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The $158 billion Singapore govt Budget Accounting Fraud: Part I

neddy

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The $158 billion Singapore Budget Accounting Fraud: Part I
Posted on July 12, 2012

In the past decade, we have become all to used to corporate accounting scandals. Respected companies like Olympus, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and the most notorious fraudster Bernie Madoff have all been caught blatantly manipulating accounting statements dating back many years. As a result of their behavior, those responsible lost their jobs or went to prison.

What happens when arguably the largest accounting restatement in the history of human existence due to fraudulent accounting practice takes place in the Singaporean government? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. No Singaporean public official to the best of my knowledge has even commented on a $158 billion SGD accounting restatement of Singaporean public finances.

We have been working with official Singaporean general and operational budget revenue, expenditure, and surpluses. The general and operational data comes from both Statistics Singapore and the International Monetary Fund. The results of each type of government surplus while all different, all produce generally similar numbers regardless of source.

Table 1-Singapore Cumulative Surpluses September 2011

Restatement-1-071212.jpg


As we can see in Table 1, the Singaporean surpluses from all sources while quite large produce broadly similar numbers with a low of $225-300 billion SGD since 1990 whether we take our numbers from Statistics Singapore or the IMF September 2011 World Economic Outlook or their International Financial Statistics databases.

However, in April 2012 the government of Singapore restated its public finance statistics going back to 1990. Given the history and size of the restatement it would probably go back further and increase even more, but the IMF World Economic Outlook only provides Singaporean public finance data back to 1990. The restatement of Singaporean public finances was not small, short, or insignificant in anyway.

Table 2—Cumulative Surpluses April 2012

Restatement-2-071212.jpg


Between September 2011 and April 2012, the government of Singapore restated its public finances raising it cumulative surplus from 1990 to 2010 from $271 billion SGD to $429 billion SGD. Through an unannounced accounting restatement which Statistics Singapore data does not reflect, the cumulative surplus between 1990 and 2002 increased from $189 billion SGD to $311 billion SGD. In other words, due to an accounting restatement of its own public finances, Singapore increased the size of its budget surplus by $158 billion SGD.

While a restatement increasing the size of the Singaporean surplus may at first seem like a good thing, it is in fact not a good thing. The last Singaporean balance sheet listed $705 billion SGD in assets but also $359 billion SGD in debt giving it only $346 billion SGD in net assets. In other words, through the investment magic of Temasek Holdings and GIC, Singapore managed to turn $428 billion SGD in government surpluses into $346 billion SGD in net equity. The larger the surpluses in Singapore means the larger the losses and discrepancies in Temasek and GIC.

This restatement as a couple implications.

First, given the historical length and size of the accounting restatement, the government should be held accountable to provide detailed information about restated items. $158 billion SGD restatements destroy any credibility and demand a public explanation.
Second, those responsible at the highest levels should be held accountable for accounting manipulation dating back more than twenty years. $158 billion SGD is not an accounting rounding error. A restatement of $158 billion is a deliberate manipulation.
Third, given the restatement, there is absolutely no way Temasek and GIC claims of long term returns can be considered accurate. $428 billion SGD in surpluses does not turn into $346 billion in net equity by earning 7-17% over more than twenty years.

For a government who claims to value accountability and transparency, its attempt to cover up a restatement of $158 billion SGD or approximately 50% of GDP is appalling. At what point does a restatement become worthy of a public statement by the government: $300 billion, $500 billion, $1 trillion? If Singapore was a company, people would deservedly have lost their jobs. Only in Singapore is a $158 billion SGD accounting fraud standard operating procedure.

Next week, I will detail the accounting restatement, provide examples of how accounting was manipulated by the government, and how this impacts the returns claimed by Temasek and GIC.
 
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Forgot to credit this posting to Professor Chis Balding, whose original blog was hacked.

http://www.tremeritus.com/2012/06/08/balding-blog-hair-raising-development/
What about the conspiracy theory? Today Chris Balding’s website containing his blog was suspended. He hasn’t found a satisfactory explanation. His service provider has informed him that his account was compromised and he has warned me that my emails to him will also have been affected. Meanwhile my open letters to MOF and the President and to the Press remain unanswered or even acknowledged. Eerie Coincidence? Or is the net that is used to isolate and silence me now tightening around Chris? You decide.


http://www.tremeritus.com/2012/06/08/prof-christopher-baldings-new-blog-address/


http://singaporemind.blogspot.com.au/2012/06/issues-raised-by-christopher-balding-on.html
 
Got to find out the reason for the restatement, TS is only talking about the impact. Don't sikali shoot own foot. Sometimes, changes in reporting standards require restatement, impact can be good or bad one.:o
 
Still waiting for Part 2.

But meanwhile, there is this interview

Read all here http://newasiarepublic.com/?p=39938

or in parts here

NAR: Whilst being an atypical SWF, what problems can arise if one of such like Temasek Holdings is allowed to invest at home?
Balding: I actually believe that SWF should be able to invest at home but I also just as strongly believe that it can allow for major problems and real distortions if politics is not separated from profit.

The primary problem is that investing at home without necessary safeguards can create very real conflicts of interest and politicization of investment. In fact, many sovereign wealth funds actually take steps to address this problem. The China Investment Corporation has a prohibition on domestic investment.

Other sovereign wealth funds, allow investment domestically only under narrow circumstances like through external asset managers. Only in Singapore is the head of a SWF being married to the prime minister not considered a conflict of interest or a family appointment.

In many Gulf sovereign wealth funds, the ruling family maintains control over the SWF, but everyone admits it is family controlled. Only in Singapore is a family member running a SWF not a family member or a conflict of interest. Furthermore, it creates very real conflicts of interest. One minister who was also the manager of a portfolio company of Temasek in an interview actually said that sometimes “I write letters to myself”. This has the clear impact of creating an unlevel playing field for firms. There is not restraint on regulation and favored investment.

Editor’s Note: In order to alleviate concerns of corporate governance at Temasek Holdings, New Asia Republic understands that Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s wife Madam Ho Ching, as Executive Director, does not report directly to the Ministry of Finance. Instead, she is accountable to the Executive Committee which is answerable to the Board of Directors which in turn reports to the Ministry of Finance.

NAR: Temasek Holdings was initially designed to invest budget surpluses, so how did Singapore end up in a situation with high public debt?
Balding: As has been pointed out, Singapore’s debt is somewhat atypical compared to other governments but just as importantly, that does not make the debt any less important or any less real. Singapore created bodies like the Central Provident Fund that mandated contributions by citizens where the government could easily borrow funds. This has a couple of major impacts.

First, the government of Singapore essentially passed a law requiring it citizens to lend it money. I know of no other country where citizens are by law required to lend its government money.

Second, the government of Singapore only profits when it earns money in excess of the guaranteed rate of return owed to its citizens. Otherwise, the government and taxpayers are subsidizing investment losses of Temasek and GIC. In recent history, there is little evidence that supports the idea that Singapore is earning a profitable rate of return able to guarantee the debt owed to bodies like the CPF. Net asset growth after accounting for increases in debt have hardly increased implying that Singapore is failing to earn a profitable rate of return that it needs to guarantee CPF holders.

Third, Singaporean sovereign wealth funds like Temasek and GIC are bearing essentially no risk. Singaporean tax payers bear the risk of GIC/Temasek but do not share the benefits. If GIC and Temasek fare poorly or collapse, the Singaporean tax payer will have to bear the cost of guaranteeing the CPF. However, if GIC and Temasek do a good job the CPF debt holder earns 2.5-4%, then GIC enjoy the entire difference. This is a profoundly perverted structure where the people providing all capital and bear all the risk and enjoy none of the rewards.

While Singapore instituted sound policy of requiring individuals to save for retirement, rather than allowing the government to borrow money from the CPF at low investment rates, there are many better alternatives. Let me give you two examples.

First, Chile instituted a similar system where individuals payed into their account but the government opened up the investment system to external asset managers. Studies show that Chilean savers have fared quite well compared to other social security systems where savers earn a below market rate of return.

Second, rather than forcing Singaporean savers to lend at a such a low rate but capturing the market gains for the state, make CPF account holders “equity” holders that receive a dividends about their investment. The state of Singapore through GIC/Temasek is a defacto asset manager for the Singaporean people who lend them the money either through debt or budget surpluses.

It would be better financially for the Singaporean people, who guarantee their own debt anyway, to have a stake in the performance of the SWF’s.

NAR: What are the socioeconomic consequences of a high public debt and budget surpluses, in the case of Singapore as your paper suggests? Why?
Balding: As Singaporean debt is slightly different than other countries, it has some unique implications. Let me begin by saying that just because the debt has some different characteristics, does not make it any less real, less important, or less necessary to bring down.

First, the Singaporean government is extracting public savings from its people in the form of enormous current account and government surpluses. By running such large and sustained government surpluses, the government is extracting savings from its own population.

Second, by failing to run a balanced budget the government is failing to provide public services for its citizens. As has been demonstrated time and time again, though Singapore claims it is a low tax haven, many services which are government provided in other countries are paid for via fees in Singapore.

Third, the government is capturing the financial reward of the risk taken by the people of Singapore. Let me give you an example. If a CPF holder invests $1,000 and GIC/Temasek can pay back the 2.5-4% debt Singapore incurs to borrow money from the CPF, the government captures the difference between 4% and 10% (for instance) even though it is the peoples money.

However, if GIC/Temasek cannot pay back the debt, the government will go raise taxes on the CPF holder who invested his $1,000 asking him to subsidize the losses incurred by Temasek/GIC. If the people of Singapore are being asked to take the financial risk, they should enjoy the financial rewards. Fourth, Singapore is taking enormous financial risk.

At a roughly 2:1 leverage ratio, Singapore is running significant risk. For instance, during the financial crises when Temasek incurred a 31% drop, there were probably days during this period when Singapore had more debt than assets. This seems like an unacceptably high level of risk to be running with national finances.

NAR: Is it possible to reverse the current trend of high public debt in Singapore?
Balding: In the foreseeable future, no. There is a very simple reason for that.

Singaporean citizens are obligated by law to pay into CPF and the government of Singapore will borrow from the CPF and other sources. The government could easily reverse this trend by making CPF holders equity stake holders in GIC/Temasek rather than continuing to borrow but this would necessitate allowing Singaporean citizens greater voice in increase accountability which I see no evidence of the government changing.
 
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Can some kind soul use a very simple analogy to explain to an economics idiot like me? The article gave me a bad headache :D
 
Can some kind soul use a very simple analogy to explain to an economics idiot like me? The article gave me a bad headache :D

It is like this, you gave them your CPF money, but it is all on paper that you have $xxx,xxx in your account. We may wake up one day & want to withdraw all your $xxx,xxx and find out that, they have only $x,xxx to pay you and the balance they say to you, they will pay, $xxx.xx in 360 months plus interest.

get it!
 
It is like this, you gave them your CPF money, but it is all on paper that you have $xxx,xxx in your account. We may wake up one day & want to withdraw all your $xxx,xxx and find out that, they have only $x,xxx to pay you and the balance they say to you, they will pay, $xxx.xx in 360 months plus interest.

get it!

Nothing wrong with that. All banks do that have observing that most people do not withdraw what they save, well in the past. So CPF is a forced savings to guarantee that. 20% from you as a start. If we go by the textbook of 10% cash equivalent reserve the CPF bank can lend out 10 times what you deposited. Now if we can turn observation of withdrawal to fact, using that piece of trash called your house which 600-1000% more than its actual construction price (land evaluation is feudal lord concept of squeezing yours balls to pay for their debauchery), you effectively guarantee withdrawal to less than 10%. Playing around with the special accounts and medisave accounts, the house you could have paid with no debt, you now end up with a nice fat debt which could render you paying more than 30% of the principle and gurantee zero in your ordinary account as well as bank account. The S and medisave account are just notional as you can see but cannot touch. Now, if you no money, our fuckers then collateralize your overpaid by undervaluing it for a reverse mortgage. So by doing this, it is a fiscal win win for you but enslavement to the government. Well, if they seriously reinvest in the people and public hard and soft infrastructure, we would complain less. Nope, they sell you shit food, give you highly contaminated hawker centres, under capacity drainage bottlenecks, bad air, expensive electricity, poor greenery to provide needed oxygen to singpore, poor housing materials for schools and HDB and channel funds into Commie SOEs that compete with the private sector with proceeds going to someone's personal trust fund. You get the drift.
 
It is like this, you gave them your CPF money, but it is all on paper that you have $xxx,xxx in your account. We may wake up one day & want to withdraw all your $xxx,xxx and find out that, they have only $x,xxx to pay you and the balance they say to you, they will pay, $xxx.xx in 360 months plus interest.

get it!

Sinkee CPF members in their twilight years may never see their CPF money illegally detained under the Minimum Sum Scheme (CPF Life ) as the wihdrawal date has been deferred from 55 yo to 65 yo.
KNNCCB to the PAP minister who introduced the Minimum Sum Scheme.May he burned in hell for robbing the people's CPF money in their twilight years to be used as a cheap source of funds to GIC previously under the charge of the current 35 % president Tony Tan.
What if sinkees are jobless and sick and old and need money for daily survival between 55 yo and 65 yo ? If the PAP 's attitude is "U die is your business" ,Why do the PAP want to keep our CPF money ? It is better that the PAP let us die with our own CPF money .We want to die with our own CPF money !!!
KNNCCB to the PAP !!!
May PAP burnt in hell !!!
May Retribution befall on the PAP !!!
 
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