Disassembling GRC system benefits PAP (Part 1 of 3)
Posted by theonlinecitizen on April 9, 2012
The term GRC (Group Representation Constituency) denotes a constituency and an electoral division within Singapore, where MPs are voted in as a group, with the voters choosing on a party rather than an individual basis. The primary reasoning behind such a scheme by the PAP-dominant legislative branch of government is that such a system guarantees the representation of a candidate from a minority ethnic group – with at least one MP being a member of the minority group. This scheme came into effect in 1988, prior to which all constituencies were SMCs (Single Member Constituencies).
It has been utilised successfully to maintain the PAP hold on the legislative branch, though this has brought about the suggestion of gerrymandering by critics, due to the redrawing of electoral boundaries and the permitted deviation of 30% for each GRC, which can create differences in the voting power of the electorate across different wards and differing workloads for each MP (Tan, 2010). It has suffered several criticisms levelled at it, as well as allegations that it has failed to fulfil the primary purpose of ensuring minority representation and reduced the voting power of the individual Singapore citizen.
The advantages and disadvantages of the GRC model are presented and evaluated here for objective assessment, through the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis. The current view suggest that it may be to the PAPs advantage to abandon the GRC model and return to the SMC system, or to tweak the GRC model and limit the maximum number of representatives to 3 individuals on a team, with a suggested margin of between 5-10% in population.
Advantages
The advantages suggested by the GRC model and commonly cited by its supporters, primarily the PAP, are that it entrenches and assures minority representation within the legislative branch of government (Constitution,1991).
Article 39A(1)a of the Constitution also permits a maximum of 6 MPs per GRC, stated that this was primarily in order to ensure that a ward with a rapidly growing population has sufficient management and representation (Goh,1996).
Another advantage suggested by this model was the reasoning that with greater access to a larger population of constituents, combined with a diversity of views offered by the different MPs in a GRC team, their effectiveness at providing representation in Parliament to a wider range of views from the citizenry is made possible.
However the deficits far outweigh any advantages granted by the GRC in terms of economies of scale as well as administration and representation, as well as lending credence to regime critics and intelligentsia, lessening the legitimacy of the PAP regime. The GRC Model is fundamentally unsound and disadvantages the PAP in the long term.
The criticisms offered up by critics of the GRC model are that it weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance rather than national allegiance and diverts away from the original premise of protecting minority representation.
It also suggests and creates a perception amongst the public – as well as lend credence to allegations of critics – that the PAP is an immature and petty political institution. It suggests a lack of faith in its political branding and insecurity, as well as a lack of respect towards the electorate via the reduction of the power of their vote.
Impaired Voting Power
To quote from Eugene Tan (2010) who analysed the case for redrawing electoral boundaries in relation to the GRC by the EBRC (Election Boundaries Review Committee):
“In reviewing electoral boundaries, the EBRC operates on a 30-per-cent deviation rule. Let's assume the ratio of one MP serving 26,000 voters is maintained; the number of voters in an electoral division can range from 18,200 to 33,800 (30 per cent plus/minus of 26,000). Extrapolating from this, a five-member GRC can have between 91,000 and 169,000 voters – the difference between the minimum and maximum number of voters being a whopping 86 per cent!”
He went on to note that the review and subsequent redrawing of boundaries affected ”the principle of fair and balanced representation and results in different "workloads" for MPs. This also has implications for the equality of votes. A voter in a five-member GRC with 91,000 voters has effectively more voting power since it returns as many MPs as another five-member GRC with 170,000 voters.”
The wards of Aljunied and Tanjong Pagar during GE 2006 were compared to present the resulting discrepancy, noting that while Aljunied GRC, headed by a team of five, had a population of 145,141 voters, the six-man ward of Tanjong Pagar GRC had only 3,000 more voters. Potong Pasir, the smallest SMC and represented by Chiam See Tong, had a population of 15,888 voters while the largest SMC, Bukit Panjang, had 30,452 voters. This created a case where the power of the voters was impaired, due to the difference in numbers across the wards (Tan,2010).
Under the current GRC system, the guide ratio of MPs to their constituents can be as much as 26 000 constituents to 1 MP, implying the number of voters within an electoral division can vary between 18 200-33 800 voters. This results in a five-member GRC being able to possess between 91 000-169 000 voters, a difference of 86% and beyond the permitted 30% deviation. In functioning electoral systems of far larger countries with more uneven spreads of population, the deviation is closer to 5%, as in the UK and New Zealand, while Australia permits a maximum deviation of 10% (Tan,2010).
Finally, it creates unequal voting power across the electorate. In a GRC a single vote returns 4-6 candidates into power, compared to a vote in an SMC which returns a single representative to power. Compared to an SMC, the power of a single vote in a GRC is greatly reduced and prevents voters from ejecting an unpopular individual (Tan,2007). This prevents the PAP from accurately assessing a mandate in a ward. It also allows for the retention of unpopular individuals, weakens the PAP mandate and disenfranchises the electorate, as well as weakens the affinity of the electorate towards the PAP.
In summary, GRCs allow for the retention of unpopular individuals who pose liabilities to the PAP via their unpopularity and lack of mandate from the people or the insertion of unpopular individuals which further weakens any existing PAP mandate, as in the case of Tin Pei Ling in Marine Parade GRC, which resulted in a reduction in the total percentage of votes, despite the presence of a PAP stalwart in the form of Goh Chok Tong (Ouyang,2011).
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Disassembling GRC system benefits PAP (Part 2 of 3)
In Part 1 of this series published yesterday, I argued on the deficit of the GRC System and how the model weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance.
In Part 2, I contend that the GRC system unnecessarily exposes PAP to criticisms of gerrymendering.
MP-Voter Relationship Weakened
It is also noted that the relationship between the PAP MPs and their constituents is weakened by the GRC model. The credibility and accountability of candidates within a team can be reduced, because the more credible members are seen as using their esteem with the electorate to shield less popular members from being voted out. The relationship is between the team of MPs and the electorate rather than between the individual MP and the electorate (Singh,2006).
Retaining unpopular candidates by such a method thus weakens the affinity of the citizens and the PAP mandate with such an arrangement. It also works to lessen the credibility of an established representative by association. Steps were taken to amend this in 2009 (Lee) by the introduction of more SMC wards and downsizing GRCs. However this only alleviates the problem rather than solving what remains a structural deficit of the election process and a liability towards the PAP.
Entrenchment of Racial Attitudes and Diversion from National Identity
The adoption of the GRC model emphasises a sense of racial consciousness in the attitudes of individuals and may very well contribute to dividing the different ethnicities along community lines. It can result in questioning the legitimacy of any minority candidate, as the electorate would question whether they are selected based on a quota rather than their merit (Think Centre,2002).
The PAP may reply that minority candidates have undergone stringent selection and vetting processes but this has ultimately been cast into doubt with the revelation by MP Charles Chong that the PAP has experienced difficulty in recruiting candidates and has been fielding and second and third tier candidates since 2006 (Seah,2011 & SatayClub,2011). This then calls into question the calibre of minority representatives given the small pool of candidates to recruit from in the first place.
Such a system arguably also affects the personal esteem of the minority candidate, as they would not then be sure whether they were elected based on the affinity of the electorate for them or due to the model itself and the team they were part of. It creates the insinuation that were they to contest an SMC, they would lack the merit and credibility as individuals to succeed and that they are of insufficient ability (Think Centre,2002).
It also creates and perpetuates a perception of disrespect to the electorate and to the Chinese majority by assuming that a Chinese electorate will vote according to the primordial instincts of race, culture and language rather than on the merit of the candidate (Think Centre,2002). We know this not to be the case based on three precedents.
The first precedent is of JB Jeyaratnam, a Singaporean Indian and Worker's Party MP, who won a by-election in the Anson ward in 1981. This ward was populated by a Chinese-majority population. A more recent precedent is of the election of Michael Palmer, a Eurasian PAP MP, in the Chinese majority ward of Punggol. The third precedent is the historical case of David Saul Marshall, a Singaporean of Indian Baghdadi Jewish descent, who was the first Chief Minister of Singapore from 1955-1956 (Rahim,1998).
A continued use of the GRC model presupposes that the Singaporean Chinese community will continue to exhibit alleged primordial behaviour (Think Centre,2002) when this has been explicitly shown not to be the case in the two precedents of David Saul Marshall and JB Jeyaratnam. This illustrates that at two different points in history, the ethnic origin of a political candidate has negligible bearing on their election or attraction to the Chinese majority, at both a local and national level.
It also contributes to disenfranchising the minority communities for simple reasons. Such communities are granted dignity, empowered and enfranchised within the nation as well as granted affinity by the provision of equal opportunities and equal treatment to develop and succeed (Think Centre,2002). A fitting statement to describe the situation is that: “Minorities do not want to feel good because we have legislated representation, we want to feel dignified that we have men and women who have fought a good fight to enter parliament on their merits”
In purely political and ethical terms, this works to the PAPs disadvantage by alienating a desired electorate segment and weakens the mandate, working against stated PAP social interests. It works against social harmony and is divergent with the goal of forging national unity and a national identity.
Constant Boundary Shifting
The large deviation rule allowed in designating the boundaries of a constituency means a higher tolerance for the size of any single electoral division. Theoretically, this should reduce the need to redraw boundaries. The creation of oddly-shaped electoral boundaries also erodes the sense of identity of voters (Tan,2010; Think Centre,2002).
An example of the case in being is of the placement of Braddell Heights being part of Marine Parade GRC despite its proximity to Macritchie Reservoir rather than East Coast Park. Another example may be the prior placement of Dunearn Estate and the Stevens Road neighbourhood area within the Tanjong Pagar GRC before the subsequent shift to Kallang-Moulmein GRC in 2011.
This then creates the suggestion of gerrymandering. The lack of transparency in the boundary shifting process then feeds the public perception that the PAP conducts itself unethically and undermines both the long-term mandate of the party as well being a barrier to the opposition, which has been elaborated on (Tan,2010).
The EBRC (Election Boundaries Review Committee), responsible for overseeing the setting of electoral districts, has to respond to the legitimate expectations of a more educated electorate sensitive to fair play, ethical conduct and the voter enfranchisement. Any reasoning behind the shifting of boundaries must not only be sound, it must be articulated and substantive in accomplishing this (Tan,2010).
Voters are entitled to know why boundaries are drawn or shifted, and the process of how they are accomplished. If not accomplished and explained “…it sho uld not be surprising if Singaporeans view the redrawing of boundaries as being calculated to undermine the Opposition or, at the very least, not disadvantage the ruling party” (Tan,2010).
Criticisms of Favouring Incumbents at the Cost of The Opposition
The GRC model exposes the PAP to criticisms of gerrymandering as the GRC model presents a high threshold and indeed works to our advantage, as acknowledged by Goh Chok Tong due to the PAP ability to field credible teams or teams with strong anchors that appeal to the electorate (Mutalib,2002). This works to entrench PAP dominance by creating an artificially high barrier of entry for political opposition factions who have to invest far more resources in breaching the GRCs, due to the vote threhold increasing for them (Singh,2006).
As an illustration, currently each candidate running in a GRC is required to deposit a sum of equal to 8% of the total allowances payable to an MP in the calendar year preceding the election, rounded to the nearest $500, under Section 28 of the Parliamentary Elections Act. Under the same section, should a candidate not attain at least an eighth of the total votes within the GRC, they are then required to forfeit their deposit.
A common criticism is that this results in a large number of walkovers, due to the inability of the political opposition factions to match the resources of the incumbent PAP. To date, the only breach achieved into the political fortress created by the GRC model is by the Worker's Party of Singapore, who contested and won the Aljunied GRC (Loh,2011).
This action of creating political barriers and not engaging in treatment of parity with other parties erodes the PAPs political branding by creating an image of unethical and non-virtuous conduct, weakens the mandate in the long term by denying the dissent inherent in any diverse society and causes the loss of ground amongst the supporters of the opposition, whom the PAP desires as support. Treating the opposition as such, with an increasingly educated, politically aware and informed population, only serves to polarise via ideology and create the seeds of partisanship – a distinct disservice to national interests.
Minority Representation Lessened
The official justification behind the GRC system has always been to entrench minority representation in Parliament and as a result ensure their views as a community are voiced in the political landscape. This reasoning has no rational basis and presents a vulnerability that critics can exploit with an increasingly educated and politically aware population. It has also failed, in fact decreasing the proportion of minorities in Parliament.
As stated before, using this reasoning as a basis for the GRC scheme is unsound. All PAP minority candidates fielded have won regularly, even in SMCs, with the only MPs losing their seas being of Chinese descent, with one case being the loss to a Singaporean Indian candidate in 1984. This was again in Anson, where Ng Pock Too lost to Joshua Benjamin Jeyaratnam (Parliamentary General Election,1984) who had triumphed there at a by-election in 1981 (Rahim,1998). The other candidate who lost was Mah Bow Tan to Chiam See Tong in Potong Pasir.
Under the GRC model, as the size of a GRC increases, the minorities have less representation overall as the proportion of minority candidates per GRC decreases. As the minority candidates already form a numerical minority in Parliament, this dilutes minority representation even further (Rahim,1998).
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In Part 1 of this series published yesterday, I argued on the deficit of the GRC System and how the model weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance.
In Part 2, I contended that the GRC system unnecessarily exposes PAP to criticisms of gerrymendering.
In this concluding part, I discuss why the GRC system only offers more costs than benefits for the ruling party.
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Law of Large Numbers
The Law of Large Numbers works both in favour and against the incumbent. Due to the large number of people, theoretically it reflects the mandate that the party enjoys via the popular vote (Da Cunha,1997).
In GE 2006, the PAP maintained an average of 67.04% of the votes in any contested GRC, while the average figure was 61.67% for an SMC ward. The national average for GE 2006 was 66.6%. The percentage difference in the PAP votes between SMCs and GRCs grew from 3% in GE 1991, and remained stable at ~5% in the 1997, 2001 and 2006 General Elections. This may be attributed to the enlargement of the size of GRCs in 1997, which multiplied the effect of the law of large numbers.
However in GE 2011, the mood in Aljunied GRC resulted in the removal of the PAP incumbents and the loss of several PAP stalwarts. As such, an entire team of experienced political executives can be lost in a single election should the popular mood be against the PAP (Asiaone,2011).
Similarly, the practice of renewal via nestling a selected candidate with a veteran or veteran team can be a destabilising factor working against the incumbent, especially in the case of the Marince Parade GRC. Tin Pei Ling was a highly unpopular figure and would arguably have lost had she stood as a candidate in an SMC ward. However, she was emplaced with the team of then-Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong. The result of such an action reduced the PAP vote share to 56.65%, compared to prior vote shares of 72.9% in 1992, expressing disapproval with such a candidate and clear evidence of a liability to the PAP (Ouyang,2011).
Political Costs to the PAP
The costs of the GRC system have come to light in the most recent General Election. GE 2011 resulted in the loss of a veteran minister and PAP stalwart, George Yeo Yong Boon, who had previously served as Foreign Minister (2006-2011) and had previously served as a Minister for Information and Arts (1991-1999), Minister for Health (1995-1997) and the Minister for Trade and Industry (1999-2006). He also served as the Chairman of the Young PAP from 1991-2000 (PAP,2011).
The Loss of High Value Teams and Individuals
George Yeo was previously responsible for pushing Internet infrastructure efforts in the 1990s, laying the groundwork for the information sector to develop, as well the development of the Life Sciences sector via Biopolis. He also oversaw the negotiation and finalisation of Free Trade Agreements with the USA, Japan, India and Australia, amongst other countries. Furthermore, he proposed the creation of the Integrated Resorts of Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa, both of which boosted the tourist sector and generated tremendous economic returns for Singapore.
He along with the entirety of his team, consisting of Lim Hwee Hua, Zainal Abidin, Cynthia Phua and Ong Ye Kung contested against the Worker's Party in Aljunied GRC at the GE 2011 and lost. This resulted in the loss of an entire team of high-value MPs who are both credible and experienced, as well as possessing a level of personal branding within and outside the party and the nation. (Straits Times,2011). The loss of a High-Value Team with experienced personnel is then a cost that results from an electoral loss in a GRC ward, which is something that should be avoided.
Liabilities
The inclusion of an unpopular individual within a GRC team poses a challenge winning an award and presents a liability, as a person may evoke enough aversion from the electorate to compromise the mandate of the entire team and risk electoral victory.
The case of Tin Pei Ling during the GE 2011 is presented here. The Chairperson of the Ulu Pandan Youth Executive Committtee for the Young PAP and a member of the Community Development Welfare Fund Committee. She was fielded in Marine Parade GRC alongside the politically established stalward Goh Chok Tong (Russell,2011).
However, she also attracted a great amount of negative attention, warranted or otherwise, as well as criticisms ranging from her perceived immaturity to allegations of gaining her position due to political connections with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong as her husband, Ng How Yue, is the PM's Principal Private Secretary.
She was ultimately credited as being a significant factor in large reduction of the vote for the PAP in Marine Parade GRC, due to the negative publicity attached to her (Ouyang,2011). This was strong enough to affect what was generally perceived as a PAP stronghold, combined with a powerful opposition team anchored by Nicole Seah, a highly popular candidate. Even with the presence of a political heavyweight, the percentage of popular votes dropped from 72.9% to 56.7% of the popular vote (Ouyang,2011).
She was also perceived as lacking both substance and meaning in her appointment as a politician by observers and commentators, especially in comparison to the figure on the other end of the political spectrum she was compared to, Nicole Seah of the National Solidarity Party (Russell,2011).
The case of Tin Pei Ling in Marine Parade GRC illustrates how such an individual can become a liability, even with the presence of a political heavyweight in the form of Senior Minister Emeritus Goh Chok Tong. This is inimical to the organisational interests of the PAP as it works against the PAP.
Loss of Talents
George Yeo was an asset to the PAP. He was the Foreign Minister and also a political figure who served as a non-partisan figure, able to garner praise and respect from political opponents (Chan,2011), as well as overseeing the establishment of excellent relations with Malaysia after may dips and rises throughout their history, with the strength of relationship referred to with the term “not just a relationship, but one based on the common view of how both countries should seize the future together”.
In his role as the foreign minister, he was described by Chan Jia Hui (2011), as possessing ”…the necessary contacts all over the world, which constitute our diplomatic channels. Diplomatic channels are important in facilitating trade links, transfer of knowledge and technology, conflict mediation and establishing bilateral or multi-lateral ties. All of which will be to our benefit. His portfolio may not directly impact Singaporeans as compared with his manpower or trade and industry ministry colleagues, but nonetheless are every bit as important”.
By comparison, the new entrant, Tin Pei Ling, garnered immense negative publicity and with her lack of media management acumen and perceived political convictions, handicapped herself and her team. This was combined with the presence of Nicole Seah of the NSP, were significant factors in weakening the mandate within Marine Parade GRC. She had comparatively little experience compared to George Yeo and possessed far less credibility and credentials. She also made several missteps that betrayed a lack of experience with policy formulation and public presentation. A politician requires both public speaking skills and the ability to present and discuss policies cogently (Chan,2011). Tin Pei Ling seemingly lacked both.
The end-result of this election for the PAP was to lose a highly credible and respected Minister and MP, of a calibre that requires development as well as possessing personal branding in representing the interests of Singapore overseas.
The costs of continuing such a model work against both PAP interests and national interests and as such should be discontinued. It undermines the ethical conduct that is associated and expected with the PAP branding, undermining popular mandate and granting credence and validity to the numerous criticisms levelled against the PAP. This ultimately affects the public perception of the PAP, which affects the political credibility of the party.
A review of the political environment also provides compelling evidence that continued hegemonic rule provides a disservice to Singapore (Ortmann,2006) and to the PAP itself, with established rifts (Ong,2011; RazorTV,2011) both within the party and between the electorate, as indicated by the Presidential Election of 2011 and the cyberspace community.
Political Benefits
The political benefit for the PAP by maintaining the current system is that they are then able to recruit candidates by ensuring they have a higher chance of success in the election, via being anchored by the presence of an established political heavyweight (Singh,2006; Li,2006), as the candidate may then feel that they do not wish to compromise their professional interests. Critics will argue that this may display a lack of commitment towards the political institutions and the citizenry.
The other argument made is that of administration, with GRCs able to provide economies of scale in the management of their ward, due to the increase in area and the resulting cost advantages attained thereof, such as the fall in cost for services and facilities provided, due to reductions in unit cost and increases in usage. However the use of a GRC for such a role is questionable, as Goh Chok Tong has been noted by then-NCMP Sylvia Lim as stating in 1988 that a collection of SMCs grouping together could offer the same outcome in enjoying the economies of scale (Lim,2008).
The other argument offered is the benefit of minority representation but that has been shown to be fundamentally unsound and lacking as a basis for maintaining the GRC model, from the historical cases of both JB Jeyaratnam and David Saul Marshall, as well as the decreased representation of minorities within the Parliament.
Conclusion
The continued adoption of the GRC model has exposed the PAP to several criticisms and allegations. A critical evaluation of the GRC model, along with historical precedents that undermine the premise of minority representation and the loss of talented and/or experienced political personnel have been presented as cases against its continued adoption and as a model with multiple structural deficits.
There is more benefit for the PAP to gain by returning to the SMC model of the past than by continuing a model which only offers more costs than benefits. Furthermore the basic premise is no longer sound, having been undermined at least three times by precedent and most recently in GE 2011, with the election of Michael Palmer of the PAP as MP.
Returning to the SMC model would allow the PAP to retain talented and experienced personnel with solid personal branding and credentials, while removing unpopular individuals who present a liability to the party. It would strengthen the PAPs political branding vis-a-vis more ethical conduct and image of virtue as well as provide a more accurate perspective of the strength of popular mandate by restoring the power of the voters to their optimal levels as under an SMC. It would remove the possibility of individuals unable to achieve on their own merit from attaining rank within the party infrastructure and strength the PAP as a whole.
It would go a way towards re-establishing the relationship between the PAP and the population. To quote from Lord Mandelson's public lecture at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (2011): “The trick for any party long in power is to recognise that with power comes great responsibility. It must find ways to give away more power to the people, rather than take more power into itself.”
Restoring the SMC system would grant more power to the people and remove a level of the PAP's political power. But bearing in mind the political longevity of the party and the deficits already noted in the GRC system and its fundamentally unsound basis, the PAP should pursue such a policy as it is convergent with the PAP's organisational interest and the national interest.
Political forces are driven by the intangibles of human emotion, sentiment, passion, ambition and ideals. It is these forces the PAP must learn to engage people with, to engender actual change and ensure the continuity of mandate they have enjoyed for several decades.
Posted by theonlinecitizen on April 9, 2012
The term GRC (Group Representation Constituency) denotes a constituency and an electoral division within Singapore, where MPs are voted in as a group, with the voters choosing on a party rather than an individual basis. The primary reasoning behind such a scheme by the PAP-dominant legislative branch of government is that such a system guarantees the representation of a candidate from a minority ethnic group – with at least one MP being a member of the minority group. This scheme came into effect in 1988, prior to which all constituencies were SMCs (Single Member Constituencies).
It has been utilised successfully to maintain the PAP hold on the legislative branch, though this has brought about the suggestion of gerrymandering by critics, due to the redrawing of electoral boundaries and the permitted deviation of 30% for each GRC, which can create differences in the voting power of the electorate across different wards and differing workloads for each MP (Tan, 2010). It has suffered several criticisms levelled at it, as well as allegations that it has failed to fulfil the primary purpose of ensuring minority representation and reduced the voting power of the individual Singapore citizen.
The advantages and disadvantages of the GRC model are presented and evaluated here for objective assessment, through the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis. The current view suggest that it may be to the PAPs advantage to abandon the GRC model and return to the SMC system, or to tweak the GRC model and limit the maximum number of representatives to 3 individuals on a team, with a suggested margin of between 5-10% in population.
Advantages
The advantages suggested by the GRC model and commonly cited by its supporters, primarily the PAP, are that it entrenches and assures minority representation within the legislative branch of government (Constitution,1991).
Article 39A(1)a of the Constitution also permits a maximum of 6 MPs per GRC, stated that this was primarily in order to ensure that a ward with a rapidly growing population has sufficient management and representation (Goh,1996).
Another advantage suggested by this model was the reasoning that with greater access to a larger population of constituents, combined with a diversity of views offered by the different MPs in a GRC team, their effectiveness at providing representation in Parliament to a wider range of views from the citizenry is made possible.
However the deficits far outweigh any advantages granted by the GRC in terms of economies of scale as well as administration and representation, as well as lending credence to regime critics and intelligentsia, lessening the legitimacy of the PAP regime. The GRC Model is fundamentally unsound and disadvantages the PAP in the long term.
The criticisms offered up by critics of the GRC model are that it weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance rather than national allegiance and diverts away from the original premise of protecting minority representation.
It also suggests and creates a perception amongst the public – as well as lend credence to allegations of critics – that the PAP is an immature and petty political institution. It suggests a lack of faith in its political branding and insecurity, as well as a lack of respect towards the electorate via the reduction of the power of their vote.
Impaired Voting Power
To quote from Eugene Tan (2010) who analysed the case for redrawing electoral boundaries in relation to the GRC by the EBRC (Election Boundaries Review Committee):
“In reviewing electoral boundaries, the EBRC operates on a 30-per-cent deviation rule. Let's assume the ratio of one MP serving 26,000 voters is maintained; the number of voters in an electoral division can range from 18,200 to 33,800 (30 per cent plus/minus of 26,000). Extrapolating from this, a five-member GRC can have between 91,000 and 169,000 voters – the difference between the minimum and maximum number of voters being a whopping 86 per cent!”
He went on to note that the review and subsequent redrawing of boundaries affected ”the principle of fair and balanced representation and results in different "workloads" for MPs. This also has implications for the equality of votes. A voter in a five-member GRC with 91,000 voters has effectively more voting power since it returns as many MPs as another five-member GRC with 170,000 voters.”
The wards of Aljunied and Tanjong Pagar during GE 2006 were compared to present the resulting discrepancy, noting that while Aljunied GRC, headed by a team of five, had a population of 145,141 voters, the six-man ward of Tanjong Pagar GRC had only 3,000 more voters. Potong Pasir, the smallest SMC and represented by Chiam See Tong, had a population of 15,888 voters while the largest SMC, Bukit Panjang, had 30,452 voters. This created a case where the power of the voters was impaired, due to the difference in numbers across the wards (Tan,2010).
Under the current GRC system, the guide ratio of MPs to their constituents can be as much as 26 000 constituents to 1 MP, implying the number of voters within an electoral division can vary between 18 200-33 800 voters. This results in a five-member GRC being able to possess between 91 000-169 000 voters, a difference of 86% and beyond the permitted 30% deviation. In functioning electoral systems of far larger countries with more uneven spreads of population, the deviation is closer to 5%, as in the UK and New Zealand, while Australia permits a maximum deviation of 10% (Tan,2010).
Finally, it creates unequal voting power across the electorate. In a GRC a single vote returns 4-6 candidates into power, compared to a vote in an SMC which returns a single representative to power. Compared to an SMC, the power of a single vote in a GRC is greatly reduced and prevents voters from ejecting an unpopular individual (Tan,2007). This prevents the PAP from accurately assessing a mandate in a ward. It also allows for the retention of unpopular individuals, weakens the PAP mandate and disenfranchises the electorate, as well as weakens the affinity of the electorate towards the PAP.
In summary, GRCs allow for the retention of unpopular individuals who pose liabilities to the PAP via their unpopularity and lack of mandate from the people or the insertion of unpopular individuals which further weakens any existing PAP mandate, as in the case of Tin Pei Ling in Marine Parade GRC, which resulted in a reduction in the total percentage of votes, despite the presence of a PAP stalwart in the form of Goh Chok Tong (Ouyang,2011).
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Disassembling GRC system benefits PAP (Part 2 of 3)
In Part 1 of this series published yesterday, I argued on the deficit of the GRC System and how the model weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance.
In Part 2, I contend that the GRC system unnecessarily exposes PAP to criticisms of gerrymendering.
MP-Voter Relationship Weakened
It is also noted that the relationship between the PAP MPs and their constituents is weakened by the GRC model. The credibility and accountability of candidates within a team can be reduced, because the more credible members are seen as using their esteem with the electorate to shield less popular members from being voted out. The relationship is between the team of MPs and the electorate rather than between the individual MP and the electorate (Singh,2006).
Retaining unpopular candidates by such a method thus weakens the affinity of the citizens and the PAP mandate with such an arrangement. It also works to lessen the credibility of an established representative by association. Steps were taken to amend this in 2009 (Lee) by the introduction of more SMC wards and downsizing GRCs. However this only alleviates the problem rather than solving what remains a structural deficit of the election process and a liability towards the PAP.
Entrenchment of Racial Attitudes and Diversion from National Identity
The adoption of the GRC model emphasises a sense of racial consciousness in the attitudes of individuals and may very well contribute to dividing the different ethnicities along community lines. It can result in questioning the legitimacy of any minority candidate, as the electorate would question whether they are selected based on a quota rather than their merit (Think Centre,2002).
The PAP may reply that minority candidates have undergone stringent selection and vetting processes but this has ultimately been cast into doubt with the revelation by MP Charles Chong that the PAP has experienced difficulty in recruiting candidates and has been fielding and second and third tier candidates since 2006 (Seah,2011 & SatayClub,2011). This then calls into question the calibre of minority representatives given the small pool of candidates to recruit from in the first place.
Such a system arguably also affects the personal esteem of the minority candidate, as they would not then be sure whether they were elected based on the affinity of the electorate for them or due to the model itself and the team they were part of. It creates the insinuation that were they to contest an SMC, they would lack the merit and credibility as individuals to succeed and that they are of insufficient ability (Think Centre,2002).
It also creates and perpetuates a perception of disrespect to the electorate and to the Chinese majority by assuming that a Chinese electorate will vote according to the primordial instincts of race, culture and language rather than on the merit of the candidate (Think Centre,2002). We know this not to be the case based on three precedents.
The first precedent is of JB Jeyaratnam, a Singaporean Indian and Worker's Party MP, who won a by-election in the Anson ward in 1981. This ward was populated by a Chinese-majority population. A more recent precedent is of the election of Michael Palmer, a Eurasian PAP MP, in the Chinese majority ward of Punggol. The third precedent is the historical case of David Saul Marshall, a Singaporean of Indian Baghdadi Jewish descent, who was the first Chief Minister of Singapore from 1955-1956 (Rahim,1998).
A continued use of the GRC model presupposes that the Singaporean Chinese community will continue to exhibit alleged primordial behaviour (Think Centre,2002) when this has been explicitly shown not to be the case in the two precedents of David Saul Marshall and JB Jeyaratnam. This illustrates that at two different points in history, the ethnic origin of a political candidate has negligible bearing on their election or attraction to the Chinese majority, at both a local and national level.
It also contributes to disenfranchising the minority communities for simple reasons. Such communities are granted dignity, empowered and enfranchised within the nation as well as granted affinity by the provision of equal opportunities and equal treatment to develop and succeed (Think Centre,2002). A fitting statement to describe the situation is that: “Minorities do not want to feel good because we have legislated representation, we want to feel dignified that we have men and women who have fought a good fight to enter parliament on their merits”
In purely political and ethical terms, this works to the PAPs disadvantage by alienating a desired electorate segment and weakens the mandate, working against stated PAP social interests. It works against social harmony and is divergent with the goal of forging national unity and a national identity.
Constant Boundary Shifting
The large deviation rule allowed in designating the boundaries of a constituency means a higher tolerance for the size of any single electoral division. Theoretically, this should reduce the need to redraw boundaries. The creation of oddly-shaped electoral boundaries also erodes the sense of identity of voters (Tan,2010; Think Centre,2002).
An example of the case in being is of the placement of Braddell Heights being part of Marine Parade GRC despite its proximity to Macritchie Reservoir rather than East Coast Park. Another example may be the prior placement of Dunearn Estate and the Stevens Road neighbourhood area within the Tanjong Pagar GRC before the subsequent shift to Kallang-Moulmein GRC in 2011.
This then creates the suggestion of gerrymandering. The lack of transparency in the boundary shifting process then feeds the public perception that the PAP conducts itself unethically and undermines both the long-term mandate of the party as well being a barrier to the opposition, which has been elaborated on (Tan,2010).
The EBRC (Election Boundaries Review Committee), responsible for overseeing the setting of electoral districts, has to respond to the legitimate expectations of a more educated electorate sensitive to fair play, ethical conduct and the voter enfranchisement. Any reasoning behind the shifting of boundaries must not only be sound, it must be articulated and substantive in accomplishing this (Tan,2010).
Voters are entitled to know why boundaries are drawn or shifted, and the process of how they are accomplished. If not accomplished and explained “…it sho uld not be surprising if Singaporeans view the redrawing of boundaries as being calculated to undermine the Opposition or, at the very least, not disadvantage the ruling party” (Tan,2010).
Criticisms of Favouring Incumbents at the Cost of The Opposition
The GRC model exposes the PAP to criticisms of gerrymandering as the GRC model presents a high threshold and indeed works to our advantage, as acknowledged by Goh Chok Tong due to the PAP ability to field credible teams or teams with strong anchors that appeal to the electorate (Mutalib,2002). This works to entrench PAP dominance by creating an artificially high barrier of entry for political opposition factions who have to invest far more resources in breaching the GRCs, due to the vote threhold increasing for them (Singh,2006).
As an illustration, currently each candidate running in a GRC is required to deposit a sum of equal to 8% of the total allowances payable to an MP in the calendar year preceding the election, rounded to the nearest $500, under Section 28 of the Parliamentary Elections Act. Under the same section, should a candidate not attain at least an eighth of the total votes within the GRC, they are then required to forfeit their deposit.
A common criticism is that this results in a large number of walkovers, due to the inability of the political opposition factions to match the resources of the incumbent PAP. To date, the only breach achieved into the political fortress created by the GRC model is by the Worker's Party of Singapore, who contested and won the Aljunied GRC (Loh,2011).
This action of creating political barriers and not engaging in treatment of parity with other parties erodes the PAPs political branding by creating an image of unethical and non-virtuous conduct, weakens the mandate in the long term by denying the dissent inherent in any diverse society and causes the loss of ground amongst the supporters of the opposition, whom the PAP desires as support. Treating the opposition as such, with an increasingly educated, politically aware and informed population, only serves to polarise via ideology and create the seeds of partisanship – a distinct disservice to national interests.
Minority Representation Lessened
The official justification behind the GRC system has always been to entrench minority representation in Parliament and as a result ensure their views as a community are voiced in the political landscape. This reasoning has no rational basis and presents a vulnerability that critics can exploit with an increasingly educated and politically aware population. It has also failed, in fact decreasing the proportion of minorities in Parliament.
As stated before, using this reasoning as a basis for the GRC scheme is unsound. All PAP minority candidates fielded have won regularly, even in SMCs, with the only MPs losing their seas being of Chinese descent, with one case being the loss to a Singaporean Indian candidate in 1984. This was again in Anson, where Ng Pock Too lost to Joshua Benjamin Jeyaratnam (Parliamentary General Election,1984) who had triumphed there at a by-election in 1981 (Rahim,1998). The other candidate who lost was Mah Bow Tan to Chiam See Tong in Potong Pasir.
Under the GRC model, as the size of a GRC increases, the minorities have less representation overall as the proportion of minority candidates per GRC decreases. As the minority candidates already form a numerical minority in Parliament, this dilutes minority representation even further (Rahim,1998).
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In Part 1 of this series published yesterday, I argued on the deficit of the GRC System and how the model weakens the voting power of constituents, weakens the relationship between the voter and their MP, entrenches and encourages and emphasises communalism in the form of ethnic allegiance.
In Part 2, I contended that the GRC system unnecessarily exposes PAP to criticisms of gerrymendering.
In this concluding part, I discuss why the GRC system only offers more costs than benefits for the ruling party.
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Law of Large Numbers
The Law of Large Numbers works both in favour and against the incumbent. Due to the large number of people, theoretically it reflects the mandate that the party enjoys via the popular vote (Da Cunha,1997).
In GE 2006, the PAP maintained an average of 67.04% of the votes in any contested GRC, while the average figure was 61.67% for an SMC ward. The national average for GE 2006 was 66.6%. The percentage difference in the PAP votes between SMCs and GRCs grew from 3% in GE 1991, and remained stable at ~5% in the 1997, 2001 and 2006 General Elections. This may be attributed to the enlargement of the size of GRCs in 1997, which multiplied the effect of the law of large numbers.
However in GE 2011, the mood in Aljunied GRC resulted in the removal of the PAP incumbents and the loss of several PAP stalwarts. As such, an entire team of experienced political executives can be lost in a single election should the popular mood be against the PAP (Asiaone,2011).
Similarly, the practice of renewal via nestling a selected candidate with a veteran or veteran team can be a destabilising factor working against the incumbent, especially in the case of the Marince Parade GRC. Tin Pei Ling was a highly unpopular figure and would arguably have lost had she stood as a candidate in an SMC ward. However, she was emplaced with the team of then-Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong. The result of such an action reduced the PAP vote share to 56.65%, compared to prior vote shares of 72.9% in 1992, expressing disapproval with such a candidate and clear evidence of a liability to the PAP (Ouyang,2011).
Political Costs to the PAP
The costs of the GRC system have come to light in the most recent General Election. GE 2011 resulted in the loss of a veteran minister and PAP stalwart, George Yeo Yong Boon, who had previously served as Foreign Minister (2006-2011) and had previously served as a Minister for Information and Arts (1991-1999), Minister for Health (1995-1997) and the Minister for Trade and Industry (1999-2006). He also served as the Chairman of the Young PAP from 1991-2000 (PAP,2011).
The Loss of High Value Teams and Individuals
George Yeo was previously responsible for pushing Internet infrastructure efforts in the 1990s, laying the groundwork for the information sector to develop, as well the development of the Life Sciences sector via Biopolis. He also oversaw the negotiation and finalisation of Free Trade Agreements with the USA, Japan, India and Australia, amongst other countries. Furthermore, he proposed the creation of the Integrated Resorts of Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa, both of which boosted the tourist sector and generated tremendous economic returns for Singapore.
He along with the entirety of his team, consisting of Lim Hwee Hua, Zainal Abidin, Cynthia Phua and Ong Ye Kung contested against the Worker's Party in Aljunied GRC at the GE 2011 and lost. This resulted in the loss of an entire team of high-value MPs who are both credible and experienced, as well as possessing a level of personal branding within and outside the party and the nation. (Straits Times,2011). The loss of a High-Value Team with experienced personnel is then a cost that results from an electoral loss in a GRC ward, which is something that should be avoided.
Liabilities
The inclusion of an unpopular individual within a GRC team poses a challenge winning an award and presents a liability, as a person may evoke enough aversion from the electorate to compromise the mandate of the entire team and risk electoral victory.
The case of Tin Pei Ling during the GE 2011 is presented here. The Chairperson of the Ulu Pandan Youth Executive Committtee for the Young PAP and a member of the Community Development Welfare Fund Committee. She was fielded in Marine Parade GRC alongside the politically established stalward Goh Chok Tong (Russell,2011).
However, she also attracted a great amount of negative attention, warranted or otherwise, as well as criticisms ranging from her perceived immaturity to allegations of gaining her position due to political connections with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong as her husband, Ng How Yue, is the PM's Principal Private Secretary.
She was ultimately credited as being a significant factor in large reduction of the vote for the PAP in Marine Parade GRC, due to the negative publicity attached to her (Ouyang,2011). This was strong enough to affect what was generally perceived as a PAP stronghold, combined with a powerful opposition team anchored by Nicole Seah, a highly popular candidate. Even with the presence of a political heavyweight, the percentage of popular votes dropped from 72.9% to 56.7% of the popular vote (Ouyang,2011).
She was also perceived as lacking both substance and meaning in her appointment as a politician by observers and commentators, especially in comparison to the figure on the other end of the political spectrum she was compared to, Nicole Seah of the National Solidarity Party (Russell,2011).
The case of Tin Pei Ling in Marine Parade GRC illustrates how such an individual can become a liability, even with the presence of a political heavyweight in the form of Senior Minister Emeritus Goh Chok Tong. This is inimical to the organisational interests of the PAP as it works against the PAP.
Loss of Talents
George Yeo was an asset to the PAP. He was the Foreign Minister and also a political figure who served as a non-partisan figure, able to garner praise and respect from political opponents (Chan,2011), as well as overseeing the establishment of excellent relations with Malaysia after may dips and rises throughout their history, with the strength of relationship referred to with the term “not just a relationship, but one based on the common view of how both countries should seize the future together”.
In his role as the foreign minister, he was described by Chan Jia Hui (2011), as possessing ”…the necessary contacts all over the world, which constitute our diplomatic channels. Diplomatic channels are important in facilitating trade links, transfer of knowledge and technology, conflict mediation and establishing bilateral or multi-lateral ties. All of which will be to our benefit. His portfolio may not directly impact Singaporeans as compared with his manpower or trade and industry ministry colleagues, but nonetheless are every bit as important”.
By comparison, the new entrant, Tin Pei Ling, garnered immense negative publicity and with her lack of media management acumen and perceived political convictions, handicapped herself and her team. This was combined with the presence of Nicole Seah of the NSP, were significant factors in weakening the mandate within Marine Parade GRC. She had comparatively little experience compared to George Yeo and possessed far less credibility and credentials. She also made several missteps that betrayed a lack of experience with policy formulation and public presentation. A politician requires both public speaking skills and the ability to present and discuss policies cogently (Chan,2011). Tin Pei Ling seemingly lacked both.
The end-result of this election for the PAP was to lose a highly credible and respected Minister and MP, of a calibre that requires development as well as possessing personal branding in representing the interests of Singapore overseas.
The costs of continuing such a model work against both PAP interests and national interests and as such should be discontinued. It undermines the ethical conduct that is associated and expected with the PAP branding, undermining popular mandate and granting credence and validity to the numerous criticisms levelled against the PAP. This ultimately affects the public perception of the PAP, which affects the political credibility of the party.
A review of the political environment also provides compelling evidence that continued hegemonic rule provides a disservice to Singapore (Ortmann,2006) and to the PAP itself, with established rifts (Ong,2011; RazorTV,2011) both within the party and between the electorate, as indicated by the Presidential Election of 2011 and the cyberspace community.
Political Benefits
The political benefit for the PAP by maintaining the current system is that they are then able to recruit candidates by ensuring they have a higher chance of success in the election, via being anchored by the presence of an established political heavyweight (Singh,2006; Li,2006), as the candidate may then feel that they do not wish to compromise their professional interests. Critics will argue that this may display a lack of commitment towards the political institutions and the citizenry.
The other argument made is that of administration, with GRCs able to provide economies of scale in the management of their ward, due to the increase in area and the resulting cost advantages attained thereof, such as the fall in cost for services and facilities provided, due to reductions in unit cost and increases in usage. However the use of a GRC for such a role is questionable, as Goh Chok Tong has been noted by then-NCMP Sylvia Lim as stating in 1988 that a collection of SMCs grouping together could offer the same outcome in enjoying the economies of scale (Lim,2008).
The other argument offered is the benefit of minority representation but that has been shown to be fundamentally unsound and lacking as a basis for maintaining the GRC model, from the historical cases of both JB Jeyaratnam and David Saul Marshall, as well as the decreased representation of minorities within the Parliament.
Conclusion
The continued adoption of the GRC model has exposed the PAP to several criticisms and allegations. A critical evaluation of the GRC model, along with historical precedents that undermine the premise of minority representation and the loss of talented and/or experienced political personnel have been presented as cases against its continued adoption and as a model with multiple structural deficits.
There is more benefit for the PAP to gain by returning to the SMC model of the past than by continuing a model which only offers more costs than benefits. Furthermore the basic premise is no longer sound, having been undermined at least three times by precedent and most recently in GE 2011, with the election of Michael Palmer of the PAP as MP.
Returning to the SMC model would allow the PAP to retain talented and experienced personnel with solid personal branding and credentials, while removing unpopular individuals who present a liability to the party. It would strengthen the PAPs political branding vis-a-vis more ethical conduct and image of virtue as well as provide a more accurate perspective of the strength of popular mandate by restoring the power of the voters to their optimal levels as under an SMC. It would remove the possibility of individuals unable to achieve on their own merit from attaining rank within the party infrastructure and strength the PAP as a whole.
It would go a way towards re-establishing the relationship between the PAP and the population. To quote from Lord Mandelson's public lecture at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (2011): “The trick for any party long in power is to recognise that with power comes great responsibility. It must find ways to give away more power to the people, rather than take more power into itself.”
Restoring the SMC system would grant more power to the people and remove a level of the PAP's political power. But bearing in mind the political longevity of the party and the deficits already noted in the GRC system and its fundamentally unsound basis, the PAP should pursue such a policy as it is convergent with the PAP's organisational interest and the national interest.
Political forces are driven by the intangibles of human emotion, sentiment, passion, ambition and ideals. It is these forces the PAP must learn to engage people with, to engender actual change and ensure the continuity of mandate they have enjoyed for several decades.
