What went wrong, or, more appropriately, what went right?
Many of the negative forecasts followed a pattern of underestimating the U.S. economy’s resilience, typically because they were based on historical models and precedent – not situational and idiosyncratic context. Consider the following four displays of resilience:
1) Labor market resilience. The widespread assumption was that monetary policy would push labor demand collectively under water. Instead we have seen pockets of weakness, covered by aggregate strength. Significant layoffs happened where hiring had overshot (e.g., tech) but in other sectors (e.g., services) hiring was still catching up and remained strong. Laid-off workers found new jobs. Resilience was found in the unusual economic diversification of recessionary sectors with booming ones.
2) Consumer resilience. Growing layoffs, inflation eating away at household budgets, and falling portfolios weakening balance sheets led to predictions of a collapse in spending. But the context mattered. Balance sheets had buffers, including cash. And while individual budgets were squeezed, the total number of incomes continued to grow rapidly as hiring persisted, providing consumer strength. The aggregate downdraft has not happened.
3) Housing resilience. A common fear has been that rising interest rates would kneecap the housing market — delaying construction activity, pushing down prices, or even, as some doomsayers predicted, causing another housing-centered recession. But these narratives overlooked the fact that activity remains precisely because housing inventory is low. As a result, higher rates have tamped down — rather than choked — housing activity. Housing starts and prices dipped, and transactions fell, but they have stabilized and are rising again.
4) Financial system resilience. Another common fear was that the Fed will hike until something breaks. The idea that the financial system would be the collateral damage of higher rates is not unreasonable as the collapse of SVB demonstrated. But the risk of contagion was overestimated, while the ability of policy-makers to avert it was underestimated.