http://singaporeuncletrader.wordpre...ropped-its-collective-pants-to-china-via-fta/
Temasek Hedge, 31 Dec 2009
ASEAN has just dropped its collective pants to China via FTA
Economic recovery on horizon, right? Everyone getting ready for inflation, no? Stocks are expected to go up 20% at least in 2010?
Well, contrarian that I am, the forecast that I’m making for 2010 for ASEAN economies is that things will get worse (for those who follow the teachings of Anthony Robbins, Rhonda Byrne, or their MLM upline mentor, please stop reading now).
Here’s an interesting read from BT, “China’s growing power unsettles its neighbours”
Temasek Hedge, 31 Dec 2009
ASEAN has just dropped its collective pants to China via FTA
Economic recovery on horizon, right? Everyone getting ready for inflation, no? Stocks are expected to go up 20% at least in 2010?
Well, contrarian that I am, the forecast that I’m making for 2010 for ASEAN economies is that things will get worse (for those who follow the teachings of Anthony Robbins, Rhonda Byrne, or their MLM upline mentor, please stop reading now).
Here’s an interesting read from BT, “China’s growing power unsettles its neighbours”
There’s a sense of disquiet over the implications of China’s seemingly boundless expansion
IN THE Dickensian depths of the Dunia Metal Works here (in Indonesia), all is cacophony: The bam bam bam of grease-drenched punches; the rhythmic clank of unspooling steel wire; the storm and stress of glinting, freshly minted nails cascading onto a broad metal table for boxing.
But for all the industrial din, Dunia is undergoing a painful slump. Today it runs at 40 per cent of its capacity, its domestic nail business imperilled – and its exports wiped out – by cheaper Chinese alternatives. ‘We have been competing with the Japanese and the Koreans,’ said Juniarto Suhandinata, the factory’s director. ‘But the Chinese – no chance.’
The Chinese are tough competitors, and Dunia is hardly the first to find out. But Mr Suhandinata’s lament speaks to something different: a sense of disquiet, even in developing Asian nations in Beijing’s orbit, over the implications of China’s swift, seemingly boundless economic growth.
China has long claimed to be just another developing nation, even as its economic power far outstripped that of any other emerging country. Now, it is finding it harder to cast itself as a friendly alternative to an imperious American superpower. For many in Asia, it is the new colossus. ‘China 10 years ago is totally different with China now,’ said Ansari Bukhari, who oversees metals, machinery and other crucial sectors for Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry. ‘They are stronger and bigger than other countries. Why do we have to give them preference?’
To varying degrees, others are voicing the same complaint. Take the 10 South-east Asian nations in the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean). Through September, ASEAN ran up a collective US$74 billion trade deficit with China. That is a sharp reversal of the surplus those nations enjoyed in most recent years, and it is prompting some rethinking of the conventional wisdom that China’s rise is a windfall for the whole neighbourhood.
Vietnam just devalued its currency by 5 per cent, to keep it competitive with China. In Thailand, manufacturers are grousing openly about their inability to match Chinese prices. India has filed a sheaf of unfair-trade complaints against China this year covering everything from I-beams to coated paper.
‘Market-oriented exchange rates’
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the biggest regional group, last month urged the adoption of ‘market-oriented exchange rates’ for Asian currencies without mentioning China’s currency, which many economists say China keeps artificially undervalued to promote its own exports. China has taken some steps to mollify complainers. In April, it proposed a US$10 billion investment fund to help build badly needed roads, railways and ports in South-east Asia, and a US$15 billion fund to give Asian nations low-interest development loans. But it has so far done little to address regional and global unease over the value of its currency, the renminbi. Because the currency is lashed by effective government fiat to the sinking American dollar, China’s exports have become significantly cheaper in countries whose own currencies have not compensated for the dollar’s recent fall.
In Asia, the renminbi is doubly significant. During the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the values of many regional currencies collapsed, making their goods cheap to foreign buyers. The Chinese then won the gratitude of their neighbours by keeping the renminbi’s value fixed. That prevented a competitive spiral of devaluations that many economists feared might make the crisis much worse.
The latest financial crisis tells a different story: China’s exchange rate controls are cited as a leading cause of huge global imbalances that contributed to the collapse of 2008. This time, China has resisted pressure to untie the renminbi from the dollar and let it rise. And its neighbours’ exports have suffered as a result.
Michael Pettis, an economist and scholar with the China programme of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that China can no longer pursue the same export-driven development model at a time when Western consumers no longer are able to gobble up whatever it and other Asian manufacturers produce.
Until 2008, Mr Pettis said: ‘Most of these countries ran trade surpluses, and the US was the countervailing trade deficit.’ ‘The entire model depended on the ability of an external agent – the US – to absorb trade deficits,’ he added.
Indonesia is especially vulnerable to the shift. It is the most populous and arguably the least economically advanced nation among the onetime Asian Tigers, and perhaps the least able to accommodate itself to a new regional order dominated by China. Didik J Rachbini, a professor and the founder of an economic research institute here, said that in the past four years, Indonesia had swung from more or less parity in bilateral trade to a deficit equal to one-third of its annual exports to China – and rising.
The lowly nail is one focus of tension. Making nails is not complicated: start with a bale of steel wire, shave it down to the proper diameter, then feed it into a punch that shapes the nail, cuts it and spits it into a bin. Labour and machinery account for 10 or 15 per cent of the cost of a nail. The rest is the cost of the wire.
Too many steel mills
And that is Indonesia’s problem.
‘Many Chinese steel factories have overcapacity, so they sell their wire very cheap,’ said Ario N Setiantoro, who leads the Indonesia Nail and Wire Factory Association. ‘Chinese nails enter the market here at about the same price as our wire.’
He is right. Most analysts say China has too many steel mills. Its excess steelmaking capacity equals the entire annual production of the world’s No 2 steelmaker, Japan. Beyond supply, Chinese state-run banks support industry with construction loans so cheap that credit can be almost free, holding down operating costs. China’s vast purchases of iron ore lock in volume discounts that Indonesia’s small steelmakers cannot match.
Irvan K Hakim, a co-chairman of the Indonesian Iron and Steel Industry Association, said he had aired complaints to Chinese officials for years. He did not appear optimistic about a meeting of the minds. ‘China is China, you know?’ he said, shrugging. ‘Even the US cannot talk to China.‘ – NYT
Continue on next page....IN THE Dickensian depths of the Dunia Metal Works here (in Indonesia), all is cacophony: The bam bam bam of grease-drenched punches; the rhythmic clank of unspooling steel wire; the storm and stress of glinting, freshly minted nails cascading onto a broad metal table for boxing.
But for all the industrial din, Dunia is undergoing a painful slump. Today it runs at 40 per cent of its capacity, its domestic nail business imperilled – and its exports wiped out – by cheaper Chinese alternatives. ‘We have been competing with the Japanese and the Koreans,’ said Juniarto Suhandinata, the factory’s director. ‘But the Chinese – no chance.’
The Chinese are tough competitors, and Dunia is hardly the first to find out. But Mr Suhandinata’s lament speaks to something different: a sense of disquiet, even in developing Asian nations in Beijing’s orbit, over the implications of China’s swift, seemingly boundless economic growth.
China has long claimed to be just another developing nation, even as its economic power far outstripped that of any other emerging country. Now, it is finding it harder to cast itself as a friendly alternative to an imperious American superpower. For many in Asia, it is the new colossus. ‘China 10 years ago is totally different with China now,’ said Ansari Bukhari, who oversees metals, machinery and other crucial sectors for Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry. ‘They are stronger and bigger than other countries. Why do we have to give them preference?’
To varying degrees, others are voicing the same complaint. Take the 10 South-east Asian nations in the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean). Through September, ASEAN ran up a collective US$74 billion trade deficit with China. That is a sharp reversal of the surplus those nations enjoyed in most recent years, and it is prompting some rethinking of the conventional wisdom that China’s rise is a windfall for the whole neighbourhood.
Vietnam just devalued its currency by 5 per cent, to keep it competitive with China. In Thailand, manufacturers are grousing openly about their inability to match Chinese prices. India has filed a sheaf of unfair-trade complaints against China this year covering everything from I-beams to coated paper.
‘Market-oriented exchange rates’
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the biggest regional group, last month urged the adoption of ‘market-oriented exchange rates’ for Asian currencies without mentioning China’s currency, which many economists say China keeps artificially undervalued to promote its own exports. China has taken some steps to mollify complainers. In April, it proposed a US$10 billion investment fund to help build badly needed roads, railways and ports in South-east Asia, and a US$15 billion fund to give Asian nations low-interest development loans. But it has so far done little to address regional and global unease over the value of its currency, the renminbi. Because the currency is lashed by effective government fiat to the sinking American dollar, China’s exports have become significantly cheaper in countries whose own currencies have not compensated for the dollar’s recent fall.
In Asia, the renminbi is doubly significant. During the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the values of many regional currencies collapsed, making their goods cheap to foreign buyers. The Chinese then won the gratitude of their neighbours by keeping the renminbi’s value fixed. That prevented a competitive spiral of devaluations that many economists feared might make the crisis much worse.
The latest financial crisis tells a different story: China’s exchange rate controls are cited as a leading cause of huge global imbalances that contributed to the collapse of 2008. This time, China has resisted pressure to untie the renminbi from the dollar and let it rise. And its neighbours’ exports have suffered as a result.
Michael Pettis, an economist and scholar with the China programme of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that China can no longer pursue the same export-driven development model at a time when Western consumers no longer are able to gobble up whatever it and other Asian manufacturers produce.
Until 2008, Mr Pettis said: ‘Most of these countries ran trade surpluses, and the US was the countervailing trade deficit.’ ‘The entire model depended on the ability of an external agent – the US – to absorb trade deficits,’ he added.
Indonesia is especially vulnerable to the shift. It is the most populous and arguably the least economically advanced nation among the onetime Asian Tigers, and perhaps the least able to accommodate itself to a new regional order dominated by China. Didik J Rachbini, a professor and the founder of an economic research institute here, said that in the past four years, Indonesia had swung from more or less parity in bilateral trade to a deficit equal to one-third of its annual exports to China – and rising.
The lowly nail is one focus of tension. Making nails is not complicated: start with a bale of steel wire, shave it down to the proper diameter, then feed it into a punch that shapes the nail, cuts it and spits it into a bin. Labour and machinery account for 10 or 15 per cent of the cost of a nail. The rest is the cost of the wire.
Too many steel mills
And that is Indonesia’s problem.
‘Many Chinese steel factories have overcapacity, so they sell their wire very cheap,’ said Ario N Setiantoro, who leads the Indonesia Nail and Wire Factory Association. ‘Chinese nails enter the market here at about the same price as our wire.’
He is right. Most analysts say China has too many steel mills. Its excess steelmaking capacity equals the entire annual production of the world’s No 2 steelmaker, Japan. Beyond supply, Chinese state-run banks support industry with construction loans so cheap that credit can be almost free, holding down operating costs. China’s vast purchases of iron ore lock in volume discounts that Indonesia’s small steelmakers cannot match.
Irvan K Hakim, a co-chairman of the Indonesian Iron and Steel Industry Association, said he had aired complaints to Chinese officials for years. He did not appear optimistic about a meeting of the minds. ‘China is China, you know?’ he said, shrugging. ‘Even the US cannot talk to China.‘ – NYT
