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Apple says it will no longer surrender data from most iPhones or iPads to police, even when they have a search warrant.
The policy change is a bid to blunt allegations that technology companies have participated too readily in government efforts to collect user data.
The move, announced on Wednesday night in a privacy policy tied to the release of Apple's latest mobile operating system, iOS 8, is an engineering solution to a legal dilemma.
Rather than comply with court orders, Apple has reworked its latest encryption to make it all but impossible to gain access to the data typically stored on phones or tablet computers.
The key is the encryption that Apple mobile devices automatically put in place when a user selects a passcode, making it difficult for anyone who lacks that passcode to access the information within, including photos, emails, recordings or other documents. Apple once kept encryption keys that unlocked devices for police requests, but will no longer do so for iOS8.
Over the next several weeks the number of devices that Apple is capable of breaking into will decline to the point when only those several years old can be cracked. The company will continue to have to surrender data from areas such as the iCloud service, so users wanting to prevent police access to information would have to adjust settings that stop data from flowing to the iCloud.
"Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data. So it's not technically feasible for us to respond to government warrants for the extraction of this data from devices in their possession running iOS 8," Apple said.
The move is the latest in a series in which Apple has sought to distinguish itself through more rigorous security, especially in the aftermath of revelations last year about government spying made by former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.
The move to block police access to the latest iPhones and iPads will thrill privacy activists and frustrate officials, who have come to rely on the extensive evidence often found on personal electronic devices.
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What a drag: Facebook won't let gay performers use their stage names
San Francisco drag queens are sparring with Facebook over its policy requiring people to use their real names, rather than drag names such as Pollo Del Mar and Heklina. But the world's biggest social network is not budging.
In recent weeks, Facebook has deleted the profiles of self-described drag queens and other performers because their use of stage names did not meet real-names rules. On Wednesday, the network declined to change its policy after meeting with drag queens and a member of the San Francisco board of supervisors. The company said it deleted accounts with fake names after investigating complaints.
"This policy is wrong and misguided," said supervisor David Campos, who was flanked by seven drag queens during a press conference at San Francisco City Hall.
Many in the gay community say they fear using real names for a variety of reasons, including threats to their safety and employment.
Campos and the drag queens say they plan another meeting with Facebook and hope the company will soften its policy, or plan demonstrations.
Why Apple locked latest operating system and threw away the key
Apple means new operating system to stop everyone, not just governments, accessing users' data
Last week Apple released its new iOS 8 operating system for iPhones, iPads, and iPod Touch devices. Most of the coverage of iOS 8 focuses on visible features that users can interact with.
But there's one major change in iOS 8 that most users probably won't notice unless they find themselves in a great deal of trouble. Specifically, Apple has radically improved the way that data on those devices is encrypted. Once users set a pass code, Apple will no longer be able to unlock your device - even if ordered to do so by a court.
While privacy advocates have praised Apple's move, it has drawn fire from some notable legal scholars. This came as Apple made a rare apology on Thursday for a software bug that has seen iPhone users lose service, while seeking to quell a storm over reports its new handsets are susceptible to bending.
The slew of negative headlines saw a steep drop in Apple stock, as the US technology giant acknowledged the software glitch, offering a temporary fix immediately and a full update "in the next few days".
Apple sought to minimise reports on bending of its newly released oversize iPhone, saying it had only received nine complaints about the matter.
Writing in The Washington Post on September 19, Orin Kerr referred to Apple's new security policy as a "dangerous game", one that "doesn't stop hackers, trespassers, or rogue agents" but "only stops lawful investigations with lawful warrants".
While Kerr has moderated his views since his initial post, his overarching concern remains the same: by placing customer interests before that of law enforcement, Apple is working against the public interest. If you interpret Apple's motivations as Kerr does, then Apple's recent move is pretty surprising. Not only had the company picked a pointless fight with the United States government, he said, it was potentially putting the public at risk.
The only problem is that Kerr is wrong about this. Apple is not designing systems to prevent law enforcement from executing legitimate warrants. It's building systems that prevent everyone who might want your data - including hackers, malicious insiders, and even hostile foreign governments - from accessing your phone.
This is absolutely in the public interest. Moreover, in the process of doing so, Apple is setting a precedent that users, and not companies, should hold the keys to their own devices.
Once a user sets the pass code on Apple's new iPhone 6, there is no "back door" for the company to access the device's data. Photos: Reuters
The first time you power up a new iPhone or iPad, you'll be asked to set a pass code for unlocking your phone. This can be a full password or just a four-digit PIN - though the former is certainly stronger. On devices with a Touch ID sensor, you'll also be allowed to use your fingerprint as a more convenient alternative.
A pass code may look like flimsy security, but it's not. The minute you set one, Apple's operating system immediately begins encrypting your phone's sensitive data - including mail, texts, photos, and call records - with a form of encryption that the US government uses to protect military secrets.
The key for this encryption is mathematically derived by combining your pass code with a unique set of secret numbers baked into your phone.
If all goes well, you'll never notice this is happening. But the impact on data raiders is enormous. Even if someone cracks your phone open and attempts to read data directly off of the memory chips, all she'll see is useless, scrambled junk. Guessing your pass code won't help her - unless she can also recover the secret numbers that are stored within your phone's processor. And Apple's latest generation of phones makes that very difficult.
Of course, your would-be data thief could try to get in by exhaustively trying all possible combinations, but according to an iOS security document, Apple also includes protections to slow this attack down. In the same document, Apple estimates that a six-digit alphanumeric password could take upward of five years to guess.
The encryption on Apple devices is not entirely new with iOS 8. What is new is the amount of data your phone will now encrypt. Apple has extended encryption protections to nearly all the data you produce on a daily basis, and will also require you to enter the pass code (or fingerprint) each time you reboot your phone.
In addition, if you purchase a recent iPhone (5S, 6, or 6 Plus), Apple will store your keys within a dedicated hardware encryption "co-processor" called the Secure Enclave.
Taking Apple's recent privacy announcements at face value, even Apple itself can't break into the Secure Enclave in your phone. While it may seem "natural" that the designer of a system - in this case Apple - can break its own encryption, the truth is that such a capability is hardly an inevitable design outcome. For Apple to maintain such a capability with its newer security processors, it can't just be more knowledgeable than its customers. It would have to literally design in a form of "skeleton key". In computer-security circles this mechanism is generally known as a back door.
Designing back doors is easy. The challenge is in designing back doors that only the right people can get through. In order to maintain its access to your phone, Apple would need a back door that allowed it to execute legitimate law-enforcement requests, while locking hackers and well-resourced foreign intelligence services out. The problem is so challenging that even the US National Security Agency has famously got it wrong.
Much of the Apple criticism thus far stems from the perception that Apple is primarily targeting the US government with its new encryption features. But this is shortsighted. Apple currently has retail stores in 14 countries and sells its phones in many more. The United States is not the only government with law enforcement, or with an interest in its citizens' data.
We don't have to speculate about what those interests might be. Back in 2012, rumours swirled that the Indian government had threatened to ban BlackBerry's messaging services and had even forced BlackBerry to hand over the encryption keys to that service. BlackBerry denied handing over the keys, but eventually admitted it had built a "lawful intercept" mechanism for the Indian government.
If Apple holds its customers' keys - or maintains a back door into your phone - then the same calculus will soon apply to Apple. That's the problem with keys. Once you have them, sooner or later someone will expect you to use them.
Today those requests originate from police in the US. Tomorrow they may come from the governments of China or Russia. And while those countries certainly have legitimate crime to prosecute, they're also well known for using technology to persecute dissidents. Apple may not see either public interest or shareholder value in becoming the world's superintendent, meekly unlocking the door for whichever nation's police ask them to.
Apple's new encryption may not solve this problem entirely - foreign governments could always ban the sale of Apple products or force Apple to redesign. But by approaching the world with a precedent that customers, not Apple, are responsible for the security of their phones, Apple can at least make a credible attempt to stay above the fray.
