http://www.yawningbread.org/arch_2008/yax-961.htm
Yawning Bread. 29 November 2008
Politics airport-style
Seizing an airport and stranding a reported 90,000 travellers in Bangkok with no way to fly out of the city is certainly headline-grabbing. News media tell the story in many ways, from political moves to inconvenienced-man-in-the-street tales, but I see very little that attempts to explain the bigger picture.
PAD supporters occupy the passenger terminal of Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi airport
Part of the reason why it may be hard, at least for formal media organisations, to tell the story is because it involves the royal family and Thailand's strict lese majesté law makes it a crime to mention royalty in unflattering light. Like Singapore's use of defamation suits and more recently contempt of court laws, the lese majesté law has the effect of creating self-censorship.
What is happening in Thailand this year is really a war of succession. This is a classic kind of conflict that arises when a political era has ended or is coming to an end and various powers jostle to seize the upper hand for the next period. The era that is ending is the reign of King Rama IX (Bhumibol Adulyadej), but apparently, you're not even supposed to insinuate that!
For much of his reign, Thailand has been ruled alternately by military dictatorships and short-lived parliamentary governments. Whether one or the other, generals, politicians and senior civil servants have been drawn from the social elite, who have mostly served the interests of their own class. Thailand is relatively business-friendly because this class owns a lot of businesses. Development is centred on Bangkok, because this class is mostly based in the capital, while much of Thailand remains dirt-poor. The wealth gap between those who live in upscale Suan Phlu condominiums and their maids' families back in a rural village is shocking.
A typical villager's house in Surin province, Thailand
Despite these tensions, social peace has been maintained through a triad of reasons:
Firstly, Thai governments, whatever their ilk, have not done absolutely nothing for the provinces; they have done at least the minimum, such as extending the electrical grid, building roads and providing schools, that provides a semblance of progress.
Secondly, Bhumibol is genuinely popular. He spent many years criss-crossing the country listening to country folk and it is largely through his personal influence that Thai governments have not completely neglected the provinces. (But see also the box at right.)
Thirdly, Thai culture is not yet fully modern. It sees social stratification as normal and people accommodate themselves to this fact of life through a complex system of patronage. Higher-ups are respected for the gifts that they occasionally shower on poorer folk, who return the favour with loyalty; at no time do people question why some chaps are rich and powerful enough to dispense patronage and why others must remain receivers of charity.
While respect for the king is definitely genuine, it should also be noted that there has been a huge amount of propaganda over the decades building up the image of the monarchy. In Thailand, one is frequently struck by the excessive, usually obsequious, display of engineered adulation.
Despite the spread of schools, educational standards are still poor and (I believe) a majority of children in the provinces do not finish middle school. What is produced is a large pool of minimally-educated workers who are able to staff the production lines, restaurants and hotels of booming Bangkok and its industrial estates, but who do not expect the social mobility to ever challenge the place of the elite.
Then came the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and Thaksin Shinawatra. The first felled many rich Thais who had over-extended themselves by borrowing abroad (at fixed exchange rates) to fund their domestic investments. The moment the Thai central bank could not maintain the exchange rate and was forced to devalue the baht, whole swathes of rich Thai society were financially crippled. Large projects in Bangkok stood unfinished. Suddenly, the upper class of Thai society did not look so permanent after all.
Thaksin after an election victory
Into this situation burst Thaksin Shawatra, who was already a tycoon before he entered politics. In 2001, he won the general election -– then considered one of the most open, corruption-free elections ever held -- becoming prime minister. His government promptly instituted a series of populist measures, including the 30-baht healthcare scheme that brought state healthcare within reach of many rural families for the first time.
With his popularity so cemented, he proved he could win successive elections. In 2005, his Thai Rak Thai party swept 374 seats in the 500-seat lower house. This model for winning elections -– appealing to the interests of the provincial masses -– would prove highly threatening to the Bangkok elite. For the first time, they had to contemplate a government that did not depend on them, or on the royal court, for favours.
Accusations were hurled at him about corruption, vote-buying, and so on, and possibly some of the charges may well be true, though in the present charged, partisan atmosphere, it is difficult to get an impartial view as to the real facts.
Sondhi Limthongkul
Before long, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media magnate, emerged as the point man for the anti-Thaksin campaign. From the beginning, Sondhi and his People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) were reputed to enjoy support from not only a cross section of the Bangkok elite, but from the court as well.
Propelling his campiagn was a sense that the political equation in Thailand had changed. The docile masses had tasted the power of their voting rights, and would in time become more and more assertive. Through Thaksin's party, they would become the new permanent majority in Thailand's politics, sidelining the old order.
So came the coup of September 2006 and a short period of military rule. Yet, it changed nothing, for when elections under a new constitution were held again in December 2007, the People Power Party (PPP), the successor to the banned Thai Rak Thai, became the largest party in parliament, and with a few allies, formed the post-coup government.
That's when the PAD changed its tune. From asserting that its campaign was against Thaksin's corrupt politics, it finally came out to say that its aim was to rewrite the constitution to make future parliaments 70 percent appointed. The masses were not to be trusted with the vote because, according to Sondhi, they were "ill-educated" and prone to selling their vote.
This is an admission that one leg of the triad that kept the old order in place has been knocked out. The masses have been empowered through their experience of Thaksin-style populism and they are not likely to go back to their meek selves.
But who would be doing the appointing of the 70 percent? Nobody ever details that.
Another leg is cracking too. King Bhumibol is now frail. He will turn 81 next month. The crown prince enjoys nothing like the same reverence that the old king does. When Bhumibol goes, the second leg of the triad goes too.
That this prospect figures strongly in the PAD's calculations was seen when -- I wish I had kept the quote and reference -- Sondhi let slip that the matter was urgent: The problem had to be solved before the royal succession.
Everybody in Thailand knows, but no one is saying it: The royal court is one of the key parties behind the PAD. Why? They need to institutionalise their grip on power before the informal influence wielded by the old king fades into history. At the same time, this faction has wide support among the Bangkok elite because they too see their interests threatened when future governments are beholden to the provincial masses rather than to them.
This is why I say it's a classic war of succession. Who would hold sway over the future of Thailand post-Bhumibol? As the king's health deteriorates, the battle becomes ever more desperate -- to the extent of seizing the airport and cutting off Bangkok from the rest of the world. The PAD and its backers see it as an existential struggle. That being the case, it hardly matters whether Thailand's economy is destroyed in the process, because if they fail, they'd be destroyed.
Singaporeans might ask the question: when will it be our turn?
© Yawning Bread
The PM has no full control of the army and police
The current government of Somchai Wongsawat appears quite impotent in the face of these widespread sit-ins and blockades mounted by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD at the Government House (6 months now) and both Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi airports.
The army and police will not carry out the government's orders to clear out the protestors. Part of the reason is that the higher echelons of these forces belong to the Bangkok elite too and so are sympathetic to the PAD.
They can also see the preferences of the royal court and may not wish to act in a way that offends it.
Moreover, as with all such situations, it is not clear who the eventual winner of the struggle will be, and these senior officers are probably hedging their bets as far as possible, through inaction.
Footnotes
None
Addenda
None
Yawning Bread. 29 November 2008
Politics airport-style
Seizing an airport and stranding a reported 90,000 travellers in Bangkok with no way to fly out of the city is certainly headline-grabbing. News media tell the story in many ways, from political moves to inconvenienced-man-in-the-street tales, but I see very little that attempts to explain the bigger picture.
PAD supporters occupy the passenger terminal of Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi airport
Part of the reason why it may be hard, at least for formal media organisations, to tell the story is because it involves the royal family and Thailand's strict lese majesté law makes it a crime to mention royalty in unflattering light. Like Singapore's use of defamation suits and more recently contempt of court laws, the lese majesté law has the effect of creating self-censorship.
What is happening in Thailand this year is really a war of succession. This is a classic kind of conflict that arises when a political era has ended or is coming to an end and various powers jostle to seize the upper hand for the next period. The era that is ending is the reign of King Rama IX (Bhumibol Adulyadej), but apparently, you're not even supposed to insinuate that!
For much of his reign, Thailand has been ruled alternately by military dictatorships and short-lived parliamentary governments. Whether one or the other, generals, politicians and senior civil servants have been drawn from the social elite, who have mostly served the interests of their own class. Thailand is relatively business-friendly because this class owns a lot of businesses. Development is centred on Bangkok, because this class is mostly based in the capital, while much of Thailand remains dirt-poor. The wealth gap between those who live in upscale Suan Phlu condominiums and their maids' families back in a rural village is shocking.
A typical villager's house in Surin province, Thailand
Despite these tensions, social peace has been maintained through a triad of reasons:
Firstly, Thai governments, whatever their ilk, have not done absolutely nothing for the provinces; they have done at least the minimum, such as extending the electrical grid, building roads and providing schools, that provides a semblance of progress.
Secondly, Bhumibol is genuinely popular. He spent many years criss-crossing the country listening to country folk and it is largely through his personal influence that Thai governments have not completely neglected the provinces. (But see also the box at right.)
Thirdly, Thai culture is not yet fully modern. It sees social stratification as normal and people accommodate themselves to this fact of life through a complex system of patronage. Higher-ups are respected for the gifts that they occasionally shower on poorer folk, who return the favour with loyalty; at no time do people question why some chaps are rich and powerful enough to dispense patronage and why others must remain receivers of charity.
While respect for the king is definitely genuine, it should also be noted that there has been a huge amount of propaganda over the decades building up the image of the monarchy. In Thailand, one is frequently struck by the excessive, usually obsequious, display of engineered adulation.
Despite the spread of schools, educational standards are still poor and (I believe) a majority of children in the provinces do not finish middle school. What is produced is a large pool of minimally-educated workers who are able to staff the production lines, restaurants and hotels of booming Bangkok and its industrial estates, but who do not expect the social mobility to ever challenge the place of the elite.
Then came the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and Thaksin Shinawatra. The first felled many rich Thais who had over-extended themselves by borrowing abroad (at fixed exchange rates) to fund their domestic investments. The moment the Thai central bank could not maintain the exchange rate and was forced to devalue the baht, whole swathes of rich Thai society were financially crippled. Large projects in Bangkok stood unfinished. Suddenly, the upper class of Thai society did not look so permanent after all.
Thaksin after an election victory
Into this situation burst Thaksin Shawatra, who was already a tycoon before he entered politics. In 2001, he won the general election -– then considered one of the most open, corruption-free elections ever held -- becoming prime minister. His government promptly instituted a series of populist measures, including the 30-baht healthcare scheme that brought state healthcare within reach of many rural families for the first time.
With his popularity so cemented, he proved he could win successive elections. In 2005, his Thai Rak Thai party swept 374 seats in the 500-seat lower house. This model for winning elections -– appealing to the interests of the provincial masses -– would prove highly threatening to the Bangkok elite. For the first time, they had to contemplate a government that did not depend on them, or on the royal court, for favours.
Accusations were hurled at him about corruption, vote-buying, and so on, and possibly some of the charges may well be true, though in the present charged, partisan atmosphere, it is difficult to get an impartial view as to the real facts.
Sondhi Limthongkul
Before long, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media magnate, emerged as the point man for the anti-Thaksin campaign. From the beginning, Sondhi and his People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) were reputed to enjoy support from not only a cross section of the Bangkok elite, but from the court as well.
Propelling his campiagn was a sense that the political equation in Thailand had changed. The docile masses had tasted the power of their voting rights, and would in time become more and more assertive. Through Thaksin's party, they would become the new permanent majority in Thailand's politics, sidelining the old order.
So came the coup of September 2006 and a short period of military rule. Yet, it changed nothing, for when elections under a new constitution were held again in December 2007, the People Power Party (PPP), the successor to the banned Thai Rak Thai, became the largest party in parliament, and with a few allies, formed the post-coup government.
That's when the PAD changed its tune. From asserting that its campaign was against Thaksin's corrupt politics, it finally came out to say that its aim was to rewrite the constitution to make future parliaments 70 percent appointed. The masses were not to be trusted with the vote because, according to Sondhi, they were "ill-educated" and prone to selling their vote.
This is an admission that one leg of the triad that kept the old order in place has been knocked out. The masses have been empowered through their experience of Thaksin-style populism and they are not likely to go back to their meek selves.
But who would be doing the appointing of the 70 percent? Nobody ever details that.
Another leg is cracking too. King Bhumibol is now frail. He will turn 81 next month. The crown prince enjoys nothing like the same reverence that the old king does. When Bhumibol goes, the second leg of the triad goes too.
That this prospect figures strongly in the PAD's calculations was seen when -- I wish I had kept the quote and reference -- Sondhi let slip that the matter was urgent: The problem had to be solved before the royal succession.
Everybody in Thailand knows, but no one is saying it: The royal court is one of the key parties behind the PAD. Why? They need to institutionalise their grip on power before the informal influence wielded by the old king fades into history. At the same time, this faction has wide support among the Bangkok elite because they too see their interests threatened when future governments are beholden to the provincial masses rather than to them.
This is why I say it's a classic war of succession. Who would hold sway over the future of Thailand post-Bhumibol? As the king's health deteriorates, the battle becomes ever more desperate -- to the extent of seizing the airport and cutting off Bangkok from the rest of the world. The PAD and its backers see it as an existential struggle. That being the case, it hardly matters whether Thailand's economy is destroyed in the process, because if they fail, they'd be destroyed.
Singaporeans might ask the question: when will it be our turn?
© Yawning Bread
The PM has no full control of the army and police
The current government of Somchai Wongsawat appears quite impotent in the face of these widespread sit-ins and blockades mounted by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD at the Government House (6 months now) and both Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi airports.
The army and police will not carry out the government's orders to clear out the protestors. Part of the reason is that the higher echelons of these forces belong to the Bangkok elite too and so are sympathetic to the PAD.
They can also see the preferences of the royal court and may not wish to act in a way that offends it.
Moreover, as with all such situations, it is not clear who the eventual winner of the struggle will be, and these senior officers are probably hedging their bets as far as possible, through inaction.
Footnotes
None
Addenda
None
