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Bank Management Shld Be FIRED Over Minibombs!

makapaaa

Alfrescian (Inf)
Asset
<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR>Mis-selling: 'The fault lies not with individuals, but with management processes that encourage wrongful behaviour.'
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<!-- START OF : div id="storytext"--><!-- more than 4 paragraphs -->ST MONEY editor Ignatius Low wrote a constructive article on Monday, "Tougher Action on Mis-selling". I would like to build on his thoughts and give a suggestion from a slightly different angle.
As someone who works in industrial-organisational psychology (specifically in the area of motivation), I wish to share that organisational reward systems can be powerful motivators of individual behaviour. Simply put: Individuals will do what they know they will be rewarded to do.
Suppose that a bank sets only monetary goals for their relationship managers - that is, within the next 12 months to sell X dollar amount of High Notes 5 - then any human psychology will very naturally focus on that goal. Goal-focused people may not see the ethical subtleties that accompany their actions.
The question to ask then, is whether or not banks set specific goals related to the ethical treatment of customers.
Suppose next a bank distributes bonuses, commissions and other monetary rewards according to how relationship managers perform at their goal targets of X amount of dollars; then you would understand that even the least goal-focused person by nature, would focus on that target. The question to ask next is whether or not banks reward employees for the ethical treatment of customers, or merely for selling enough High 5 Notes.
Depending on whether expectations of one, the other, or both are built into the reward systems, individual behaviours would greatly differ.
My point is that the fault lies not with individuals, but with management processes that encourage the wrong behaviour. As long as these reward processes remain, the same pitiful stories will be heard again and again. Hence, one way of ensuring that retirement funds are not jeopardised every time a recession hits is to redesign the banks' motivation levers so that individuals working within the system are motivated to do the right thing.
As employees, each relationship manager's actions and behaviour is shaped by organisational expectations. They may be at fault, but not entirely. The larger fault lies with the organisation for design flaws in their reward systems. Relationship managers are merely scapegoats whose motives are simple - draw my salary, meet my targets and get myself promoted. There is nothing wrong with that. We all do that.
What is more important is to examine the motives of the bank. Did these motives include ethics? While it is difficult to assess the motives of individuals because their minds are not open to scrutiny, the motives of organisations are relatively easier to evaluate. One need only examine the reward systems put in place to coordinate the direction, intensity and persistence of employees. If an audit of the banks' reward systems reveal only monetary targets and no ethical targets, then the motives of the bank are clear. Profit to the exclusion of morals. Madam Kay Ren Tse
 

makapaaa

Alfrescian (Inf)
Asset
<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR>Financial engineering: 'Singapore banks should bite the bullet and admit they made a bad mistake.'
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<!-- START OF : div id="storytext"--><!-- more than 4 paragraphs -->THE recent nightmare over "structured financial products" (SFPs) triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers is as if a bomb had landed on investors' Nirvana.
Are SFPs attractive options for financial investment or are they just an innovative marketing ploy for banks to generate huge margins from unsuspecting investors?
Manufacturing these complex, billion-dollar "paper products" has become a new discipline from Wall Street called financial engineering. Ingenious engineers from schools of finance and creative commercial lawyers conceived a labyrinth of financial instruments that were as complicated as astro-physics.
But SFPs are full of pitfalls for the unwary. Should banks promote them to the general public as if they were enhanced fixed-deposits with higher interest over longer periods? To ordinary uncles and aunties, the enthusiasm of relationship managers reveals no doubts.
Would the situation change if banks sell SFPs with a simple warning in bold print in its brochures: "Bankruptcy in any related links may cause total loss of your money and this bank is not responsible"? I bet it will, because it is clearly caveat emptor (buyer beware).
The fundamental principle is whether Singapore banks should sell such products to the unwary in the first place. There has been no recent memory of Singapore retail banks going bust, so why would anyone worry about losing their money when buying Singapore bank products?
Now that SFPs have encountered a "credit event" in America, the truth of the "shrouded risk of such engineering products" has been revealed. Is it helpful to beat a dead horse and blame the buyers and relationship managers?
Singapore banks should bite the bullet and admit they made a bad mistake and pay back retired folks and non-investment savvy workers in full, and at least 40 to 50 per cent to the rest to close the episode.
It is simply not good enough to promise to pay investors back at market value because it could be less than 5 per cent - the residual value of the failed SFPs.
Let everybody learn a bitter lesson and move on. Paul Chan
 
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