Democracy is invented by the Brits and Yankees to keep the rest of the world esp Asia and Africa in check and under their thumbs. These countries can be taken out or invaded based on allegations of human rights abuses and undemocratic practices not to their liking.
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CCP says 'weak' Australia would be first hit in a war over Taiwan
- Thread starter glockman
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Why haven't they invaded sinkieland and liberate us from tyranny?
Singapore is doing a great job of being a fake democracy pandering to almost every western whim and fancy. We can easily join the 5 eyes to become their 6th eye but they also want to be seen as a neutral country.Why haven't they invaded sinkieland and liberate us from tyranny?
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So it's good from the outside but fucked up on the inside.
Well said, you got it in one sentence.
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fuck u mother farker ah tiong.
Go fuck yrslf Indian deepshit. Go back to yr flirty India..
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If Bo Xilai had come to power, China would have broken up like Soviet Union and set back economically 50 years. It’s politics 胜者为王，败者为寇
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China’s plan to hurt Australia’s exports hits major new snag
China’s plan to hurt Australia’s iron ore exports hits major new snag
June 12, 2021 1:35pmChina’s latest threats to cut off Australian iron ore has raised major concerns about the ripple effect on our domestic housing market....
The free market can be a brutal and unforgiving place even when you’re as powerful as the Chinese Communist Party.
This week has made it painfully clear that their plan to drive down the price of Australia’s number one export has backfired — and now they’ve been hit with another devastating supply issue that is likely to drive prices up even further.
Iron ore — a critical ingredient in steelmaking — is now fetching an eye-watering US$217 a tonne after a week of sustained gains. That is more than double the price of what it was a year ago.
The CCP now reckons that by using the latest technology in scrap steel recycling, it can cut our iron ore exports to them in half in the next ten years.
That would be potentially devastating for the Australian economy, as China is still currently buying huge amounts of Australian iron ore.
In the first five months of the year China snapped up 444.9 million tonnes. Over 2020, China bought 81 per cent of all the iron ore Australia shipped overseas.
The export brings in about $136 billion to Australia’s economy a year, and is by far Australia’s largest and most valuable export.
Just over two weeks ago, the price of iron ore dipped below $US200 a tonne after hitting a record high in mid-May, driven by concerns China would intervene to stop speculative behaviour.
Some experts feared a downward slide was on the cards, but this week it has taken a spectacular rebound to another level.
As mining companies prepare to give out big dividends to shareholders and prices continue to climb, China has been hit by yet another problem.
Global supplies of iron ore were already tight, which is a key factor in its rising value amid record demand from China.
China’s iron ore port inventory hit a four-month low last week, while weekly shipment arrivals fell.
But the situation is tipped to get even worse for Beijing in the coming weeks, as the world’s second biggest iron ore exporter, Brazil, is facing more problems.
Brazil’s Vale SA has now halted production at two mines and decommissioned a dam over safety concerns. The closures will reduce its output by 40,000 iron ore tonnes a day, it said.
The Latin American nation’s output was already suffering because of a dam collapse and the pandemic, but this added spanner in the works means it may take much longer for the mining industry there to get back on its feet.
China is still producing record levels of steel. Picture: China Daily/Reuters Source: Reuters
This is the last thing China needs to hear as it looks to turn away from Australia’s supplies amid trade tensions.
Another issue is that the steel industry is booming like never before as the global economy recovers from the pandemic — with mills in turn making huge profits.
Steel in the US has tripled in 12 months as the swifter-than-expected economic recovery caught producers by surprise, while in China futures reached a record after authorities pledged to lower output in a push to control emissions.
“The sharpness and speed of the moves has been something like I’ve never seen before,” Phil Gibbs, an analyst at Keybanc Capital Markets told Bloomberg.
“I’ve been covering this space now close to 15 years, so I’ve seen some pretty crazy runs.”
This unexpected boom makes it almost impossible for China to stop buying Australia’s iron ore in the short term as it looks to continue its record steel output.
The sharp rebound through the start of June has forced a rethink of just how effectively China can tamp down soaring prices.
“The jawboning from China has historically not had much success,” Tribeca Global Natural Resources portfolio manager Ben Cleary told theAustralian Financial Review.
“All the fundamentals are pretty strong. Steel producer margins are at multi-decade highs and I can’t see demand dissipating anytime soon. We’re at the start of fiscal stimulus, not the end, so I think over the northern hemisphere summer, things should remain quite strong.”
Dumbtwit poon pe pe. Every war is different.
UrArseA only bully armless countries and weapons bought from them too like Iraq.
What so great of many years as bully and no war dare not touch Russia with nuclear power.
China do have nuclear bombs power.
go fuck yrslf ownslf defend ownself...
Try China with carrier this time.
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The ChiCons keep threatening fuckein island n it's neighbours. And also it's antics in SCS etc It's obvious that Winnie is trying to stir shit with everyone n distract the tiongs with the ChiCons land domestic issues.
Right now ChiCon land looks super powerful etc etc. But look at the last war the ChiCons were in. They were defeated by a numerical inferior foe. N it was an overland invasion etc. Unless the ChiCons just use missiles n blow up the fuckein island ..or the fuckeins just surrender.. ChiCons will pay a damn heavy price n Winnie will be overthrown. In addition the ChiCons greatest weakness is Winnie bcos all dictators fear lost of power n the guillotine. So I doubt Winnie will do anything extreme besides sabre rattling.
By Nguyen Minh Quang
February 23, 2017
Anti-China protester Anh Chi prays at the grave of Nguyen Xuan Chinh, who died during the border war of China and Vietnam, at a military cemetery outside Hanoi (February 16, 2014). Credit: REUTERS/Kham
Almost 40 years after a short yet devastating war launched by China in 1979, there has been not any official commemoration of the war in Vietnam. The fierce fight from February 17 to March 16, 1979, claimed tens of thousands of lives, soldiers and civilians alike, in Vietnam’s border provinces, but the conflict hasn’t received the same level of attention as wars against the French and Americans.
Yet since the escalation of tensions with China in the South China Sea in recent years, the Sino-Vietnamese war has begun receiving renewed media attention. For this year’s anniversary, Vietnamese people used social media to vocally commemorate martyrs and civilians who died in the war, followed by debates criticizing the government for remaining silent and neglecting the war in high school history textbooks.
The Road to War
On February 17, 1979, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops crossed Vietnam’s northern border to invade the country, waging a bloody strike along the 600-kilometer border that the two nations share. From the standpoint of historians, China’s month-long invasion of Vietnam is understood to as a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies undertaken by Hanoi.
Historically, China had previously given Hanoi steadfast support against U.S. forces in the Vietnam War. But their comradeship swiftly began to deteriorate in the mid-1970s, especially when Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (USSR) – then China’s greatest rival – in 1978. China called the treaty a military alliance and branded Vietnam the “Cuba of the East,” pursuing hegemonistic “imperial dreams” in Southeast Asia.
In December 1978, Vietnam began a full-scale counter-attack against Kampuchea (today’s Cambodia), whose armed forces had launched a number of unilateral clashes along the Cambodia-Vietnamese land and maritime boundaries between 1975 and 1977, leaving more than 30,000 Vietnamese civilians dead. Vietnam’s incursions into China-friendly Kampuchea, which quickly eradicated the genocidal pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge regime, coupled with its intimacy with the Soviet Union, which was massively building up forces on China’s northern border, appeared to threaten China’s security and interests in the region. Thus, China’s leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, had good reason to urge the government to teach a proper lesson to the Vietnamese.
It’s worth noting that, even prior to the war proper, incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border had increased in frequency and violence since mid-1978 when Deng came to power and began consolidating his paramount leadership by creating an effective tripod – control of the state, control of the Communist Party, and control of the military. Deng had seen off the rival threat posed by the ultra-Maoist Gang of Four (headed by Mao’s fourth wife, Jiang Qing) and his well-reasoned strategy to modernize China required the removal of obstructionist Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cadres. Thus, some historians have speculated that a war was necessary to support Deng’s modernization plans by highlighting the technological deficiencies of the PLA and keeping the army preoccupied. The war brought Deng precious time in his first full year in charge to cement his own power in Beijing, eliminating leftist rivals from the Maoist era. Combat with the Vietnamese proved to be the PLA’s blood test.
On August 25, 1978, Chinese troops crossed the border to Vietnam to assault officers, women, and local people. Le Dinh Chinh, a local policeman, fought back with his bare hands and was stabbed to death by a group of Chinese. Chinh is thus known as the first Vietnamese soldier who fell in Vietnam’s fight against the Chinese invasion. This incident sent an ominous signal of a looming armed conflict between the two brothers. After a few months of serious and careful preparation for a military ground campaign against Vietnam, in the pre-dawn hours of February 17, Chinese spearheads, supported by 400 tanks and 1,500 artillery pieces, concurrently attacked in the direction of Vietnam’s border provincial capitals, when residents living there were still sleeping.
Owning to its large population and the huge disparity in economic and military capacity vis-à-vis Vietnam, the PLA relied on “human waves” of ragtag soldiers, a tactic used nearly three decades before during the Korean War, and a “scorched-earth” policy to conquer Vietnam. These tactics enabled Chinese soldiers to completely destroy everything in their paths, overrun population centers, and occupy strategically important mountainous areas and high spots along the boundary. These areas then became sites of low-profile yet deadly conflicts, which took place throughout the following decade.
In early March 1979, China suddenly declared its “lesson” to Vietnam was finished and began to withdraw completely on March 16. But, in fact, its campaign was not over. Right after the war, China launched another semi-public campaign that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. On the one hand, the PLA maintained a level of steady harassment through artillery fire, intrusions by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in inland waterways. On the other hand, China pursued psychological warfare operations to sabotage Vietnam’s attempts to restore its war-torn border economic centers by igniting anti-Vietnamese sentiments among the border ethnic minorities and encouraging them to engage illicit activities like smuggling.
The 1979 war and armed clashes that flared over border disputes in the subsequent years resulted in a heavy toll in terms of both casualties and economic losses for both sides. Though neither side publicized its casualties and the exact figures remain unclear, Western estimates run as high as 28,000 Chinese dead and 43,000 wounded, while the number of Vietnamese dead were estimated at under 10,000.
Post-War Era: Trying to Forget a Tragic Past
Since the full normalization of the China-Vietnam relationship in late 1991, though Hanoi and Beijing both claimed victory, state media on both sides have remained quiet on the war, barely mentioning it on commemorative occasions and seeking to deflect questions. But historians, diplomats, veterans, and local civilians in both sides have not forgotten. Despite official silence, every February debates about the conflict still rage online in both China and Vietnam. In China, some social media users question whether it was worth sacrificing thousands of Chinese lives to support the Khmer Rouge butchers. Other ardent Chinese nationalists downplay the Khmer Rouge factor and instead justify the war by citing Vietnam’s oppression of Hoa people (ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam), and Hanoi’s supposed hegemonic dreams of dominating Indochina with the backing of the USSR.
In Vietnam, low-profile anniversaries of the fierce fight against the Chinese invasion are organized each year in local cemeteries in the northern border provinces while small-scale demonstrations have occurred in Hanoi. Vietnamese veterans, military enthusiasts, historians, and diplomats have also urged the government to reconsider their decades of deliberate silence; such advocates call on Hanoi to highlight the facts of the war to help people all over the world, including the Chinese, fully understand what really happened. In 2013, Major-General Le Van Cuong, former director of the Strategy Institute under the Ministry of Public Security, and other retired politicians told state media it was time to review the official commemorations of this war. In particular, the government must include the war in textbooks.
“Thousands of people have lost their lives to protect the land in the north. Why do we have no words for them? It’s late and can’t be later… We cannot have a vague view or ignore this historic issue,” Cuong said.
Duong Danh Dy, first secretary of the Vietnamese embassy in China in 1979, wrote that Vietnam’s reticence to discuss the war was motivated by the greater cause of fostering amity between the neighboring nations. The government’s silence is “not because we were not on the right side, and not because the Vietnamese people are scared or quick to forget,” he explained.
But young academics are deeply concerned that a majority of students today do not know about this war. “While information about Vietnam’s just defensive war against China’s 1979 aggression remains little and vague, the Vietnamese youth have long been surrounded by movies that advertise and diffuse Chinese culture and history. It will be the government’s responsibility if this situation lasts longer,” said Pham Duc Thuan, a 30-year-old history lecturer at Can Tho University.
Apparently, both the Vietnamese and Chinese publics are looking forward to clear and straightforward information about the nature of the war from their respective governments. For the Chinese people, they need to know the actual ambitions behind a war that seems motivated much more by the Deng-led government’s political interests than the excuses offered by pugnacious nationalists. For the Vietnamese, they want “justice” for those martyrs who lost their lives in the tragic defensive fight, but have since been forgotten by the government.
It’s understandable that neither state wishes to stoke any expressions of strident nationalism among their people. Both China and Vietnam are keen to confine the period of unhappiness to their past while creating a bright future together by deepening bilateral economic interdependence. In 1999, eight years after full normalization, the Sino-Vietnamese land border disputes were successfully settled by the Treaty of Land Border signed in December. That same year, leaders of both nations agreed on the “16-golden-word motto” that would guide relations between the two countries: “long-term stability and future orientation, friendly neighborhood, comprehensive cooperation.” In 2000, China’s then Communist Party Chief Jiang Zemin explained that the motto, among other things, means both sides should close down the sad past and look forward to a brighter future for China-Vietnam ties.
Whose Victory, Whose Responsibility?
However, while the Vietnamese government has seriously committed to this pledge by suppressing memories of the war, the Chinese population and leadership, after decades of miseducation, seem convinced that China was on the right side in the 1979 war. China claims the war as “a victory,” with all missions completed. This view is not supported by evidence and analyses undertaken by outside observers and strategists. Scholars like Gerald Segal, Bruce Elleman, and Carlyle Thayer agreed that China’s 1979 war was a complete failure. First, Deng and his generals failed to induce Vietnam to withdraw regular forces from Cambodia and thereby relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge. Second, Beijing also sought to engage main force Vietnamese units near the border and destroy them. But Vietnam largely held its main forces in reserve and mainly used its militia and local forces to defend against China; thereby China further failed to dispel its image as a paper tiger. Third, it also failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition.
Two other major goals behind China’s attack were to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud and ruin Vietnam’s northern defense system and economic infrastructure. In this respect, Beijing’s policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. It also succeeded in totally destroying most of villages and major provincial capitals such as Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son, but not in a few days as anticipated and scheduled by Deng and his men. It took three weeks of heavy fighting and severe casualties. With the conflict viewed in this light, Thayer told BBC Vietnamese that China was the aggressor, not Vietnam, in the 1979 war.
Final Remarks
Almost four decades on since China waged a massive and costly invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, the deliberate oblivion of this history by both Hanoi and Beijing has triggered growing public disapproval in both countries. Though both governments claimed victory, the war was a chastening experience for all involved.
Chinese people’s misunderstanding of the nature of the war, mainly caused by Beijing’s steely and unrelenting efforts to control information, and history in particular, appears to be a major obstacle to resolving the debates and alleviating mutually hostile sentiments between the two peoples.
Since the conflict was fought entirely on Vietnamese territory, it runs contrary to the ruling Communist Party’s prevailing narratives of a China that never threatens or attacks its neighbors. China’s propaganda machine has attached an ungainly and unconvincing name to the conflict, the “Self-Defensive Counterattack Against Vietnam.” It is also generally held by outside scholars that if the war did not produce an outright defeat for China, it was a costly mistake fought for dubious purposes, including Deng’s political ambitions, and a desire to punish Vietnam for overthrowing Pol Pot, a Chinese ally who was one of the world’s bloodiest tyrants. Thus, the difficulty for China is how to commemorate the controversial war without raising questions about the veracity of Deng’s claim of having achieved all China’s goals.
For Vietnam, even though it has witnessed some relative stability and economic improvement in its war-torn northern border provinces thanks to strongly growing cross-border trade revenue, it pays to remain vigilant. Because of geographical proximity, the Vietnamese people have been forced to cope with repeated Chinese invasions, followed by centuries-long suzerainty, in the course of history. Thus, the 1979 border war, once again, reminded the country to keep in mind who the permanent, ominous foe is.
However, remembering the forgotten war in 1979 does not have to mean igniting national hostilities. Rather, commemorations should provide justice for those soldiers and victims of both sides who lost their lives due to misjudgments and miscalculations of ambitious leaders.
Accordingly, China and Vietnam should both pigeon-hole their tragic past and seriously study the dear lessons drawn from the 1979 war to avoid the same mistakes in the future. More importantly, once the actual facts and nature of the war are acknowledged with constructive and sympathetic perspectives from both sides, the two sides can consider the use of “historical compensation” to adjust public opinion towards each other. As long as the mutual suspicion between the two peoples remains unsettled, China-Vietnam bilateral ties will be unable to develop substantially and smoothly, no matter how much official jargon glorifies the relationship.
Nguyen Minh Quang is a lecturer at School of Education, Can Tho University, focusing on conflict studies and Mekong Delta environmental security issues. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of Can Tho University.
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Right now ChiCon land looks super powerful etc etc. But look at the last war the ChiCons were in. They were defeated by a numerical inferior foe. N it was an overland invasion etc. Unless the ChiCons just use missiles n blow up the fuckein island ..or the fuckeins just surrender.. ChiCons will pay a damn heavy price n Winnie will be overthrown. In addition the ChiCons greatest weakness is Winnie bcos all dictators fear lost of power n the guillotine. So I doubt Winnie will do anything extreme besides sabre rattling.
The Bitter Legacy of the 1979 China-Vietnam War
Officially, both sides have tried to forget the bloody conflict. Unofficially, bitterness still runs deep.By Nguyen Minh Quang
February 23, 2017
Almost 40 years after a short yet devastating war launched by China in 1979, there has been not any official commemoration of the war in Vietnam. The fierce fight from February 17 to March 16, 1979, claimed tens of thousands of lives, soldiers and civilians alike, in Vietnam’s border provinces, but the conflict hasn’t received the same level of attention as wars against the French and Americans.
Yet since the escalation of tensions with China in the South China Sea in recent years, the Sino-Vietnamese war has begun receiving renewed media attention. For this year’s anniversary, Vietnamese people used social media to vocally commemorate martyrs and civilians who died in the war, followed by debates criticizing the government for remaining silent and neglecting the war in high school history textbooks.
The Road to War
On February 17, 1979, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops crossed Vietnam’s northern border to invade the country, waging a bloody strike along the 600-kilometer border that the two nations share. From the standpoint of historians, China’s month-long invasion of Vietnam is understood to as a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies undertaken by Hanoi.
Historically, China had previously given Hanoi steadfast support against U.S. forces in the Vietnam War. But their comradeship swiftly began to deteriorate in the mid-1970s, especially when Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (USSR) – then China’s greatest rival – in 1978. China called the treaty a military alliance and branded Vietnam the “Cuba of the East,” pursuing hegemonistic “imperial dreams” in Southeast Asia.
In December 1978, Vietnam began a full-scale counter-attack against Kampuchea (today’s Cambodia), whose armed forces had launched a number of unilateral clashes along the Cambodia-Vietnamese land and maritime boundaries between 1975 and 1977, leaving more than 30,000 Vietnamese civilians dead. Vietnam’s incursions into China-friendly Kampuchea, which quickly eradicated the genocidal pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge regime, coupled with its intimacy with the Soviet Union, which was massively building up forces on China’s northern border, appeared to threaten China’s security and interests in the region. Thus, China’s leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, had good reason to urge the government to teach a proper lesson to the Vietnamese.
It’s worth noting that, even prior to the war proper, incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border had increased in frequency and violence since mid-1978 when Deng came to power and began consolidating his paramount leadership by creating an effective tripod – control of the state, control of the Communist Party, and control of the military. Deng had seen off the rival threat posed by the ultra-Maoist Gang of Four (headed by Mao’s fourth wife, Jiang Qing) and his well-reasoned strategy to modernize China required the removal of obstructionist Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cadres. Thus, some historians have speculated that a war was necessary to support Deng’s modernization plans by highlighting the technological deficiencies of the PLA and keeping the army preoccupied. The war brought Deng precious time in his first full year in charge to cement his own power in Beijing, eliminating leftist rivals from the Maoist era. Combat with the Vietnamese proved to be the PLA’s blood test.
On August 25, 1978, Chinese troops crossed the border to Vietnam to assault officers, women, and local people. Le Dinh Chinh, a local policeman, fought back with his bare hands and was stabbed to death by a group of Chinese. Chinh is thus known as the first Vietnamese soldier who fell in Vietnam’s fight against the Chinese invasion. This incident sent an ominous signal of a looming armed conflict between the two brothers. After a few months of serious and careful preparation for a military ground campaign against Vietnam, in the pre-dawn hours of February 17, Chinese spearheads, supported by 400 tanks and 1,500 artillery pieces, concurrently attacked in the direction of Vietnam’s border provincial capitals, when residents living there were still sleeping.
Owning to its large population and the huge disparity in economic and military capacity vis-à-vis Vietnam, the PLA relied on “human waves” of ragtag soldiers, a tactic used nearly three decades before during the Korean War, and a “scorched-earth” policy to conquer Vietnam. These tactics enabled Chinese soldiers to completely destroy everything in their paths, overrun population centers, and occupy strategically important mountainous areas and high spots along the boundary. These areas then became sites of low-profile yet deadly conflicts, which took place throughout the following decade.
In early March 1979, China suddenly declared its “lesson” to Vietnam was finished and began to withdraw completely on March 16. But, in fact, its campaign was not over. Right after the war, China launched another semi-public campaign that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. On the one hand, the PLA maintained a level of steady harassment through artillery fire, intrusions by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in inland waterways. On the other hand, China pursued psychological warfare operations to sabotage Vietnam’s attempts to restore its war-torn border economic centers by igniting anti-Vietnamese sentiments among the border ethnic minorities and encouraging them to engage illicit activities like smuggling.
The 1979 war and armed clashes that flared over border disputes in the subsequent years resulted in a heavy toll in terms of both casualties and economic losses for both sides. Though neither side publicized its casualties and the exact figures remain unclear, Western estimates run as high as 28,000 Chinese dead and 43,000 wounded, while the number of Vietnamese dead were estimated at under 10,000.
Post-War Era: Trying to Forget a Tragic Past
Since the full normalization of the China-Vietnam relationship in late 1991, though Hanoi and Beijing both claimed victory, state media on both sides have remained quiet on the war, barely mentioning it on commemorative occasions and seeking to deflect questions. But historians, diplomats, veterans, and local civilians in both sides have not forgotten. Despite official silence, every February debates about the conflict still rage online in both China and Vietnam. In China, some social media users question whether it was worth sacrificing thousands of Chinese lives to support the Khmer Rouge butchers. Other ardent Chinese nationalists downplay the Khmer Rouge factor and instead justify the war by citing Vietnam’s oppression of Hoa people (ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam), and Hanoi’s supposed hegemonic dreams of dominating Indochina with the backing of the USSR.
In Vietnam, low-profile anniversaries of the fierce fight against the Chinese invasion are organized each year in local cemeteries in the northern border provinces while small-scale demonstrations have occurred in Hanoi. Vietnamese veterans, military enthusiasts, historians, and diplomats have also urged the government to reconsider their decades of deliberate silence; such advocates call on Hanoi to highlight the facts of the war to help people all over the world, including the Chinese, fully understand what really happened. In 2013, Major-General Le Van Cuong, former director of the Strategy Institute under the Ministry of Public Security, and other retired politicians told state media it was time to review the official commemorations of this war. In particular, the government must include the war in textbooks.
“Thousands of people have lost their lives to protect the land in the north. Why do we have no words for them? It’s late and can’t be later… We cannot have a vague view or ignore this historic issue,” Cuong said.
Duong Danh Dy, first secretary of the Vietnamese embassy in China in 1979, wrote that Vietnam’s reticence to discuss the war was motivated by the greater cause of fostering amity between the neighboring nations. The government’s silence is “not because we were not on the right side, and not because the Vietnamese people are scared or quick to forget,” he explained.
But young academics are deeply concerned that a majority of students today do not know about this war. “While information about Vietnam’s just defensive war against China’s 1979 aggression remains little and vague, the Vietnamese youth have long been surrounded by movies that advertise and diffuse Chinese culture and history. It will be the government’s responsibility if this situation lasts longer,” said Pham Duc Thuan, a 30-year-old history lecturer at Can Tho University.
Apparently, both the Vietnamese and Chinese publics are looking forward to clear and straightforward information about the nature of the war from their respective governments. For the Chinese people, they need to know the actual ambitions behind a war that seems motivated much more by the Deng-led government’s political interests than the excuses offered by pugnacious nationalists. For the Vietnamese, they want “justice” for those martyrs who lost their lives in the tragic defensive fight, but have since been forgotten by the government.
It’s understandable that neither state wishes to stoke any expressions of strident nationalism among their people. Both China and Vietnam are keen to confine the period of unhappiness to their past while creating a bright future together by deepening bilateral economic interdependence. In 1999, eight years after full normalization, the Sino-Vietnamese land border disputes were successfully settled by the Treaty of Land Border signed in December. That same year, leaders of both nations agreed on the “16-golden-word motto” that would guide relations between the two countries: “long-term stability and future orientation, friendly neighborhood, comprehensive cooperation.” In 2000, China’s then Communist Party Chief Jiang Zemin explained that the motto, among other things, means both sides should close down the sad past and look forward to a brighter future for China-Vietnam ties.
Whose Victory, Whose Responsibility?
However, while the Vietnamese government has seriously committed to this pledge by suppressing memories of the war, the Chinese population and leadership, after decades of miseducation, seem convinced that China was on the right side in the 1979 war. China claims the war as “a victory,” with all missions completed. This view is not supported by evidence and analyses undertaken by outside observers and strategists. Scholars like Gerald Segal, Bruce Elleman, and Carlyle Thayer agreed that China’s 1979 war was a complete failure. First, Deng and his generals failed to induce Vietnam to withdraw regular forces from Cambodia and thereby relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge. Second, Beijing also sought to engage main force Vietnamese units near the border and destroy them. But Vietnam largely held its main forces in reserve and mainly used its militia and local forces to defend against China; thereby China further failed to dispel its image as a paper tiger. Third, it also failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition.
Two other major goals behind China’s attack were to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud and ruin Vietnam’s northern defense system and economic infrastructure. In this respect, Beijing’s policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. It also succeeded in totally destroying most of villages and major provincial capitals such as Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son, but not in a few days as anticipated and scheduled by Deng and his men. It took three weeks of heavy fighting and severe casualties. With the conflict viewed in this light, Thayer told BBC Vietnamese that China was the aggressor, not Vietnam, in the 1979 war.
Final Remarks
Almost four decades on since China waged a massive and costly invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, the deliberate oblivion of this history by both Hanoi and Beijing has triggered growing public disapproval in both countries. Though both governments claimed victory, the war was a chastening experience for all involved.
Chinese people’s misunderstanding of the nature of the war, mainly caused by Beijing’s steely and unrelenting efforts to control information, and history in particular, appears to be a major obstacle to resolving the debates and alleviating mutually hostile sentiments between the two peoples.
Since the conflict was fought entirely on Vietnamese territory, it runs contrary to the ruling Communist Party’s prevailing narratives of a China that never threatens or attacks its neighbors. China’s propaganda machine has attached an ungainly and unconvincing name to the conflict, the “Self-Defensive Counterattack Against Vietnam.” It is also generally held by outside scholars that if the war did not produce an outright defeat for China, it was a costly mistake fought for dubious purposes, including Deng’s political ambitions, and a desire to punish Vietnam for overthrowing Pol Pot, a Chinese ally who was one of the world’s bloodiest tyrants. Thus, the difficulty for China is how to commemorate the controversial war without raising questions about the veracity of Deng’s claim of having achieved all China’s goals.
For Vietnam, even though it has witnessed some relative stability and economic improvement in its war-torn northern border provinces thanks to strongly growing cross-border trade revenue, it pays to remain vigilant. Because of geographical proximity, the Vietnamese people have been forced to cope with repeated Chinese invasions, followed by centuries-long suzerainty, in the course of history. Thus, the 1979 border war, once again, reminded the country to keep in mind who the permanent, ominous foe is.
However, remembering the forgotten war in 1979 does not have to mean igniting national hostilities. Rather, commemorations should provide justice for those soldiers and victims of both sides who lost their lives due to misjudgments and miscalculations of ambitious leaders.
Accordingly, China and Vietnam should both pigeon-hole their tragic past and seriously study the dear lessons drawn from the 1979 war to avoid the same mistakes in the future. More importantly, once the actual facts and nature of the war are acknowledged with constructive and sympathetic perspectives from both sides, the two sides can consider the use of “historical compensation” to adjust public opinion towards each other. As long as the mutual suspicion between the two peoples remains unsettled, China-Vietnam bilateral ties will be unable to develop substantially and smoothly, no matter how much official jargon glorifies the relationship.
Nguyen Minh Quang is a lecturer at School of Education, Can Tho University, focusing on conflict studies and Mekong Delta environmental security issues. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of Can Tho University.
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The ChiCons lost the Vietnam war?
Key Point: Beijing may have lost the war, but it won in the long-run. Here's how the conflict helped birth painful but necessary military reforms in the PLA.
Chinese operations against Vietnam in the 1980s are often divided into four phases. In the first, the Chinese and Vietnamese further entrenched their positions along the border. This lasted until 1981. The second and third phase consisted of escalating offensive operations across the border from 1981 to 1987, gradually increasing in intensity. The last phase involved the PLA’s withdrawal from the border region. The political objectives of the Chinese incursions were to “punish” Vietnam for its continued belligerence towards Thailand and Cambodia. Since Vietnamese troops were going into Cambodia, Chinese troops would continue to do the same. Militarily, China saw the border conflict as a way to evolve the PLA from an antiquated fighting force to a modern one, by testing new doctrines and equipment on the border.
This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
The PLA’s performance in the 1979 war was so bad, even Vietnamese commanders were surprised, according to some sources. This was a result of its reliance on Korean War–style infantry assault tactics, due to the operational inflexibility and stagnation of military thought in the PLA. The layout of the command structure, and the infrastructure that supported it, could not support maneuver warfare by smaller units of higher-quality forces.
Following the 1979 war, many reforms and reorganizations occurred within the PLA. Old leadership was removed, and a fresh set of new officers was brought in. Finally, in 1984 the situation presented itself for a test of these reforms. Late in 1983, Deng Xiaoping met with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The prince wanted help, as Vietnamese soldiers were making significant gains inside of Cambodia. As a result, Deng decided to mobilize the PLA for a significant offensive operation in 1984. The offensive’s objectives were to capture the areas of Laoshan and Zheyinshan. After preparatory barrages throughout most of April 1984, the ground offensive was finally launched on April 28. Five infantry regiments assaulted hilltop positions around Laoshan, taking them one by one. This was not a total success story, as these regiments took heavy casualties and used inflexible tactics similar to 1979. The two regiments assigned to assault Zheyinshan fared better. Flexible command allowed the attacks to be postponed until the opportune time, and the attack was a great success, with all Vietnamese positions being captured. The divisional commander in charge of those regiments was soon promoted to command the Eleventh Army, and the attack was cited as a textbook example of what the PLA could now accomplish.
The Vietnamese launched counterattacks in the MD-84 Campaign in an attempt to reclaim the positions they lost in the Laoshan offensive. Counterattacks occurred against the Chinese positions at Laoshan throughout June and July. After-action reports from these offensives suggest that Chinese military modernization proved to be a possible reason for success. Vietnamese veterans recalled being shelled by Chinese artillery even at nighttime, due to the deployment of new Chinese night-vision devices to the frontline. In addition, Chinese logistics achieved new levels of efficiency. One Chinese artillery commander remarked that in repelling the counterattacks, he could execute as many fire missions as he wished without worrying about ammunition supply for the first time in his career.
Operations in the Laoshan sector also were the catalyst for the development of greater direct-action capability among the PLA’s reconnaissance units. After a Vietnamese Dac Cong commando unit destroyed a PLA counterbattery radar in 1984, Deng Xiaoping asked the PLA General Staff to create similar capabilities. All Chinese military regions were ordered to organize reconnaissance brigades, which were then rotated throughout the Laoshan sector. Fifteen reconnaissance brigades were created, three to five of which were deployed to the sector at any given time. These brigades were very active in raiding rear areas, and experience gained by them was later used by the PLA to help create their own special-operations forces.
Overall, while the Sino-Vietnamese border wars might have seemed insignificant, they proved to be an effective testing ground for the PLA’s reforms. Trials by fire in the Laoshan sector allowed the PLA to grow a new cadre of forward-thinking leadership. New technologies and organizational structures were also trialed and reformed, and combat experience was gained that lead to the creation of Chinese SOF. In one Chinese general’s words, the border conflict “allowed him to achieve his dream of waging modern war by modern methods.” The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 can be seen as the crucible in which the modern PLA was born, reformed from the lumbering army that attacked Vietnam in 1979.
Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
Image: Reuters
Shocking Defeat: How China Lost to Vietnam in 1979
A trial by fire.Key Point: Beijing may have lost the war, but it won in the long-run. Here's how the conflict helped birth painful but necessary military reforms in the PLA.
Chinese operations against Vietnam in the 1980s are often divided into four phases. In the first, the Chinese and Vietnamese further entrenched their positions along the border. This lasted until 1981. The second and third phase consisted of escalating offensive operations across the border from 1981 to 1987, gradually increasing in intensity. The last phase involved the PLA’s withdrawal from the border region. The political objectives of the Chinese incursions were to “punish” Vietnam for its continued belligerence towards Thailand and Cambodia. Since Vietnamese troops were going into Cambodia, Chinese troops would continue to do the same. Militarily, China saw the border conflict as a way to evolve the PLA from an antiquated fighting force to a modern one, by testing new doctrines and equipment on the border.
This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
The PLA’s performance in the 1979 war was so bad, even Vietnamese commanders were surprised, according to some sources. This was a result of its reliance on Korean War–style infantry assault tactics, due to the operational inflexibility and stagnation of military thought in the PLA. The layout of the command structure, and the infrastructure that supported it, could not support maneuver warfare by smaller units of higher-quality forces.
Following the 1979 war, many reforms and reorganizations occurred within the PLA. Old leadership was removed, and a fresh set of new officers was brought in. Finally, in 1984 the situation presented itself for a test of these reforms. Late in 1983, Deng Xiaoping met with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The prince wanted help, as Vietnamese soldiers were making significant gains inside of Cambodia. As a result, Deng decided to mobilize the PLA for a significant offensive operation in 1984. The offensive’s objectives were to capture the areas of Laoshan and Zheyinshan. After preparatory barrages throughout most of April 1984, the ground offensive was finally launched on April 28. Five infantry regiments assaulted hilltop positions around Laoshan, taking them one by one. This was not a total success story, as these regiments took heavy casualties and used inflexible tactics similar to 1979. The two regiments assigned to assault Zheyinshan fared better. Flexible command allowed the attacks to be postponed until the opportune time, and the attack was a great success, with all Vietnamese positions being captured. The divisional commander in charge of those regiments was soon promoted to command the Eleventh Army, and the attack was cited as a textbook example of what the PLA could now accomplish.
The Vietnamese launched counterattacks in the MD-84 Campaign in an attempt to reclaim the positions they lost in the Laoshan offensive. Counterattacks occurred against the Chinese positions at Laoshan throughout June and July. After-action reports from these offensives suggest that Chinese military modernization proved to be a possible reason for success. Vietnamese veterans recalled being shelled by Chinese artillery even at nighttime, due to the deployment of new Chinese night-vision devices to the frontline. In addition, Chinese logistics achieved new levels of efficiency. One Chinese artillery commander remarked that in repelling the counterattacks, he could execute as many fire missions as he wished without worrying about ammunition supply for the first time in his career.
Operations in the Laoshan sector also were the catalyst for the development of greater direct-action capability among the PLA’s reconnaissance units. After a Vietnamese Dac Cong commando unit destroyed a PLA counterbattery radar in 1984, Deng Xiaoping asked the PLA General Staff to create similar capabilities. All Chinese military regions were ordered to organize reconnaissance brigades, which were then rotated throughout the Laoshan sector. Fifteen reconnaissance brigades were created, three to five of which were deployed to the sector at any given time. These brigades were very active in raiding rear areas, and experience gained by them was later used by the PLA to help create their own special-operations forces.
Overall, while the Sino-Vietnamese border wars might have seemed insignificant, they proved to be an effective testing ground for the PLA’s reforms. Trials by fire in the Laoshan sector allowed the PLA to grow a new cadre of forward-thinking leadership. New technologies and organizational structures were also trialed and reformed, and combat experience was gained that lead to the creation of Chinese SOF. In one Chinese general’s words, the border conflict “allowed him to achieve his dream of waging modern war by modern methods.” The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 can be seen as the crucible in which the modern PLA was born, reformed from the lumbering army that attacked Vietnam in 1979.
Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
Image: Reuters
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Spoken by a fucked-up cuntry that hasn't fought a war in over 70 years.
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ChiCons sure r desperate to even lie about the 79 war. N Viet Cong land invade ChiCon land? A small country invade the all Powderful ChiCons? N the tiongs believe tat?
Be ‘accurate, objective’ with history, Vietnam tells China - VnExpress International
By Vu Anh
Thu 10/7/2021, 09:52 pm (GMT+7)
Vietnam has stressed the need for looking at history ‘accurately and objectively’ and for countries to build a future of friendly, cooperative, equitable development of all nations.
Be ‘accurate, objective’ with history, Vietnam tells China
A still from Chinese drama series "Ace Troops".
Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang made this comment Thursday while responding to questions about a Chinese TV series that is allegedly premised upon inaccurate history and wrongful depictions.
She said Vietnam requests that China properly abides by the "mutual awareness of high-level leadership" of both countries regarding "friendly and objective propaganda that fosters societal foundations beneficial for the development of both countries' relations."
The historical inaccuracies were detected after comments made on social media platform Bidu regarding a trailer for a TV serial called "Ace Troops" described the story as being set in the 1980s when "the Vietnamese army was getting stronger... and launching invasions into China."
Chinese website Manyanu said the series was about "Chinese soldiers in a self-defence counterattack against Vietnam," which is completely contrary to facts.
Vietnamese netizens have pointed out that the clothes worn by the actors in the trailer match those of Chinese soldiers when they invaded Vietnam in 1979.
Hang said Vietnam's consistent stance on historical issues is to "look towards the future" and to look at history accurately and objectively.
Vietnam desires practical actions that contribute to friendly and cooperative relationships between and development of all countries in the world, she added.
Send mail to author
Be ‘accurate, objective’ with history, Vietnam tells China - VnExpress International
By Vu Anh
Thu 10/7/2021, 09:52 pm (GMT+7)
Vietnam has stressed the need for looking at history ‘accurately and objectively’ and for countries to build a future of friendly, cooperative, equitable development of all nations.
Be ‘accurate, objective’ with history, Vietnam tells China
A still from Chinese drama series "Ace Troops".
Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang made this comment Thursday while responding to questions about a Chinese TV series that is allegedly premised upon inaccurate history and wrongful depictions.
She said Vietnam requests that China properly abides by the "mutual awareness of high-level leadership" of both countries regarding "friendly and objective propaganda that fosters societal foundations beneficial for the development of both countries' relations."
The historical inaccuracies were detected after comments made on social media platform Bidu regarding a trailer for a TV serial called "Ace Troops" described the story as being set in the 1980s when "the Vietnamese army was getting stronger... and launching invasions into China."
Chinese website Manyanu said the series was about "Chinese soldiers in a self-defence counterattack against Vietnam," which is completely contrary to facts.
Vietnamese netizens have pointed out that the clothes worn by the actors in the trailer match those of Chinese soldiers when they invaded Vietnam in 1979.
Hang said Vietnam's consistent stance on historical issues is to "look towards the future" and to look at history accurately and objectively.
Vietnam desires practical actions that contribute to friendly and cooperative relationships between and development of all countries in the world, she added.
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democracy was invented by the greeks so that anyone with an alpha dick could act and behave like a king. no more bloodlines to assume throne.
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