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Recent news in the media about the sale of a large stake of UBS bank shares to institutional investors by GIC and the unsurprising dearth in detailed reporting on the losses suffered prompted me to attempt to put some numbers on the matter.
Background:
In the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007/2008, many big banks were hit badly and many went under or were merged. These were toxic banking stocks, which were sitting on a mountain on non performing subprime debt. Banks making questionable housing loans packaged these loans into bundles to sell to investors, and used rating agencies to give the debt (bonds) an appearance of being investment grade quality. Many professional and institutional investors were staying away from the banking stocks, including Warren Buffet. For example, Buffet bought Goldman Sachs in 2011 after the blood had run its course on Wall Street for a bargain price and eventually earned over USD$2 billion on his stake’s appreciation.
The mechanics of the Investment
For reasons unknown to the citizens of Singapore, GIC decided to make an emergency capital injection of USD$10 billion investment into UBS, in other words, it became UBS’s knight in shining armour, in March 2008. No business case has ever been revealed as to why a sovereign wealth fund supposedly run by the highest paid civil servants in the world would buy into a toxic banking stock, other then to assume that GIC was gullible and deceived into making the investment. GIC’s investment of USD$10 billion (approximately S$13.9 billion) was converted into Swiss Franc, equivalent to approximately SF$11 billion. The actual investment itself was not in UBS common shares, nor convertible preferred shares (how Buffet bought his Goldman Sachs shares), but instead, it was in mandatory convertible notes with a coupon rate of 9%. In other words, UBS sold GIC its own IOUs. But the worse feature of the notes that GIC bought was the mandatory convertible feature. This feature stipulated that these notes must be converted to UBS common shares in 2 years time. There is no way out of this. The risk that GIC did not foresee was that the UBS common share price will tank in the 2 years that it has to convert the notes. A prudent investor would have known how desperate all banks were to receive cash infusion in the face of looming crisis and should have demanded say a 10 year convertibility clause at its own discretion. In other words, the notes can be converted at any time by the investor into shares within a 10 year window. I am certain that a desperate UBS would have would have agreed to this or any other clause. It was this clause that caused the losses suffered in UBS.
In 2010, at the maturation of the 2 years, the SF$11 billion investment was duly converted into common shares. At the time of the initial investment of SF$11 billion into the UBS notes, it was agreed that these notes would be converted in 230.7 million UBS common shares. This place the initial investment conversion price at SF$47.7 per share. (SF$11 billion divided by 230.7 million shares). But in 2010 when it came time to convert, the UBS shares were only worth SF$15.86 per share, making the total investment worth only SF$3.659 billion, and making the immediate paper loss equal to SF$7.341 billion or an average loss of over USD$3 billion a year. The conversion made GIC the largest investor in UBS at 6.6% ownership. The current stake of 93 million shares being sold is equivalent to 2.4% ownership.
The Calculation:
Price per share at initial investment = SF$47.7 per share.
Selling price per share for 93 million shares = SF$16.6 per share.
Actual loss = SF$2.89 billion
Interest income at 9% coupon rate for 2 years = SF$2 billion X .363636 (pro-rated) = SF$727 million
Forex difference: Investment was made by GIC converting USD into Swiss Franc. Since the initial investment, the Swiff Franc has gone down 10% versus the USD. Since this sale takes place in Swiss Franc and is converted back to USD, GIC also takes a 10% Forex loss on the investment. This is equivalent to another SF$289 million in losses.
Dividend history based on 230.7 million common shares:
2010 – No dividend distributed
2011 – 0.10 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$23.07 million
2012 – 0.15 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$ 34.605 million
2013 – 0.25 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$57.67 million
2014 – 0.5 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$115.35 million
2014- Supplemental dividend 0.25 Francs = SF$57.67 million
2015 – 0.85 Francs X 230.7 = SF$196 million
2016 - 0.6 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$138.42 million
Total dividends earned (approximately before tax) = SF$622.785 million
Total calculations (please note that these are best guess and without access to GIC information) in Swiss Francs
Realized loss $2.89 billion
Forex loss $289 million
Gross losses $3.179 billion
Less:
Interest income $727 million
Dividend income $622.785 million
Net losses $1.829 billion
Remember this is loss suffered only on the sale of this stake. GIC stills owns a substantial remaining stake, under 5% of the company. Finally, remember these famous last words?
Tony Tan said on Jan 29[SUP]th[/SUP] 2011 :
“We look to continue to hold on to our stakes in UBS and Citigroup for many years to come,” Tony Tan, deputy chairman of the Singapore sovereign wealth fund, said in a Jan. 29 interview at Davos, Switzerland, where he attended the World Economic Forum meeting. ‘But one never says never; if someone offers an extremely high price, of course we’ll look at the possibility.”
The only problem is that A) they did not hold it for many years to come B) No one offered them an extremely high price.
[FONT=&]Let’s be clear on one thing, citizens of Singapore. The PAP are not the smartest guys in the room[/FONT]
Background:
In the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007/2008, many big banks were hit badly and many went under or were merged. These were toxic banking stocks, which were sitting on a mountain on non performing subprime debt. Banks making questionable housing loans packaged these loans into bundles to sell to investors, and used rating agencies to give the debt (bonds) an appearance of being investment grade quality. Many professional and institutional investors were staying away from the banking stocks, including Warren Buffet. For example, Buffet bought Goldman Sachs in 2011 after the blood had run its course on Wall Street for a bargain price and eventually earned over USD$2 billion on his stake’s appreciation.
The mechanics of the Investment
For reasons unknown to the citizens of Singapore, GIC decided to make an emergency capital injection of USD$10 billion investment into UBS, in other words, it became UBS’s knight in shining armour, in March 2008. No business case has ever been revealed as to why a sovereign wealth fund supposedly run by the highest paid civil servants in the world would buy into a toxic banking stock, other then to assume that GIC was gullible and deceived into making the investment. GIC’s investment of USD$10 billion (approximately S$13.9 billion) was converted into Swiss Franc, equivalent to approximately SF$11 billion. The actual investment itself was not in UBS common shares, nor convertible preferred shares (how Buffet bought his Goldman Sachs shares), but instead, it was in mandatory convertible notes with a coupon rate of 9%. In other words, UBS sold GIC its own IOUs. But the worse feature of the notes that GIC bought was the mandatory convertible feature. This feature stipulated that these notes must be converted to UBS common shares in 2 years time. There is no way out of this. The risk that GIC did not foresee was that the UBS common share price will tank in the 2 years that it has to convert the notes. A prudent investor would have known how desperate all banks were to receive cash infusion in the face of looming crisis and should have demanded say a 10 year convertibility clause at its own discretion. In other words, the notes can be converted at any time by the investor into shares within a 10 year window. I am certain that a desperate UBS would have would have agreed to this or any other clause. It was this clause that caused the losses suffered in UBS.
In 2010, at the maturation of the 2 years, the SF$11 billion investment was duly converted into common shares. At the time of the initial investment of SF$11 billion into the UBS notes, it was agreed that these notes would be converted in 230.7 million UBS common shares. This place the initial investment conversion price at SF$47.7 per share. (SF$11 billion divided by 230.7 million shares). But in 2010 when it came time to convert, the UBS shares were only worth SF$15.86 per share, making the total investment worth only SF$3.659 billion, and making the immediate paper loss equal to SF$7.341 billion or an average loss of over USD$3 billion a year. The conversion made GIC the largest investor in UBS at 6.6% ownership. The current stake of 93 million shares being sold is equivalent to 2.4% ownership.
The Calculation:
Price per share at initial investment = SF$47.7 per share.
Selling price per share for 93 million shares = SF$16.6 per share.
Actual loss = SF$2.89 billion
Interest income at 9% coupon rate for 2 years = SF$2 billion X .363636 (pro-rated) = SF$727 million
Forex difference: Investment was made by GIC converting USD into Swiss Franc. Since the initial investment, the Swiff Franc has gone down 10% versus the USD. Since this sale takes place in Swiss Franc and is converted back to USD, GIC also takes a 10% Forex loss on the investment. This is equivalent to another SF$289 million in losses.
Dividend history based on 230.7 million common shares:
2010 – No dividend distributed
2011 – 0.10 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$23.07 million
2012 – 0.15 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$ 34.605 million
2013 – 0.25 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$57.67 million
2014 – 0.5 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$115.35 million
2014- Supplemental dividend 0.25 Francs = SF$57.67 million
2015 – 0.85 Francs X 230.7 = SF$196 million
2016 - 0.6 Francs X 230.7 million = SF$138.42 million
Total dividends earned (approximately before tax) = SF$622.785 million
Total calculations (please note that these are best guess and without access to GIC information) in Swiss Francs
Realized loss $2.89 billion
Forex loss $289 million
Gross losses $3.179 billion
Less:
Interest income $727 million
Dividend income $622.785 million
Net losses $1.829 billion
Remember this is loss suffered only on the sale of this stake. GIC stills owns a substantial remaining stake, under 5% of the company. Finally, remember these famous last words?
Tony Tan said on Jan 29[SUP]th[/SUP] 2011 :
“We look to continue to hold on to our stakes in UBS and Citigroup for many years to come,” Tony Tan, deputy chairman of the Singapore sovereign wealth fund, said in a Jan. 29 interview at Davos, Switzerland, where he attended the World Economic Forum meeting. ‘But one never says never; if someone offers an extremely high price, of course we’ll look at the possibility.”
The only problem is that A) they did not hold it for many years to come B) No one offered them an extremely high price.
[FONT=&]Let’s be clear on one thing, citizens of Singapore. The PAP are not the smartest guys in the room[/FONT]
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