n September 2011, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) released a report on estimating future population trends based on different immigration scenarios. The focus was on net migrants.
This term was undefined. However, it was likely to refer to potential future residents who immigrate to Singapore annually. Residents meant Singapore Citizens (SCs) and Singapore Permanent Residents (SPRs).
When Singapore became independent in 1965, the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) concern was overpopulation. Immigration was initially highly restricted and gradually relaxed later. In the 1970s, the equivalent of the current R-Pass Work Permit system was implemented to bring in general workers. In the 1980s, the Employment Pass (EP) system was implemented to bring in suitable foreign Professionals, Managers, Executives, Technicians (PMETs).
It was stated in Parliament on 26 Feb 1993 (Reply of the Home Affairs Minister) that there were about 8000 new SPRs annually from 1983 to 1986. Due to resident Total Fertility Rate (TFR) falling from 2.1 in 1975 to 1.4 in 1986, the future Emeritus Senior Minister (ESM) Goh Chok Tong started a pro-immigration & pro-natal population policy in 1987.
From then to General Election (GE) 2011, the ESM openly promoted non-stop mass immigration. He regularly used the term Foreign Talents (FTs) to describe foreign PMETs and foreign-born students in local higher-level academic institutions.
New annual SPRs increased to 20 000++ from 1987 to 1997. Large numbers of EPs and equivalents turned into SPRs. TFR rose from 1.4 in 1986 to 1.75 in 1996.
A 2nd phase started in 1997 with immigration being changed from a supplement to the main focus. Non-resident foreign students in higher-level educational institutions were increased significantly. During the National Day Rally on 24 August 1997, the ESM declared FTs were not just a restricted pool but included conventional PMETs.
Dr Tan Khee Giap of the Nanyang Business School estimated in 1997 that under this 2nd phase, new EPs & equivalents would be 35 000 to 40 000 annually. With more new EPs, new annual SPRs increased to 30 000++ annually from 2001 to 2004. In July 1998, the EP category was divided into the higher P and lower Q categories.
In October 1998, the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI) released a Report on Singapore’s Competitiveness. Some points included greater flexibility in the criteria of EPs and the adoption of a “Singapore Incorporation” Mindset.
More local PMETs were being replaced by foreigners who were said to be better and sometimes cheaper. PAP Members of Parliament (MPs) such as Mr Ong Ah Heng, Dr Tan Boon Wan & Mr K Shanmugam (Parliamentary Reports 1997-1999) urged for a clarification of the FT policy.
The ESM remained in the Cabinet after stepping down from the Prime Ministership in 2004. Another PMET category, the S Pass, was introduced. In an even bigger 3rd phase from 2005 to 2010, new SPRs ranged from 50 000 to 80 000 annually. From 1991 to 2010, there were 726 768 successful SPR applications.
Some 3rd generation home-grown citizens born after 1965 (P65) suggested an inflow reduction to the pre-1997 situation. They hoped this would give older 2nd generation ex-PMETs a 2nd chance for suitable and meaningful re-employment. But these P65 3rd generations did not understand their 2nd generation parents. Around 1990, the 1st FT increase partly led to a sharp rise in property prices and rentals. Some 2nd generation property owners benefited greatly through such investments.
The 1st price surge ended in 1997-1998 with a massive plunge, with the 2nd generation job displacement occurring simultaneously. During GE2001, the opposition advocated immigration reduction and a Singaporean-first job policy except in cases where no suitable local candidates could be found.
The pro-restriction camp got a rude shock when PAP got 75.3% of the valid vote. Less FTs could mean former 2nd generation PMETs restored to their positions. However, this could also mean a drop in resale and rental values. The 2nd generation voters chose property values over career values.
The property market began to recover unevenly from 1998 to 2004. In 2006, former PAP MP Dr Tan Hui Heng called for a “big bang approach” in doubling manpower. He suggested admitting not only the highly talented, but also those with lower and intermediate skills. He argued that this big bang approach would prevent erosion of asset values.
To PAP critics, Dr Tan Hui Heng’s suggestion was nothing new. These critics felt the ESM’s FT policy had always admitted few with high talent but many with mediocre backgrounds. The critics’ response to the ESM’s critical mass emphasis was that he cared little about critical quality.
The PAP permitted a 2nd sustained price surge from 2004 onwards. However, this vastly increased the financial burden of non-investing buyers. After GE2011, the PAP regime announced plans to cool the property market & to review existing immigration levels.
This led to expressions of uneasiness in the mainstream media. A TODAY reader, Mr Wong Toon Tuan declared in his published letter on 7 Oct 2011 that in order to sustain economic growth. “Singapore MUST (emphasis added) welcome 30,000 migrants (presumably net migrants as defined by IPS) annually.”
Another reader, Mr Ng Ya Ken, insisted overcrowding should be the least of Singapore’s worries. He was not worried about 5.1 million people squeezing in a land area of 712.4 sq km. PAP critics alleged these persons might be motivated by property investment interests.
The Economy became over-dependent on high property investment values. In 1990, 22.3% of bank loans were property-related. In 2010, the figure was 51.4%.
To understand the IPS report, a link has to be established between IPS net migrant scenarios and the actual immigration of potential residents. The PQS (Employment & S Pass) numbers are not announced but can be estimated.
Most new SPR holders are existing PQS equivalents. Granting SPRs based on family links are limited. Decrease in PQS holders are due to conversion to SPRs and departures. Based on an average of 48,213 new SPRs from 2001 to 2010, annual new PQS holders probably totaled 50,000++.
In the same period, net resident population increased an average of 44,580. Therefore net annual migrant additions to the resident population (not to be confused with total population increase) probably totaled 50,000 – 60,000. The Report compared the current 60 000 (60K) situation with a reduced 30 000 (30K) scenario.
Meanwhile, Mr Lee Kuan Yew stated the 60K was politically indigestible & the 30K was more realistic. However, PAP critics are doubtful whether the 30K scenario is practical. This probably creates 30,000 new annual SPRs, similar to the 2001 situation. At that time local PMETs displacement was already significant.
The ESM hoped that young FTs would make up for the baby shortfall. To ensure potential residents to settle down as soon as possible, the PAP regime encouraged workplace diversification.
Conventional PMET positions which could have gone to locals were given to foreigners, especially young foreign women of child bearing age.
The 2nd (1997-2004) & 3rd (2004-2011) immigration phases led to a tremendous job pressure which caused TFR to plunge from 1.75 in 1996 to 1.15 in 2010. After 14 years, it was biologically impossible for those who had postponed having children to restart the process. In addition, younger SCs became worried about their financial future and emigrated elsewhere.
On 14 October 2011, NTUC (National Trades Union Congress) met with the Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF). NTUC advocated less FTs but SNEF objected. For many years, SNEF followed the ESM FT declaration that Singapore had a shortage of local talent.
This resulted in foreigners being seen as more suitable than locals in all levels, sectors and functions. Few employers were eager to rehire former local PMETs regardless of how these ex-PMETs tried to improve themselves. NTUC could not encourage SCs priority without rejecting the ESM FT declaration.
After promoting FT immigration without really defining its meaning from 1987 to 2011, the ESM relinquished his Cabinet position. He expressed hopes that a younger Cabinet would be able to carry Singapore forward in a more difficult and complex situation. His policies probably caused this situation.
The FT policy lost focus over the years. The 1st phase (1987-1997) was mainly for population replacement. This was changed to accumulating a critical mass of PMETs in the 2nd phase (1997-2004) with no regard for job displacement. The 3rd phase (2004-2011) seemed very concerned on property value appreciation.
http://theonlinecitizen.com/2011/10/the-sep-2011-ips-population-report-in-the-larger-context/
This term was undefined. However, it was likely to refer to potential future residents who immigrate to Singapore annually. Residents meant Singapore Citizens (SCs) and Singapore Permanent Residents (SPRs).
When Singapore became independent in 1965, the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) concern was overpopulation. Immigration was initially highly restricted and gradually relaxed later. In the 1970s, the equivalent of the current R-Pass Work Permit system was implemented to bring in general workers. In the 1980s, the Employment Pass (EP) system was implemented to bring in suitable foreign Professionals, Managers, Executives, Technicians (PMETs).
It was stated in Parliament on 26 Feb 1993 (Reply of the Home Affairs Minister) that there were about 8000 new SPRs annually from 1983 to 1986. Due to resident Total Fertility Rate (TFR) falling from 2.1 in 1975 to 1.4 in 1986, the future Emeritus Senior Minister (ESM) Goh Chok Tong started a pro-immigration & pro-natal population policy in 1987.
From then to General Election (GE) 2011, the ESM openly promoted non-stop mass immigration. He regularly used the term Foreign Talents (FTs) to describe foreign PMETs and foreign-born students in local higher-level academic institutions.
New annual SPRs increased to 20 000++ from 1987 to 1997. Large numbers of EPs and equivalents turned into SPRs. TFR rose from 1.4 in 1986 to 1.75 in 1996.
A 2nd phase started in 1997 with immigration being changed from a supplement to the main focus. Non-resident foreign students in higher-level educational institutions were increased significantly. During the National Day Rally on 24 August 1997, the ESM declared FTs were not just a restricted pool but included conventional PMETs.
Dr Tan Khee Giap of the Nanyang Business School estimated in 1997 that under this 2nd phase, new EPs & equivalents would be 35 000 to 40 000 annually. With more new EPs, new annual SPRs increased to 30 000++ annually from 2001 to 2004. In July 1998, the EP category was divided into the higher P and lower Q categories.
In October 1998, the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI) released a Report on Singapore’s Competitiveness. Some points included greater flexibility in the criteria of EPs and the adoption of a “Singapore Incorporation” Mindset.
More local PMETs were being replaced by foreigners who were said to be better and sometimes cheaper. PAP Members of Parliament (MPs) such as Mr Ong Ah Heng, Dr Tan Boon Wan & Mr K Shanmugam (Parliamentary Reports 1997-1999) urged for a clarification of the FT policy.
The ESM remained in the Cabinet after stepping down from the Prime Ministership in 2004. Another PMET category, the S Pass, was introduced. In an even bigger 3rd phase from 2005 to 2010, new SPRs ranged from 50 000 to 80 000 annually. From 1991 to 2010, there were 726 768 successful SPR applications.
Some 3rd generation home-grown citizens born after 1965 (P65) suggested an inflow reduction to the pre-1997 situation. They hoped this would give older 2nd generation ex-PMETs a 2nd chance for suitable and meaningful re-employment. But these P65 3rd generations did not understand their 2nd generation parents. Around 1990, the 1st FT increase partly led to a sharp rise in property prices and rentals. Some 2nd generation property owners benefited greatly through such investments.
The 1st price surge ended in 1997-1998 with a massive plunge, with the 2nd generation job displacement occurring simultaneously. During GE2001, the opposition advocated immigration reduction and a Singaporean-first job policy except in cases where no suitable local candidates could be found.
The pro-restriction camp got a rude shock when PAP got 75.3% of the valid vote. Less FTs could mean former 2nd generation PMETs restored to their positions. However, this could also mean a drop in resale and rental values. The 2nd generation voters chose property values over career values.
The property market began to recover unevenly from 1998 to 2004. In 2006, former PAP MP Dr Tan Hui Heng called for a “big bang approach” in doubling manpower. He suggested admitting not only the highly talented, but also those with lower and intermediate skills. He argued that this big bang approach would prevent erosion of asset values.
To PAP critics, Dr Tan Hui Heng’s suggestion was nothing new. These critics felt the ESM’s FT policy had always admitted few with high talent but many with mediocre backgrounds. The critics’ response to the ESM’s critical mass emphasis was that he cared little about critical quality.
The PAP permitted a 2nd sustained price surge from 2004 onwards. However, this vastly increased the financial burden of non-investing buyers. After GE2011, the PAP regime announced plans to cool the property market & to review existing immigration levels.
This led to expressions of uneasiness in the mainstream media. A TODAY reader, Mr Wong Toon Tuan declared in his published letter on 7 Oct 2011 that in order to sustain economic growth. “Singapore MUST (emphasis added) welcome 30,000 migrants (presumably net migrants as defined by IPS) annually.”
Another reader, Mr Ng Ya Ken, insisted overcrowding should be the least of Singapore’s worries. He was not worried about 5.1 million people squeezing in a land area of 712.4 sq km. PAP critics alleged these persons might be motivated by property investment interests.
The Economy became over-dependent on high property investment values. In 1990, 22.3% of bank loans were property-related. In 2010, the figure was 51.4%.
To understand the IPS report, a link has to be established between IPS net migrant scenarios and the actual immigration of potential residents. The PQS (Employment & S Pass) numbers are not announced but can be estimated.
Most new SPR holders are existing PQS equivalents. Granting SPRs based on family links are limited. Decrease in PQS holders are due to conversion to SPRs and departures. Based on an average of 48,213 new SPRs from 2001 to 2010, annual new PQS holders probably totaled 50,000++.
In the same period, net resident population increased an average of 44,580. Therefore net annual migrant additions to the resident population (not to be confused with total population increase) probably totaled 50,000 – 60,000. The Report compared the current 60 000 (60K) situation with a reduced 30 000 (30K) scenario.
Meanwhile, Mr Lee Kuan Yew stated the 60K was politically indigestible & the 30K was more realistic. However, PAP critics are doubtful whether the 30K scenario is practical. This probably creates 30,000 new annual SPRs, similar to the 2001 situation. At that time local PMETs displacement was already significant.
The ESM hoped that young FTs would make up for the baby shortfall. To ensure potential residents to settle down as soon as possible, the PAP regime encouraged workplace diversification.
Conventional PMET positions which could have gone to locals were given to foreigners, especially young foreign women of child bearing age.
The 2nd (1997-2004) & 3rd (2004-2011) immigration phases led to a tremendous job pressure which caused TFR to plunge from 1.75 in 1996 to 1.15 in 2010. After 14 years, it was biologically impossible for those who had postponed having children to restart the process. In addition, younger SCs became worried about their financial future and emigrated elsewhere.
On 14 October 2011, NTUC (National Trades Union Congress) met with the Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF). NTUC advocated less FTs but SNEF objected. For many years, SNEF followed the ESM FT declaration that Singapore had a shortage of local talent.
This resulted in foreigners being seen as more suitable than locals in all levels, sectors and functions. Few employers were eager to rehire former local PMETs regardless of how these ex-PMETs tried to improve themselves. NTUC could not encourage SCs priority without rejecting the ESM FT declaration.
After promoting FT immigration without really defining its meaning from 1987 to 2011, the ESM relinquished his Cabinet position. He expressed hopes that a younger Cabinet would be able to carry Singapore forward in a more difficult and complex situation. His policies probably caused this situation.
The FT policy lost focus over the years. The 1st phase (1987-1997) was mainly for population replacement. This was changed to accumulating a critical mass of PMETs in the 2nd phase (1997-2004) with no regard for job displacement. The 3rd phase (2004-2011) seemed very concerned on property value appreciation.
http://theonlinecitizen.com/2011/10/the-sep-2011-ips-population-report-in-the-larger-context/
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