The last few days, the print edition of the Straits Times filled me with despair. Every day, pages and pages were devoted to a book (titled Men in White) that they recently published about the People's Action Party (PAP). More incessant hardsell one could barely imagine. The overkill only served to remind me of the newspaper's decades-long devotion to acting as an apologist for the PAP government, but now in the twilight of Lee Kuan Yew's years, it also comes across as a somewhat desperate attempt to carve in stone the central role of the PAP in the national narrative.
The boast is that this book treats Lee's opponents within the PAP fairly. This is a boast borne of necessity. A new generation of Singaporeans will not bother with any history that does not. But whether that boast is supported by the actual writing, I shall leave it to others, more knowledgeable about history, to assess.
Already though, the excerpts published so far in the Straits Times, suggest that anyone yearning for a more radical reading of history may be disappointed. The book's so-called "fair treatment" may be no more than cosmetic. Yet, the thing about giving an inch is that one can sometimes spy the missing mile.
For example, in the telling of the 1961 split when a faction left to form the Barisan Socialis, the excerpts indicate that those who left did so because they felt extremely uncomfortable with Lee's headlong rush into Malaysia.
What has been revealed is that Lee was convinced that the leftwing of the PAP had pro-communist sympathies, and that they could potentially carry the electorate. Lee didn't feel he was strong enough to stop the leftist tide. Instead he appealed to foreign powers to intervene to save him and his ideals. This was the true motive behind the idea of Malaysia. A radical reading of history could therefore say: This man sold Singapore out in order to stop his opponents from taking Singapore in the direction he disagreed with. In most other countries, such a leader would be called a traitor.
Then, bolstered by the foreign power, Lee launched Operation Coldstore, detaining without trial large numbers of the opposition, in order that they could not impede the consolidation of his (foreign-supported) power, and ending Singapore's brief fling with a two-party system. In most other countries, such a politician would be called unspeakable names.
Karma struck back unusually soon. The foreign power decided it really didn't need Lee and tried instead to take Singapore for itself. It started to undermine Lee by raising the spectre of racial conflict. So Lee was played out. Such a politician is normally lampooned as a fool.
Eventually, to save his own skin, Lee pulled Singapore out of the federation. In effect, the 1961 naysayers in the PAP were proven right when they said the terms of merger were lousy and not acceptable.
So, who was the reckless one who played Russian Roulette with Singapore's future? Bear in mind too, the then Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had no interest in the idea of Malaysia; it was Lee who kept selling the idea to him and the British by constantly referring to the communist threat, a threat which, by 1960, had ended. The Malayan Emergency ceased that year, with the remnants of the communist guerillas driven into Southern Thailand.
If Malaya had not expanded into Malaysia, what would the British have done with Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo? Might the British have decided instead to create a bigger Singapore incorporating these territories? If so, might today's Singapore therefore have more strategic space than it now has? In other words, are we worse off now after that reckless and misguided adventure into Malaysia?
In the foregoing, I have deliberate overstated an interpretation of history, playing a kind of devil's advocate to make a point: A truly incisive look at history will require us to conduct an analysis as critical as that. That, to me, is what I would understand by "fair treatment".
However, as most Singaporeans will know, such a critical analysis is not yet possible. For now, however critical a book pretends to be, Lee must emerge a hero, not traitor, fool or &%^*#$@)%(^. At best, we can only be permitted the kind of "fair treatment" the new book, so loudly trumpetted by the Straits Times, displays.
* * * * *
Despair was leavened with a bit of hope Saturday (5 September 2009). The same newspaper finally addressed the question that people have asked for years: What if a rogue government sprang from the bosom of the PAP?
PAP leaders always assumed that if the opposition were to form the government, it would be a weak one which would ruin the country. The institutional safeguards they designed were supposed to prevent the emergence of a rogue government.
But what if the rogue government sprang from the bosom of the PAP itself? Was it inconceivable that a good PAP government might turn rotten mid-term or that a good prime minister could succumb to temptations along the way?
-- Straits Times, 5 Sept 2009, What if a rogue govt sprang from the bosom of the PAP?
The newspaper noted that of all the scenarios for Singapore's future, this is about the scariest, and yet, I would add, it is also one of the most likely. It is scarier than the scenario of an opposition party winning a general election, forming a new government and then making a hash of things, because this latter scenario would imply that there are competitive elections, which in turn means there is an avenue for the people to throw out the incompetents before long. In saying this, I must caution readers not to fall into the unthinking association that an opposition-led government will surely be a bad one, as often suggested by the PAP. Who knows, it could well be that an opposition party may prove itself a worthy government.
The boast is that this book treats Lee's opponents within the PAP fairly. This is a boast borne of necessity. A new generation of Singaporeans will not bother with any history that does not. But whether that boast is supported by the actual writing, I shall leave it to others, more knowledgeable about history, to assess.
Already though, the excerpts published so far in the Straits Times, suggest that anyone yearning for a more radical reading of history may be disappointed. The book's so-called "fair treatment" may be no more than cosmetic. Yet, the thing about giving an inch is that one can sometimes spy the missing mile.
For example, in the telling of the 1961 split when a faction left to form the Barisan Socialis, the excerpts indicate that those who left did so because they felt extremely uncomfortable with Lee's headlong rush into Malaysia.
What has been revealed is that Lee was convinced that the leftwing of the PAP had pro-communist sympathies, and that they could potentially carry the electorate. Lee didn't feel he was strong enough to stop the leftist tide. Instead he appealed to foreign powers to intervene to save him and his ideals. This was the true motive behind the idea of Malaysia. A radical reading of history could therefore say: This man sold Singapore out in order to stop his opponents from taking Singapore in the direction he disagreed with. In most other countries, such a leader would be called a traitor.
Then, bolstered by the foreign power, Lee launched Operation Coldstore, detaining without trial large numbers of the opposition, in order that they could not impede the consolidation of his (foreign-supported) power, and ending Singapore's brief fling with a two-party system. In most other countries, such a politician would be called unspeakable names.
Karma struck back unusually soon. The foreign power decided it really didn't need Lee and tried instead to take Singapore for itself. It started to undermine Lee by raising the spectre of racial conflict. So Lee was played out. Such a politician is normally lampooned as a fool.
Eventually, to save his own skin, Lee pulled Singapore out of the federation. In effect, the 1961 naysayers in the PAP were proven right when they said the terms of merger were lousy and not acceptable.
So, who was the reckless one who played Russian Roulette with Singapore's future? Bear in mind too, the then Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had no interest in the idea of Malaysia; it was Lee who kept selling the idea to him and the British by constantly referring to the communist threat, a threat which, by 1960, had ended. The Malayan Emergency ceased that year, with the remnants of the communist guerillas driven into Southern Thailand.
If Malaya had not expanded into Malaysia, what would the British have done with Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo? Might the British have decided instead to create a bigger Singapore incorporating these territories? If so, might today's Singapore therefore have more strategic space than it now has? In other words, are we worse off now after that reckless and misguided adventure into Malaysia?
In the foregoing, I have deliberate overstated an interpretation of history, playing a kind of devil's advocate to make a point: A truly incisive look at history will require us to conduct an analysis as critical as that. That, to me, is what I would understand by "fair treatment".
However, as most Singaporeans will know, such a critical analysis is not yet possible. For now, however critical a book pretends to be, Lee must emerge a hero, not traitor, fool or &%^*#$@)%(^. At best, we can only be permitted the kind of "fair treatment" the new book, so loudly trumpetted by the Straits Times, displays.
* * * * *
Despair was leavened with a bit of hope Saturday (5 September 2009). The same newspaper finally addressed the question that people have asked for years: What if a rogue government sprang from the bosom of the PAP?
PAP leaders always assumed that if the opposition were to form the government, it would be a weak one which would ruin the country. The institutional safeguards they designed were supposed to prevent the emergence of a rogue government.
But what if the rogue government sprang from the bosom of the PAP itself? Was it inconceivable that a good PAP government might turn rotten mid-term or that a good prime minister could succumb to temptations along the way?
-- Straits Times, 5 Sept 2009, What if a rogue govt sprang from the bosom of the PAP?
The newspaper noted that of all the scenarios for Singapore's future, this is about the scariest, and yet, I would add, it is also one of the most likely. It is scarier than the scenario of an opposition party winning a general election, forming a new government and then making a hash of things, because this latter scenario would imply that there are competitive elections, which in turn means there is an avenue for the people to throw out the incompetents before long. In saying this, I must caution readers not to fall into the unthinking association that an opposition-led government will surely be a bad one, as often suggested by the PAP. Who knows, it could well be that an opposition party may prove itself a worthy government.
