and low tech Silkworms to fuck up the AEGIS and make the carriers kadang kapor with DF21D DF26 dropping out of the sky at Mach 10 to bring good news to them.
And Chinese subs , naval ships and boats firing off thousands of high tech and low tech Silkworms

So the one who talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.



Kong langjeow wei

 

[KuanTi01]

One important quality one must also mention but often overlooked: Chinese pilots are super-patriotic and fearless. They are mentally-programmed to fight to the death and have no qualms being blown to bits or coming home in body bags. On the other hand, American pilots are mostly Top-gun show-offs types, full of complacency and bravado and they fear very much to be packed into body bags! Besides, the American public will raise a hue and cry very much louder than the Chinese public when the bodies start mounting!

 

[pakchewcheng]

I think USA carriers can remain very safe safe in San Frisco Bay.
And no USA pilots need fear body bag if they fly about in USA

 

[Taksama_b_l]

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-11-01/doc-ifynhhaz1122642.shtml

中国075两栖舰明年或下水 可同时起飞6架直升机
2017年11月01日 15:50 新浪军事


新浪扶翼 行业专区
　　近日，多家国内外媒体报道了中国海军075型两栖攻击舰的进度情况。报道称，075型两栖攻击舰很有可能在今年年底对外公布并于明年正式下水，最快将于2020年服役。075型两栖攻击舰目前正在由中国船舶工业集团公司旗下的沪东中华造船集团有限公司进行建造，这是一艘排水量接近4万吨的巨舰。预计中国海军将利用该舰执行东海、南海地区的岛屿作战任务，并用来维护国家的统一和领海完整。

　　设想中的中国海军075两栖攻击舰

　　由于中国海军自成立以来，一直都担负着解放台湾，维护祖国统一的任务，因此中国海军一直十分重视两栖登陆作战舰艇的发展。从上世纪60年代开始，中国海军就设计建造了073型登陆舰。上世纪70年代，吨位更大，性能更好的072型登陆舰开始加入中国海军。072型登陆舰与其改进型先后建造了30余艘，目前均在中国海军中服役，是中国海军两栖作战部队的中坚力量。

　　072型登陆舰是中国海军两栖作战部队的中坚力量

　　072型登陆舰虽然性能较好，但是受限于传统登陆舰设计，仍需要进行抢滩登陆才能将携带的重型武器送上滩头，这无疑增加了登陆作战时的风险。因此在2000年后，中国海军建造了新型的071船坞登陆舰，这款满载排水量高达20000余吨的船坞登陆舰能够携带4艘726型气垫登陆艇执行登陆作战，能够在短时间内将一个营级规模的海军陆战队送上滩头，并且具备携带2架大型直升机，进行垂直登陆的能力。071型船坞登陆舰服役后，迅速取代了072型登陆舰成为中国海军登陆舰部队的绝对主力，也使得中国海军的登陆作战从二战期间的抢滩登陆模式一跃成为代表世界最先进水平的超视距快速登陆模式。在071型船坞登陆舰服役后，大批072型登陆舰不再担负首批抢滩登陆，夺取滩头登陆场的任务，转为执行夺取滩头登陆场后的后续力量输送任务，以发挥其载重量大，卸载时间快的优点。

　　071船坞登陆舰服役后，中国海军具备了超视距登陆作战能力

　　071船坞登陆舰服役后，中国海军拥有了梦寐以求的快速登陆能力。但是071型船坞登陆舰只能携带2架直升机，无法独立进行大规模的垂直登陆作战。在现代战争中，使用直升机进行垂直登陆作战，可以将空降兵直接投送在敌方的纵深，在对方难以预料的地区和时机登陆，以达成登陆作战更大的突然性。因此，从军事爱好者到中国海军都十分期待有一款能够执行垂直登陆的两栖攻击舰服役，执行全方位的超视距登陆作战。然而，中国海军的直升机种类与数量都不足，没有适合执行此类作战任务的直升机，直接影响到了两栖攻击舰的发展。

　　缺乏直升机，直到现在仍然是一个困扰着中国海军的问题

　　2010年后，随着直-8改进型与直-10的陆续服役，直-20的研制工作稳步推进，新一代两栖攻击舰的设计也开始提上了日程。2012年，075型两栖攻击舰项目正式立项，开始研制。2017年，075型两栖攻击舰已经开工制造，将在2020年前服役。值得一提的是，一直以来，都有人将中国海军两栖攻击舰的型号称为“081型”，其实，真正的081型是中国海军于2007年服役的新型扫雷舰，根本就不是传说中的两栖攻击舰。

　　这才是真正的081型，中国海军新型扫雷舰

　　据称，075型两栖攻击舰排水量为3.6万吨，舰长250米、宽30米，可以携带30余架直升机。有分析称，075型两栖攻击舰采用直通甲板，可同时起飞5~6架直升机，主要包括武直-10、直-8以及直-9。此外，该舰有着宽敞的坞舱，这对于海上运载来说有着极大的优势，可以投放水陆两栖车辆以及各种类型的登陆载具，也正是如此，在该舰服役后中国海军将具备完整的超视距两栖作战能力，能够在极短时间内将大量作战部队投送至登陆地区，对试图破坏祖国统一的分裂主义分子与觊觎中国沿海岛礁的敌国具有强大的威慑力。（作者署名：迷彩派）

 

[Taksama_b_l]

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-11-01/doc-ifynfvar5743794.shtml


中国空军已形成性能优势 战机以2打4照样完胜对手
2017年11月01日 15:38 新浪军事

新浪扶翼 行业专区


　　10月30号，央视《军事纪实》栏目播出了中国空军与某外军最新的空战对抗训练结果。报道称，中方两架来自空军的4代中期型歼-11B战机与外方的4架2代改进型的歼-7PG战机进行了空战对抗。结果显示，尽管外方数量更多，战术得当，飞行员也具有很强的拼搏精神，但最终仍处于劣势。

　　中国歼-11B战机

　　歼-7PG又称歼-7MG，是中国是歼-7P为基础大幅度升级而成。相对于歼-7P，其机动性大增，号称格斗性能提高了84%，整体机动性性能提高了近一半，最大航程增加到2200公里，是FC-1到位前中方为外方提供的最优秀的2代改型战机。外方空军对该型机也十分的满意，认为其机动性仅次于F-16A；其飞行员在接受采访时，曾拍着该机称，只要驾驶它上天，没人能逃脱他的手掌心。

　　论涂装和拍摄水平的重要性之歼-7PG战机

　　中方飞行员对这次对抗的外方飞行员的评价是：对方飞行员战术素养非常高，对各机型的研究比较透彻，作战风格泼辣，是一个强劲的对手。对抗开始了，外方编队的密切配合给中方飞行员带来了不少困扰，但中方仍率先击落对方一架；虽然外方也一度锁定中方一架战机，但却被迅速赶来的另一架中方战机给破坏了。由于规定的对抗时间到，双方结束对抗，宣布双方“互有攻防，握手言和”。但从报道的具体内容看，显然外方处于劣势状态。外方飞行员评价称，歼-7PG与歼-11B是不同的战机，外方飞出了歼-7PG的最好性能（此话并无夸大，歼-10首席试飞员雷强曾称，歼-7战机被该方飞行员飞出了极限性能），但中方的歼-11B飞出了更好的性能。

　　出现这种对抗结果，笔者并不意外。此前歼-11B曾以同样的数量比例（1：2）与国内的歼-8F战机进行对抗，歼-8F依然没有占什么便宜。在大家训练水平相差不大，支援体系相近的情况下，武器的代差是很难弥补的。不要说代差，前面歼-11出国与泰方的JAS-39“鹰狮”战机进行空战对抗，因为在航电、武器性能上弱于对方，在机动性上强于对方，结果在超视距作战中输于对方，在格斗中赢了对方——空战结果与战机性能对比十分的吻合。

　　至于代差，歼-20的飞行员有云，我们的目标就是“横扫4代机”，其在军内的实际对抗结果也确实如此；歼-11B的飞行员称，“代差的鸿沟很多方面是无法弥补的”。美国空军军内的对抗也十分清晰的表明，4代机群面对5代机的时候，几乎没有多少还手之力；格斗的时候还能对抗一下，一旦进入超视距作战或者进入超巡模式，那就是5代机的天下了——类似的话也出现在歼-20战机飞行员口中。

　　我们应该十分庆幸，也应该十分的骄傲，我们拥有当今世界最顶级的战机——歼-20，从此我们可以傲视周边，声称“5代以下，你们都为渣”；即使是俄罗斯的T-50战机，虽然发动机推力更大一些，但却因为只有“入门级”的隐身水平，在与歼-20的对抗中将处于劣势，在俄罗斯成鸡肋，被印度宣称要撤资。

　　T-50的只是刚跨入隐身的门槛

　　今天，面对周边，我们不再是“以弱胜强”，终于也可以“以优胜优”，甚至“以强打弱”。歼-20独坐中门，放眼天下，有几个是对手？其总设计师杨伟最近被选为“XX后补委员”，体现了国家对人才的爱护，他当之无愧。（利刃/晨曦）